• Increase font size
  • Default font size
  • Decrease font size
Apogee Consulting Inc

Departing Air Force General Calls for Fundamental Changes to DOD Acquisition Processes on His Way Out

E-mail Print PDF


We’re sure it’s merely coincidence, but on his last day of active duty with the USAF, Lt. General Dave Deptula spoke his mind about the need for fundamental changes to the DOD’s acquisition processes.  This article from the Online Defense and Acquisition Journal blog (“DoD Buzz”) reports on General Deptula’s last official press conference as an Air Force officer, in which he talked about his “personal views” on the need to get new weapon systems developed, tested, and fielded faster.  According to the article—

During a recent meeting with his staff during a meeting to discuss Remotely Piloted Vehicle capabilities, Deptula asked them when a program might make it to Initial Operational Capability if they started work on right away, they told him it would take until 2020 ….


What’s the problem?  According to the General Deptula—

The current Air Force acquisition system was born of the industrial age of warfare, not the current age. Instead of relying on that system, Deptula pointed to the Liberty program and the Big Safari office as examples the service ‘should adopt as the norm rather than the exception.’ Big Safari is an independent office that has helped develop Air Force RPVs since the early 1960s.


The DoD Buzz article reports that General Deptula was even more pointed in his criticism of DOD acquisition processes.

Deptula pointed to one of the most complex and disliked parts of the acquisition process — the Joint Capabilities Integration Development System (JCIDS) — and gently ridiculed it, noting that ‘Al Qaeda doesn’t have a JCIDS process.’


What is JCIDS?  According to the DOD, the JCIDS process—

… was created to support the statutory responsibility of the JROC to validate joint warfighting requirements. JCIDS is also a key supporting process for DOD acquisition and Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) processes. The primary objective of the JCIDS process is to ensure the capabilities required by the joint warfighter are identified with their associated operational performance criteria in order to successfully execute the missions assigned. This is done through an open process that provides the JROC the information they need to make decisions on required capabilities. The JCIDS process supports the acquisition process by identifying and assessing capability needs and associated performance criteria to be used as a basis for acquiring the right capabilities, including the right systems. These capability needs then serve as the basis for the development and production of systems to fill those needs. Additionally, it provides the PPBE process with affordability advice by assessing the development and production lifecycle cost.


Did you get all that?  If not, here’s a link to the office JCIDS Manual.  And here’s a link to a Wikipedia article that uses more understandable terminology. 

General Deptula is not the first military leader to call for reform to an overly complex and lengthy process.  In May 2010, National Defense magazine carried an article entitled, “Without Radical Change, Many More Defense Programs Will End Up Like JSF,” written by Sandra Erwin.  Ms. Erwin explored “how to stop more programs from ending up like JSF,” with its “soaring costs and schedule slips.” 

We’ve written about the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program before, notably here and here.  But Ms. Erwin was not writing about the F-35; she was writing about the “fatal flaw” in the Defense acquisition system that needs to be fixed.  As she wrote—

The Defense Department and Congress this past year unleashed an avalanche of new reforms … But all these attempts at overhauling a broken system continue to conveniently ignore a fatal flaw in the weapons acquisition process: It is hopelessly slow and unresponsive to the military’s rapidly changing needs.

Because it takes years or even decades to bring a weapon system to fruition, it gets redesigned so much that invariably it results in sticker shock.  Every change, no matter how small, runs up a huge tab.  When a program spans 10 to 12 years, and hundreds of modifications are made … it is no surprise that costs spin out of control.

It is no surprise we agree with Ms. Erwin’s thoughts, and have written as much (for example, this article exploring why DOD’s Missile Defense Agency can’t manage its programs.)  But the problem isn’t necessary change control; the problem is the process that embeds a nearly unmanageable volume of changes into its very fabric.  The problem is a DOD JCIDS process that “deliberately emphasizes analysis and risk avoidance at the expense of speed”—to quote Colonel Timothy Chyma (as Ms. Erwin did).  Ms. Erwin also quotes an anonymous “senior Air Force official” as saying, “We’ll be dealing with the same issues as long as we have the same JCIDS process.”

We are in the midst of seeing enormous amounts of energy poured into addressing “efficiency” and “affordability” initiatives by the Pentagon and its contractor industrial base.  (See one of our many articles on that topic here.)  We urge the Pentagon to take a long, hard look at its JCIDS process—because if that process is significantly reformed, then it will increase both Pentagon decision-making efficiency and weapon system affordability. 

Two birds with one stone.  We like that kind of approach.


 

TANKER UPDATE: Russians Submit Late Bid and a Protest

E-mail Print PDF


When last we wrote about the problem-plagued USAF next-generation aerial refueling tanker acquisition, we told you that Ukrainian aircraft manufacturer Antonov would be submitting a bid in partnership with U.S. Aerospace.  Most observers thought little of the “dark-horse” team’s prospects.  Nonetheless, the Antonov/U.S. Aerospace team submitted a bid … and it arrived five minutes too late.  As this article reported—

According to an industry executive, a messenger carrying a bid from U.S. Aerospace arrived at the Wright-Patterson gate at about 1:30 p.m., 30 minutes before the deadline. ‘Air Force personnel intentionally denied the messenger entry to the base’ and later provided ‘incorrect directions,’ and forced the messenger to wait when he got turned around. The proposal was marked 2:05 p.m., but this executive says that the bid was under Air Force control prior to that time

Both EADS and Boeing submitted their competing bids on time.  Interestingly, the article noted that each of the other bidders’ proposals were “more than 8,000 pages in length.”

Because the Antonov bid was late, it was rejected by the US Air Force.  The article quotes the Pentagon’s press secretary as saying, ““The proposal was late and by law we are not allowed to consider it.  We are considering two proposals and U.S. Aerospace is not one of those being considered.”  Moreover, the spokesperson said—

Those deadlines count.  They mean something. They are there for a reason and any professional contractor knows that. This is a $30-40 billion bid.  This is not a high school homework assignment. Deadlines count here.

The Antonov/U.S. Aerospace team promptly filed a protest on August 2, 2010, with the Government Accountability Office (GAO).   They claimed the Air Force’s actions were unreasonable and that personnel at Wright Patterson AFB discriminated against their bid.  Do they have a case?  Let’s look.

FAR 15.208 has this to say about the treatment of late proposals –

(a) Offerors are responsible for submitting proposals, and any revisions, and modifications, so as to reach the Government office designated in the solicitation by the time specified in the solicitation. …

(b)(1) Any proposal, modification, or revision, that is received at the designated Government office after the exact time specified for receipt of proposals is ‘late’ and will not be considered unless it is received before award is made, the contracting officer determines that accepting the late proposal would not unduly delay the acquisition; and—

(i) If it was transmitted through an electronic commerce method authorized by the solicitation, it was received at the initial point of entry to the Government infrastructure not later than 5:00 p.m. one working day prior to the date specified for receipt of proposals; or

(ii) There is acceptable evidence to establish that it was received at the Government installation designated for receipt of proposals and was under the Government’s control prior to the time set for receipt of proposals; or

(iii) It was the only proposal received.

(2) However, a late modification of an otherwise successful proposal, that makes its terms more favorable to the Government, will be considered at any time it is received and may be accepted.

(c) Acceptable evidence to establish the time of receipt at the Government installation includes the time/date stamp of that installation on the proposal wrapper, other documentary evidence of receipt maintained by the installation, or oral testimony or statements of Government personnel.

So, to prevail in its protest the Antonov/U.S. Aerospace team must prove that its proposal was received “at the Government installation designated for receipt of proposals and was under the Government’s control” before the due date of 2:00 PM.  Otherwise, its protest likely will not be sustained.

But regardless of the protest outcome, it strikes us as disadvantageous to the Government to ignore a proposal received a mere 5 minutes after the deadline.  Certainly, nobody has hinted that there was some competitive advantage that accrued to the late bid in that five minute period.  Given the troubled history of this procurement, we would expect some flexibility to be shown where the other bidders would not be prejudiced and the taxpayers might get their tankers for less money.

On the other hand, such tardiness does reek of amateur hour, doesn’t it?  How does the Antonov/U.S. Aerospace team expect to build 100 aerial tankers on time and on budget, when it can’t even get its proposal to the USAF evaluators on time?



 

“Affordability” and “Efficiency” Become New DOD Mantras

E-mail Print PDF


We’ve been following the Pentagon’s recent obsession with moving “tail to tooth” by reducing its overhead expenditures—and that of its contractors—by $100 billion in order to prepare for the new fiscal realities.  In fact, we’ve been rather critical of the effort so far, calling it “exactly the opposite” of what Secretary Gates called for, in that the early activity seemed to consist of adding bureaucracy rather than cutting it.  We may have been a bit overhasty in our initial assessment.

In our defense, very few of the news stories on these topics are getting it right either.  It this all about affordability or efficiency?  Is it about the Pentagon, or its contractors?  It turns out it’s about both.

What we are seeing now is a bifurcation:  it looks like two separate initiatives are being pursued by the DOD.  One effort is focused on delivering Secretary Gates’ call for “efficiency” within the Defense Department, while the other effort is focused on implementing the call for contractor “affordability” (as championed by Deputy SECDEF Lynn and Undersecretary (AT&L) Dr. Ash Carter). 

According to this story at DefenseNews.com, on July 29, 2010, Defense Secretary Gates planned to meet “with more than a dozen U.S. defense industry executives to discuss his efficiencies effort.  Gates will be joined … by Deputy Defense Secretary William Lynn and Pentagon acquisition executive Ashton Carter … to hear their suggestions, thoughts and concerns about the Pentagon's efforts to find efficiencies and get a better deal when it buys weapons, services and other items from industry.”

Let’s review the status each of the efforts.

Affordability

The July 26, 2010 edition of Aviation Week & Space Technology magazine carried a story about Dr. Carter’s meeting with various industry executives at the Farnborough air show, in order “to emphasize the need to improve affordability and productivity in weapon system development and procurement” and “to solicit input” into his initiative. But the executives (who insisted on anonymity) were somewhat less than supportive.  AW&ST reported that “one executive says that because companies already answer to shareholders, they are often leaner than the government.”  (We agree, and we pointed that out in our prior articles on this topic.)

Regardless, Dr. Carter intends to move forward to find savings in the defense industrial base.  He wrote an article for FederalTimes.com here, in which he stated—

To sustain our force structure, modernize and develop future combat capabilities, we must make every taxpayer dollar count. This initiative is a first step toward restoring affordability to defense spending.

Those who hesitate to embrace the need for change should consider the alternative: broken and canceled programs, unpredictability and uncertainty for industry, erosion of taxpayer confidence and, above all, lost capability for our war fighters.

The savings we seek will not be found overnight. It has taken years for excessive costs to creep into our business practices, and it will take years to root them out. But it is crucial that we begin this process now. …the earlier we embark on this initiative, the easier it will be to succeed.

Efficiency

The Wall Street Journal blog reported that the Defense Business Board prepared a series of recommendations for SECDEF Gates’ consideration.  Although the recommendations are not yet finalized, the blog stated—

In a presentation issued today at the Pentagon, the Defense Business Board, an independent federal advisory body that includes business executives and corporate strategy types, offered a few proposals for getting smarter about spending. The board’s observations would be familiar to any corporate efficiency expert: The Department of Defense often suffers from bloated staffs, redundant layers of management and inadequate spending controls. …

This report offers a number of concrete measures, including a hiring freeze within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and an effort to streamline staff within the Pentagon’s geographic commands. It also encourages the department to get a grip on contractor headcounts, and find out how many contractors actually work for the DoD. And it recommends elimination of Joint Forces Command, a contractor-heavy headquarters organization based in Norfolk, Va.

Similarly, DefenseNews.com reported that the DBB would recommend that the Pentagon’s civilian workforce should be cut by 111,000 heads.  The article stated—

The study group will advise Gates to either shrink the DoD civilian work force to 2003 levels or by 15 percent, whichever is greater. The greater reduction would be a 15 percent cut, which would amount to 111,508 personnel, based on the 743,388 employees DoD had in March, according to the Office of Personnel Management's online database, Fedscope. DoD had 654,287 civilian employees in September 2003.

(We have sourced a copy of the actual Defense Business Board’s “pre-decisional” presentation.  Members will be able to find it in our knowledge resources section very soon.  UPDATE:  The DBB presentation is available under Knowledge Resources as of 08/03/10.)

Notes from the July 27, 2010 meeting between Pentagon officials and industry executives revealed the following points:

  • This initiative is “not a budget exercise.”  The DOD is “not looking to take money from contractors or from existing programs.
  • The DOD is not looking to “enforce improvements in existing programs.”  Instead, reforms will be imposed on “all future programs.”
  • Dr. Carter will be issuing a memo in September that will kick-off sustained follow-up effort.  The memo will not be the end of the process; “it’s just the beginning.”
  • “Mr. Lambert stressed a few times about the unintended consequences of our actions and implement solutions that work without falling into the trap in unintentionally making things worse.“

Notes from a participant, distributed by Lt. General Larry Farrell (USAF, Retired), to members of the National Defense Industrial Association (NDIA), included the following points:

  • Someone made a really good suggestion about cutting the requirements for proposals. I recently saw a proposal that cost a company $4 million and took two pallets to deliver. I can’t imagine that all of that paper was really necessary to make an intelligent procurement decision. By limiting proposals to things that really contribute to lower risk and greater value the B&P costs will be reduced and there will be more money available for competing more, lowering G&A or doing IR&D, not to mention hiring the people who must read and document their assessments of all of that stuff.
  • There have been many discussions about reducing cycle times for decades. Doing this not only saves money, but produces more timely results, and keeps pace with technology. We have an enemy who improvises - this is not the cold war. The ‘Lean Aerospace Initiative’ was an attempt to create metrics that would lower cycle times. Its findings should be re-examined, updated, and extended. Time is money, but it is also lost capability.

While the foregoing activity was happening, another key stakeholder was warning that cutting funding for weapon programs would be a mistake.  This New York Times article reported that “a blue-ribbon board” warned that efforts to cut Pentagon waste “would not free enough money to modernize aging ships and planes and close a ‘growing gap’ between the size of the military and its missions.”  According to the article—

Its 155-page report expressed mild criticism of the Pentagon’s planning process. And it warned that ‘a train wreck’ was coming unless the Pentagon found more money to modernize the Air Force and Navy and gained control of skyrocketing health and benefits costs.

Conclusion

The more we hear about these initiatives, the more we hope they will succeed.  The Pentagon’s bloated bureaucracy needs to be pruned, and there’s absolutely nothing wrong with rewarding contractors that deliver their programs on-time and on-budget—while penalizing those that do not.  Nonetheless, we maintain a detached air of pessimism, informed by decades of watching similar efforts that went nowhere.



 

DOE IG Faults OCRWM Subcontractor Management, Identifies $175 Million Potentially Unallowable Costs

E-mail Print PDF


We frequently discuss subcontractor management on this site.  Whether we are pointing out that prime contractors need to embrace lean principles in their proposal preparation processes, in order to ensure that cost and/or price analyses are being performed, or noting that DCAA has taken the position that unsupported subcontractor prices result in unreasonable (and hence unallowable) costs, we are frequently writing about the importance of this topic.  Often we call it “supply chain management” rather than “subcontractor management” (for example, here), because we think that phrase is a more accurate description of the situation.  And we can’t think of a single factor that influences program execution more than effective management of the multiple tiers of the supply chain.

Today’s rather sad (if not outright pathetic) tale of ineffective subcontractor management comes to us via the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)’s Inspector General, who recently issued a “special report” in which it identified $175 million in “questioned, unresolved and potentially unallowable costs” incurred by the prime contractor (Bechtel SAIC Company, LLC) at the nuclear waste repository site at Yucca Mountain, Nevada.  The site is managed by DOE’s Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (OCRWM).  The Yucca Mountain site was identified decades ago (in 1987) as the repository for the nation’s nuclear waste and hundreds of millions of dollars have been spent to prepare the site to receive the waste and store it safely.  In addition, more millions of dollars of legal fees have also been spent in efforts to prevent the site from opening, and even more millions of dollars have been spent by nuclear power plants and electricity companies in litigating breach of contract claims against the Federal Government because of lengthy delays in opening the site to accept the waste by written commitment dates. 

The fact is that the nation needs to safely store its nuclear waste, and the Federal government promised to take care of the problem long ago.  In the meantime, the waste is stored locally throughout the country, in “temporary” repositories that risk environmental damage as well as the health and safety of the public.  Regardless of the obvious need to solve the problem on a permanent basis, one of President Obama’s earliest official decisions (made in February, 2009, less than a month after taking office) was to stop funding the project and to close down the site. 

Interestingly, in early July, 2010, a three-judge Nuclear Regulatory Commission panel ruled that the Obama Administration lacked the authority to unilaterally close the site, because doing so required an act of Congress.  So the future of the site is up in the air at this time.  But that didn’t save the Bechtel SAIC Company (BSC) from having its management and operating (M&O) contract ended by the DOE in March, 2009, after eight years of effort.  The DOE has announced its intention to shut down all project activities by September 30, 2010.  Part of DOE’s shut-down activities is to negotiate the final contract value of BSC’s M&O contract.  In the words of the DOE Inspector General, OCWM “needs to address” contractor costs that have been questioned in prior audits, as well as “ensure that disallowed costs are settled and funds recouped; required audits of costs incurred are completed; and, that all excess funds are deobligated.”

The DOE IG’s “special report” on the status of BSC’s costs asserts that—

We identified over $175 million in questioned and unresolved costs claimed by BSC during Fiscal Years (FY) 2001 through 2009. Specifically,

  • $19,024,410 in questioned costs that had been identified in audits and reviews and had not been resolved; and,
  • $159,955,538 in subcontract costs that we consider to be unresolved because necessary audits had not been requested or performed.

$18.8 million of “unresolved costs” related to costs questioned by BSC’s own internal audit function.  The majority of this amount related to “unsupported” subcontractor and other supplier costs.  For example, the DOE IG stated that amount included (among other items), “payments to Department of Energy national laboratories, BSC's parent company, and an array of suppliers and vendors.”

The special report noted that some of the unresolved costs were first identified as early as 2002, yet OCRWM has yet to resolve them with BSC, either through negotiation or through unilateral disallowance.  No particular reason is given for OCRWM’s negligence in executing its contractor oversight function.

Moreover, the DOE IG noted that its concern with subcontractor costs should not be a surprise to OCRWM or to DOE leadership.  It reported—

Our concern with contractor/subcontractor incurred costs issues at OCRWM is not new. In a 2005 OIG audit report on Assessment of Changes to the Internal Control Structure and their Impact of the Allowability of Cost claimed by and Reimbursed to Bechtel SAIC Company, LLC (OAS-V-05-03, January 2005), we questioned subcontractor costs totaling $95,552,645 that had not been audited.

As of the current tally, the DOE IG states that there is now $160 million in subcontractor costs awaiting audit.  The DOE IG did address a potential root cause for the lack of subcontractor cost audits.  It reported that—

As we understand it, the OCRWM contracting officer is waiting for the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) to complete three audit reports and for BSC to provide additional information before determining the allowability of the remaining questioned costs. We reported the $82,588,449 as unresolved costs pending audit.

In addition, the DOE IG made sure to note that OCRWM is working the process. It stated that, “OCRWM committed to requesting the appropriate audit for those subcontracts for which it determines an incurred cost audit or close-out audit is required.”  In other words, after eight years, DOE still has trouble identifying BSC’s flexibly priced subcontractors and requesting DCAA audits of them.  And even after they figure out which subcontracts require audit, they still need to wait for DCAA to complete the work and issue the reports.  And we all know how long that will take …  Good luck with that 9/30/2010 final close-down date.

In the words of OCRWM’s management response to the DOE IG audit findings—

For those subcontracts for which OCRWM determines an incurred cost audit or close-out audit is required, then OCRWM will request the appropriate audit.

Estimated date of closure: Contingent upon the Defense Contract Audit Agencies' (DCAA) response time.

Regardless of the foregoing, the DOE IG noted that “The Department [of Energy] has placed closure of the Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management on an expedited fast track.”  Yeah, right.

It strikes us that there are two parties worthy of blame for this debacle.  First, BSC had the responsibility to review invoices it received to ensure that only reasonable and allowable costs were being reimbursed on flexibly priced subcontracts.  It had the responsibility to identify subcontracts requiring audit, and to ensure that the required audits were carried out on a timely basis.  It had the responsibility to identify to OCRWM the subcontracts that required DCAA audit.  It is not clear from the DOE IG report to what extent (if any) they fulfilled their responsibilities in this area of supply chain management.

But it seems to us that OCRWM bears quite a bit of the responsibility here.  It had the responsibility to timely request audits of both BSC and BSC’s subcontractors; it had the responsibility to push DCAA for timely audit reports; and it had the responsibility to disposition timely the audit findings it received.  It appears to us that OCWRM fulfilled none of its oversight responsibilities in this area.

We keep harping on the importance of supplier management.  In addition to ensuring that suppliers perform their work, prime contractors must also ensure that administrative and oversight functions are executed as well.  Those administrative/oversight functions are as integral to contract performance as execution of the statement of work.

Post-Script


On September 23, 2009, then DCAA Director April Stephenson told the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs that existing DCAA funding “provides for only about 65% of the audits that are required to be completed.”   In other words, more than a third of required DCAA audits go unperformed because the audit agency lacks the funding to hire the necessary audit workforce. Although DCAA has since initiated a hiring program, nothing has changed significantly since that time—too many DCAA audits still go unperformed, and those that are performed take three times as long to complete as they used to.

Which leads us to the question, why is DCAA expending its scarce audit resources performing audits for non-DOD agencies? Why does DCAA accept work from DOE when it can’t complete the work it already has on its plate?

Rather than blaming DCAA for untimely audits, in our view DOE ought to “man-up” and take on the audit work internally, either through DOE IG audit resources or through hiring outside auditors. DOE should simply stop relying on DCAA to perform its audits, and DCAA should stop accepting work from outside DOD.


 

Government Contractor Fraud in the News

E-mail Print PDF


We recently posted an article about fraud in the commercial and international marketplaces.  (We could keep on posting similar articles, such as this one, but we won’t.)  Other past articles have focused on corrupt activity by military or civilian government employees.  Our point—which we’ve made before—is that a myopic focus only on government contractors misses the bigger picture.  Fraud and corruption are endemic to the human condition, and they flourish where weak people and their temptations meet lax oversight and/or ineffective controls.  Enhance the control environment and you reduce the opportunity for miscreants to break the rules.

But today we are reporting on yet more government contractors who are in the news because of alleged wrongdoing.  Let’s start first with John Feeney, of Woodbridge, Virginia—who at age 28 has pretty much ruined the rest of his life.  According to the Department of Justice, Mr. Feeney pleaded guilty to one count of mail fraud on July 28, 2010.  Interestingly, Mr. Feeney thought he was defrauding only his employer, BAE Systems Training Services, Inc.  Unfortunately for him, BAE Systems was a government contractor whose expenses were reimbursed by Uncle Sam’s Defense Department—meaning Mr. Feeney was really defrauding the U.S. Government, who frowns on that sort of thing.

According to the DOJ press release, Mr. Feeney was a logistics engineer who “used his position to authorize the purchase of camera lenses and video equipment, intending to keep the equipment for his personal use but to bill BAE for the purchases.”  Mr. Feeney made 15 such “illicit purchases” between August 2005 and June 2006, which cumulatively were worth $476,424.  Let’s repeat that:  Mr. Feeney purchased nearly half a million dollars worth of camera lenses and video equipment in less than a year, and sent the bills to his employer, who was apparently pleased to pay them. 

What did he do with his ill-gotten treasure of photographic goodness?  The DOJ reported that “Feeney subsequently sold many of the purchases on an Internet auction site for profit.”  As we mentioned, Mr. Feeney’s employer had a contract at that time with the DOD, under which “BAE would purchase surveillance equipment and subsequently bill the U.S. government for those purchases.”  In fact, Mr. Feeney’s job was to purchase the equipment for the contract.  BAE Systems billed the DOD for $464,819 of the equipment he fraudulently acquired.  We don’t know how Mr. Feeney was caught, but caught he was.

According to the DOJ, “The mail fraud count carries a maximum penalty of 20 years in prison, a $250,000 fine or twice the gross gain or loss, whichever is greater, as well as three years of supervised release.“  That pretty much takes care of the rest of Mr. Feeney’s career.

Next, we report the settlement of a False Claims Act case against Quantum Dynamics, of Macon, Georgia.  On July 29, 2010, the DOJ announced that it had reached a settlement with the company, who allegedly received contracts from the U.S. Army by fraudulently claiming to be a HUBZone contractor.  As the DOJ noted—

Under the HUBZone program, companies that maintain their principal office in a designated HUBZone and employ 35 percent of their workforce from a HUBZone, among other requirements, can apply to the Small Business Administration (SBA) for certification as a HUBZone small business company. HUBZone companies can then use this certification when bidding on government contracts. In certain cases, government agencies will restrict competition for a contract to HUBZone-certified companies.

Because Quantum Dynamics did not qualify as a HUBZone company, its representations that it was one created a false statement (under the False Statements Act).  Because it billed the Government for the fraudulently obtained contracts, its invoices were considered to be “false claims” that subjected the company to considerable liability.  The reported settlement figure--$750,000—indicates to us that either the prosecutors felt there was some question as to the company’s intent to defraud, or else that the company was short on financial resources and there was little use asking for more.  (Actually it could be both, as the HUBZone rules are complex and difficult to understand.)  The DOJ press release did not report which company would be completing the work started by Quantum Dynamics.

Next, we report that on the same day (July 29, 2010) DOJ announced that it had intervened in a qui tam False Claims Act suit against Oracle Corporation (and its subsidiary Oracle America, Inc.) for allegedly failing to disclose its commercial sales practices to the General Services Administration (GSA)—which then would allegedly lead to the government paying higher prices than it otherwise would have.  The DOJ reported that Oracle billed GSA “hundreds of millions of dollars in sales” under the contract, so we’re not hopeful that Oracle can settle the suit for less than a million dollars, as Quantum Dynamics did. 


What did Oracle (allegedly) do wrong?  According to the DOJ—

Under the contract, GSA used Oracle’s disclosures about its commercial sales practices to negotiate the minimum discounts for government agencies who bought Oracle software. The contract required Oracle to update GSA when commercial discounts improved and extend the same improved discounts to government customers. The suit contends that Oracle misrepresented its true commercial sales practices, ultimately leading to government customers receiving deals far inferior to those Oracle gave commercial customers.

The DOJ noted that the suit was originally filed by Paul Frascella, who was the Senior Director of Contract Services at Oracle, and who might be expected to know Oracle’s sales practices.  The suit, United States ex rel. Frascella v. Oracle Corp. et al., No. 1:07cv:529 (E.D. Va.), may make Mr. Frascella a rich man, since as “relator” he will share in any damages awarded by the Court to the United States.

Finally, we wanted to relate this sad tale of corruption in the executive ranks of a defense contractor.  (Here’s the link, but you need to be a member to access the story.)  This is not so much a story of defrauding the U.S. Government, as it is a story about “sweeping accusations of fraud, insider trading, and company-financed personal extravagance.”  According to the New York Times story, David Brooks (former CEO and Chairman of the Board at DHB, now called Point Blank Solutions) received corporate reimbursement for “more than $6 million in personal expenses”—including luxury cars as well as “university textbooks for his daughter, pornographic videos for his son, plastic surgery for his wife, a burial plot for his mother, prostitutes for his employees, and, for him, a $100,000 American-flag belt buckle encrusted with rubies, sapphires and diamonds.” 

Hey, some of that stuff might be unallowable!

As the article noted, what makes this story interesting is the egregiousness of Mr. Brooks’ behavior and “how gross the abuses are.”  The article stated that—

Mr. Brooks has not disputed that many of his personal expenses were paid for by the company, but his lawyers have maintained that the practice was authorized.  His lawyers also defended the hiring of prostitutes for employees and board members, arguing in court papers that it represented a legitimate business expense ‘if Mr. Brooks thought such services could motivate his employees and make them more productive.’

There’s quite a bit more to the story, including allegations of forged compensation agreements, inventory manipulation, insider trading, and tax evasion.  If convicted, Mr. Brooks may be spending a long time behind bars.  Apparently, Mr. Brooks is aware of his precarious future, as the article reported that—

He may also face additional charges stemming from an episode last week when he was caught for a second time trying to smuggle into jail prescription anti-anxiety pills, which were similar to medication he was already taking at an unusually high dose. The pills had been hidden in pens that a supporter of Mr. Brooks’s had placed near the defendant’s seat in the courtroom.

So as we bring this article to its conclusion, we agree that we have presented litany of dissimilar stories that may not have much of a common theme—other that they all happened at government contractors.  On the other hand, government contractors are supposed to have developed robust internal controls to prevent such acts from occurring.  We hope readers will think carefully about how they might detect or prevent similar incidents at their companies.



 


Page 229 of 279

Newsflash

Effective January 1, 2019, Nick Sanders has been named as Editor of two reference books published by LexisNexis. The first book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Cost Accounting Standards. Nick replaces Darrell Oyer, who has edited those books for many years.