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And Justice For All: Army Majors, Embassy Employees, and Government Contractors

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Every day we get e-mails from the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), updating us on the legal entanglements of public procurement officials and the contractors they oversee. Here are a few of the more recent updates.

October 8, 2010 -- U.S. Army Major Charles E. Sublett, 46, of Huntsville, Ala., was sentenced to 21 months in prison for making false statements to a federal agency. In addition to his prison term, Sublett was also sentenced to two years of supervised release and was ordered to forfeit $107,900 and 17,120,000 Iraqi dinar. Sublett was deployed to Balad Regional Contracting Center on Logistical Support Area (LSA) Anaconda in Iraq from August 2004 through February 2005. Sublett served as a contracting officer while deployed to LSA Anaconda. As a contracting officer, Sublett was responsible for, among other things, evaluating and supervising contracts with companies that provide goods and services to the U.S. Army. Sublett admitted that he sent a package from Balad, Iraq, to Killeen, Texas, which was seized by U.S. Customs and Border Protection officers in Memphis. Sublett admitted that, on the international air waybill, he falsely described the contents of the package as books, papers, a jewelry box and clothes with a total declared customs value of $140 when, in fact, Sublett knew the package contained $107,900 in U.S. currency and 17,120,000 in Iraqi dinar. Sublett also admitted that he failed to file a currency or monetary instruments transaction report (CMIR) as required by federal law when transporting currency in amounts of more than $10,000 into or out of the United States. During the plea hearing, Sublett admitted to making false claims to investigators regarding his attempt to bring the currency into the United States in an effort to impede their investigation. See the DOJ announcement here.


October 15, 2010 – Osama Esam Saleem Ayesh, 36, a foreign national employed at the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad, Iraq, was charged with theft of public money and acts affecting a personal financial interest in connection with $237,236 in U.S. Government funds. Ayesh was arrested on Aug. 16, 2010, based on a criminal complaint charging him with one count of conflict of interest. Ayesh held the position of shipping and customs supervisor at the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad, where he was responsible for preparing the necessary documents and logistical support for customs clearance and delivery of shipments coming into Iraq for the embassy and embassy officials and personnel. The indictment alleges that, between November 2008 and June 2010, Ayesh fraudulently caused $237,236 in U.S. Government funds, intended for the payment of services provided to the U.S. Embassy pursuant to two Blanket Purchase Agreements (BPAs), to be sent to a bank account in Jordan that he controlled. The indictment further alleges that, between September 2008 and June 2010, Ayesh participated in the creation and operation of BPAs executed by the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad, in which Ayesh knew that he and his wife had a financial interest. The indictment alleges that Ayesh also knew that he and his wife had a financial interest in the instigation of U.S. electronic funds transfers to pay for services rendered under those BPAs.

The theft of public funds counts each carry a maximum of 10 years in prison and a $250,000 fine. The conflict of interest charge carries a maximum of five years in prison and a $250,000 fine. See the DOJ announcement here.

October 4, 2010 – A federal jury convicted computer programmer Rajendrasinh Babubhai Makwana, age 36, of Montgomery County, Maryland, of computer intrusion arising from the transmission of malicious script to Fannie Mae’s computer servers. Makwana was a contractor working at Fannie Mae’s Urbana, Maryland facility from 2006 to October 24, 2008, where he was a UNIX engineer who worked on Fannie Mae’s network of almost 5,000 computer servers. Makwana was fired on October 24, 2008 and told to turn in all of his Fannie Mae equipment, including his laptop. On October 29, 2008, a Fannie Mae senior engineer discovered a malicious script embedded in a routine program. A subsequent analysis of the script, computer logs, Makwana’s laptop and other evidence, revealed that Makwana had transmitted the malicious code on October 24, 2008 which was intended to execute on January 31, 2009. The malicious code was designed to propagate throughout the Fannie Mae network of computers and destroy all data, including financial, securities and mortgage information. Makwana faces a maximum sentence of 10 years in prison. See the DOJ announcement here.


October 12, 2010 – Bristol Alloys, Inc.—and its president, James Bullick (age 42)—pleaded guilty to one count of Major Fraud against the United States government. The defendants fraudulently supplied a Navy subcontractor with metal that did not conform to required military specifications. They also provided counterfeit certifications that showed that the metal had been treated in accordance with contractual requirements when, in fact, no such heat treatment had occurred. The defective metal was used to build Virginia Class submarines. The company faces a maximum possible sentence of five years probation, a $5 million fine, mandatory restitution—and a $400 “special assessment”. Bullick faces a maximum possible sentence of 10 years in prison, a 3-year period of supervised release, a $ million fine, mandatory restitution, and (of course) a $100 “special assessment”. See the DOJ announcement at this site, here.

According to this article at the Hampton Roads PilotOnline news site—

Last month, spokesmen for the Navy and the U.S. attorney's office in Philadelphia declined to say whether any of the metal has been installed in submarines or whether there are safety implications. The Navy has known of the issue since last October, a spokesman said, and has conducted detailed inspections of parts made with Bristol Alloys' materials but would not provide further details.

Notice that these reports were all issued within one two-week period. With the constant stream of news stories like these, it’s no wonder government auditors and law enforcement officials think so many people (and contractors) are crooks.




 

UPDATE: The Ups and Downs of the F-35 Program

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As always, the F-35 Lightning II program provides a constant cavalcade of compelling stories—some good and others not so much. We have been following the ups and downs of the program for some time. See, for example, our story here in which we discussed potential cost increases to the carrier-based and STOVL versions of the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), a potential halving of the United Kingdom aircraft order, and the initiation of yet another “bottom-up review of the program and its costs.” In this article, we noted that the U.S. Air Force had halted its plans to increase aircraft production to 110 planes per year, and instead had decided to “top-out” purchases at 80 planes per year, starting in GFY 2016.

Since that article was published in early February of 2010, there has been quite a bit happening on the JSF program. We’re going to skip over some history and focus on the most recent events.

The October 11, 2010 edition of Aviation Week & Space Technology magazine carried a story entitled, “Insult to Injury” in which it recounted some of those events. The article reported—

Lockheed Martin is … recovering from a short suspension of JSF flight operations in late September [2010] after problems with the fuel system software came to light in the laboratory. A sequencing problem was found to have the potential to shut down all three of the F-35’s boost fuel pumps. The suspension was lifted Oct. 5.

Four F-35B [STOVL] variants have been restricted only to conventional flight until a fix is implemented for a bearing-retention feature in the auxiliary inlet door’s forward hinge. The fix must receive airworthiness approval…. This is compounding difficulties keeping pace with STOVL fight-test expectations.

Another wrinkle … is the willingness of the U.S. Marine Corps., the first customer expected to use and deploy operational JSFs, to slip its date for initial operational capability (IOC). … However, timing for the steps to reach IOC … are under review as part of a major technical rebaselining … which is due in preparation for a Nov. 23 Defense Acquisition Board meeting on the F-35.

Looking abroad, the October 4, 2010 edition of AW&ST reported uncertainty on the part of the JSF’s international customers, resulting in “frustration” and “friction” between the U.S. and its international partners. The article reported—

Price has been a key issue…. A representative for a European F-35 customer says it has been frustrating not to have received a clear answer on what the aircraft will cost. [In addition] the issue of electronic warfare (EW) reprogrammability … has been an area of friction…. The U.S. has been slow to address these concerns….

The discussions are unfolding as overseas buyers are also adjusting plans to new program realities, reflecting delays announced this year by the Pentagon. As a result, Norway is delaying the start of acquiring most of its F-35s, following a similar decision announced last month by the Netherlands. Norway is postponing its procurements to avoid buying immature systems. This means the Norwegians will not start taking the bulk of their F-35s until 2018. … But Norway insists it remains committed to the program. The defense ministry reaffirms that it is seeing big industrial benefits from Norwegian companies’ participation.

Developments in Norway and the Netherlands are being closely followed by Denmark, which had already delayed its plans to make a type decision between the F-35, Boeing F/A-18E/F and Saab Gripen. But even if Denmark buys the F-35, it is looking to other international operators to iron out early fielding issues, so delivery delays in Norway, for example, could have a ripple effect in Denmark.

Adding “insult to injury,” however, has been the DOD’s decision “to decertify [Lockheed Martin’s] Forth Worth facility for lack of adherence to the government’s Earned Value Management System (EVMS) standards.” As the October 11th AW&ST article reported—

Compliance problems first came to light in 2007, when the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) found the Fort Worth site deficient in about half of the 32 EVMS guidelines. … DCMA approved a corrective action plan June 30, less than one month after the Pentagon recertified the F-35 to move forward, despite an 80% cost overrun.

The AW&ST article quoted a Pentagon spokesperson as saying—

The facility ‘continues to make inadequate progress against its corrective action plan,” and decertification was ‘necessary due to lack of progress.’ [The decertification] ‘will help ensure that Lockheed Martin devotes the needed attention to complete the corrective action plan in a timely manner. It also reinforces the responsibility the company has to deliver to the government what it agreed to.’

The AW&ST article also notes that DCMA permitted LockMart to conduct its own internal EVMS review in 2009 instead of performing a full re-audit of the system, because “it deemed a finding of compliance unlikely.” The article reports that “about 200 Lockheed Martin personnel are dedicated to EVMS,” but does not state whether that figure represents personnel located only in Fort Worth, or if they are located company-wide.

We have discussed our concerns with DOD’s evaluations of EVMS before. In our article on the Missile Defense Agency’s program management issues, we noted that 14 MDA programs were found by DCMA EVMS evaluators to be “noncompliant” with EVMS standards—and yet the Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that 12 of those 14 programs had program cost and performance measurement data reliable enough for its audit purposes. We quoted GAO as saying “We reviewed the basis for the noncompliance and unassessed ratings and determined that” the EVM data was reliable enough “for our purposes.” Clearly, opinions differ regarding whether contractors have implemented an adequate EVMS system that meets the standards of the 32 EVMS criteria.

In a recent article on this topic, Sandra Erwin wrote in National Defense magazine that the root cause of Lockheed Martin’s EVMS woes might not be simply ineffective management. She wrote—

“There is enough blame to go around in industry and government,’ said one industry source. … Contractors for years have complained to the Defense Department that the government’s in-house EVMS skills base has degraded. Over the past several decades, the popularity of EVMS has ebbed and flowed, and so has the level of top management attention it has received both in the public and private sectors, experts said. The Defense Department’s newly created ‘PARCA’ office (Performance Assessments and Root Cause Analyses) within the office of the undersecretary of defense for acquisition is supposed to have an EVMS ‘policy czar’ on the staff, but that position remains unfilled. … The ‘executive agent’ in charge of overseeing EVMS since 1996 has been the Defense Contract Management Agency. Several senior jobs in that shop also remain vacant, sources said. … Well planned out, EVMS tells you ‘where your problems are going to be. … But if you let the skills deteriorate, you get surprises.’

So before anybody gets too upset at LockMart’s loss of EVM System adequacy, consider whether the U.S. Government reviewers were being objective in their review procedures. One source (the DOD Inspector General) has recently accused DOD EVMS reviewers of failing to “demonstrate independence and objectivity in fulfilling its oversight responsibilities.” For our part, we are reserving judgment.

But before we move on, let’s note some positive news for the program. It’s not all doom and gloom.

  • On October 7, 2010, Israel signed a contract to purchase 20 JSF aircraft in a deal reportedly worth $2.75 billion dollars. The deal reported includes an option that would allow Israel to purchase up to 75 additional jets. The deal is being funded by U.S. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) funds.

  • On October 8, 2010, Flight Global reported that Lockheed Martin had received $13 million to incorporate a “shipboard rolling vertical landing” (SRVL) capability into the STOVL F-35B. The funding came from the U.S. Navy, but the work will be performed on behalf of the United Kingdom. The SRVL capability will reportedly “enable the F-35B to return to an aircraft carrier’s deck carrying more weapons and fuel than possible when making a vertical landing.”

  • On October 11. 2010, a Federal District Court judge dismissed a whistleblower “qui tam” suit that alleged Lockheed Martin “followed unsafe and fraudulent practices in developing flight control software for the F-25 joint strike fighter,” according to this report. The case was dismissed with prejudice after LockMart filed a motion which argued that “the case should be dismissed because Davis failed to present evidence of specific acts of Lockheed or its employees making false claims.”

To sum it all up, the program continues to experience challenges—as one might expect of the largest U.S. defense program in the history of ever. Despite the drama surrounding the program, it seems as if it is moving ahead. Perhaps it is not moving as quickly as originally hoped-for, but nonetheless it looks like progress is being made.

 

Let Us Welcome Public Law 111-240, the Small Business Jobs and Credit Act of 2010

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On September 27, 2010, the President signed into law H.R. 5297, the Small Business Jobs and Credit Act of 2010—now P.L. 111-240. The new law is long and fairly complex. Rather than recap its many provisions that affect government contractors, we are going to link to an excellent summary by the law firm Venable LLP.

Go check out Venable’s summary. What? You’re too lazy to click the link? Okay, then here is a very brief list of some of the interesting items contained in the new public law. We are quoting from Venable. You should really go review their summary, instead of reading our recap of their recap.

  • Contractors that misrepresent their size status are presumed to be liable for the amount which the government expends on a contract intended for small businesses.

  • A contractor that believes in good faith that his company is small (based on his understanding of the affiliation rules and the calculation of annual receipts during the relevant period) will be ‘deemed’ to have affirmatively, willfully, and intentionally misrepresented the company’s size status if the company is not actually small.

  • The law now requires all small businesses to recertify their size status on an annual basis through the Online Representations and Certifications Application.

  • The new law imposes new past performance and potential non-responsibility consequences on prime contractors that fail to pay their subcontractors in a timely manner.

Now, doesn’t that make you want to go check out the details of the new law? It should. Remember the sad tale of GTSI Corporation, who has seen roughly three-quarters of its annual revenue put into jeopardy based on allegations of misrepresentation of business size status. You mess with socioeconomic reporting at your risk.

That’s always been the case—but now the law has more teeth in it.

Next step will be to open FAR Cases to implement the new statute in the Code of Federal Regulations. Watch for those proposed rules.

Here is a link to the Department of Energy's recap of the new law:  http://management.energy.gov/documents/AttachmentFlash2011-6%281%29.pdf

 

 

DOD PGI Revised to Limit DCAA Audits of Contractor Proposals

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Recently we’ve published a few articles discussing changes to how DCAA audits contractor cost proposals—what they call “price proposals” or “forward price proposals”. (Not to be confused with Forward Pricing Rate Proposals, which are entirely different critters.) We have been less than enamored with the audit guidance, going so far as to say (here) that DCAA’s audit guidance is so preposterous that DCMA needs to cut DCAA out of the price negotiation process. We said, “We urge the Pentagon to figure out another way of getting contractor proposals evaluated so that the parties can negotiate a reasonable price.”

Well, maybe that’s just us being our usual strident over-the-top blog posters. Or maybe somebody at DCMA agrees with us. On September 17, 2010, the DFARS PGI was revised to address when DCMA Contracting Officers request “field pricing assistance” to support their analysis of contractor cost proposals. Significantly, the PGI now prescribes proposal value floors, under which DCAA audit assistance normally should not be requested. The revised PGI limits DCAA’s role in the process.

First, let’s discuss what the PGI is, because that’s not well understood. A few years ago, the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) was revised to eliminate much of its verbiage that discussed how and why DOD Contracting Officers did what they did. The goal was to pare the regulations down to just that—regulations. All the other verbiage was moved to a new document—the DFARS Procedures, Guidance, and Information (PGI), which co-exists with and links to the DFARS regulatory language.

So when we say that the PGI was revised, we are saying that the internal guidance and direction issued to the DOD Contracting Officers was revised. Since the official DFARS regulatory language was not changed, there was no need to run the revisions through the DAR Council or to follow the prescribed rule-making process (which includes publication in the Federal Register and solicitation of public input). Even if you don’t like the revisions you have no input into DOD internal guidance—so you have to just suck it up.

Here is the revised PGI document. The changes are denoted by a vertical line at the far right margin. Take a look at the PGI language found at 215.404-2(a)—“Field Pricing Assistance”. The language now reads as follows—

(a) Field pricing assistance.

(i) The contracting officer should consider requesting field pricing assistance (See PGI 215.404-2(c) for when audit assistance should be requested) for—

(A) Fixed-price proposals exceeding the cost or pricing data threshold;

(B) Cost-type proposals exceeding the cost or pricing data threshold from offerors with significant estimating system deficiencies …; or

(C) Cost-type proposals exceeding $10 million from offerors without significant estimating system deficiencies.

(ii) The contracting officer should not request field pricing support for proposed contracts or modifications in an amount less than that specified in paragraph (a)(i) of this subsection. An exception may be made when a reasonable pricing result cannot be established because of—

(A) A lack of knowledge of the particular offeror; or

(B) Sensitive conditions (e.g., a change in, or unusual problems with, an offeror’s internal systems).

(c) Audit assistance for prime contracts or subcontracts.

(i) The contracting officer should consider requesting audit assistance from DCAA for—

(A) Fixed-price proposals exceeding $10 million;

(B) Cost-type proposals exceeding $100 million.

(ii) The contracting officer should not request DCAA audit assistance for proposed contracts or modifications in an amount less than that specified in paragraph (c)(i) of this subsection unless there are exceptional circumstances explained in the request for audit. …

(iii) If, in the opinion of the contracting officer or auditor, the review of a prime

contractor's proposal requires further review of subcontractors' cost estimates at the subcontractors' plants … the contracting officer should inform the administrative contracting officer (ACO) having cognizance of the prime contractor before the review is initiated.

(iv) Notify the appropriate contract administration activities when extensive, special, or expedited field pricing assistance will be needed to review and evaluate subcontractors' proposals under a major weapon system acquisition. If audit reports are received on contracting actions that are subsequently cancelled, notify the cognizant auditor in writing.

(v) Requests for audit assistance for subcontracts should use the same criteria as established in paragraphs (c)(i) and (c)(ii) of this subsection.

What we see in the foregoing is a movement towards limiting DCAA’s role in DCMA proposal analysis. Fixed-price proposals valued at less than $10 million normally should not be reviewed by DCAA. Similarly, cost-type proposals valued at less than $100 million normally should not be reviewed by DCAA. We acknowledge some weasel-words about “exceptional circumstances.” We also acknowledge the risk-averse nature of the modern DCMA Contracting Officer. Regardless, we think (and hope) that those circumstances will be, well, exceptions and not the rule.

In any case, this seems to be a good first step in DCMA’s evolution towards a contract administration agency that can evaluate and negotiate cost proposals without leaning on DCAA like a crutch. We applaud it—and encourage the Pentagon to keep going!




 

UPDATE: DCMA Agrees with DCAA that Some Contractor Health Care Costs are Expressly Unallowable

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Forget health care costs for a minute. Let’s first lay a bit of foundation before we get into the meat of what needs to be discussed….

In Government contract cost accounting, not all costs are created equal. Beyond the distinctions between “allowable” and “unallowable” there are also “expressly unallowable” costs as well as “directly associated unallowable costs.” We want to focus on the distinctions between costs that are merely unallowable and those costs that are “expressly unallowable.”

When submitting the final indirect cost rate proposal (also known as the annual incurred cost submission), FAR 42.703-2 discusses that a certification must accompany the proposal. The certification is formally required by the contract clause 52.242-4 (“Certification of Final Indirect Costs”). By executing the certification, the contractor represents that all costs being claimed are allowable pursuant to the applicable cost principles, and that “This proposal does not include any costs which are expressly unallowable …”

The contract clause 52.242-3 describes what happens if a contractor includes unallowable costs in its final indirect cost rate proposal, despite its certification to the contrary. Such costs are subject to penalties. The clause prescribes—

If the Contracting Officer determines that a cost submitted by the Contractor in its proposal is expressly unallowable under a cost principle in the FAR, or an executive agency supplement to the FAR, that defines the allowability of specific selected costs, the Contractor shall be assessed a penalty equal to—


(1) The amount of the disallowed cost allocated to this contract; plus

(2) Simple interest, to be computed—

(i) On the amount the Contractor was paid (whether as a progress or billing payment) in excess of the amount to which the Contractor was entitled; and

(ii) Using the applicable rate effective for each six-month interval prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury pursuant to Pub. L. 92-41 (85 Stat. 97).


If the Contracting Officer determines that a cost submitted by the Contractor in its proposal includes a cost previously determined to be unallowable for that Contractor, then the Contractor will be assessed a penalty in an amount equal to two times the amount of the disallowed cost allocated to this contract.

(Readers wanting to dig deeper into the imposition of penalties should also look at the DCMA’s Guidance to Contracting Officers for negotiating final overhead rates. Here is a link to get you started.)

What is meant by “expressly unallowable” has been a source of disagreement between contractors and government representatives. The definitions section of FAR Part 31 states—

‘Expressly unallowable cost’ means a particular item or type of cost which, under the express provisions of an applicable law, regulation, or contract, is specifically named and stated to be unallowable.

The foregoing definition is not particularly conducive to resolving disagreements between government and contractor. In practice, DCAA tends to assert that any unallowable cost is expressly unallowable; whereas contractors tend to believe that very few costs are expressly unallowable. Alcohol, charitable contributions, and amortization of goodwill are among the few areas of agreement. The other cost principles are fertile ground for dispute.

In June 2002, the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA) discussed the concept of “expressly” unallowable costs in the appeal of General Dynamics (ASBCA No. 49372). Although the decision subsequently was reversed (on other grounds) on appeal, the Court’s opinion stands as the most lucid discussion of the topic. The Court opined—

We do not believe the determination of ‘express unallowability’ can turn solely on whether the contractor made a ‘good faith effort’ to comply with the particular cost principle involved, although subjective good faith is important. We think Congress intended the standard to be an objective one. The FAR and CAS definitions of ‘expressly unallowable’ point to the need to examine the particular principle involved in light of the surrounding circumstances. Moreover, since Congress adopted the ‘expressly unallowable’ standard to make it clear that a penalty should not be assessed where there were reasonable differences of opinion about the allowability of costs, we think the Government must show that it was unreasonable under all the circumstances for a person in the contractor’s position to conclude that the costs were allowable. The scope of the inquiry will vary with the clarity and complexity of the particular cost principle and the circumstances involved. Under 10 U.S.C. § 2324(e)(1)(F), for example, the ‘costs of alcoholic beverages’ are unallowable and may leave little room for debate, short of a discussion of alcohol levels. On the other hand, the analysis required under 10 U.S.C. § 2324(k) is far more complicated and the answer not necessarily obvious, particularly when a settlement agreement must be consulted. See also 10 U.S.C. § 2324(e)(1)(N), now (e)(1)(O). [Emphasis added.]

Accordingly, our position is that the “expressly unallowable” standard is a high bar and difficult for the government to impose.

The foregoing is necessary prelude for the subject of this article.

On September 24, 2010, DCMA issued this guidance to the DOD “Contracts Community”. The guidance was short and simple. It said—

  • DCAA found that some defense contractors are inappropriately charging the Government for health benefit costs for dependents that are no longer eligible for benefits under the contractors' plans.  Based on their findings, DCAA issued audit guidance on ineligible dependent health benefit costs in MRD 09-PSP-016(R). That guidance states that the costs are expressly unallowable, and therefore subject to penalties if included in a contractor's final indirect cost rate proposal.

  • We have reviewed DCAA's audit guidance and agree that the costs are expressly unallowable and subject to penalties if included in a contractor's final indirect cost rate proposal. 

  • If the ACO determines that the costs are unallowable, the ACO shall treat the costs as expressly unallowable costs.

  • As a result, we are revising the Final Overhead Instruction to ensure ACOs properly assess penalties on these costs.

We told you about DCAA’s focus on “ineligible” dependent health care costs last year, in this article. We called the audit guidance “troubling” and made some suggestions regarding what contractors might do to prepare for DCAA’s audit approach. Subsequently, we’ve learned more about this topic (mostly from contractors who have been audited) and we think it’s a tempest in a teapot. Quite simply, the amount of costs at issue just isn’t that big.

But we think the government is going to have trouble meeting the standard established by the ASBCA regarding the test for “expressly unallowable” costs—particularly with respect to the “grace periods” offered to employees who need to report changes in the eligibility of dependents.

That said, we’re also concerned by DCMA’s guidance, which continues a troubling trend of reducing the discretion of Contracting Officers in favor of centralized direction. The current DCMA guidance (link above) requires that an Administrative Contracting Officer (ACO) must generate “an affirmative statement that the ACO agreed or disagreed with each finding and recommendation made by DCAA or DCMA specialists … and whether or not the assessment of any penalties and interest is appropriate.”  We have difficulty seeing why the ACO needs to follow that direction, when there is no discretion to disagree.



 


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Newsflash

Effective January 1, 2019, Nick Sanders has been named as Editor of two reference books published by LexisNexis. The first book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Cost Accounting Standards. Nick replaces Darrell Oyer, who has edited those books for many years.