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Apogee Consulting Inc

Oil So Plentiful in Southwest Asia You Can Just Steal It

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Pundits and Internet trolls have engaged in protracted debates regarding whether the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2002 was more about oil than it was about WMD.  The American Conservative website notes that—

Controlling Iraq’s oil has historically been a vital factor in America’s involvement in Iraq and was always a crucial element of the Bush administration’s plans for the post-Saddam era. Of course, that’s not how the war was sold to the American people. A few months before the invasion, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld declared that the looming war had ‘nothing to do with oil, literally nothing to do with oil.’ The war was necessary, its planners claimed, because Saddam Hussein supported terrorism and, left unchecked, he would unleash weapons of mass destruction on the West.

Nevertheless, oil was the foremost strategic focus for the U.S. military in Iraq. The first objectives of the invading forces included the capture of key Iraqi oil terminals and oilfields. On March 20, 2003, Navy SEALs engaged in the first combat of the war when they launched a surprise invasion of the Mina al-Bakr and Khor al-Amaya oil loading terminals in the Persian Gulf. A few hours later, Marine Lt. Therral Childers became the first U.S. soldier to die in combat in the invasion when he was killed fighting for control of the Rumaylah oil field in southern Iraq.

Oil was also the first objective when U.S. forces reached Baghdad on April 8. Although the National Library of Iraq, the National Archives, and the National Museum of Antiquities were all looted and in some cases burned, the oil ministry building was barely damaged. That’s because a detachment of American soldiers and a half-dozen assault vehicles were assigned to guard the ministry and its records.

After all, the war’s architects had promised that oil money was going to rebuild Iraq after the U.S. military took control. In March 2003, Paul Wolfowitz told a Congressional panel, ‘The oil revenues of that country could bring between $50 and $100 billion over the course of the next two or three years. Now, there are a lot of claims on that money, but … we are dealing with a country that can really finance its own reconstruction and relatively soon.’ As Michael Gordon and Bernard Trainor explained in their 2006 book, Cobra II, ‘The Pentagon had promised that the reconstruction of Iraq would be ‘self-financing,’ and the preservation of Iraq’s oil wealth was the best-prepared and -resourced component of Washington’s postwar plan.’

Our various articles covering the official DOD reports to Congress regarding progress made in Iraq (example: here) have noted the importance of oil—and of the oil infrastructure—to stability in the region. The armed forces of the United States are huge users of oil.  In March, 2010, we posted an article about the importance of oil to the armed forces, and the theft of approximately 10 million gallons of fuel from the U.S. Army at Camp Liberty, Iraq.

Well, here’s another story about theft of fuel from the U.S. armed forces.  This time, the location is Afghanistan.  On August 19, 2010, the Department of Justice announced that Michael Dugger, age 27, a former U.S. Army Sergeant, had pleaded guilty to one count of receiving a bribe as a public official.  Another former U.S. Army Staff Sergeant, Steven Ringo, was also charged, but did not plead guilty; his case is still pending.

According to the DOJ press release—

Ringo and Dugger were stationed at Forward Operating Base (FOB) Shank, a U.S. Army installation in the Logar Province of Eastern Afghanistan.   … the Army stores large quantities of fuel at FOB Shank and redistributes that fuel to installations in the surrounding area through government contractors.   Dugger’s responsibilities included supervision of FOB Shank’s fuel redistribution process.

Dugger admitted that between January and February 2010 he aided and abetted a co-conspirator’s solicitation and acceptance of more than $400,000 in bribes from a government contractor, all in exchange for his co-conspirator’s creation and submission of fraudulent paperwork permitting that contractor to steal fuel from FOB Shank.   Dugger also admitted that he helped his co-conspirator conceal the money in various locations in and around FOB Shank.   The total value of the fuel stolen during the course of the scheme was at least $1.39 million.

The amount of fuel stolen was not disclosed, but we guess it was a substantial amount, given the $1.4 million value ascribed to the theft.

One of the guys who stole the 10 million gallons of fuel from Camp Victory (for subsequent resale on the black market) was sentenced to three years in prison.  How does Mr. Dugger fare in comparison?  The DOJ announced that, “At sentencing, Dugger faces a maximum penalty of 15 years in prison and a fine of $250,000; twice the gross gain or loss from the scheme; or three times the value of the payments solicited or received.”  Ouch!



 

Awesome Plea Bargain Saves former NASA Bigwig from Big Time in the Big House

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Far be it for us to criticize the recent plea bargain that the Department of Justice recently entered into with Courtney Stadd, who “previously served as NASA Chief of Staff and White House Liaison”—especially when “Attorney Burkhalter and NASA Inspector General Martin commended the outstanding investigative work of the agents from the NASA Office of Inspector General and prosecutive work of the U.S. Attorneys Office in the Southern District of Mississippi.”  To the contrary, we commend Mr. Stadd and his attorneys for accepting the sweetheart deal. 

According to the August 18, 2010 press release from the DOJ and the NASA Office of Inspector General, Mr. Stadd pleaded guilty to “conspiracy charges in connection with actions he took to obtain and receive funds from a $600,000 sole-source contract” awarded from the Stennis Space Center to Mississippi State University (MSU). 

According to the plea hearing, Stadd admitted to conspiring with the NASA Deputy Chief Engineer of Programs to give the contract to MSU.  MSU, in turn, awarded a $450,000 subcontract to Stadd’s consulting business.  Apparently, Stadd ran a consulting business (on the side?) called either Capitol Solutions or Capitol Alliance Solutions.  Hmm, can anybody say “criminal conflict of interest”?

We previously reported on another NASA “felony conflict of interest charge” in this article.  That situation involved a former NASA scientist who participated in awarding contracts to his wife’s company.  That scientist received a fine, probation, and community service.  As we reported, “Prosecutors agreed Schoeberl did not deserve to go to jail, noting in court documents that he quickly accepted responsibility for his conduct, had no criminal history and had a lengthy record of service at NASA.”  In contrast to that scientist, Mr. Stadd “met with senior government officials in an ill-fated attempt to stop the NASA Office of the Inspector General from continuing to investigate his activities.”

But that’s not all.

According to the press release, Stadd and the Deputy Chief Engineer of Programs had an agreement that the Deputy Chief Engineer would work on the subcontract received from MSU, after he left NASA.  Under that subcontract--

Stadd received over $287,000 on the subcontract and admitted to inflating hours billed and falsifying invoices to MSU. Stadd further admitted to sending two false Quarterly Reports to MSU in August of 2005 stating that Valador Incorporated of Herndon, Virginia, ‘a service-disabled, veteran-owned small aerospace business with extensive satellite engineering experience,’ was also working on the contract, when he knew that in fact, Valador Incorporated was not involved on that contract.  Stadd admitted to having paid the former Deputy Chief Engineer over $87,000 for his work on the subcontract. That Deputy Chief Engineer earlier plead guilty to a charge of conflict of interest.

So we know that Stadd admitted to submitting false claims and to making false statements.  In addition—

Stadd admitted that, to further conceal the conspiracy, he created false documents in response to a Federal Grand Jury subpoena. The false documents included four invoices reflecting billing work unrelated to the Mississippi State University contract, documents purporting to calculate composite rates for billing Mississippi State University, and documents supporting the authorization for composite rates of billing when no such authorization existed.

Violations of the False Statements Act and the False Claims Act are serious, serious business.  Each count can subject a person to huge fines and up to five years in Federal prison. Near as we can tell, Mr. Stadd was looking at least six counts of false statements and nearly $300,000 in false claims.  Based on our rough back-of-the-envelope calculation, Mr. Stadd could have been fined nearly $1 million and been sentenced to more than 30 years in jail.

But Mr. Stadd’s defense team worked a miracle on his behalf.  Instead of the foregoing, the press release reported that, “Stadd faces up to five years in prison and $250,000.00 in fines.”  That’s some damn fine defense lawyering right there, in our opinion.  On the Government’s side?  Not so much—despite the words of praise found in the press release.



 

DOD Inspector General Criticizes DCMA for Excluding DCAA from EVMS Reviews

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Recently the DOD Inspector General (DOD IG) released a July 28, 2010 audit report that criticized the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) for “unsatisfactory conditions” related to how the oversight agency performed reviews of a defense contractor’s Earned Value Management System (EVMS).  The DOD IG criticized DCMA for three specific failings, as follows—

During two reviews of a DoD contractor in 2008, the Earned Value Management Center failed to (1) allow the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) sufficient time to perform an audit of the contractor’s system, (2) adequately resolve the DCAA findings, and (3) demonstrate independence and objectivity in fulfilling its oversight responsibilities.

Let’s peel the onion back a bit, shall we?

Both DOD oversight agencies (DCMA and DCAA) have been criticized heavily for both their dysfunctional relationship and their failure to accomplish their oversight missions.  We’ve posted several articles on the Commission on Wartime Contracting and its criticism of the agencies.  See, for example, here or here.  We even posted speculation that the two agencies might merge together.

We said at the time—

Reports are beginning to come out regarding the Commission's latest 2-day hearing on contractor business systems and DOD oversight -- and those reports indicate that the Commission thinks DCMA has failed in its oversight role and should possibly merge with DCAA in order to eliminate ‘dysfunctionality’ between the two DOD agencies.



For example, GovExec.com reports that ‘a lack of cooperation’ between DCMA and DCAA ‘is hindering the oversight of contractors' business systems.’ The article states that ‘members of the commission accused DCMA ... of almost uniformly ignoring recommendations from DCAA with regard to the business systems of logistical support contractors,’ and always siding with contractors by ignoring DCAA audit findings. …

The Commission called for the dysfunctional relationship between DCAA and DCMA to come to an end and, according to the report, put the onus on DCMA to resolve the problems. Co-Chair Shays was quoted as saying, ‘both of you up there, you're on the same team, but it doesn't sound like it and it doesn't look like it. ... With no disrespect to [DCMA], we think there needs to be more adjustment on DCMA's part than on DCAA's part. I think that's fairly clear.’

Recent proposed FAR revisions would affect how the DOD evaluates the adequacy of contractors’ “business systems.”  If the proposed rule is implemented as drafted (and rumors/gossip seem to indicate that some changes will be made), then there would be six (6) official business systems:  (1) Accounting, (2) Earned Value Management, (3) Estimating, (4) Material Management and Accounting (MMAS), (5) Property Control, and (6) Purchasing.  Some of those business systems would be the exclusive purview of the DCMA—e.g., property control and purchasing.  Others would seem to be the purview of the DCAA—e.g., Accounting and MMAS.  (Though it would appear that DCMA would retain the authority to issue final determinations of system adequacy—as it should.)  The authority/responsibility over the assessment of the other systems—notably Estimating and EVMS—would seem to be somewhat ambiguous.  And perhaps those two systems do require a joint approach to the assessment of adequacy, since costs and cost reporting accuracy play a prominent role within them.

But remember, DCAA has admitted publicly that “In fiscal 2008, the average time to complete a contractor pricing review was 28 days, compared with 72 days in fiscal 2010.”  For those in the know, DCAA reviews of contractor cost proposals are “demand audits,” and thus given the agency’s highest priority.  It used to be that such audits were to be completed in 30 days … but now they take more than twice as long as they used to—and that’s for the highest priority audits.  How long do you think DCAA takes to complete an assessment of contractors’ internal controls related to their business systems?

And remember that area for which DCAA has received the most criticism has been its review of contractor internal controls.  For example, in October 2009, we reported that the Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported “widespread audit quality problems” at DCAA.  As we reported at the time, “The GAO report stated that ‘we found audit quality problems … with all 37 audits of contractor internal controls and the 4 incurred cost and the 2 request for equitable adjustment audits we reviewed at 7 FAOs across the 5 DCAA regions ….’”  The Commission on Wartime Contracting reported that—

As a result of personnel shortfalls, DCAA system reviews and follow-ups are not always timely; therefore, the real-time status of contractor business systems cannot always be determined. As noted in our Interim Report to Congress, DCAA has not performed timely reviews of many contractor business systems.

The gadfly watchdog group, POGO, went so far as to send a letter to influential Senators saying, “We worry that these problems are indicative of a systemic strategy for reform that seeks to decrease congressional pressure rather than to institute meaningful reform.”  So given DCAA’s recent implementation of multiple layers of management review, its deferral of new system reviews—pending upcoming changes in how such reviews are to be performed—we invite readers to ask themselves how long DCAA actually takes to perform its evaluation of contractor internal controls related to business systems.  Perhaps you’ve experienced that duration first hand, as we have (many, many times).  Let’s ask how long DCAA should take to perform such reviews, how long DCMA should give DCAA to perform its share of joint system evaluations. What’s reasonable? 

A month?  Maybe a year?  How about a decade?

We can tell you, based on first-hand experience, that DCAA can’t perform such reviews in a month.  We don’t believe that anybody should expect those reviews to be performed in a month.  But certainly six months would seem reasonable, yes?  Most of us would expect DCAA to plan its work, perform its field work, and get a report reviewed within six months.  That seems reasonable—at least to us.

So when we tell you that you’ll be lucky to see a DCAA report evaluating the adequacy of a contractor’s internal controls related to a business system—a full scope audit—within the span a year, believe us.  A year is good.  A year is nominal.  Eighteen months would be highly probable.  Two years would not be out of the question.  Three years might be stretching it a bit.  Within five years?  Yeah, you’ll pretty much be certain of seeing that report within five years.  Virtual 100% certainty--but not quite 100%.  There may be some outliers….

Thus, contractors and other oversight agencies—notably DCMA—get frustrated at the slow pace of DCAA audits.  And DCMA starts looking to cut corners.  Does a Contracting Officer really need to see the DCAA audit report on the contractor’s proposed costs before sitting down at the negotiating table?  Can s/he afford to even wait that long before agreeing to a price and getting some weapon into the hands of warfighters in Southwest Asia who might desperately need it?  And can the DCMA functional specialists—the system evaluators—afford to hold up their official reports (the same reports that identify system deficiencies that require contractor corrective actions) for that period of time?  Or should they just go ahead and issue their report anyway?  After all, they have the final say in contractor business system adequacy.

Ponder those questions as we turn to the DOD IG report.  (Yeah, you were wondering when we would get back to the topic, weren’t you?  But we trust you’ll see how it all ties together.)

The DOD IG took DCMA to task for cutting DCAA out of their EVMS evaluation process.  First, a little background on that evaluation process, courtesy of the IG report:

The DCMA Contract Management Office … is one of 47 such offices established throughout the United States [with the authority and responsibility of determining the acceptability of the DoD contractor earned value management system under their cognizance.]  In addition, DCMA has established an Earned Value Management Center (the Center) to conduct initial ‘compliance’ reviews of DoD contractor systems for compliance with the ANSI/EIA-748 guidelines. The Center is currently comprised of a team of approximately 31 earned value management specialists who perform compliance reviews across the United States on a full time basis. The Center also performs follow-up reviews of significant deficiencies until they are corrected. Once the Center makes an initial determination that a contractor complies with the guidelines, the Contract Management Office will recognize such compliance through the issuance of either an Advance Agreement or a Letter of Acceptance. Thereafter, the Contract Management Office conducts ‘surveillance’ reviews on an ongoing basis to verify a contractor’s continued compliance with the guidelines. If a surveillance review detects significant noncompliances, the Contract Management Office may request that the Center perform another compliance review of all or parts of the contractor’s earned value management system and could withdraw acceptance of the system until the contractor reestablishes compliance.

The DOD IG reviewed two DCMA EVMS evaluations. The first was an April 2008 compliance review and the other was a follow-up review conducted in August of that same year.  “The April 2008 compliance review disclosed several noncompliances with the ANSI/EIA-748 guidelines. The contractor took corrective actions … and the DCMA follow-up review determined that those actions were adequate.”  DCAA participated in the initial compliance review but not the follow-up review. 

Somebody at DCAA didn’t like the way they were treated, so they made an Inspector General Hotline report. 

(Note that DCAA audit guidance encourages auditors to make such referrals when they encounter “mismanagement, a failure to comply with specific regulatory requirements or gross negligence in fulfilling his or her responsibility that result in substantial harm to the Government or taxpayers, or that frustrate public policy.”  See MRD 09-PAS-004(R), dated March 13, 2009, available at www.dcaa.mil, under “open audit guidance.”)

The DOD IG “substantiated” the allegations.  Specifically, the DOD IG found—

The Earned Value Management Center did not allow sufficient time for DCAA to meaningfully participate in the April and August 2008 reviews. The unreasonably short time frames effectively prevented DCAA from fulfilling its participation responsibilities … The Center established a 2-week time frame to complete a comprehensive review of the contractor’s system for compliance with all 32 ANSI/EIA-748 guidelines. As requested, DCAA participated in the review by auditing the contractor’s compliance with 8 of the accounting and financial related guidelines. Before receiving the DCAA audit results, DCMA held an exit conference with the contractor on … the last day of the 2-week period to advise them of the review results and provide a list of deficiencies. DCAA issued its audit report 6 weeks later … which reported additional noncompliances with 2 of the guidelines. The Center should have waited for the DCAA audit report before holding the exit conference with the contractor and providing a list of deficiencies. While the Center did consider an April 2008 draft of the DCAA report, the Center failed to adequately document its rationale for not upholding the DCAA findings … the Center should not have established an arbitrary and inflexible time frame to conduct reviews at all major DoD contractors. The established time frame should be based on a careful consideration of the risks and circumstances at each contractor location.

The Center established a 4-day time frame to complete the follow-up review. On August 12, 2008, DCAA notified the Center that it could not participate in the follow-up review because (i) the scope of the review had been restricted to the specific programs where the deficiencies were initially identified, (ii) the programs, cost reports, and period of time subjected to review had been selected and pre-announced to the contractor, and (iii) DCAA could not complete a follow-up review within the 4-day time frame established by the Center. Nevertheless, DCAA offered to perform a follow-up review in a timely manner that would still allow for incorporation into the final DCMA report. The Center did not adjust the 4-day requested due date for completing the DCAA follow-up. Rather than utilize DCAA, the Center used an ex-DCAA auditor on its staff to follow-up on the DCAA-reported noncompliances.

Let’s pause for a moment and consider whether the DOD IG might be on to something.  Was it unreasonable, as well as “arbitrary and inflexible” for DCMA to force DCAA to perform its share of the joint review within 2 weeks.  Well, yes.  There’s no way DCAA can comply with its existing audit guidance (both published and unpublished) in a 2-week period.  Either DCAA needs to change the way in which it performs its joint system reviews or DCMA needs to perform the reviews without the participation of DCAA.

In fact, we mustered the gumption to recommend to DCAA Director Fitzgerald that he might want to consider exempting some of DCAA’s audits from the rigors of GAO-interpreted GAGAS, just to avoid some of these issues.  We boldly recommended that Mr. Fitzgerald—

… consider whether all DCAA audits need to be subject to GAGAS. Reasonable people will disagree with GAO’s stringent definition of “independence” under GAGAS, but you can avoid the issue altogether if you make certain audits subject to GAGAS while others are not. There is precedent for this change: the AICPA has Consulting Standards that differ from Auditing Standards. Since DCAA performs both financial advisory services and audits, it would seem to make sense to apportion each type of audit into GAGAS-compliant and non-GAGAS-compliant groupings. And, by the way, DCMA really wants DCAA to participate in the process as an advisor; it wants your audits to offer value-added advice and to support the acquisition process. Contractors want to hear from auditors as well; they want to know where they need to improve and what should be done to fix system deficiencies. Your auditors can’t do this if GAO will allege they’ve compromised ‘independence’ whenever this happens—so change the rules of the game to eliminate the issue altogether.

What else did the DOD IG find?  The DOD IG found that DCMA compromised its own independence/ objectivity “by appearance” during the performance of the EVMS review.  The DOD IG reported—

First, the Center notified the contractor well in advance which programs and related cost reports it selected for review. As a result, the contractor’s compliance efforts could have focused exclusively on those pre-selected programs. Second, the Center did not vary the selection of programs reviewed. DCMA reviewed the same five programs during the April and August 2008 reviews as it did in a prior December 2006 review. Therefore, the Government has no reasonable assurance of the contractor’s compliance on other programs.

The [DCMA] representatives held joint activities with the contractor on two separate occasions which could have compromised DCMA’s independence and objectivity. In January 2007, following a December 2006 DCMA compliance review, DCMA … representatives participated in a week-long contractor review to identify root causes of various deficiencies and to develop a corrective action plan. In December 2007, representatives from DCMA … attended the contractor’s internal audit of its system in preparation for the April 2008 DCMA compliance review. DCMA officials charged with determining system compliance should not participate with the contractor in developing corrective action plans or performing internal audits. Participation in such activities may compromise the ability of DCMA to independently determine system compliance and continued acceptability of the earned value management system.

Moreover, the DOD IG asserted that “DCMA should not plan or conduct joint surveillance reviews with the contractor,” even though it admitted that “DCMA Instruction ‘Earned Value Management System (EVMS) System-Level Surveillance,’ January 2008, strongly encourages contractor participation in planning and conducting DCMA surveillance reviews.”

We have to disagree with the DOD IG on that one.  First, DCMA isn’t subject to rigid interpretations of “independence” under GAGAS and the IG shouldn’t hold the agency to such an inapplicable standard—especially when DCMA’s actions clearly fall within its own agency policy guidance.  Second, contractors and DCMA need to interact together, in order to identify root causes and appropriate corrective actions.  We wish DOD oversight agencies and their industry partners did more of that sort of behavior!  Finally, the IG report glosses over the fact that the same EVMS criteria that provide the standards for an adequate EVMS business system, the ones against which DCMA and DCAA were reviewing, were developed jointly by both industry and DOD officials, back in the days when such an approach was deemed to be in the public interest.

Talk about an independence problem!  Hey DOD IG—how about you deal with the historical fact that the “adequacy criteria” used for the reviews that you would like to subject to GAGAS-controlled independence were developed by the same people being reviewed, in concert with the people doing the reviewing. There’s a reason that’s not considered to be a real issue—and the reason is that none of the parties ever intended the oversight process to be subject to GAGAS—nor should it be.  Oops.  Missed that one, did you?

We aren’t the only ones to believe that the DOD IG missed the mark on this report.  The Director of DCMA, Mr. Charlie Williams, Jr., did not concur with much of the report either.  He told the IG—

  • DCMA’s reviews lose their effectiveness and impact if DCMA’s results are presented to the contractor long after the review has been completed.
  • The DCMA Director agreed that the DCAA findings of noncompliance were valid. However, DCMA did not consider the issues systemic. Therefore, the DCMA Contract Management Office worked with DCAA to correct the issues as part of the contractor’s Corrective Action Plan.
  • DCMA has established and maintains a cooperative Government-contractor relationship that does not compromise the independence of their decisions. A Review for Cause is a focused review of specific elements of the contractor’s earned value management system in order to confirm the acceptability of the system. Advance notification to the contractor is necessary to ensure the contractor can support a review during the time period, key employees are available for interview, and the data requested is provided to the review team before the review.
  • DCMA agrees with and is committed to ensuring that the decisions which result from its surveillance and compliance reviews represent an independent DCMA decision. DCMA does not agree that the only way to achieve this independence is by isolating the contractor from the review process.

Well, that was a breath of fresh, reasonable, air.  There yet may be hope for the DOD oversight process.  Oh, you want to see the DOD IG report for yourself?  Find it here.



 

As U.S. DOD Looks for Efficiency and Affordability, So Does U.K. MoD

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We’ve published several articles on the current drive for “efficiency” and “affordability” by the U.S. Department of Defense.  Our most recent article provided details regarding how Secretary of Defense Gates proposed to reduce Pentagon bureaucracy, and noted the almost immediate creation of a group of politicians united in opposition to any cuts that might take place in their states.  But the U.S. is not alone in trying to rein-in out of control defense spending.

As this article at FlightGlobal.com reports, the U.K. government has unveiled plans to reorganize its Ministry of Defense, in order to “stop programme delays and cost overruns.”  This is not the first time we noted acquisition system reform attempts within the government of our former colonial masters.  In October, 2009, we reported—

It seems that the USA is not alone in seeing an urgent need to reform the aerospace/defense acquisition system. The UK MoD faces similar problems and has received several recommendations to address them. Just as in the U.S., true reform will require a fundamental shift in how the legislative branch (i.e., Parliament) authorizes funds to the Defense Department (i.e., MoD). In the U.S., though, such heresy has not been well received. Perhaps the UK will undertake the difficult yet necessary reforms, and will reap commensurate benefits. We wish them the best of luck.

In that same article, we noted with approval the publication of a nearly 300 page-long report from an independent review team, in which problems were catalogued with candor, and feasible recommendations were put forward.  We asked if the U.S. DOD could benefit from those recommendations, since the problems reported seemed so familiar.  Nearly a year later, the MoD seems to be moving forward on those recommendations. 

Not only is the MoD going to be reorganized, but the U.K. armed forces will also be reformed, so as to ensure “more efficient provision of defence capability and generation and sustainment of operations".  According to the FlightGlobal article—

The department is to be ‘reorganised into three pillars’, namely: policy and strategy; the armed forces; and procurement and estates. The new three pillar structure is designed to ‘stop the constant over-specification and then respecification of programmes which has led to so many cost overruns and programme delays’.

The envisaged cultural shift would render the department ‘leaner and less centralised’.

Addressing the efforts to reform the armed services, the article reported—

The armed forces review, meanwhile, is intended to ‘challenge some of the fundamental assumptions which drive force generation, such as tour lengths and intervals’, says [the MoD spokesperson], noting that it takes armed forces of over 180,000 to sustain a combat force of under 10,000 in Afghanistan.

The article also noted—

Estimating the unfunded liability in defence at £37 billion ($57.6 billion) over the next 10 years - £20 billion of it attributable to the equipment and support programme – [the MoD] said that ‘short-term reductions’ were required to ‘return defence to a sound footing’ and that the SDSR was being faced with ‘unavoidably constrained finances’.

Moreover, the MoD spokesperson stated—

The defence reform unit will liaise with senior personnel to ‘find ways of devolving greater responsibility for the running of the services’, says Fox, adding: ‘We must get away from the over centralising tendency that has become the hallmark of the MoD in recent years.’

He anticipates changes to the services' senior rank structure, commenting: ‘We cannot demand efficiency from the lower ranks while exempting those at the top.’

As we noted above, the U.K. and U.S. seem to be facing similar problems, and also seem to be addressing those problems along similar lines.  Yet we can’t help noticing that the U.K. reform efforts seem to have both an overall strategy and concrete, implementable short-term plans.  Although the U.S. is also moving ahead with its Defense reform efforts, we do not see a similar picture.  Instead, we hear Secretary of Defense Gates’ intentions without much support … and with some die-hard opposition already emerging from the politicians who control the purse.

Once again, we suggest that the U.S. DOD can learn something from its U.K. kin, and it ought to be actively liaising with the MoD to see how it can accelerate and improve on its on efforts.  We wonder why DOD leadership appears to be ignoring this obvious force-multiplier?



 

DFARS Class Deviation Offers Ray of Hope for Defense Contractors

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One of the biggest gripes about the results of DCAA’s current truculent attitude is the withdrawal of “direct billing authority” for most—if not all—defense contractors.

For those who don’t know, the authority to submit requests for provisional payment (via Public Voucher) directly to the Defense Financial Accounting Service (DFAS) payment office—without the delay caused by DCAA audit of said Public Voucher—was a boon to contractors, accelerating cash flow by several days.  But the authority to do so was entirely in the hands of DCAA.  As the DFARS said—

242.803 Disallowing costs after incurrence.

*****

(b) Auditor receipt of voucher.

(i) The contract auditor is the authorized representative of the contracting officer for—

(A) Receiving vouchers from contractors;

(B) Approving interim vouchers for provisional payment (this includes approving the fee portion of vouchers in accordance with the contract schedule and administrative contracting officer instructions) and sending them to the disbursing office;

(C) Authorizing direct submission of interim vouchers for provisional payment to the disbursing office for contractors with approved billing systems;

*****

The June 2010 edition of the DCAA Contract Audit Manual (CAM) says (at 6-1007)—

It is Agency policy to obtain the maximum contractor participation in the direct submission (direct billing) of interim vouchers program.  FAOs should actively work with contractors to eliminate billing system deficiencies and encourage contractor participation in the direct billing program.  The direct billing program will reduce the administrative effort (both Government and contractor) related to interim public vouchers processing for contractors with adequate billing systems.

Regardless of the foregoing, in April, 2009, DCAA issued audit guidance (via MRD 09-PPD-0006(R)) that contained the following direction to auditors—

FAOs cognizant of major contractors with billing systems that have been approved for direct billing should ensure that those systems have not been significantly modified or the contractor has not implemented a new system since issuance of the latest adequate audit opinion. In addition, the accounting system and billing system may be so interconnected that a major change to the accounting system will impact Government billings. If a billing system or accounting system that affects the billing system has been significantly modified or a new system has been implemented, the following steps should be taken:

• Auditors should immediately provide verbal and written notification to the appropriate contractor level (e.g., the Chief Financial Officer) that their authorization to participate in the Direct Bill Program will be rescinded in 30 days.

• The FAO should ensure that it has a documented sampling plan and procedures for reviewing a sufficient number of public vouchers as part of its review plan (CAM 6-1008).

• The FAO should ensure that an appropriate number of FAO personnel are authorized to approve interim vouchers in Wide Area Workflow (WAWF).

• Auditors should immediately commence a billing system audit.

• Upon completion of the billing system audit of the new or modified system, the contractor may be authorized to direct bill if the auditor determines that the new or revised system is adequate.

The foregoing audit guidance not only conflated accounting system adequacy with billing system adequacy, with respect to permitting contractors to utilize the direct billing program, it also acted to undercut the policy that directed DCAA to “encourage” contractors to participate in the program.  As a result of the revised DCAA audit guidance, many contractors had their participation in the program ended, impacting their cash flow.  In addition, DCAA has had to redirect resources from audits of high-risk areas to audits of interim vouchers—which are low risk because of their provisional nature.  (I.e., costs paid to contractors are subject to future adjustment based on audit findings.)

To be clear, at a time when DCAA has testified that its current funding and headcount only permit it to address 65 percent of required audits, it has devoted a significant amount of its limited resources to the very low value activity of auditing contractor interim vouchers.

So this DFARS Class Deviation, issued on August 17, 2010, seemed to offer both DCAA and defense contractors a ray of hope in the dark cloud of the current audit environment.  Its words may be short and simple, but we are encouraged that they portend something profound: a shift in the DOD oversight environment.

The class deviation said—

Effective immediately, this class deviation deletes the words “for contractors with approved billing systems” from DFARS 242.803(b)(i)(C).  This deviation eases the requirements, especially for small businesses, to qualify for direct billing, thereby reducing DoD administration and conserving resources in processing low risk payment vouchers.

We can only speculate on the effect of the class deviation.  But since it eliminates the requirement to have an “approved” billing system in order to participate in the program, we believe that it will act to undercut the unfortunate DCAA audit guidance quoted above, and may lead to contractors regaining their ability to participate in the direct billing program.

It may lead to improved contractor cash flow, and permit DCAA to return badly needed audit resources to more value-added and high-risk areas.

It is good news—about the best news we’ve heard in some time.


 


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Newsflash

Effective January 1, 2019, Nick Sanders has been named as Editor of two reference books published by LexisNexis. The first book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Cost Accounting Standards. Nick replaces Darrell Oyer, who has edited those books for many years.