TANKER UPDATE: Russians Submit Late Bid and a Protest
When last we wrote
about the problem-plagued USAF next-generation aerial refueling tanker
acquisition, we told you that Ukrainian aircraft manufacturer Antonov
would be submitting a bid in partnership with U.S. Aerospace. Most
observers thought little of the “dark-horse” team’s prospects.
Nonetheless, the Antonov/U.S. Aerospace team submitted a bid … and it
arrived five minutes too late. As this article reported—
According
to an industry executive, a messenger carrying a bid from U.S.
Aerospace arrived at the Wright-Patterson gate at about 1:30 p.m., 30
minutes before the deadline. ‘Air Force personnel intentionally denied
the messenger entry to the base’ and later provided ‘incorrect
directions,’ and forced the messenger to wait when he got turned around.
The proposal was marked 2:05 p.m., but this executive says that the bid
was under Air Force control prior to that time
Both
EADS and Boeing submitted their competing bids on time. Interestingly,
the article noted that each of the other bidders’ proposals were “more
than 8,000 pages in length.”
Because
the Antonov bid was late, it was rejected by the US Air Force. The
article quotes the Pentagon’s press secretary as saying, ““The proposal
was late and by law we are not allowed to consider it. We are
considering two proposals and U.S. Aerospace is not one of those being
considered.” Moreover, the spokesperson said—
Those
deadlines count. They mean something. They are there for a reason and
any professional contractor knows that. This is a $30-40 billion bid.
This is not a high school homework assignment. Deadlines count here.
The
Antonov/U.S. Aerospace team promptly filed a protest on August 2, 2010,
with the Government Accountability Office (GAO). They claimed the Air
Force’s actions were unreasonable and that personnel at Wright
Patterson AFB discriminated against their bid. Do they have a case?
Let’s look.
FAR 15.208 has this to say about the treatment of late proposals –
(a)
Offerors are responsible for submitting proposals, and any revisions,
and modifications, so as to reach the Government office designated in
the solicitation by the time specified in the solicitation. …
(b)(1)
Any proposal, modification, or revision, that is received at the
designated Government office after the exact time specified for receipt
of proposals is ‘late’ and will not be considered unless it is received
before award is made, the contracting officer determines that accepting
the late proposal would not unduly delay the acquisition; and—
(i)
If it was transmitted through an electronic commerce method authorized
by the solicitation, it was received at the initial point of entry to
the Government infrastructure not later than 5:00 p.m. one working day prior to the date specified for receipt of proposals; or
(ii)
There is acceptable evidence to establish that it was received at the
Government installation designated for receipt of proposals and was
under the Government’s control prior to the time set for receipt of
proposals; or
(iii) It was the only proposal received.
(2)
However, a late modification of an otherwise successful proposal, that
makes its terms more favorable to the Government, will be considered at
any time it is received and may be accepted.
(c)
Acceptable evidence to establish the time of receipt at the Government
installation includes the time/date stamp of that installation on the
proposal wrapper, other documentary evidence of receipt maintained by
the installation, or oral testimony or statements of Government
personnel.
So, to
prevail in its protest the Antonov/U.S. Aerospace team must prove that
its proposal was received “at the Government installation designated for
receipt of proposals and was under the Government’s control” before the
due date of 2:00 PM. Otherwise, its protest likely will not be
sustained.
But
regardless of the protest outcome, it strikes us as disadvantageous to
the Government to ignore a proposal received a mere 5 minutes after the
deadline. Certainly, nobody has hinted that there was some competitive
advantage that accrued to the late bid in that five minute period.
Given the troubled history of this procurement, we would expect some
flexibility to be shown where the other bidders would not be prejudiced
and the taxpayers might get their tankers for less money.
On
the other hand, such tardiness does reek of amateur hour, doesn’t it?
How does the Antonov/U.S. Aerospace team expect to build 100 aerial
tankers on time and on budget, when it can’t even get its proposal to
the USAF evaluators on time?
“Affordability” and “Efficiency” Become New DOD Mantras
We’ve been following the Pentagon’s recent obsession
with moving “tail to tooth” by reducing its overhead expenditures—and
that of its contractors—by $100 billion in order to prepare for the new
fiscal realities. In fact, we’ve been rather critical
of the effort so far, calling it “exactly the opposite” of what
Secretary Gates called for, in that the early activity seemed to consist
of adding bureaucracy rather than cutting it. We may have been a bit
overhasty in our initial assessment.
In
our defense, very few of the news stories on these topics are getting
it right either. It this all about affordability or efficiency? Is it
about the Pentagon, or its contractors? It turns out it’s about both.
What we are seeing now is a bifurcation: it looks like two separate initiatives
are being pursued by the DOD. One effort is focused on delivering
Secretary Gates’ call for “efficiency” within the Defense Department,
while the other effort is focused on implementing the call for
contractor “affordability” (as championed by Deputy SECDEF Lynn and
Undersecretary (AT&L) Dr. Ash Carter).
According to this story
at DefenseNews.com, on July 29, 2010, Defense Secretary Gates planned
to meet “with more than a dozen U.S. defense industry executives to
discuss his efficiencies effort. Gates will be joined … by Deputy
Defense Secretary William Lynn and Pentagon acquisition executive Ashton
Carter … to hear their suggestions, thoughts and concerns about the
Pentagon's efforts to find efficiencies and get a better deal when it
buys weapons, services and other items from industry.”
Let’s review the status each of the efforts.
Affordability
The
July 26, 2010 edition of Aviation Week & Space Technology magazine
carried a story about Dr. Carter’s meeting with various industry
executives at the Farnborough air show, in order “to emphasize the need
to improve affordability and productivity in weapon system development
and procurement” and “to solicit input” into his initiative. But the
executives (who insisted on anonymity) were somewhat less than
supportive. AW&ST reported that “one executive says that because
companies already answer to shareholders, they are often leaner than the
government.” (We agree, and we pointed that out in our prior articles
on this topic.)
Regardless,
Dr. Carter intends to move forward to find savings in the defense
industrial base. He wrote an article for FederalTimes.com here, in which he stated—
To
sustain our force structure, modernize and develop future combat
capabilities, we must make every taxpayer dollar count. This initiative
is a first step toward restoring affordability to defense spending.
Those
who hesitate to embrace the need for change should consider the
alternative: broken and canceled programs, unpredictability and
uncertainty for industry, erosion of taxpayer confidence and, above all,
lost capability for our war fighters.
The
savings we seek will not be found overnight. It has taken years for
excessive costs to creep into our business practices, and it will take
years to root them out. But it is crucial that we begin this process
now. …the earlier we embark on this initiative, the easier it will be to
succeed.
Efficiency
The Wall Street Journal blog reported
that the Defense Business Board prepared a series of recommendations
for SECDEF Gates’ consideration. Although the recommendations are not
yet finalized, the blog stated—
In
a presentation issued today at the Pentagon, the Defense Business
Board, an independent federal advisory body that includes business
executives and corporate strategy types, offered a few proposals for
getting smarter about spending. The board’s observations would be
familiar to any corporate efficiency expert: The Department of Defense
often suffers from bloated staffs, redundant layers of management and
inadequate spending controls. …
This
report offers a number of concrete measures, including a hiring freeze
within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and an effort to
streamline staff within the Pentagon’s geographic commands. It also
encourages the department to get a grip on contractor headcounts, and
find out how many contractors actually work for the DoD. And it
recommends elimination of Joint Forces Command, a contractor-heavy
headquarters organization based in Norfolk, Va.
Similarly, DefenseNews.com reported that the DBB would recommend that the Pentagon’s civilian workforce should be cut by 111,000 heads. The article stated—
The
study group will advise Gates to either shrink the DoD civilian work
force to 2003 levels or by 15 percent, whichever is greater. The greater
reduction would be a 15 percent cut, which would amount to 111,508
personnel, based on the 743,388 employees DoD had in March, according to
the Office of Personnel Management's online database, Fedscope. DoD had
654,287 civilian employees in September 2003.
(We
have sourced a copy of the actual Defense Business Board’s
“pre-decisional” presentation. Members will be able to find it in our
knowledge resources section very soon. UPDATE: The DBB presentation is available under Knowledge Resources as of 08/03/10.)
Notes from the July 27, 2010 meeting between Pentagon officials and industry executives revealed the following points:
- This initiative is “not a budget exercise.” The DOD is “not looking to take money from contractors or from existing programs.
- The
DOD is not looking to “enforce improvements in existing programs.”
Instead, reforms will be imposed on “all future programs.”
- Dr.
Carter will be issuing a memo in September that will kick-off sustained
follow-up effort. The memo will not be the end of the process; “it’s
just the beginning.”
- “Mr.
Lambert stressed a few times about the unintended consequences of our
actions and implement solutions that work without falling into the trap
in unintentionally making things worse.“
Notes
from a participant, distributed by Lt. General Larry Farrell (USAF,
Retired), to members of the National Defense Industrial Association
(NDIA), included the following points:
- Someone made a really good suggestion about cutting the requirements for proposals. I recently saw a proposal that cost a company $4 million and took two pallets to deliver. I can’t imagine that all of that paper was really necessary to make an intelligent procurement decision. By
limiting proposals to things that really contribute to lower risk and
greater value the B&P costs will be reduced and there will be more
money available for competing more, lowering G&A or doing IR&D,
not to mention hiring the people who must read and document their
assessments of all of that stuff.
- There have been many discussions about reducing cycle times for decades. Doing this not only saves money, but produces more timely results, and keeps pace with technology. We have an enemy who improvises - this is not the cold war. The ‘Lean Aerospace Initiative’ was an attempt to create metrics that would lower cycle times. Its findings should be re-examined, updated, and extended. Time is money, but it is also lost capability.
While
the foregoing activity was happening, another key stakeholder was warning
that cutting funding for weapon programs would be a mistake. This New York Times article reported that “a blue-ribbon board” warned that efforts to cut Pentagon waste “would not free
enough money to modernize aging ships and planes and close a ‘growing
gap’ between the size of the military and its missions.” According to
the article—
Its 155-page report
expressed mild criticism of the Pentagon’s planning process. And it
warned that ‘a train wreck’ was coming unless the Pentagon found more
money to modernize the Air Force and Navy and gained control of
skyrocketing health and benefits costs.
Conclusion
The
more we hear about these initiatives, the more we hope they will
succeed. The Pentagon’s bloated bureaucracy needs to be pruned, and
there’s absolutely nothing wrong with rewarding contractors that deliver
their programs on-time and on-budget—while penalizing those that do
not. Nonetheless, we maintain a detached air of pessimism, informed by
decades of watching similar efforts that went nowhere.
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DOE IG Faults OCRWM Subcontractor Management, Identifies $175 Million Potentially Unallowable Costs

We frequently discuss subcontractor management on this site. Whether we are pointing out
that prime contractors need to embrace lean principles in their
proposal preparation processes, in order to ensure that cost and/or
price analyses are being performed, or noting that DCAA has taken the position
that unsupported subcontractor prices result in unreasonable (and hence
unallowable) costs, we are frequently writing about the importance of
this topic. Often we call it “supply chain management” rather than
“subcontractor management” (for example, here),
because we think that phrase is a more accurate description of the
situation. And we can’t think of a single factor that influences
program execution more than effective management of the multiple tiers
of the supply chain.
Today’s
rather sad (if not outright pathetic) tale of ineffective subcontractor
management comes to us via the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)’s
Inspector General, who recently issued a “special report”
in which it identified $175 million in “questioned, unresolved and
potentially unallowable costs” incurred by the prime contractor (Bechtel
SAIC Company, LLC) at the nuclear waste repository site at Yucca
Mountain, Nevada. The site is managed by DOE’s Office of Civilian
Radioactive Waste Management (OCRWM). The Yucca Mountain site was
identified decades ago (in 1987) as the repository for the nation’s
nuclear waste and hundreds of millions of dollars have been spent to
prepare the site to receive the waste and store it safely. In addition,
more millions of dollars of legal fees have also been spent in efforts
to prevent the site from opening, and even more millions of dollars have
been spent by nuclear power plants and electricity companies in
litigating breach of contract claims against the Federal Government
because of lengthy delays in opening the site to accept the waste by
written commitment dates.
The
fact is that the nation needs to safely store its nuclear waste, and
the Federal government promised to take care of the problem long ago.
In the meantime, the waste is stored locally throughout the country, in
“temporary” repositories that risk environmental damage as well as the
health and safety of the public. Regardless of the obvious need to
solve the problem on a permanent basis, one of President Obama’s
earliest official decisions (made in February, 2009, less than a month
after taking office) was to stop funding the project and to close down
the site.
Interestingly, in early July, 2010, a three-judge Nuclear Regulatory Commission panel ruled
that the Obama Administration lacked the authority to unilaterally
close the site, because doing so required an act of Congress. So the
future of the site is up in the air at this time. But that didn’t save
the Bechtel SAIC Company (BSC) from having its management and operating
(M&O) contract ended by the DOE in March, 2009, after eight years of
effort. The DOE has announced its intention to shut down all project
activities by September 30, 2010. Part of DOE’s shut-down activities is
to negotiate the final contract value of BSC’s M&O contract. In
the words of the DOE Inspector General, OCWM “needs to address”
contractor costs that have been questioned in prior audits, as well as
“ensure that disallowed costs are settled and funds recouped; required
audits of costs incurred are completed; and, that all excess funds are
deobligated.”
The DOE IG’s “special report” on the status of BSC’s costs asserts that—
We
identified over $175 million in questioned and unresolved costs claimed
by BSC during Fiscal Years (FY) 2001 through 2009. Specifically,
- $19,024,410 in questioned costs that had been identified in audits and reviews and had not been resolved; and,
- $159,955,538
in subcontract costs that we consider to be unresolved because
necessary audits had not been requested or performed.
$18.8
million of “unresolved costs” related to costs questioned by BSC’s own
internal audit function. The majority of this amount related to
“unsupported” subcontractor and other supplier costs. For example, the
DOE IG stated that amount included (among other items), “payments to
Department of Energy national laboratories, BSC's parent company, and an
array of suppliers and vendors.”
The
special report noted that some of the unresolved costs were first
identified as early as 2002, yet OCRWM has yet to resolve them with BSC,
either through negotiation or through unilateral disallowance. No
particular reason is given for OCRWM’s negligence in executing its
contractor oversight function.
Moreover, the DOE IG noted that its concern with subcontractor costs should not be a surprise to OCRWM or to DOE leadership. It reported—
Our concern with contractor/subcontractor incurred costs issues at OCRWM is not new. In a 2005 OIG audit report on Assessment
of Changes to the Internal Control Structure and their Impact of the
Allowability of Cost claimed by and Reimbursed to Bechtel SAIC Company,
LLC (OAS-V-05-03, January 2005), we questioned subcontractor costs totaling $95,552,645 that had not been audited.
As
of the current tally, the DOE IG states that there is now $160 million
in subcontractor costs awaiting audit. The DOE IG did address a
potential root cause for the lack of subcontractor cost audits. It
reported that—
As
we understand it, the OCRWM contracting officer is waiting for the
Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) to complete three audit reports and
for BSC to provide additional information before determining the
allowability of the remaining questioned costs. We reported the
$82,588,449 as unresolved costs pending audit.
In
addition, the DOE IG made sure to note that OCRWM is working the
process. It stated that, “OCRWM committed to requesting the appropriate
audit for those subcontracts for which it determines an incurred cost
audit or close-out audit is required.” In other words, after eight
years, DOE still has trouble identifying BSC’s flexibly priced
subcontractors and requesting DCAA audits of them. And even after they figure
out which subcontracts require audit, they still need to wait for DCAA
to complete the work and issue the reports. And we all know how long
that will take … Good luck with that 9/30/2010 final close-down date.
In the words of OCRWM’s management response to the DOE IG audit findings—
For
those subcontracts for which OCRWM determines an incurred cost audit or
close-out audit is required, then OCRWM will request the appropriate
audit.
Estimated date of closure: Contingent upon the Defense Contract Audit Agencies' (DCAA) response time.
Regardless
of the foregoing, the DOE IG noted that “The Department [of Energy] has
placed closure of the Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management
on an expedited fast track.” Yeah, right.
It
strikes us that there are two parties worthy of blame for this
debacle. First, BSC had the responsibility to review invoices it
received to ensure that only reasonable and allowable costs were being
reimbursed on flexibly priced subcontracts. It had the responsibility
to identify subcontracts requiring audit, and to ensure that the
required audits were carried out on a timely basis. It had the
responsibility to identify to OCRWM the subcontracts that required DCAA
audit. It is not clear from the DOE IG report to what extent (if any)
they fulfilled their responsibilities in this area of supply chain
management.
But
it seems to us that OCRWM bears quite a bit of the responsibility
here. It had the responsibility to timely request audits of both BSC
and BSC’s subcontractors; it had the responsibility to push DCAA for
timely audit reports; and it had the responsibility to disposition
timely the audit findings it received. It appears to us that OCWRM
fulfilled none of its oversight responsibilities in this area.
We
keep harping on the importance of supplier management. In addition to
ensuring that suppliers perform their work, prime contractors must also
ensure that administrative and oversight functions are executed as
well. Those administrative/oversight functions are as integral to
contract performance as execution of the statement of work.
Post-Script
On
September 23, 2009, then DCAA Director April Stephenson told
the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
that existing DCAA funding “provides
for only about 65% of the audits that are required to be completed.”
In other words, more than a third of required DCAA audits go
unperformed because the audit agency lacks the funding to hire the
necessary audit workforce. Although DCAA has since initiated a
hiring program, nothing has changed significantly since that time—too
many DCAA audits still go unperformed, and those that are performed
take three
times
as long to complete as they used to.
Which
leads us to the question, why is DCAA expending its scarce audit
resources performing audits for non-DOD agencies? Why does DCAA
accept work from DOE when it can’t complete the work it already has
on its plate?
Rather
than blaming DCAA for untimely audits, in our view DOE ought to
“man-up” and take on the audit work internally, either through
DOE IG audit resources or through hiring outside auditors. DOE
should simply stop relying on DCAA to perform its audits, and DCAA
should stop accepting work from outside DOD.
Government Contractor Fraud in the News

We recently posted an article about fraud in the commercial and international marketplaces. (We could keep on posting similar articles, such as this one,
but we won’t.) Other past articles have focused on corrupt activity by
military or civilian government employees. Our point—which we’ve made
before—is that a myopic focus only on government contractors misses the
bigger picture. Fraud and corruption are endemic to the human
condition, and they flourish where weak people and their temptations
meet lax oversight and/or ineffective controls. Enhance the control
environment and you reduce the opportunity for miscreants to break the
rules.
But
today we are reporting on yet more government contractors who are in
the news because of alleged wrongdoing. Let’s start first with John
Feeney, of Woodbridge, Virginia—who at age 28 has pretty much ruined the
rest of his life. According to the Department of Justice, Mr. Feeney pleaded guilty
to one count of mail fraud on July 28, 2010. Interestingly, Mr. Feeney
thought he was defrauding only his employer, BAE Systems Training
Services, Inc. Unfortunately for him, BAE Systems was a government
contractor whose expenses were reimbursed by Uncle Sam’s Defense
Department—meaning Mr. Feeney was really defrauding the U.S. Government,
who frowns on that sort of thing.
According to the DOJ press release, Mr. Feeney was a logistics engineer who “used
his position to authorize the purchase of camera lenses and video
equipment, intending to keep the equipment for his personal use but to
bill BAE for the purchases.” Mr. Feeney made 15 such “illicit
purchases” between August 2005 and June 2006, which cumulatively were
worth $476,424. Let’s repeat that: Mr. Feeney purchased nearly half a
million dollars worth of camera lenses and video equipment in less than a
year, and sent the bills to his employer, who was apparently pleased to
pay them.
What
did he do with his ill-gotten treasure of photographic goodness? The
DOJ reported that “Feeney subsequently sold many of the purchases on
an Internet auction site for profit.” As
we mentioned, Mr. Feeney’s employer had a contract at that time with
the DOD, under which “BAE would purchase surveillance equipment and
subsequently bill the U.S. government for those purchases.” In
fact, Mr. Feeney’s job was to purchase the equipment for the contract.
BAE Systems billed the DOD for $464,819 of the equipment he
fraudulently acquired. We don’t know how Mr. Feeney was caught, but
caught he was.
According to the DOJ, “The mail fraud count carries a maximum penalty of 20 years in prison, a
$250,000 fine or twice the gross gain or loss, whichever is greater, as
well as three years of supervised release.“ That pretty much takes
care of the rest of Mr. Feeney’s career.
Next,
we report the settlement of a False Claims Act case against Quantum
Dynamics, of Macon, Georgia. On July 29, 2010, the DOJ announced
that it had reached a settlement with the company, who allegedly
received contracts from the U.S. Army by fraudulently claiming to be a
HUBZone contractor. As the DOJ noted—
Under
the HUBZone program, companies that maintain their principal office in a
designated HUBZone and employ 35 percent of their workforce from a
HUBZone, among other requirements, can apply to the Small Business
Administration (SBA) for certification as a HUBZone small business
company. HUBZone companies can then use this certification when bidding
on government contracts. In certain cases, government agencies will restrict competition for a contract to HUBZone-certified companies.
Because
Quantum Dynamics did not qualify as a HUBZone company, its
representations that it was one created a false statement (under the
False Statements Act). Because it billed the Government for the
fraudulently obtained contracts, its invoices were considered to be
“false claims” that subjected the company to considerable liability.
The reported settlement figure--$750,000—indicates to us that either the
prosecutors felt there was some question as to the company’s intent to
defraud, or else that the company was short on financial resources and
there was little use asking for more. (Actually it could be both, as
the HUBZone rules are complex and difficult to understand.) The DOJ
press release did not report which company would be completing the work
started by Quantum Dynamics.
Next, we report that on the same day (July 29, 2010) DOJ announced that it had intervened in a qui tam
False Claims Act suit against Oracle Corporation (and its subsidiary
Oracle America, Inc.) for allegedly failing to disclose its commercial
sales practices to the General Services Administration (GSA)—which then
would allegedly lead to the government paying higher prices than it
otherwise would have. The DOJ reported that Oracle billed GSA “hundreds
of millions of dollars in sales” under the contract, so we’re not
hopeful that Oracle can settle the suit for less than a million dollars,
as Quantum Dynamics did.
What did Oracle (allegedly) do wrong? According to the DOJ—
Under
the contract, GSA used Oracle’s disclosures about its commercial sales
practices to negotiate the minimum discounts for government agencies who
bought Oracle software. The contract required Oracle to update GSA when
commercial discounts improved and extend the same improved discounts to
government customers. The suit contends that Oracle misrepresented its
true commercial sales practices, ultimately leading to government
customers receiving deals far inferior to those Oracle gave commercial
customers.
The
DOJ noted that the suit was originally filed by Paul Frascella, who was
the Senior Director of Contract Services at Oracle, and who might be
expected to know Oracle’s sales practices. The suit, United States ex rel. Frascella v. Oracle Corp. et al., No. 1:07cv:529 (E.D.
Va.), may make Mr. Frascella a rich man, since as “relator” he will
share in any damages awarded by the Court to the United States.
Finally, we wanted to relate this sad tale of corruption in the executive ranks of a defense contractor. (Here’s the link,
but you need to be a member to access the story.) This is not so much a
story of defrauding the U.S. Government, as it is a story about
“sweeping accusations of fraud, insider trading, and company-financed
personal extravagance.” According to the New York Times story, David
Brooks (former CEO and Chairman of the Board at DHB, now called Point Blank Solutions)
received corporate reimbursement for “more than $6 million in personal
expenses”—including luxury cars as well as “university textbooks for his
daughter, pornographic videos for his son, plastic surgery for his
wife, a burial plot for his mother, prostitutes for his employees, and,
for him, a $100,000 American-flag belt buckle encrusted with rubies,
sapphires and diamonds.”
Hey, some of that stuff might be unallowable!
As
the article noted, what makes this story interesting is the
egregiousness of Mr. Brooks’ behavior and “how gross the abuses are.”
The article stated that—
Mr.
Brooks has not disputed that many of his personal expenses were paid
for by the company, but his lawyers have maintained that the practice
was authorized. His lawyers also defended the hiring of prostitutes for
employees and board members, arguing in court papers that it
represented a legitimate business expense ‘if Mr. Brooks thought such
services could motivate his employees and make them more productive.’
There’s
quite a bit more to the story, including allegations of forged
compensation agreements, inventory manipulation, insider trading, and
tax evasion. If convicted, Mr. Brooks may be spending a long time
behind bars. Apparently, Mr. Brooks is aware of his precarious future,
as the article reported that—
He
may also face additional charges stemming from an episode last week
when he was caught for a second time trying to smuggle into jail
prescription anti-anxiety pills, which were similar to medication he was
already taking at an unusually high dose. The pills had been hidden in
pens that a supporter of Mr. Brooks’s had placed near the defendant’s
seat in the courtroom.
So
as we bring this article to its conclusion, we agree that we have
presented litany of dissimilar stories that may not have much of a
common theme—other that they all happened at government contractors. On
the other hand, government contractors are supposed to have developed
robust internal controls to prevent such acts from occurring. We hope
readers will think carefully about how they might detect or prevent
similar incidents at their companies.
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