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DCAA Director Fitzgerald Testifies Before CWC; Blasts LOGCAP Subcontractor Management

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On July 26, 2010, the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan (CWC) held a hearing entitled “Subcontracting: Who’s Minding the Store” to address concerns about the subcontracting process in Southwest Asia.  As the Commission Co-Chairs noted, “Poorly conceived, poorly structured, poorly conducted, and poorly monitored subcontracting can lead to poor choices in security measures and damage to U.S. foreign-policy objectives, among other problems.”  Accordingly, the Commission explored “whether, especially in a high-risk, contingency environment, the government needs additional controls over, or more visibility into, subcontractor performance and costs to ensure the prime contractor is adequately managing its subcontractors.”

(We have reported on several of the CWC hearings and reports before.  To find those stories, type “CWC” in the search window on the website.)

Before we delve into DCAA’s testimony, we want to note a statement made by the Commission Co-Chairs (Shays and Thibault).  They said that the Commission “will issue a major report with proposals for statutory and administrative changes in December, followed by our final report to Congress in July 2011.”  So we are in our final year of CWC activity.  We look forward (with more than a little trepidation) to reading the Commission’s recommendations for “statutory and administrative changes.”  Now on to the hearing….

The hearing consisted of three panels, logically arranged into (1) Government, (2) Prime Contractors, and (3) Subcontractors.  Looking at the first panel, we were less than impressed with the “motherhood and apple pie” written statements from most of the participants.  DCAA Director Patrick Fitzgerald’s written statement, however, piqued our interest.  Lying amongst his platitudes and smooth-talk were some gems of note.  Let’s look at those, shall we?

Director Fitzgerald told the Commission that DCAA has 34 full-time auditors assigned to audit contingency contractors in Iraq, Kuwait, and Afghanistan.  17 are assigned to the Afghanistan Branch Office (ABO) and 17 are assigned to the Iraqi Branch Office (IBO).  By the end of GFY 2010 (September 30, 2010), DCAA expects to increase its workforce to 40 full-time auditors.

Director Fitzgerald also testified that, “As noted in the Commission’s interim report (June 2009), adequate contractor business systems are the first line of defense against waste, fraud and abuse. In the realm of subcontracting, we find this statement to be profoundly true.”  What did he mean by that statement?

As Director Fitzgerald explained to the Commissioners, “With respect to the three LOGCAP IV performance contractors, DCAA has reported all the estimating systems as inadequate and cited their estimating practices as being deficient for ensuring fair and reasonable subcontract prices.”  In addition, “DCAA has performed contractors’ purchasing system reviews (CPSRs) for the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) Administrative Contracting Officer (ACO) at all of the three LOGCAP IV performance contractors and has found each system to be inadequate.”  Moreover, Director Fitzgerald told the Commission, “During our review of prime contractor billings and incurred cost audits, DCAA has identified situations where the prime contractor has not awarded its fixed-price subcontracts based on fair and reasonable prices leading to unreasonable or unallowable costs being paid by the Government.”

Reasonableness of Subcontractor Costs

It is one of the few unavoidable requirements placed on Government contractors that, prior to making a subcontract award, the prime must first make a written determination that the price it proposes to pay is fair and reasonable. (See FAR 15.404-3(b), which requires a prime contractor (or higher-tier subcontractor) to “conduct appropriate cost or price analyses to establish the reasonableness of proposed subcontract prices.”)  So when Director Fitzgerald says the LOGCAP IV prime contractors are failing in their duty to perform the requisite analyses, that statement gets our attention.

Director Fitzgerald provided some details to support his assertion.  He told the Commission—

In March 2010, DCAA reported estimating system deficiencies at DynCorp related to the inclusion of unsupported subcontract costs … for Corps Logistics and Support Service, Theatre Transportation Mission and Postal Operations in Iraq (commonly referred to as the CTP proposal). During the audit of the CTP proposal, the auditors found the subcontract proposal from DynCorp’s then “team member” subcontractor, Agility, to be inadequate. An examination of the U.S.-based Agility business unit disclosed that approximately 40 percent of the proposed direct costs were unsupported. That is, the subcontractor, Agility, was unable to support the reasonableness of the proposed direct labor costs proposed as part of the CTP proposal. Further, in its proposal to the prime contractor, Agility included lower-tier subcontractors to perform the bulk of the subcontract effort. In fact, Agility proposed to use two foreign-based Agility-affiliated subcontractors (sister business units). … During the review of one affiliate’s proposal, the Iraq Branch found the lower-tier subcontractor had only prepared a rough order magnitude proposal without supporting detailed data. In the case of the other lower-tier subcontractor, the Iraq Branch was initially denied access supposedly on the basis that its prices were commercial prices and exempt from any requirement for the submission of cost or pricing data. As a result, the auditors determined that almost all of the proposed Agility (and its affiliated subcontractor) costs were unsupported. … As a result, the DCAA audit report classified over $800 million of the proposed subcontract costs predominately related to Agility and its affiliates as unsupported. It is important to point out that the prime contractor had not performed adequate subcontract cost or price analyses. The DCAA reported the contractor proposal was not adequate for the basis of negotiating/awarding a fair and reasonable contract price.

But DynCorp wasn’t alone.  As Director Fitzgerald told the Commissioners—

Our audits of KBR proposals have disclosed similar significant unsupported subcontract costs. In May 2010, DCAA issued its report on the LOGCAP III Task Order (TO) 151 extension proposal. We identified over $48 million of unsupported subcontract costs. KBR failed to obtain subcontract proposals and conduct the required price or cost analyses. The contractor’s failure to obtain adequate support from its prospective subcontractors on this sole-source procurement increases the likelihood of subcontract prices being unreasonable in amount. Similarly, earlier this month, we completed an audit of Fluor’s “rebaseline” proposal under LOGCAP IV TO 0002 that incorporated the impact of numerous change orders on the total task order price. The change orders included proposed subcontract costs of approximately $35 million. DCAA reported over 40 percent of the proposed subcontract costs as unsupported because the prime contractor’s proposal lacked sufficient supporting documentation (e.g., cost or price analysis, competitive quotations). The majority of the proposed subcontract costs that we reported as unsupported were from foreign subcontractors of Fluor where, despite the sole source nature of the contracting action, Fluor did not obtain cost or pricing data from the related subcontractors.

DCAA’s procedures did not stop at evaluating the adequacy and reasonableness of proposed pricing.  Indeed, DCAA proposed to disallow the cost of paying already-awarded subcontracts when price reasonableness could not be established.  As Director Fitzgerald stated—

During our review of prime contractor billings and incurred cost audits, DCAA has identified situations where the prime contractor has not awarded its fixed-price subcontracts based on fair and reasonable prices leading to unreasonable or unallowable costs being paid by the Government. For example, DCAA has identified several cases where the prime contractor asserted the subcontract price was based on adequate competition; however, our audit disclosed that adequate competition did not exist. Although the prime contractor is required to pay its fixed price subcontract amount, FAR 52.216-7 and the FAR 31.2 principles state the Government only makes payments of amounts determined to be allowable and reasonable. Therefore, where DCAA has determined that the subcontract price is not fair and reasonable DCAA has attempted to calculate a reasonable amount for reimbursement of the contractor’s billings attributed to subcontractor costs. However, in those cases where the subcontract is sole source, it is often difficult to obtain cost data to ascertain the reasonable costs without access to the subcontractor’s books and records. DCAA access to subcontractor books and records is generally limited and dependent on the flow down by prime contractor to the subcontractor of the appropriate FAR clauses, and in instances of fixed price subcontracts, virtually nonexistent. For example, during DCAA’s reviews of Fluor vouchers submitted for payment under a LOGCAP IV Task Order, the prime contractor was unable to show the prices paid to its subcontractor for DFAC and other services were fair and reasonable in amount. Since DCAA does not have access to the subcontractor’s books and records, we were unable to determine through other processes the reasonableness of the prices being paid to the subcontractor and subsequently passed on to the Government for reimbursement. As a result, the DCAA auditors have suspended much of the subcontractor’s costs from payment on vouchers (invoices) submitted for payment by Fluor. In addition, the contractor has been withholding a portion of the subcontractor billings, so that in total approximately $24.5 million is being withheld from payment until the issue is settled. The FAR audit access clause does not provide for Government access to the subcontractor’s costs records when the subcontract is firm-fixed-price.

To wrap up our review of Director Fitzgerald’s testimony, we want to recap a couple of his concluding remarks.  The following are direct quotes from his written statement.

  • Prime contractors have the responsibility to manage their subcontracts (FAR 42.202(e)(2)) and also have a fiduciary responsibility to monitor subcontractor performance and control costs to ensure the U.S. taxpayer resources are used wisely and appropriately. … we have found that prime contractors have not consistently monitored subcontractor performance and subcontractor billings submitted to the prime contractor for inclusion in the prime contractor’s billings to the Government. Although the FAR requires the management of subcontracts by the prime contractor and higher tier subcontractors, DCAA intends to recommend a review to the Director, Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy, of the feasibility of specific contract clauses that would implement the basic FAR provision on management of subcontracts. For example, prime contractors should have systems or processes in place to review subcontractor billing processes to ensure subcontract billings are in accordance with subcontract terms and conditions.
  • Based on our audit results we question whether there was adequate/true competition considering the limitations that the contractors have in a contingency environment. In Iraq and Afghanistan, U.S. and coalition military organizations most likely have consumed almost all of the capacity of most or all subcontractors capable of performing in-theater. Therefore, at best, competition within the area of a contingency is limited because the Government-required goods and services generally exceeded vendor capacities (that is, the Government is the sole or major purchaser of goods and services from all vendors) and all vendors are provided a portion of the requirements in order to satisfy the Government’s needs. In such circumstance, we do not believe competition and/or market forces provide better prices to the Government and believe cost data should be provided to determine fair and reasonable subcontract prices.
  • DCAA has taken exceptions to several subcontract pricing actions where the prime contractor asserted a fair and reasonable subcontract price based on “adequate competition” where in fact only one bid was received by the prime contractor. DCAA is concerned about the risks created by current regulations permitting awards to subcontractors using competitive pricing procedures when only one bid is actually received. Again, in these cases, we believe it would be beneficial for the prime contractor and contracting officer to have access to subcontractor cost data to determine fair and reasonable contract prices. The Adequate Pricing Subcommittee under Mr. Assad’s Panel on Contracting Integrity is taking a look into this area. They are ascertaining the need to revise this “loophole” in the regulation that we believe leads to subcontract prices being awarded at unreasonable prices. I will continue to work this issue as the Chair of this Subcommittee.

We Take Issue with Some of Director Fitzgerald’s Statements

This is much to think about in the written testimony of Director Fitzgerald.  We completely agree with him that adequate price or cost analysis must be performed by contractors, in order to determine price reasonableness, prior to awarding subcontracts valued in excess of certain dollar thresholds.  But we also note that, far too often, government acquisition schedules fail to allow contractors sufficient time to perform the required analyses.  As a result, contractors often sacrifice some of the administrative requirements.  We’re not saying they’re correct in doing so, but critics need to look at the driver(s) of improper activities—and one of those drivers is the government’s rushed RFP turn-around times.

We also take issue with Director Fitzgerald’s statements that DCAA “has performed” CPSRs for the DCMA and, as a result of its audit procedures, “has found each system to be inadequate.”  First of all, DCAA auditors don’t perform CPSRs.  At most, they perform some procedures to assist the DCMA functional specialists with the purchasing system review, under the auspices of the cognizant contract administration office.  Don’t believe us?  Check out the DCAA Contract Audit Manual (CAM) at 5-603. 

Even when DCAA independently reviews a contractor’s purchasing system—and it can only do so when the cognizant Administrative Contracting Officer approves the audit activity—the auditors are not performing a CPSR.  As the CAM states, “Where the ACO agrees with DCAA concerns, the auditor should perform a purchasing system internal control audit (not CPSR) ….”  We will not recite the control objectives and control activities DCAA believes constitute an adequate set of purchasing internal controls.  Suffice to say that they are not dissimilar from other DCAA internal control matrices, and are actually worth reviewing when establishing a purchasing system.

But the fact remains that DCAA lacks regulatory authority to determine that any contractor’s purchasing system is inadequate.  That authority is vested in the cognizant ACO.  (See FAR 44.305-1: “The cognizant ACO is responsible for granting, withholding, or withdrawing approval of a contractor’s purchasing system.”)

We are also concerned with Director Fitzgerald’s unsupported assertion that the current FAR Part 15.403-1 definition of “adequate competition” somehow creates a “loophole” that permits contractors to award contracts at other than fair and reasonable prices.  There was no evidence provided to support that assertion.  Moreover, based on Director Fitzgerald’s own testimony, the root cause was not a lack of competition, but instead failure to perform adequate price or cost analysis.

Look, we don’t know all the facts and circumstances.  All we have is the testimony proffered to the Commission.  But we get very concerned when we hear somebody say that Contractors followed the regulatory requirements to the letter, but somehow that the results were found to be improper by the audit agency.  If the so-called “loophole” is to be closed by new statutory or revised regulatory language, then we need to see some solid evidence that such a change is necessary.  And we need to be convinced that doing so will fix the alleged problem.  Failing that, we suggest DCAA get back to auditing and let the DCMA functional specialists handle this area.

Conclusion

One has only to search this site for the phrase “supply chain management” to see the importance we place on the topic.  Proper management of subcontractors is absolutely crucial to assuring adequate program execution.  Part of that task is to put subcontractors under contract—to identify sources, to evaluate bids, and to negotiate (and document) why the resulting subcontract prices are fair and reasonable.  In fact, in November 2008, we told a small gathering at the local NCMA Chapter that, “Acquisition professionals must own all pre-award activities … Don’t be afraid of cost analysis.  Dig deep into supplier bids.  Take whatever time is necessary to gain the proper understanding.”  So when DCAA tells the CWC that this is an area that needs to be addressed, we have to agree.

Clearly, subcontractor management—ranging from pre-award activities to post-award performance management—is a topic of increasing interest to DOD and other oversight officials.  Look for recommended changes and increased emphasis on this area from DCMA, DCAA, and others.  If you believe your procedures can be enhanced, then by all means we urge you to get started right away.  But we can’t help noting that, if you’ve been reading this site, you would have been sensitized to this issue long ago.

 

Former State Department Employee, IRMO Advisor, Charged with Wire Fraud and “Conversion”

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Conversion—“An authorized assumption and exercise of the right of ownership over goods … belonging to another …  Any unauthorized act which deprives an owner of his property permanently or for an indefinite time.  Unauthorized and wrongful exercise of dominion and control over another’s personal property …  See also Embezzlement, … Fraudulent Conversion …”

-- Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th Edition

On July 22, 2010, the Department of Justice announced that Robert Hearn, of Temple, Texas, had been arrested and indicted for wire fraud and conversion, stemming from an alleged “orchestration” of the transfer of “approximately 60 accommodations caravans and other equipment from the site of a U.S.-funded power plant project in Khor Az Zubair, Iraq, to the port” of Umm Qasr, in Basra, Iraq.  Mr. Hearn was employed by the State Department an assigned to the Iraq Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO) from April 2005 through September 2006, where he “was responsible for providing advice to the director of the port,” who was “an official with the Iraqi Ministry of Transportation.”

The indictment alleges that Mr. Hearn, who was allegedly reassigned for “failure” to properly advise the port director, carried out a number of unauthorized acts while assigned to port Umm Qasr.  Among the allegedly unauthorized acts were the following—

  • (Allegedly) in December 2005, Mr. Hearn accepted the transfer of the 60 “accomodations caravans” to IRMO, even though he lacked the authority to do so and “U.S. officials notified Hearn that IRMO did not have the necessary property-management structure and therefore could not take control of the equipment.”  Subsequently, Mr. Hearn (allegedly) “directed an Iraqi employee of the Ministry of Transportation to sign for and accept the equipment on behalf of the Iraqi government.”
  • (Allegedly) the individual who signed for the equipment also was employed by Bawabet Al Amer Company (BAC), a private Iraqi company operating at the port. BAC provided security, through subcontractors, as well as lodging, office space and dining services for government and private personnel. The indictment alleges that from the summer of 2005 to the fall of 2006, Hearn controlled the day-to-day operations of BAC, and on behalf of BAC and a silent investor, negotiated business contracts, provided input in BAC’s hiring decisions and directed the work of BAC employees.
  • (Allegedly) Hearn signed a three-year lease agreement on Jan. 1, 2006, on behalf of IRMO, permitting BAC to use a portion of the port, which during Hearn’s tenure became known as "Bob’s Camp." Hearn … had no authority to enter into this agreement in his official capacity with IRMO and did not discuss it with his supervisors. A portion of the transferred accommodations caravans was installed by BAC employees in "Bob’s Camp."
  • (Allegedly) on Sept. 14, 2006, the day before Hearn was scheduled to be reassigned to IRMO’s Baghdad office, he … negotiated a rental agreement on behalf of BAC involving several of the transferred accommodations caravans. … Hearn directed that rental payments be wired to a bank account in Conroe, Texas, which he controlled. In this manner, Hearn allegedly received $147,000 from the lessee business, which he used for personal and business expenses.

The DOJ announced notes that, “if convicted, Hearn faces 20 years in prison and a $250,000 fine on each of the four wire fraud counts. If convicted on the conversion charge, he faces a maximum of 10 years in prison and a $250,000 fine.”  For those doing the math, Mr. Hearn is facing 30 years in prison and $1,250,000 in fines.  How come he gets the book thrown at him when others, including Major Sublett, Sergeant Chase, and Captain Mike, get away comparatively scott-free?  Are the notorious bleeding-hears of Foggy Bottom actually tougher on miscreants than the Department of Defense?  One can only wonder ....



 

Why Can’t MDA Manage its Programs?

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Recently we inquired into the program management problems at the Department of Homeland Security.  In the past, we asked similar questions of NASA and DOD.  Now we turn our attention to the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), asking why “DOD’s largest single acquisition program” is having performance problems.  Related to that overarching inquiry are two other questions—(1) why do seven of 14 MDA prime contractors have noncompliant EVM systems, and (2) why do two of 14 MDA programs assessed have such unreliable EVM data that GAO was unable to “identify significant performance drivers or forecast future cost and schedule performance.”

We shall start our investigation with this GAO report, entitled “Missile Defense Program Instability Affects Reliability of Earned Value Management Data.”  In that report, GAO made its annual assessment of progress made by the MDA in developing and fielding the nation’s Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS).  The report supplements a previous GAO assessment.

By way of background, the GAO report states—

MDA’s mission is to develop an integrated and layered BMDS to defend the United States, its deployed forces, allies, and friends. In order to meet this mission, MDA is developing a highly complex system of systems—land-, sea- and space-based sensors, interceptors and battle management. Since its initiation in 2002, MDA has been given a significant amount of flexibility in executing the development and fielding of the BMDS.

Unlike other major defense acquisition programs, the BMDS has been exempted from the requirements of 10 U.S.C. § 2435 (which requires the programs to establish the total scope of work and total cost baselines), because the Secretary of Defense “delayed” entry of BMDS into DOD’s formal acquisition cycle.  The lack of an established baseline prevents GAO from evaluating progress of the program as a whole; instead, it has to look at each BMDS program on an individual basis.  In this report, GAO looked at 14 MDA programs.

The first thing GAO noticed was that two important programs—Ground-Based Missile Defense (GMD and Targets/Countermeasures—couldn’t be assessed.  The two programs couldn’t be assessed because their Earned Value Management (EVM) data “were not sufficiently reliable to analyze” the contracts’ cost and schedule performance.  What’s going on here?

First, the two programs each had baselines that were “no longer representative of the program of record.”  With respect to the GMD program, GAO reported that the contractor (Boeing) had “experienced difficulty” incorporating “numerous changes to the program and [resulting] modifications to the contract.”  GAO reported—

For example, although the GMD program experienced a $1.3 billion dollar restructure in 2007, another major restructure beginning in fiscal year 2008 for over $500 million that was completed in fiscal year 2009, and a third in fiscal year 2010 for over $380 million, the GMD program has not conducted an IBR [integrated baseline review] since December 2006.  DOD’s acquisition policy states that an IBR is to be conducted within 6 months after contract award, exercise of contract options, or major modifications to a contract.  DCMA officials told us that the GMD program had an IBR underway following the restructure that began in fiscal year 2008 and completed in fiscal year 2009, but in May 2009 the program was again redirected and the baseline review was cancelled.  The Director, MDA explained that some of the GMD program’s baseline instability from frequent restructures was related to the changing GMD role in European defense. … The Director told us that these European capability requirements changes drastically affected the GMD program as a significant amount of work had to be restructured.

With respect to the Targets and Countermeasures program, the prime contractor (Lockheed Martin) was “unable to update its baseline because of numerous program changes.”  GAO reported—

In September 2007, when the delivery order for the launch vehicle-2 was approximately 60 percent complete, Lockheed Martin signaled that its baseline was no longer valid by requesting a formal reprogramming of the effort to include an overrun in its baseline for this delivery order. MDA allowed the contractor to perform a schedule rebaseline and remove schedule variances – but did not provide any more budget for the recognized overrun in the performance measurement baseline. As a result, DCMA reported that the performance indicators for this delivery order, needed to estimate a contract cost at completion, were unrealistic. According to the Director, MDA did not believe the contractor had justified that there was a scope change warranting additional budget in the performance measurement baseline. He said he believed doing so would mask problems the contractor was experiencing planning and executing the contract which he identified as the issue as opposed to changes in the contract’s scope. According to the Director, one example of the issues the contractor was experiencing on this delivery order included a failure rate of 64 percent on production qualification components. … In addition … program changes since fiscal year 2008 on one delivery order included over 20 contract changes to the scope of work or corrective actions to quality issues.

GAO noted that seven of the 14 programs it reviewed were managed by contractors whose EVM systems had been assessed by DCMA as being “noncompliant” with the applicable criteria of the ANSI/EIA standard governing earned value management systems.  Despite this situation, GAO used the EVM data to evaluate the other 12 programs.  It noted that “We reviewed the basis for the noncompliance and unassessed ratings and determined that” the EVM data was reliable enough “for our purposes.”  This finding, of course, begs the question of why DCMA evaluators would find the EVM systems to be inadequate while GAO found the EVMS’ outputs to be good enough.  Some in industry have accused DCMA evaluators of being overly picky in their evaluations … but that topic is probably better left to another article.  We’ll leave it with an example of GAO’s comments—

For example, the EVM system of the STSS contractor Northrop Grumman was deemed noncompliant because of two low-level corrective action requests related to issues with other contracts that did not materially affect the performance baseline for the STSS contract we assessed. Also, the C2BMC’s contractor Lockheed Martin Information Systems & Global Services received a rating of noncompliant during 2009 because of a corrective action request that stated that major subcontractor efforts were not specifically identified, assigned, or tracked in the organizational breakdown structure. However, after the noncompliant rating was given, DCMA reversed its decision and decided to close the corrective action without requiring the contractor to change its methods.

Looking at the 12 programs GAO felt it could review, it noted mixed results.  Some programs performed adequately while others experienced cost growth and schedule slips stemming from such issues as “technical complexity,” “quality issues,” “unanticipated design changes,” “late receipt of hardware and production-level drawings,” etc.  For example, with respect to the Command and Control, Battle Management, and Communications (C2BMC) program, GAO reported—

These budgeted cost overruns are driven by increased technical complexity of Spiral 6.4 development, and more support needed than planned to address requests from the warfighter for software modifications. The $4.2 million of unaccomplished work on the agreement is driven by efforts in the Part 5 portion of the agreement, including delays in system level tests, late completion of C2BMC interface control document updates, and unexpected complexity of algorithm development and network design.

GAO also noted that the STSS program (managed by Northrop Grumman) was on schedule, but nearly $73 million overrun against budget.  There were various reasons attributed to the cost growth, including slippage of the launch dates.  GAO asserted that—

If the contractor continues to perform as it did through September 2009, our analysis projects that at completion in September 2010, the work under the contract could cost from $620.9 million to $1.6 billion more than the budgeted cost of $1.6 billion.

Similarly, the development contract for THAAD (Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense, managed by Lockheed Martin) has experienced cumulative cost overruns of $262 million and is also behind schedule.  GAO reported—

The contractor attributes overruns to the missile, launcher, and radar portions of the contract. The missile’s unfavorable cost variance is driven by unexpected costs in electrical subsystems, propulsion, and divert and attitude control systems. Also contributing are issues associated with the optical block, range safety, communications systems, and boost motors. The launcher has experienced cost growth because of inefficiencies that occurred during hardware design, integration difficulties, quality issues leading to delivered hardware nonconformances, and ongoing software costs being higher than planned because of rework of software to correct testing anomalies. These problems resulted in schedule delays and higher labor costs to correct the problems. In addition, cooling and power issues with the radar have contributed to overruns with the prime power unit. Numerous fan motor control system redesigns and retrofits for the cooling system drove costs by the supplier. Inexperience with building a prime power unit and a limited understanding of the true complexity and risks associated with the system led to significant cost growth and delivery delays.

As we have noted with respect to other Executive Agencies, MDA seems to have experienced the standard challenges associated with developing technically challenging weapon and defense systems.  Requirements changes drive design changes, which affect manufacturing schedules.  Managing changes requires staff and other administrative resources, and often requires technical personnel to take time away from their program “day jobs” to support the administrative change management processes—meaning the program work doesn’t get accomplished as planned.

This GAO report seems to confirm what we’ve been hearing from industry—that DCMA EVMS functional specialists are nit-picking and looking for reasons to withhold EVM system approvals.  GAO was able to find reliable data to evaluate, despite numerous so-called noncompliances.  We hope DCMA quits treating EVMS like Government Property control systems, and develops a sense of materiality and proportionality in its system reviews.

On the two MDA programs with unreliable program baselines, we look to MDA itself as the culprit.  On one program, numerous program restructurings appeared to have significantly impacted the prime contractor’s ability to maintain baseline control.  On the other program, it was MDA’s decision not to revise the baseline when appropriate to do so, that led to the situation where GAO felt the baseline no longer represented a meaningful point from which to measure performance variances.  In addition, GAO noted numerous program changes that impacted the contractor’s ability to maintain baseline control, of such impact that GAO apparently believed the baseline should have been revised.

Here’s the lesson in all this—at least from our point of view.  If you have a technically challenging, complex development program—especially one where requirements are fuzzy and likely to change over time—then you need to expect significant changes.  You need to plan for the changes, and have a plan to manage them.  You need to anticipate the administrative resources necessary to identify, process, and incorporate changes into both the baseline and the contract.  And you need to anticipate the technical resources involved in that process as well.

Change control is one of the key processes that distinguish contractors in the marketplace.  Contractors that have robust change control processes, and that proactively manage the inevitable changes, do better than those that do not.  Period.

So how is your change control process working out for you?


 

Status of the Defense Industry—Mid-Year 2010 Assessment

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The status and future of the aerospace/defense industry has been a popular topic here at Apogee Consulting, Inc.  Whether it has been a reported DOD funding shortfall, a report from AW&ST forecasting an industry-wide downturn, or a similar report from Forecast International, or another AW&ST forecast of a 10% industry-wide workforce reduction, readers of this site are (naturally) interested in what lies in store for the A&D industry. 

And we’ve not been entirely pessimistic, either.  In one article, we noted that several A&D companies were actually adding to their executive ranks, under the theory that an enhanced focus on program performance and customer relationships would differentiate them from the competition.  In another article, we linked to a report by the Project on Defense Alternatives that postulated a defense spending plateau that would be at least five percent higher than recent history, even after adjusting for inflation.  So even as we report on industry layoffs and corporate restructurings, we also continue to be guardedly optimistic that some sectors of the industry will maintain current business levels, while other sectors may even thrive in the near-term future.

The seeming contradiction between forecasted spending cuts and cautious optimism continues and may well define the rest of 2010 and 2011 as well.  On July 22, 2010, the New York Times published an article entitled “Pentagon Faces Growing Pressures to Trim Budget.”  The article reports—

Mr. Gates is calling for the Pentagon’s budget to keep growing in the long run at 1 percent a year after inflation, plus the costs of the war. It has averaged an inflation-adjusted growth rate of 7 percent a year over the last decade (nearly 12 percent a year without adjusting for inflation), including the costs of the wars. So far, Mr. Obama has asked Congress for an increase in total spending next year of 2.2 percent, to $708 billion — 6.1 percent higher than the peak under the Bush administration.

Mr. Gates is arguing that if the Pentagon budget is allowed to keep growing by 1 percent a year, he can find 2 percent or 3 percent in savings in the department’s bureaucracy to reinvest in the military — and that will be sufficient money to meet national security needs. In one of the paradoxes of Washington budget battles, Mr. Gates, even as he tries to forestall deeper cuts, is trying to kill weapons programs he says the military does not need over the objections of members of Congress who want to protect jobs. …

At the moment, the administration projects that the Pentagon’s base budget and the extra war spending will peak at $708 billion in the coming fiscal year, though analysts say it is likely that the Pentagon will need at least $30 billion more in supplemental war financing then.

Two-thirds of Pentagon spending is on personnel costs. It is possible that the Pentagon will have to look for the first time at cuts to the health benefits provided to active and retired military personnel and their families.

Some analysts said the Pentagon would eventually come under pressure to reduce the size of the armed forces.

Readers of this site may notice something interesting in the quoted sections of the article, above—the bit about personnel costs.  We first brought the personnel cost issue to your attention here, where we reported on an editorial from Dr. Loren Thompson of the Lexington Institute.  We subsequently reported on a GAO comparison between the costs of using private security forces versus costs of the use of State Department security personnel—and we reported that GAO found huge cost increases when government personnel were used, in almost every case it studied.  So keep that fact in mind when you hear about Government “insourcing” and hiring of more Pentagon personnel.

This July 2010 study by Deloitte’s Global Aerospace & Defense practice summed up the state of the A&D industry thusly—

Sales in 2009 were essentially flat with a small 1.3% increase, while earnings were down 15.3% from 2008. If not for the large program related write-offs, asset impairments, or regulatory fines at a few of the largest firms, industry profits would have been essentially flat as well. This financial performance could be viewed as positive when compared to the significant negative economic impact of the global recession. The industry continues to demonstrate its resiliency in the face of uncertain economic conditions.  The global aerospace and defense (A&D) industry as of midyear 2010 is experiencing the same ‘flat’ financial performance that was seen in 2009, although results varied widely by individual companies. For the top 25 global A&D firms that have issued quarterly financial statements thus far in calendar 2010 as a group, sales revenue growth was -1.01%, operating profits were -1.94%, and operating margins were -0.94% …. Holding steady on these key financial performance metrics indicates that the global industry has largely held up to the continued downward pressure on defense spending, managed its way through difficult and large-scale product introductions, and experienced continued slow sales in the commercial aircraft and business jet segments.

With respect to the defense sector in particular, the Deloitte report stated—

Some programs of record may be terminated due to cost and schedule overruns or determinations may be made that certain weapons programs conceived to fight the Cold War are no longer necessary. Conversely, programs that can be developed and fielded quickly to address the type of irregular warfare with insurgents and invisible adversaries are becoming more frequent and may attract funding.

For defense contractors, new areas will generate growth in 2010 and beyond. In particular, the number and variety of large hardware-based platforms is expected to decline and more innovation and capability will be found in software integration. Mission capability will increasingly be created by information technology services firms, which are well poised to create competitive advantage through innovation in battle space simulation, directed energy, precision engagement, threat identification, as well as energy and infrastructure security.

We recommend that readers download this report for themselves, as it contains quite a bit of excellent information.

Similarly, Jim McAleese recently briefed on this topic at NCMA’s World Congress.  We’ll hold a detailed review of Jim’s presentation for a later article, but we want to note some of his points that seem relevant to this topic.  Jim made the following points (which we copy ‘n’ paste unedited)—

  • Secretary Gates did not formally-target large cost savings within RDT&E and Procurement Accounts. To the contrary, those Modernization Accounts were intended to be the beneficiary from cuts to manpower-intensive Headquarters, plus O&M.
  • The majority of the upcoming Service negotiations on 2012-2016 POM will be conducted by DoD Comptroller; CAPE/PA&E; Joint Staff; and USD(Policy). However, USD(AT&L) has unique Statutory authorities over critical “go/no-go” Milestone-Decision-Authority, transitioning large-dollar Weapons Programs from one phase of the Acquisition cycle into the next, (ranging from Technology Development; to critical Engineering Manufacturing Development; and ultimately Production).
  • Specifically, Dr. Carter is statutorily-responsible for making Milestone Decisions on several large-dollar RDT&E Development Programs that are about to be kicked-off by the Military Services. These include Army Ground Combat Vehicle; continued production of hardware under Army’s Brigade Combat Team Modernization; Navy VXX; Navy SSBN(X); USAF Long-Range-Strike; and Airborne ISR/SIGINT Platforms.
  • This initiative will undoubtedly cause concerns over potential reduction in defense contractor Profits. However, as a general rule, for each dollar of actual labor, hardware contractors often have another 80%-100% Overhead, plus another 25%-33% of Corporate G&A, before Profit is even negotiated. This explains why Dr. Carter is so focused on attacking both exquisite Requirements by the Services, in parallel with pockets of low-value Contractor Overhead/G&A. Ultimately, Contractor Profits pale by comparison, against both excessive Service Requirements, and duplicative Contractor Overhead.
  • This means that the future ‘Discriminator’ in valuing defense contractors, will become those contractors who outperform negotiated Schedule and target Costs, to actually produce larger quantities of affordable platforms, at greater overall Profit.

We note that Jim’s conclusion—that those contactors who “outperform … Schedule and target Costs, to … produce larger quantities of affordable platforms”—will not only have a competitive advantage in the A&D marketplace, but will also enjoy “greater overall Profit,” is pretty much exactly what we’ve been posting here for nearly two years.  Let’s repeat together:  program performance equals profits.

Continuing our theme of the dichotomy between budget cuts and opportunities to grow and thrive, we offer this Reuters story (compliments of Defense Industry Daily).  It points out that U.S. defense budgets may be flattening with respect to domestic sales, but that U.S. defense export sales may well surge in the near future, according to Vice Admiral Jeffrey Wieringa, head of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA).  The article states that Vice Admiral Wieringa said in an interview with the news agency that, “U.S. arms sales will be little changed in fiscal 2010 but could surge by nearly one-third to $50 billion next year.”  The article quotes Wieringa as saying, “A lot of countries have built up cash reserves and they intend to continue buying.”  (We think those countries primarily are located in the Middle East, and the article also mentions India and Brazil.)

To address the expected growth in arms exports, the article notes that DSCA has been growing.  According to the article, “Wieringa has worked hard to expand training and staffing for U.S. military and civilian workers involved in global arms sales, boosting his agency's budget from $373 million in fiscal 2007 to an estimated $850 million in the fiscal 2012 budget being drafted now.”  That growth rate is commensurate with the growth rate experienced by U.S. defense exporters … but we can’t help wondering what Secretary Gates thinks of those numbers, when he has recently told the Defense Department to get rid of its bureaucracy.  But perhaps that’s an uncharitable thought, since U.S. A&D companies may well be relying on DSCA to champion their arms exports, and thus keep their top lines healthy and workforces intact.

To summarize, we have tried to present in this article different vectors of analysis on the health of the A&D industry.  While times may appear to be tough—and, indeed, we expect vigorous attempts to shed non-value-added overhead functions (and associated headcount)—the picture is not entirely gloomy.  Certain sectors will continue to grow, and those companies that perform well in those sectors should survive and even thrive.


 

Government Contract Math: False Timesheets Equal False Statement Equals Prison Time Plus Fine

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For some of us, Algebra was our Waterloo.  Others had trouble with Geometry.  Still others made it to Trigonometry, Statistics, Calculus, and/or other college and graduate-level courses.  The point is, almost everybody struggles with math at some point in their lives.  Most of us get just so far, but no further.  At point, we hit the math wall and we give up.

For Donna Mitchell, her moment of surrender came at age 69, when she encountered Government Contract Math.  Her sad story can be found here.

Ms. Mitchell was employed by Dragon Development Company, a government contractor.  Dragon Development was acquired by CACI, International, Inc.—another government contractor—in November, 2007.  At the time of acquisition, Dragon Development was a subcontractor to the Titan Corporation, who had a prime contract with the National Security Agency (NSA) for “document delivery services.”

From the period January, 2006 through December 28, 2007 (a full two years), Ms. Mitchell—

--submitted timesheets to Dragon and CACI falsely claiming that she had worked 752 hours more than she had actually worked on the Services Contract. Mitchell represented in some of the timesheets that on 24 days she worked an average of eight hours, when in fact, she did not work at all on those days.

So over a two-year period, Ms. Mitchell over-reported her time by about 20 percent (752 / 4,360 = 17.25%, to be exact).

Dragon/CACI invoiced Titan for Ms. Mitchell’s inflated labor costs.  In turn, Titan invoiced NSA.  NSA paid the contractors “approximately $81,859” for the unworked hours. 

On July 21, 2010, Ms. Mitchell pleaded guilty to “making false statements arising from the number of hours she claimed she worked.”  According to the DoJ press release (link above), “Mitchell faces a maximum sentence of five years in prison and a $250,000 fine.”

We call that learning math the hard way.

Post-script—

In August, 2009, we posted a point of view regarding the necessary due diligence to be performed during a merger/acquisition between two government contractors.  At that time, we said—

When contemplating the acquisition of any business that sells goods and/or services to the Federal government, it is important to evaluate the probability of contingent liabilities, and factor them into the deal. Government contracts, by their very nature, have long tails. … Thus, after an acquisition an allegation of wrongdoing can surface that relates to actions that took place literally years before. Records can be missing, personnel may have departed, but the acquiring company still has to deal with the issue(s). It is critical to structure the deal so as to protect the acquiring entity from such contingent liabilities.  Typically this is done either through purchase price adjustment, establishment of an escrow fund, or both.



During the due diligence phase of the acquisition, it is critical to evaluate existing internal and operational controls, administrative attention to detail, and to try to assess the probability that a contingent liability will surface after acquisition. …

We see no reason to change our point of view on this topic.  We don’t know the depth and/or rigor of CACI’s due diligence efforts during its acquisition of Dragon Development.  We don’t know whether CACI was held liable in a separate proceeding, or if the company was able to negotiate its way out of trouble.  But we do know that if Ms. Mitchell’s “math difficulty” had been identified as a potential contingent liability prior to the acquisition, CACI could have taken steps to protect itself.


 


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Newsflash

Effective January 1, 2019, Nick Sanders has been named as Editor of two reference books published by LexisNexis. The first book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Cost Accounting Standards. Nick replaces Darrell Oyer, who has edited those books for many years.