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BAE, Boeing & Lockheed Martin React to New Economic Reality in Different Ways

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It’s no secret that the Pentagon has gotten religion. Spurred by the teachings of Defense Shepherd Gates, the Pentagon’s acquisition flock has begun to chant the two-tone mantra of “efficiency and affordability”. We’ve reported on this new (or re-learned) religion before, and we’ll have more to say about it in the near future. But today’s article is about how some of the leaders in the defense industrial base are reacting to pressure from the zealous Pentagon faithful.

The contractors are reorganizing and cutting staff.

But first we need to be intellectually honest and admit that some contractors have been making adjustments for many months, and these changes we report today are but the latest in a series of intricate steps designed to position the companies for future dances with their favorite partner, the Department of Defense. For example, we reported here about cutbacks at Northrop Grumman’s Gulf Coast shipbuilding businesses and about cuts to Navistar’s MRAP production staff. Over here, we reported on a reorganization at BAE Systems and a planned early retirement buy-out offer for Lockheed Martin executives. And those are just two of the many stories we’ve posted about how defense contractors are adapting to the changing economic reality of the post-Bush, post-Iraq defense acquisition environment. So let’s be clear: today’s stories are nothing new, nothing out of the ordinary. But they are illustrative of what’s happening in the A&D industry.


Lockheed Martin

As noted above, we previously reported on LockMart’s early July 2010 announcement of early retirement incentives (the “Voluntary Executive Separation Program,” or VESP) to be offered to Directors and Vice Presidents who, if they accepted, would need to exit the company by February 2011. We reported that LockMart hoped to thin its executive ranks by about seven percent.

On September 8, 2010, Bloomberg reported that “about 25 percent” of the company’s executives had accepted their VESP offers. According to the article, “More than 600 vice presidents and directors applied for the program … [and] all will have gone by February.” According to the Bloomberg article—

The severance program will yield ‘substantial savings’ starting in 2011, Lockheed said. It also will provide ‘a leaner management structure at a time when our customers have an urgent need for more affordable solutions to the global security challenges they face,’ Chief Executive Officer Bob Stevens said.

Certainly, Lockheed Martin will see a reduction in current compensation costs from the departures. But at what cost? According to this Washington Post article, the company’s September 13, 2010 filing with the SEC estimated that it would record a one-time charge of between $175 and $200 million for the severance packages. According to the Post’s math, “Based on that figure, the average cost per employee could be as much as $333,000.” The article continued—

Lockheed's filing details how the payments will be made. An individual's lump-sum payment is broken into three elements: 75 percent to 125 percent of the executive's annual salary, based on years of service; a payment of $2,000 per year of service, up to 30 years, meant to defray future medical costs; and an amount equal to the executive's 2011 vacation pay.

Additionally, executives who take the buyout will remain eligible for bonuses early next year based on their 2010 performance. … The severance payment will be made within 90 days of an executive's departure.

That’s a pretty sweet deal, if you ask us. And very likely 100% allowable, as well.  But we haven’t seen any inquiries regarding whether the result of LockMart’s VESP--which were more than 300 percent better than its planned outcome--was a good thing or really just another problem that has been deferred and will surface in a few years?  Is the company really saying that it can cut 25 percent of its executive ranks and not miss a beat?  Wow, that’s kind of a message right there ....


Boeing

The No. 1 Aerospace/Defense company in the world also reported some changes to its Military Aircraft business, so as to “continue to position the company for growth in the current business environment,” according to this Boeing press release. The reported changes include consolidating six divisions into four and ten percent cuts to the BMA executive ranks. The press release adds that, “Additional reductions across all levels of the organization are anticipated in coming months.” The press release included a statement of BMA’s strategic intent—

In announcing the changes, Boeing Military Aircraft President Chris Chadwick said the new organization will allow BMA to meet domestic and global defense requirements for the next 10 years and beyond.


‘This new structure supports BMA's progression from a product-based business to a capabilities-based business, focusing on supporting our customers in the United States and increasingly important international markets,’ Chadwick said. ‘It is consistent with initiatives under way throughout the entire Boeing defense business that will allow us to remain competitive and grow.’

Frankly, we’re not 100 percent sure what Chadwick’s statement means. But we think it means that Boeing may be finally admitting that it won’t be making too many new military aircraft in the foreseeable future. With the end of the C-17 program in sight, and the F/A-18 program focused on international sales, and LockMart firmly in the F-35 driver’s seat, Boeing may be admitting that its military aircraft business is going to inevitably shink—significantly—in the near future.

In related news, remarks by Boeing Defense President Dennis Muilenburg fueled rumor and speculation that the company might make a play to acquire some or all of Northrop Grumman. Reuters reported—

Defense analyst Loren Thompson said weapons demand fell by 50 percent during the last two downturns, spurring earlier consolidation, and the same could happen again this time. ‘That means that at least one of the big players will have to exit if we are facing a similar downturn in the years ahead,’ Thompson told the Reuters Summit.


‘There's not enough business to go around,’ said one former senior military official who now works in industry, but who was not authorized to speak on the record.


Northrop Grumman Corp would be a good fit with Boeing, although there could be antitrust concerns about the two companies' space operations, Thompson said. ‘Boeing has a big revenue shortfall on the defense side that it needs to cover. Buying part or all of Northrop could fix that problem, while giving it entry into the Joint Strike Fighter program,’ Thompson said, referring to the $380 billion Lockheed Martin Corp F-35 fighter program. Northrop has a large role on the program, which Lockheed beat out Boeing to win in 2001

On the other hand, given the Obama Administration’s focus on increasing competition in the defense marketplace, as well as potential anti-trust issues, we don’t see this as a likely outcome.


BAE Systems

On September 11, 2011, the Wall Street Journal reported that BAE Systems was going to put “parts of its North American commercial aerospace business up for sale in an auction.” The article asserted that the sale could “fetch up to $2 billion.” The article stated that—

One of the units on the block makes aircraft-engine controls for General Electric Co. The other units include a commercial avionics business and a division that makes hybrid propulsion systems for buses and trucks,

According to this article at Forbes, “BAE is reportedly looking to focus on its support and maintenance operations.”

We’re not sure what conclusions one can draw from the foregoing news snippets. But we’ll have more reorganization, layoff, and M&A activity to report this year—we’re sure of that.





 

Settling-Up: Concluding DOJ Enforcement Actions

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It’s hard to go more than a week without reading yet another story about fraud, waste, abuse—or even outright corruption—in the US public procurement process. Today we bring you two stories about entities that have settled their issues by settling-up with the Department of Justice, and one story about DOJ dropping fraud charges because of judicial setbacks.


GSA Pricing Disclosure Failures Lead to Large Settlements

In 2004 two “former employees of U.S. contractors” filed a qui tam suit under the False Claims Act in the Eastern District of Arkansas. In their suit, whistleblowers Normal Rille and Neal Roberts “accused several IT companies of paying kickbacks to systems integrators in exchange for preferential treatment on government contracts the system integrators were working on …” according to this article. We previously reported settlements by Hewlett-Packard and EMC. Reportedly, IBM, CSC, and PricewaterhouseCoopers have also settled similar suits filed by the two “private attorneys general.” Now Cisco and its distributor Westcon Group North America have settled their issues with the DOJ, by agreeing to pay $48 million.

Still preparing for litigation—or still negotiating with the DOJ—are Accenture and Sun Microsystems.


Former U.S. Army Contracting Officer Pleads Guilty

On September 10, 2010, the DOJ announced that William Armstrong “pleaded guilty to submitting a false statement to the U.S. Army” Contracting Agency. According to the press release, Mr. Armstrong was “former chief of the construction division of the Fort Carson Directorate of Contracting” for the Army. While serving in that capacity, Mr. Armstrong was required to submit an “annual confidential financial disclosure report. Apparently, he failed to disclose “reportable gifts” on the form. As the press release notes—

Armstrong indicated on the form that he had not received any reportable gifts in the previous year when, in fact, Armstrong had received several thousand dollars worth of gifts from a construction contractor that had substantial business with the Fort Carson Directorate of Contracting, the department said.

The DOJ made sure to report—

Armstrong faces a maximum sentence of five years in prison and a $250,000 fine.  The maximum fine may be increased to twice the gain derived from the crime or twice the loss suffered by the victims of the crime, if either of those amounts is greater than the statutory maximum fine.

Finally, it was noted that Mr. Armstrong’s plea bargain “is the first to arise from an ongoing investigation related to the award of construction contracts at Fort Carson.” Tellingly, the DOJ’s Antitrust Division is leading the investigation.


Agility Sees Fraud Charges Dropped

We have reported on the problems faced by Kuwait-based Agility (formerly Public Warehousing Company) several times. Perhaps the most comprehensive article is this one. Suffice to say, Agility has been dealing with numerous audit issues and fraud charges. We noted the back-and-forth between the company and Federal prosecutors, reporting—

Several court hearings have been delayed as the company worked to reach a settlement with prosecutors. And the firm’s lawyers have argued that prosecutors failed to properly serve the company because it sent the indictment to the company’s U.S. subsidiaries instead of through diplomatic channels in Kuwait.

On September 3, 2010, the Associated Press reported that a judge had “blocked” fraud charges against the Kuwait parent corporation, reporting—

U.S. Magistrate Judge Alan Baverman recommended that fraud charges against the Public Warehousing Co. not go forward because the indictment had not been properly served. A federal judge must now sign off on the move.


Prosecutors then asked Friday to have remaining charges dropped against the company's U.S.-based subsidiary, Agility DGS Holdings. Prosecutor Barbara Nelan said she didn't want the subsidiary to be a ‘straw man’ that took the fall for its parent company's wrongdoing.

The Judge’s 91-page opinion concluded that efforts to serve the parent company had been “insufficient.” Although the action looks like a victory for Agility, it is not likely to be the end of the battle. As the AP article noted—

The moves aren't likely to be the end of the case. Nelan said that investigators are still gathering details on the company's contracts and she did not rule out a new indictment for the companies.


‘This investigation is broadening every day,’ she said.


The food supplier's attorneys, too, are bracing for new charges. Tom Bever, who represents Agility DGS Holdings, urged the judge to order prosecutors to hand over more than 15 million pages of discovery, even if the case is dismissed, so they can prepare for a new round of charges.

To wrap-up, the legal Kabuki dance involved with prosecuting fraud, waste, and abuse continues. Large U.S.-based corporations settle to avoid the risk of even larger fines and potential penalties such as debarment. Individuals settle for pleading guilty to relative minor charges in order to avoid more perilous ones. And Agility continues to nimbly dance with the DOJ, protesting its innocence while paying big bucks for high-priced attorneys.

We would say, “stay tuned for further updates”—but that really doesn’t need to be said, does it?








 

What is Going-On with the Army’s NextGen Ground Combat Vehicle?

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On August 25, 2010, the U.S. Army cancelled the competition for its multi-billion dollar next-generation Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV). According to this Reuters article, the Army intends to issue a new RFP within 60 days, “delaying a contract award for up to six months.” The GCV program was intended to replace the ground vehicle portion of the troubled Future Combat System (FCS) program, which was terminated in the early days of the Obama Administration.

The GCV program has been a beset by delay after delay, as this Wikipedia article documents. This latest delay is another blow to the hopes of the competing teams. As Reuters reported—

The unexpected change to the Ground Combat Vehicle … program threatens jobs as well as revenue for the competing teams of companies and marks another setback for the Army's effort to develop new infantry vehicles. The prime contractors bidding for the program are: Science Applications International, Britain's BAE Systems, and General Dynamics Corp, and their subcontractors include many of the largest U.S. defense contractors, such as Lockheed Martin Corp, Boeing Co, and Raytheon Co. The Army is studying the impact on its fiscal 2011 budget request, which called for $934 million to start development of prototype new vehicles.

The Army’s rationale for cancelling the competition was (and remains) vague. The Reuters article noted that “a review done with Pentagon acquisition officials showed risks in proceeding as planned.” This article at the Army Times explored what went wrong. It concluded that the Army “overreached” and was overly ambitious in its plans to integrate developing technology into the program. As the article reported—

‘The new RFP will reflect changes to the program’s efforts to minimize technology integration risk and to ensure that we have a viable acquisition strategy to deliver the vehicle within seven years of the contract award,’ GCV program spokesman Paul Mehney said.

The article continued---

According to industry sources familiar with the first RFP, the requirements placed on industry were stringent and demanded an enormous level of armor to protect soldiers, the vehicle and its sensors. This led to heavy and costly solutions.


A disconnect emerged between what the Army required in its RFP and what the service expected to get, an industry source said. A light went on after industry responded to the Army’s questions about the June bids. The Army got a ‘resounding’ response from industry of ‘you asked for it, you got it,’ the source said.

Apparently, the Army realized that it was headed down the wrong path. A more cynical view wondered whether it ever intended to execute the program of record at all. The Army Times article reported—

One source who attended an Army industry day last fall said he wondered whether GCV was a ‘conceptual Kabuki dance’ meant to placate Gates until he retires, and then allow the Army to take a ‘deep and informed breath’ and figure out what it really needed.

But while the Army replans its GCV program to address technology readiness and armor requirements, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) is planning quantum leaps in the technology it will apply to GCV vehicle production. In mid-August, DARPA issued several draft “Broad Agency Announcements” (BAAs) looking for massive innovation in the design and production of various “complex cyber-electro-mechanical systems such as defense and aerospace vehicles.” One aspect of DARPA’s vision is vehicleforge.mil, which it described as “an open source hosting site for the collaborative development” of such systems.

Another aspect of the vision is iFAB. What is iFAB? In the words of the draft BAA—

The principal objective of iFAB … is to enable substantial compression of the time required to go from idea to product through a shift in the product value chain for defense systems from ‘little m’ manufacturing (i.e., fabrication) to the other elements of ‘big M’ Manufacturing (i.e., design, customization, after-market support, etc.). Such a shift requires significant de-coupling of production from the other phases and facets of ‘big M’ Manufacturing so as to enable its commoditization. One might term this the ‘foundry-style’ model of manufacturing. This model is an anathema to the current defense industry trend of tightly coupling design and prototyping through multiple design-build-test-redesign iterations. In fact, the iFAB vision is to move away from wrapping a capital-intensive manufacturing facility around a single defense product, and toward the creation of a flexible, programmable, potentially distributed production capability capable of accommodating a wide range of systems and system variants with extremely rapid reconfiguration timescales.

iFAB will be based on “a foundry-style manufacturing capability … capable of rapid reconfiguration to accommodate a wide range of design variability and specifically targeted at the fabrication of military ground vehicles.” Note the emphasis on fabrication of military ground vehicles—i.e., the GCV program. .

To emphasize the connection, we note DARPA’s Fast Adaptive Next-Generation Ground Combat Vehicle (FANG) program. Details are sketchy, but we found several links between FANG and iFAB. This article states—

The specific goals of the iFAB program are to rapidly design and configure manufacturing capabilities to support the fabrication of a wide array of infantry fighting vehicle models and variants. Parallel efforts titled vehicleforge.mil and Fast Adaptable Next-Generation Ground Combat Vehicle (FANG) seek to develop the infrastructure for and conduct a series of design challenges (termed Adaptive Make Challenges) intended to precipitate open source design for a prototype of the Army's Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV).

The iFAB end vision--to be developed in the second phase of the program which will be solicited under a separate BAA at the conclusion of the present effort--is that of a facility which can fabricate and assemble the winning FANG designs, verified and supplied in a comprehensive metalanguage representation with META/META-II tools.

In other words, DARPA is looking to apply wildly advanced technology to the program that is being delayed because of concerns related to (among other things) technological maturity.

We dig the irony.



 

Just How Important is Supply Chain Management to Operational Success?

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We have tooted horns and bloviated ‘til the bovines come home, but we’re afraid the message is not getting out. Listen, folks: Whether you call it Supply Chain Management, supplier management, or subcontractor management, it is the key to success. Period.

Your preoccupation with internal matters, your management metrics that focus only on internal issues (such as headcount), your application of Lean and Six Sigma solely to your own production line, your attempts to control cost growth by forcing suppliers into firm fixed-price development contracts or into making huge program “investments”—these actions betray a management naïveté, an erroneous impression that the management approach that worked to put a man on the Moon is the same approach that will lead to successful program execution in the 21st century.

Newsflash: it will not.

Program management in the 21st century looks completely different from how it looked 40 years ago. And nowadays it’s all about managing a large team to a successful outcome. It’s all about supplier management.

But don’t take our word for it. Look at the evidence and draw your own conclusion. Here are two recent news stories that show the pros and cons of revamping one’s approach to managing subcontractors.

In the first story, the Pentagon’s Missile Defense Agency has decided to “withhold” a $400 million Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) production contract from Lockheed Martin until it can prove it has solved quality and reliability problems associated with the “optical block switch” designed and manufactured by one of its subcontractors. According to this Wall Street Journal article—

Production of the missile, Gen. O'Reilly said, is ‘badly needed’ so the Army's first THAAD unit, stationed at Fort Bliss, Texas, can fully train on its equipment. But he said he would not approve a $400 million-plus production contract unless the company fixed the flaws and the safety device passed new qualification tests within the next 30 days.


‘I am holding their [the contractor's] feet to the fire,’ Gen. O'Reilly said. ‘I will not move forward until they satisfy all the quality requirements and all the production start-up requirements.’


According to Gen. O'Reilly, Lockheed offered a warranty over the part, called an optical block switch. If production is approved and new problems are discovered, the company will be liable for any extra costs stemming from production delays, he said.

This GlobalSecurityNewswire article reported LMCO’s reaction as follows—

The company suggested it could assume additional financial responsibility to secure the contract, Reuters reported. The firm proposed underwriting potential expenses that could result from halting and resuming the manufacturing process as the faulty switch is addressed. Approval of the component is expected next February.


‘We have taken responsibility for delivering the successful optical block switch solution as promised,’ [LMCO Spokesperson] Amerine stated by e-mail.

This article at SpaceNews fills in some of the gaps—

Dallas-based Lockheed Martin Missiles and Fire Control is the prime contractor for the MDA’s Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system, designed to destroy ballistic missiles in and above the Earth’s atmosphere.

Lockheed is under contract to deliver 50 THAAD interceptors and was expected to receive a production order for 48 more. However, an optical safety switch built by one of Lockheed’s subcontractors, Moog Inc., has repeatedly failed in testing, resulting in a production delay of at least six months, U.S. Army Lt. Gen. Patrick O’Reilly, the MDA’s director, told reporters at the Space and Missile Defense Conference here.

‘It’s very frustrating. After 10 years of development of this version of THAAD we’re down to one small component,’ O’Reilly said. ‘I’m sure half of the Lockheed workforce would like to personally rebuild it themselves.’ …

A redesigned safety switch has been built and is undergoing qualification testing, O’Reilly said. Though testing of the redesigned safety switch will not be fully complete until next February, the MDA and Lockheed have come to an unconventional arrangement in order to minimize the delay. If the first three new safety switches pass preliminary testing in September, MDA will allow Lockheed Martin to enter production in exchange for a warranty on all of the interceptors built under this contract, O’Reilly said.

To wrap this story up, we want to quote an August 19, 2010 story from the Aerospace Daily & Defense Report entitled, “MDA Contractor Woes Continue with Faulty Thaad Part.” It reported—

O’Reilly said he notified Lockheed Martin of the problem a year ago; the company offered other solutions that also failed to quality. Now the focus is on a redesign … As prime contractor, Lockheed is responsible for the quality of parts used in its systems, even if they come from a supplier such as Moog. Lockheed also offered to pay for any ‘financial setbacks’ that the program could encounter in the future as a result of problems with the optical block switch.

Let’s reprint one phrase from the foregoing for emphasis: “As prime contractor, Lockheed is responsible ….”

Yes, indeed.

Program quality and execution risk cannot be transferred to suppliers. The prime contractor is responsible to the customer for the program. Period. If your attorney counsels otherwise, you should hire another attorney. If your subcontract manager or buyer or procurement specialist tells you that cost or schedule or quality or performance risk has been controlled by pushing it downwards in the supply chain, you should put a better support team in place.

Because you cannot build a wall between team members on a program; you cannot say, “This is your responsibility and this is my responsibility.” You cannot transfer risk; the most you can do is to share it. The more that design information and risk information is shared, and communicated, and managed as a team, the better the outcome. When you treat your suppliers as individual entities that succeed, or fail, on their own, then you will always suboptimize your outcome. That is axiomatic. It is a nearly inviolate law of 21st century program management.

As Lockheed Martin learned to its chagrin.

On a more positive note, Raytheon may be getting the message. We recently reported that Raytheon won the Small Diameter Bomb Increment II (GBU-53/B) competition against the odds-on favorite team of industry giants, Boeing and Lockheed Martin. After receiving its debriefing, the losing team declined not to protest the award—which is a rarity these days. Clearly, Raytheon’s technical approach and pricing gave them such a competitive advantage that the award decision was unimpeachable. Raytheon’s winning approach is worth studying.

Several articles indicated that Raytheon’s decision to use an uncooled infrared seeker was a key technical and cost differentiator. As DefenseIndustryDaily reported—

Uncooled infrared involves a performance hit over cooled infrared designs, in exchange for snap-attack capability, better reliability, and lower production and maintenance costs. Raytheon could work to adapt the IIR seeker in their AGM-154 JSOW as a starting point, and they did eventually produce a version that fit SDB-II, was cheaper to manufacture, and more than met government requirements.

But perhaps more importantly, DID reported that “Raytheon executives said that they also took a somewhat different supply-chain approach to the SDB-II.” According to the article—

[Raytheon picked] suppliers early and then work[ed] directly with them to improve productivity at every step. While Raytheon prototyped their final assembly line, and began using lean production techniques to reduce the amount of ‘touch labor’ and improve productivity, they brought in suppliers to do the same thing. For instance, Celestica engineers were embedded with the team, in order to run their own producibility tools on circuit card designs and refine them to improve yield and costs. Rockwell Collins, who makes the datalink, did the same thing. This is not uncommon in general manufacturing, but defense manufacturing has traditionally been more stovepiped.

Raytheon’s initial team during development will be about 300, but this is expected to drop below 50 for production phase – in part because Raytheon has already used lean techniques, and focused from the beginning on creating a design that was simpler to manufacture.

Raytheon’s suppliers included General Dynamics OTS, Klune Industries, Rockwell Collins, Raytheon Dene, Goodrich, and Cobham. As the article above notes, Raytheon invested in its supply chain and worked with its suppliers in a partnership to develop common processes and align approaches.

This is how it is done, folks. This is how you build a program team that shares risks and responsibilities, as opposed to an adversarial team where the overall program objectives are subliminated to the needs of the individual business entity.

(Boeing 787 team, are you listening?)


 

 

New DCAA Audit Guidance Clarifies Audits of Indirect Rates Used in Cost Estimates

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We previously shared our thoughts regarding DCAA’s June 4, 2010 audit guidance found in Memorandum for Regional Directors (MRD) 10-PSP-018(R). In that MRD, auditors were directed to disclaim any opinion on any indirect rates found in a contractor’s cost proposal (which DCAA calls “forward pricing rates”) where those rates had not yet been audited by the agency.

Where those rates were based on a negotiated Forward Pricing Rate Agreement (FPRA) with the DCMA. DCAA should not accept the FPRA rates until auditors had completed “detailed testing” and other “analytical procedures” in order to be able to opine on them. Where FPRA rates had been audited, but the DCMA Administrative Contracting Officer negotiated differing indirect cost rates with the contractor, then the DCAA auditor may accept them. However, where the auditor “believes the ACO did not fully consider the DCAA audit results and there are significant differences between the DCAA recommended rates and the FPRA or FPRR,” then the auditor should elevate the disagreement pursuant to the DCAA/DCMA dispute resolution process.”

And “If the pricing proposal audit report must be issued prior to resolving this disagreement, the audit opinion should reflect the DCAA recommended rates.” In other words, the audit guidance directed the DCAA auditor to substitute his/her judgment for that of the DOD representative who has the authority to bind the government.

** Insert eye roll here**

Suffice it to say that we were less than enamored of that piece of audit guidance.

But we are a bit happier with the DCAA’s latest MRD, 10-PSP-021(R), issued on August 24, 2010, which “clarifies” the previous “guidance on the expectations regarding the contractors’ use and extent of budgetary data in support of forward pricing rates.” We’ll provide some quoted bits from that MRD—

  • Contractors must indicate how they computed and applied their indirect rates while also showing trends and budgetary data with explanations to support the reasonableness of the rates per the requirements of FAR Part 15. The extent of detail will vary depending on the specific data supporting each Fiscal Year and based on the size and complexity of the contractor.

  • When auditing proposed indirect rates, auditors should perform substantive procedures to evaluate the reasonableness of the contractor’s basis of estimate (e.g., budgetary data and historical costs/trends). When historical contractor data is used to support the basis of estimate, the auditor must document the substantive audit procedures performed (previously or currently) to ensure the historical data is in reasonable compliance with FAR Part 31.

Well, that doesn’t seem too bad, does it? But that’s not all. The MRD contained some—shall we say aggressive?—bits as well.

The audit guidance opined that the “overarching principal of FAR Part 15” [sic] is that “the contracting officer must purchase supplies and services at fair and reasonable prices.” That’s more or less correct, but then the audit guidance states, “Contractors are generally required to follow the Table 15-2 instructions for submitting proposals as contained within FAR 15.408.” Well, that’s not true at all. Contractors are only required to follow the proposal format instructions found in FAR Table 15-2 when they are submitting cost or pricing data. (Or, if you will, “certified” cost or pricing data, based on the recently revised FAR definition(s).) If the contractor is not submitting cost or pricing data, it is not required to follow the format of Table 15-2.

(Now there may be some room for controversy here. If you follow the link above to the article, you would see that the phrase “information other than [certified] cost or pricing data” has been redefined to encompass “the identical types of data as certified cost or pricing data, consistent with Table 15–2 of 15.408, but without the certification.” That phrase strikes us as patently ambiguous, but we bet DCAA will seize on it as requiring that all cost information be submitted in the format of Table 15-2—which we would argue would be an incorrect reading of the requirements.)

Anyway, back to the MRD.

After declaring that contractors are “generally required” to follow the format and instructions of Table 15-2, the DCAA audit guidance then stated that Table 15-2 requires contractors to “indicate how they computed and applied indirect rates while also showing trends and budgetary data with appropriate explanations to support the reasonableness of the proposed rates.” The MRD used this as a foundation to state—

Therefore, in accordance with FAR Part 15, a contractor’s indirect rates should be based on a well-supported basis of estimate for each Fiscal Year of the proposed period of contract performance. To demonstrate reasonableness, contractors must show how they computed and applied the indirect rates while also providing supporting trend and budgetary data with appropriate explanations commensurate with the size and complexity of the contractor’s organization. The contractor’s proposal should be prepared in accordance with the contract cost principles and procedures in FAR Part 31 and, when applicable, the requirements and procedures in 48 CFR Chapter 99, Cost Accounting Standards (see requirements of FAR 15.404-1(c)(2)(iv)).

There’s more. The audit guidance stated—

At larger contractors it would be expected that the proposed indirect rates for the first year be based on a detailed management-approved operating budget, and each subsequent period be based on adjustments to the operating budget based on strategic or long-range forecasts (e.g., plant expansions, expected business volume, etc.). At a large contractor, with a board of directors, one would expect detailed budgets and forecasts to be in place to provide the directors with knowledge of future planned capital expenditures and other strategic and long range objectives. The contractor’s proposed rates should be consistent with this budgetary data.

Now, we all know that there is almost no chance that any contractor, large or small, has detailed operating plans that project out for any great length of time. Although some of the language above seems to expect a “well-supported estimate for each Fiscal Year of the proposed period of contract performance,” other parts seem to be more forgiving, stating that only the first year needs to be supported with a “detailed management-approved operating budget” and that subsequent periods can be based on “adjustments” to that first year budget “based on strategic or long-range forecasts.”

That seems fairly reasonable, assuming somebody has made those “strategic or long-range forecasts” and has shared them with those people calculating the forward pricing rates used in cost proposals. As the MRD stated, “Generally, the level of forecasted detail will decrease as the period being estimated moves further into the future and the uncertainty of conditions and potential events grows. Therefore, it is not expected that even larger contractors prepare detailed operating budgets for each Fiscal Year of contract performance….” Seems okay, right?

But wait a second. Let’s look a bit deeper at the MRD. It stated—

The FAR requires an explanation of how the rates were derived for each of the out-years to allow the contracting officer to ascertain the reasonableness of the rates. For example, flat-lining out-year rates with no explanation to support that the rates will not change in future periods is not adequate. Adjustments to out-year pools and bases should be made based on reasonable sales forecasts and the contractor’s assumptions for changes to major groupings of costs (e.g., variable, semi-variable, and fixed). In addition, for multi-segment contractor organizations the budgets and forecasts should reconcile for all significant cost allocations and interdivisional effort supporting the proposed rates.

We would be shocked if the large multi-segment contractors ensured that their out-years’ rates were based on budgetary data that reconciled for “all significant cost allocations and interdivisional effort.” That’s simply a huge amount of effort—nearly impossible within any reasonable timeline.

Although the audit guidance told DCAA auditors that “the extent of data supporting a contractor’s proposed indirect rates will vary,” the standards it applied to the largest contractors would be extremely difficult to meet. What happens if a contractor can’t satisfy the auditor that its forward pricing rates are well-supported and based on budgetary data?

In such cases, the MRD stated—

As outlined in CAM 9-205(d), if the contractor’s indirect rate forecasts are not adequately supported throughout the entire period of performance and are so deficient that an examination of the unsupported years cannot be performed, the auditor should recommend that the contracting officer return the proposal to the contractor.

We opined in our previous article that DCAA’s recent audit guidance was tantamount to throwing a monkey wrench into the gears of the DOD acquisition machinery. While there are a few nuggets of goodness in this latest MRD, our opinion is that there also much in it that we believe supports our previous opinion. We understand the audit agency’s need for independence—but if this is the price we have to pay for independence, then we urge the Pentagon to figure out another way of getting contractor proposals evaluated so that the parties can negotiate a reasonable price.






 


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Newsflash

Effective January 1, 2019, Nick Sanders has been named as Editor of two reference books published by LexisNexis. The first book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Cost Accounting Standards. Nick replaces Darrell Oyer, who has edited those books for many years.