GTSI Suspended for Problems with Small Business Set-Asides
administrator
On October 4, 2010, FederalTimes.com carried a small story, which reported that GTSI Corporation
had been suspended by the General Services Administration (GSA) from
receiving future awards from the Federal government. GTSI is a mid-size
reseller of computer software and other IT-related applications
(including systems integration services), based in Northern Virginia
(near Dulles Airport). Reportedly, the GSA alleged that—
… the
evidence shows that GTSI was an active participant in a scheme that
resulted in contracts set-aside for small businesses being awarded to
ineligible contractors and with contracts not being performed in
accordance with applicable law, regulations and contract terms …
A copy of the suspension letter was posted on-line by GovExec.com—you can find it here.
The letter alleges that GTSI, who did not qualify as a small business,
was a subcontractor on a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) contract
that was set-aside for small business bids. The letter alleges that—
There
is evidence that GTSI’s prime contractors had little to no involvement
in the performance of the contracts, in direct contravention of
applicable laws and regulations regarding the award of small business
contracts. The evidence shows that GTSI was an active participant in a
scheme that resulted in contracts set-aside for small businesses being
awarded to ineligible contractors, and with contracts not being
performed in accordance with applicable law, regulations, and contact
terms.
In
order to allow the prime contractors to appear eligible … GTSI actively
engaged in conduct concealing the extent of its involvement as a
subcontractor …. [including such actions as] GTSI created invoices and
placed the letterhead of the prime contractor on the invoice … so the
invoice would appear to have been created by the prime contractor rather
than by GTSI.
This
is a big deal for GTSI. As the FederalTimes article notes, “Last year,
some 72 percent of GTSI's $762 million in sales came from the Defense
Department and other federal agencies, according to its most recent
annual report.” It is such a big deal, that it reportedly cratered an
upcoming acquisition of GTSI by Eyak Technologies, LLC—who is an Alaska
Native Corporation (ANC). The FederalTimes article reports that, “Eyak …
said in a statement … that it was withdrawing its $7.50 per share cash
proposal ‘in order to carefully evaluate the effect of the SBA's action
upon GTSI.’”
GTSI’s
future, then, is threatened on two fronts—the termination of an
upcoming acquisition, and potential loss of nearly three-quarters of its
annual revenue. For its part, the company asserted that it did nothing
wrong. As reported by the FederalTimes article—
‘Until
tonight, no government agency had made an allegation that GTSI had
violated any law or regulations regarding this matter,’ [GTSI CEO Scott]
Friedlander wrote. ‘Please be assured that we will fight to restore our
good name.’
A couple of days later, Robert Brodsky reported further details on GTSI’s problems at GovExec.com. He reported—
The
allegations against GTSI stem from a contract awarded two years ago. In
September 2008, a joint venture company known as MultiMaxArray was
awarded a $165 million delivery order on Homeland Security's FirstSource
information technology contract. FirstSource was a 100 percent small
business set-aside contract reserved for companies with fewer than 150
employees.
Days
after the award, Wildflower International Ltd., an IT firm that
promotes itself as New Mexico's largest woman-owned small business,
filed a protest … arguing MultiMaxArray was not eligible for the
contract. …
Among
Wildflower's arguments was MultiMaxArray was little more than a front
company and most, if not all, the work was to be performed by GTSI, a
company that, based on its size, was ineligible for the FirstSource
contract. …
The
protest filing said GTSI had ‘taken control’ of MultiMaxArray, which at
the time of the delivery order, had ceased to exist due to a merger
months earlier with Harris Technical Services Corp., Wildflower said.
‘GTSI
apparently designs the systems necessary to satisfy a FirstSource
delivery order, selects the computer hardware and software
configurations, negotiates pricing with the vendors, prepares the
MultiMaxArray proposal and then performs all of the necessary services
to install, maintain and provide technical support and training for the
DHS user,’ the protest document said. The protest further claimed that
during the kick-off meeting for the contract, several GTSI employees
represented the prime contractor to discuss performance of the delivery
order. Ultimately, MultiMaxArray decided not to fight the protest and
the contract was terminated.
Tellingly, Brodsky noted that, “This
is not the first time GTSI has been in trouble with the government. In
June 2005, the SBA inspector general recommended the government
permanently debar GTSI for misrepresenting itself as a small business on
a Navy IT hardware contract.” However (as Brodsky noted), “after
reviewing the recommendation, the SBA's Office of General Counsel
decided it did not have the authority to debar GTSI since it was not an
SBA contract in question.”
Finally, Brodsky noted that this is not an isolated incident. He reported that, “The
SBA IG also is investigating GTSI's actions in regard to its conduct as
a subcontractor on other set-aside contracts, including those awarded
to ANCs.”
Catch-Up Time: Bribery, False Statements, and DCAA Justice
administrator
We’re
back from the Apogee Consulting, Inc. annual fall maintenance
shut-down, and ready to catch-up on some news. Here we go—
1. We
previously
reported the
sordid little tale of two former Staff Sergeants in the U.S. Army,
stationed at a Forward Operating Base in Afghanistan, who accepted
bribes and falsified documents in order to facilitate theft of fuel
by a government contractor. Our prior story reported that (former)
Staff Sergeant Michael Dugger (age 27) had pleaded guilty to one
count of receiving a bribe as a public official, but that his alleged
co-conspirator, (former) Staff Sergeant Stevan Ringo (age 26), had
turned-in a plea of not guilty. Well that’s changed.
On
September 24, 2010, the Department of Justice announced
that Ringo had decided to plead guilty to one count of bribery.
Ringo, like Dugger, now faces up to 15 years in prison plus monetary
fines. As the DOJ reported—
Ringo
was stationed at Forward Operating Base (FOB) Shank, a U.S. Army
installation in the Logar Province of Eastern Afghanistan. FOB
Shank supports U.S. military operations in Afghanistan in various
ways, including through fuel receipt and redistribution. More
specifically, the Army stores large quantities of fuel at FOB Shank
and redistributes that fuel to installations in the surrounding area
through government contractors. Ringo’s responsibilities at FOB
Shank included supervision of that fuel redistribution process.
In
his guilty plea, Ringo admitted that between December 2009 and
February 2010, he accepted more than $400,000 in cash payments from a
government contractor in exchange for creating and submitting
fraudulent paperwork permitting that contractor to steal fuel from
FOB Shank. The total value of the fuel stolen in the course of the
scheme was nearly $1.5 million.
2. We
have reported (several times) on compliance implications associated
with falsely certifying business socioeconomic status. For example,
in this
article we
reported on a firm that settled allegations it improperly reported
the extent to which minority and disadvantaged business enterprises
were performing work on its public construction contract, and in
another
article we
reported the story of an Alaska Native Corporation (ANC) that was
alleged not to qualify for status as an SBA 8(a) business. Here’s
a story about affiliated companies that falsely claimed to be HUBZone
business entities.
CSI
Engineering and CSI Design Build, located in Beltsville, Md., and
their president, Debdas Ghosal, have agreed to pay the United States
$200,000 to settle claims that they used false statements to obtain
contracts from several government agencies. … The United States
alleged that CSI Design Build falsely represented to the SBA and
other government agencies that it maintained its principal office in
a designated HUBZone location in Maryland. According to the
government, CSI Design Build actually operated as part of CSI
Engineering, which was not located in a HUBZone. Both companies are
owned by Debdas Ghosal. Despite not qualifying for the HUBZone
program, CSI Design Build was awarded contracts that had been set
aside for qualified HUBZone companies based upon the false statements
it made to the SBA and the contracting agencies. The company obtained
HUBZone contracts from the Army, the Department of Labor, the
Department of Homeland Security and the Smithsonian Institution.
As
the DOJ release notes—
Under
the HUBZone program, companies that maintain their principal office
in a designated area and employ 35 percent of their workforce from
that area, among other requirements, can apply to the Small Business
Administration (SBA) for certification as a HUBZone small business
company. HUBZone companies can then use this certification when
bidding on government contracts. In certain cases, government
agencies will restrict competition for a contract to
HUBZone-certified companies.
It
was not made clear how the $200,000 settlement was reached. So we
are left to wonder whether it was based on the number of false
statements made, the number of false claims submitted under contracts
tainted by the false statements, or whether it had something to do
with profits made under the fraudulently obtained contracts. It
would be helpful to us—and we believe to our readers as well—if
the DOJ would clarify whether the settlement made such improper
business practices unprofitable, or not.
3. If
you’ve seen our presentation on the “DOD Oversight Wars” you
know that one of the great unanswered questions of 2009 was why then
DCAA Director April Stephenson never fired any of the audit agency
executives who were accused of such infractions as allowing audit
scope to be influenced by buying commands (and/or contractors),
changing audit findings, and whistle-blower retaliation. Clearly,
taking action would have appeased the agency’s critics and might
have helped her keep her job. We’ve seen speculation that her
hands were tied by agency counsel, who forbade her from taking any
action while investigations were open against the individuals (who
after all were entitled to the protections of their civil service
positions). But we’ve never seen anything definitive, and it has
remained one of the mysteries of the situation.
So
we were very interested in this recent
report by
Robert Brodsky at GovExec.com, in which he noted a one-line September
27, 2010 memo to DCAA employees, stating that, “in light of the
investigations at DCAA,” Ms. Susan Barajas was “no longer an
active DCAA employee.” According to the article, Ms. Barajas was
the Deputy Director of the Western Region, and was implicated in some
of the shenanigans cited by the GAO in the two audit quality reports
it issued, which were subsequently confirmed by the DOD Inspector
General. As the article noted—
It is
not clear whether the investigations Fitzgerald referred to in his
memo on Barajas' departure are related to the 2008 GAO report, but if
they are, the deputy regional director would be the first DCAA career
employee to face substantive disciplinary action as a result of the
findings.
As
is the case with almost all GovExec.com articles about the troubled
Defense audit agency, the comments were brutal. That said, a couple
of them caught our eye. Here they are, unedited and unverified:
“The
agency wide memo from Director Fitzgerald sounds great but why is
that many within DCAA are saying that Barajas was allowed to retire
at age 55 with her full pension. DCAA allowed her to remain on the
payroll for two years after all these findings came to light and then
retire with her full pension and no penalty for leaving early. Why
were these facts not reported? This woman went after little people
and showed no mercy, yet she was allowed to hang around for over two
years and then collect her six figure pension. Just goes to show you
how there are different rules for different people within DCAA. But
hey at least we got rid of one bad egg. Why not ask the Western
Regional Director who was her boss to leave or do we have to wait ten
years until he is 55? We have many more who need to call it a
career.”
“In
an old school, good-old-boy Agency, 2 women are made the scapegoats
and forced out.”
“It
seems to me her departure is being percieved as a sort of
chemo-therapy. We're not sure which was worse, the cure or the
disease. The director is limited in what he can do, not so much the
political appointees; the Secretary of Defense could have taken an
interest in correcting this agency a long time ago. He still has a
chance to clear out the Executive Steering Committee and give the
director a chance to make positive changes.
At
some point the agency is going to have evolve into a federal agency,
follow the law, provide a service to tax payers, and a good start
could be adhering to a code of ethics - real philisophical ethics,
not the auditor ethics that are being ignored anyway. It doesn't take
much time to see the left hand has no concept of the right hand.
Contridiction exists in practically everything we do - and we look
like a joke.”
We
have much more to write about—but we’ll save additional topics
for another day.
DCAA Helps Auditors to Communicate
administrator
We recently told you about brand-new audit guidance (MRD 10-PSP-023(R))
that encouraged DCAA auditors to support DCMA contracting officer
negotiations with contractors—but placed limits on that interaction. We
asserted that some of those limits would leave “the contracting officer
and buying commands stuck in limbo” for perhaps 90 days, “awaiting a
supplemental report in order to have DCAA officially alter its original
opinion based on receipt of new facts” provided by the contractors
during negotiations. We liked the idea that DCAA HQ was encouraging its
auditors to get back in the role of providing financial advisory
services to DCMA, but we didn’t much care for the stringent limits and
narrow-minded approach the audit agency placed on its auditors.
Thus,
we were very interested in receiving an official DCAA PowerPoint
presentation used to train auditors on the “’Rules of Engagement’ for
Auditor Communications.” The presentation we received included the
speaker’s notes in addition to the slides themselves. The presentation
was undated; however, we believe it to be contemporaneous with the
September 9, 2010 MRD discussed in the link above. If you are a site
member, you can find the entire presentation here. For the rest of you, here’s a brief overview.
The
presentation did more than encourage auditors to communicate with both
requestors of audits and those being audited—it actually stated that
such communications were required. The notes stated—
While
GAGAS specifically addresses communication at the planning and
reporting stages, communicating with the contractor and requestor
throughout all phases of an audit is necessary to comply with other
GAGAS requirements. For example, GAGAS 6.04b requires the auditor to
obtain sufficient evidence to provide a reasonable basis for the
conclusion expressed in the report. To obtain sufficient evidence, it is
essential for auditors to communicate with the contractor to ensure
that conclusions are based on a full understanding of all relevant
facts. In addition, discussions with the requestor may disclose
information relevant to the audit. Such discussions are a normal part of
an audit and can be conducted without impairing an auditor’s
independence.
As we’ve previously noted,
the U.S. Air Force recently implemented a new process designed to
facilitate the negotiation and final price agreement for Undefinitized
Contract Actions (UCAs). We also noted that the DCAA issued audit
guidance regarding the auditors’ roles in that process, which included
attending the mandatory “proposal walk-through” for Government
personnel. Tellingly, the presentation treated the Air Force’s focused
UCA definitization process as the norm for all contractor proposals, including proposals to establish final indirect cost rates. The presentation stated—
At
the commencement of the audit the contractor should provide Government
representatives (e.g., DCAA, ACO, and PCO) with a ‘walk-through’ of its
assertion (e.g., forward pricing proposal, incurred cost submission).
The walk-through should generally take place after the auditor performs
an initial adequacy review of the contractor’s assertion and may occur
either before or during the entrance conference. At these meetings, the
contractor should fully explain its assertion and allow the audit team
to ask questions to fully understand the contractor’s assertion. This
process will facilitate the early identification of any inadequacies
with the contractor’s assertion that needs to be addressed.
Yikes!
How did an Air Force process designed to expedite proposal negotiations
with the contracting officer, in order to meet specific statutory
deadlines, morph into this?
Apparently, the walk-through is now hosted by DCAA “either before or
during the entrance conference,” and not the contracting officer. It is
now to be expected for all proposals, not just those for large
sole-source procurements and for definitization of UCAs. And it is now
to be used by DCAA to identify inadequacies, instead of to facilitate
negotiations. How did we get from there to here? (Note: that was a rhetorical question.)
Much
criticism has been leveled at DCAA—by us and many others—regarding the
lack of communication with those being audited. In fact, we recently
wrote—
[Audit]
reports that have been issued, generally have been riddled with factual
errors and other quality shortcomings, because (a) auditors are afraid
to openly communicate with those they are auditing (as well as those
agency customers requesting the audits), and (b) once the auditors reach
a preliminary finding, everybody (from the auditor to the supervisory
auditor to the branch manager to the regional audit manager) is afraid
to change it—even when confronted by facts that would lead a reasonable
person to a different conclusion.
So
we were pleased to see the presentation emphasize that it’s perfectly
okay for auditors to actually communicate with contractors during an
audit. Moreover, preliminary findings should be discussed with the
contractor so as to see if there are any facts that would tend to lead a
reasonable person to a different conclusion. The presentation stated—
Discuss
matters as needed for a full understanding of contractor’s basis for
each item in submission or aspect of area being audited. Discuss
preliminary audit findings (potential system deficiencies, FAR/CAS
noncompliances, etc.) so that conclusions are based on a complete
understanding of all pertinent facts. Through-out the audit, the auditor
should discuss matters with the contractor as needed to obtain a full
understanding of the contractor’s basis for each item in the submission,
or each aspect of the area subject to audit. The auditor should discuss
preliminary audit findings (e.g., potential system deficiencies,
potential FAR/CAS noncompliances, etc.) with the contractor to ensure
conclusions are based on a complete understanding of all pertinent
facts. These types of discussions do not impair auditor independence and
are generally necessary to obtain sufficient evidence to support audit
conclusions.
We
were also pleased to see that an exit conference should be held
promptly “after completion of field work.” But despite that very helpful
language, the presentation also contradicted that statement, saying
that exit conferences were to be held “upon completion of field work and
after supervisory review and FAO manager approval (or all management
reviews if RAM/DAM review is required).” So which is it? We’ll post the
exact language below and let you decide—
Upon
completion of the field work, the auditor should hold the exit
conference to discuss the audit results and obtain the contractor’s
views concerning the findings, conclusions, and recommendations for
inclusion in the audit report as required by GAGAS. Except for audits
requiring RAM/DAM review, the exit conference may be held after the
supervisor completes his/her review of the working paper and draft
report but before the FAO manager completes the final review if the FAO
manager believes it is appropriate based on his/her involvement with the
audit, and/or the complexity of the audit and the experience of the
audit team. In such cases, the auditor should inform the contractor that
the results are subject to management review. For audits requiring
RAM/DAM review, all applicable management reviews must be completed
prior to holding the exit conference. The auditor should invite the
requestor/contracting officer to the exit conference, especially if
there are major or complex audit issues.
We
want to be excited about this, we really do. But we think it’s more
likely that the requirement for supervisory review of the draft report,
and potential FAO manager review of the working papers and draft report,
will mean that the contractor won’t hear about the auditor’s
findings/conclusions until it is too late to affect them with
explanations and facts. Yes, it’s true that “preliminary audit findings”
are to be discussed with the contractor, but that really doesn’t happen
very often. It’s great when it does happen, but the exit conference is
also an opportunity to hear and rebut preliminary findings—or at least
it used to be. Not so much anymore, apparently.
Moreover, the presentation included guidance that—
The
information provided to the contractor at or in anticipation of the
exit conference (i.e., draft report/results or, in the case of
forecasted costs subject to negotiations, factual information) should be
provided concurrently to the requestor/contracting officer.
So
by the time the contractor learns about the auditor’s official
findings/conclusions—but has not yet submitted a written response to
those findings/conclusions—so has the customer. The customer gets an
unrebutted audit report, one that lacks the contractor’s official
response. That’s nice. (Note: that was sarcasm.)
To
sum up, we expect to use this presentation in our interactions with
DCAA, to try to force more open communication, especially to try to
learn about preliminary audit issues before they get into draft audit
reports. But we know from experience that the strategy will not always
work. And now we know that if we don’t learn about those issues before
the exit conference, then it will be too late—because the DCMA
contracting officer will be receiving a one-sided report at about the
same time we’re hearing the auditor’s findings for the first time.
DCAA Stomps on Ray of Hope Offered by DFARS Class Deviation
administrator
We recently wrote
about a “ray of hope” offered by the August 17, 2010 DFARS Class
Deviation issued by the Honorable Shay Assad, Director, Defense
Procurement and Acquisition Policy. The Class Deviation deleted the
words “for contractors with approved billing systems” from DFARS
language discussing DCAA’s authority to “authorize direct submission of
interim vouchers for provisional payment to the [DOD] disbursing
office.” In other words, whether or not DCAA authorized a contractor to
directly submit its invoices to DFAS was no longer tied to the adequacy
of the contractor’s billing system.
We
thought this was great news, especially given DCAA official position on
the matter (as expressed in the DCAA Contract Audit Manual), which was:
“It is Agency policy to
obtain the maximum contractor participation in the direct submission
(direct billing) of interim vouchers program.” Great news, we thought,
because now DCAA could follow its policy and restore the direct billing
authority for all the contractors where that authority had been
withdrawn based on inadequate or unaudited business systems (which, by
the way, were not necessarily the contractors’ billing systems).
We
thought it was also great news for the audit agency, because it could
redeploy its scarce audit resources away from this non-valued-added
activity toward areas with more risk and vulnerability for waste, fraud,
and abuse. Given that the contractors were only submitting “interim
vouchers for provisional payment,” the risk of overpayment was minimal.
After all, those vouchers and contract costs were going to be reviewed
again during the audits of the contractors’ incurred costs. Redundant
audits made no sense, especially when DCAA was so under-resourced it
could only audit 65% of the audits it was required to perform (by its
own admission).
This was great news. Hallelujah! Or so we thought.
But we were wrong.
DCAA issued Memorandum for Regional Directors MRD 10-PPD-022(R)
on August 26, 2010, in order to clarify that DCAA’s policy of denying
contractors direct billing authority based on inadequate or unaudited
business systems was unaffected by the Class Deviation. The MRD stated—
This deviation does not impact current DCAA policy for authorizing
contractors direct billing authority (CAM 6-1007). Auditors should
continue to use existing policy for authorizing contractors direct
billing authority and the additional guidance provided in MRD
09-PPD-006(R), dated April 15, 2009.
Now it seemed to us that the intent of the Class Deviation was exactly aimed
at impacting the current DCAA policy. But DCAA not only disagreed with
our interpretation of the intent of the Class Deviation, it also
asserted that the Class Deviation was issued at its request! The MRD
reported—
The deviation was issued to address a DoDIG interpretation of the
subject DFARS language. The DoDIG has interpreted that the DFARS
language requires that a comprehensive evaluation of the billing system
internal controls is required for all contractors to participate in the
direct billing program. We determined that conducting such reviews at
smaller contractors would not be a prudent use of audit resources or
taxpayer dollars. DCAA currently performs other audit procedures
tailored to the risk to the Government when authorizing nonmajor
contractors to direct bill. Therefore, we requested the DFARS class
deviation to allow DCAA to use its existing policies and procedures for
authorizing the direct submission of interim vouchers for provisional
payment to the disbursing office.
So
according to DCAA, the Class Deviation applies only to “nonmajor”
contractors, such as small businesses. The “major” contractors will
continue to suffer delays in cash receipts.
First,
we question DCAA’s interpretation. We don’t care what DCAA intended the
Class Deviation to do; all we have to go on is what it says. The “plain
language” of the Class Deviation removes the linkage between direct
billing authority and business system adequacy. Period.
The Class Deviation does not contain any express language that would
limit its application only to businesses of a certain size or class.
While it may be true that the intent was to make the Class Deviation
applicable only to small businesses, that’s not what the regulation
says—either before or after the deletion of the language.
Granted,
DCAA has the authority to authorize or not authorize direct billing
authority, and it can do so based on whatever rationale it wants to cook
up. But at least its actions should be consistent with its own
published policy, or so it seems to us.
Second,
we note that, based on the date of the MRD, it should have been
published on the DCAA website already. The website says it includes all
audit guidance “open as of August 31, 2010”—but you can’t find this
particular one listed there. DCAA has told contractors that it publishes
all releasable open audit guidance every month, but this particular MRD
somehow slipped through the cracks. We have to ask whether DCAA is
trying to slip its flawed interpretation under the radar?
This
is not the first time that DCAA has delayed, for whatever reason,
publishing audit guidance for inspection by the public. Given the Obama
Administration’s push
for openness and transparency, we would have thought that DCAA would be
eager to share all of its audit guidance with the public in a timely
fashion. And just like our thoughts about the DFARS Class Deviation, we
would have been wrong.
Perhaps
we are overreacting to the situation. It wouldn’t be the first time!
But here’s how we see it: DCAA is interpreting the current DFARS
language (after implementation of the Class Deviation) in a manner that
appears to be arbitrary, capricious, and self-serving. It appears to be
interpreting the DFARS language in a manner that is inconsistent with
its own policy statements and in a manner that actually harms its own
self-interest, as it cannot redeploy audit resources to more fruitful
areas as it should.
DCAA
reports to DOD Comptroller Hale in a separate vertical from that of
DCMA. But given that the Class Deviation was issued by the DOD
Procurement and Acquisition Policy Directorate, one might think it would
carry some weight with the DOD auditors. Can DCAA simply ignore
promulgations it disagrees with—or reinterpret them in ways it finds
more palatable? Or is this situation something akin to insubordination?
We don’t know, but (frankly) nothing DCAA says or does surprises us
anymore.
Finally, President Obama has issued an Open Government Directive,
and that Directive applies to all Executive Agencies and
Departments—including the DOD and its auditors, the DCAA. That Directive
states—
Agencies
shall respect the presumption of openness by publishing information
online (in addition to any other planned or mandated publication
methods) and by preserving and maintaining electronic information,
consistent with the Federal Records Act and other applicable law and
policy. Timely publication of information is an essential component of
transparency. Delays should not be viewed as an inevitable and
insurmountable consequence of high demand.
Given
that DCAA is not publishing its audit guidance timely, one has to ask
whether it is meeting the expectations established by the President’s
Directive. Or is DCAA treating that Directive with the same strategy it
has applied to the DFARS Class Deviation?
But perhaps that’s not all … Dare we say it?
Yeah, let’s go there …
By
apparently ignoring the requirements of the Open Government Directive,
is DCAA being insubordinate to the lawful orders of the
Commander-in-Chief? In a time of war?
Okay, we admit it—we are definitely
overreacting to the situation. But we’re concerned, and we’re asking
tough (rhetorical) questions. If DCAA wants to email us an official
response, we’ll be happy to post it here. And we’ll post it timely, too.
And
you too can post your thoughts on this site. Every member can post
comments here, and you are welcome to do so. Agree, disagree, or have a
story to share? Feel free to leave a comment.
Will A&D Industry Embrace Rapid Prototyping?
administrator
Our
aim here at Apogee Consulting, Inc. is to move above and beyond cost
accounting, contract administration, and other back-office matters, to
see a bigger picture that encompasses all facets of a company’s
business, including operations and program execution. We believe our
viewpoint, created (as it were) from a higher perspective, creates more
value for our clients. (Thus: the use of the term “Apogee” in our
corporate name.) We like to demonstrate our higher perspective, from
time to time, by focusing on issues such as technological innovations.
This is one of those times.
We previously discussed
issues associated with the U.S. Army’s NextGen Ground Combat Vehicle
(GCV). One of the more interesting aspects of that troubled program was
the interaction of the rather prosaic armored vehicle with the utterly
innovative approach to rapid prototyping and production envisioned for
it by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). As you may
recall, the Army reportedly intended to award nearly $1 billion during
Government Fiscal Year 2011, to “start development of new prototype
vehicles,” but the competition for the funding was halted because the
Pentagon reportedly saw “risks in proceeding as planned.” Exactly what
those risks were was not reported in any detail.
But
we were sensitized to the ideas that: (1) more than one GCV prototype
might be funded and those prototypes might be competed against each
other, and (2) one discriminator in the competition might be the ability
to rapidly field prototypes and subsequently modify those prototypes
quickly in response to design changes. That latter concept is much more
difficult to put into practice than it is to type on a page—especially
for the aerospace/defense industry. As DARPA noted, its innovative
prototyping/production concepts were “anathema to the current defense
industry trend of tightly coupling design and prototyping through
multiple design-build-test-redesign iterations.” Our thought is that the
team that could break through the historical prototyping approach (as
described by DARPA) would be able to dramatically reduce both cost and
schedule—which would obviously be a clear competitive advantage.
Our
heightened sensitivity led us to a recent Aviation Week & Space
Technology magazine article on Selective Laser Sintering (SLS). “What is
SLS?” we hear you asking. According to this article
on Wikipedia, it is “an additive manufacturing technique that uses a
high power laser … to fuse small particles of plastic, metal, ceramic,
or glass powders into a mass that has a desired 3-dimensional shape.”
The Wikipedia article continues—
The
laser selectively fuses powdered material by scanning cross-sections
generated from a 3-D digital description of the part (for example from a
CAD file or scan data) on the surface of a powder bed. After each
cross-section is scanned, the powder bed is lowered by one layer
thickness, a new layer of material is applied on top, and the process is
repeated until the part is completed. … SLS technology is in wide use
around the world due to its ability to easily make very complex
geometries directly from digital CAD data. While it began as a way to
build prototype parts early in the design cycle, it is increasingly
being used in limited-run manufacturing to produce end-use parts.
Here’s a five-minute infomercial on SLS.
The
AW&ST article had some nice things to say about SLS, including that
its “affinity for rapid prototyping of complex, thin-wall parts that
are lightweight and high quality was a natural fit for specialized
designs, like those in UAVs.” The article noted that the A&D
industry began to use SLS early in the decade, on such programs as the
F/A-18 and Boeing’s 787 Dreamliner—but so far the big users have been
the UAV programs, which have more of a “let’s try it” attitude.
Apparently, many defense programs prefer the cumbersome traditional
design/build process that DARPA wants to move away from. As if to
emphasize the cutting-edge nature of SLS, the article cautioned that “so
far, the attraction [of SLS] extends only in the transition from design
to reality [read: prototyping] and not into production.” Moreover, the
article reported that, “most A&D work is for non-structural parts”
and even the near-term growth curve includes only “structural non-flight
parts.” In other words, A&D companies have been slow to adopt the
new technology for parts produced in volume, and are afraid to embrace
the promise that SLS, and related technologies, offer for rapid
prototyping as well as full-rate production.
Is
the A&D industry justified in its caution regarding SLS and related
“additive manufacturing processes”? One individual read the
aforementioned AW&ST article and was moved to write a letter to the
magazine, stating that the article was “on the mark” regarding SLS
technology. He wrote—
I
spent 15 years in the telecom industry … In telecom, rapid prototyping,
quick-turn tooling, new product launch protocols and top-notch program
management help produce amazingly powerful and sophisticated products,
utilizing teams of hundreds of engineers, outsourced to multiple
facilities and complex supply chains, for a two-year cradle-to-grave
life-cycle device with the durability to be dropped 6feet, small enough
to fit in a pocket, and costing under $400. Thousands can be built for
the cost of one modern weapons unit.
I
returned to the defense industry as part of an outreach program
intended to bring in new perspectives … For years … I spoke of SLS,
3DSL, MIMs, 3D Printing and Rapid Tooling. I gave impassioned speeches
regarding the benefits of using prototype, dummy and rapid-molded parts
for developing assembly process methods during pilot runs. All attempts
were met with: “This is the defense industry, things don’t work that way
here … we don’t have that kind of time/financing.” Yet, we blew past
schedules, dumped tons more money into programs and struggled with
quality issues.
It’s
pretty clear that DARPA thinks defense manufacturing is ripe for
fundamental change, a kind of quantum leap driven by cutting edge
technology such as additive processes. Yet even though the benefits of
fully embracing such technology are obvious, too many companies prefer
to move slowly, one small step at a time. So the question is: where is
the leadership that wants to drive the kind of revolutionary change
DARPA is looking for? Where are the risk-takers? Where is the company
that is ready to dramatically reduce the duration from design to
prototype to full-rate production, and that will reap the commensurate
benefits?
Effective January 1, 2019, Nick Sanders has been named as Editor of two reference books published by LexisNexis. The first book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Cost Accounting Standards. Nick replaces Darrell Oyer, who has edited those books for many years.