DCAA Stomps on Ray of Hope Offered by DFARS Class Deviation
administrator
We recently wrote
about a “ray of hope” offered by the August 17, 2010 DFARS Class
Deviation issued by the Honorable Shay Assad, Director, Defense
Procurement and Acquisition Policy. The Class Deviation deleted the
words “for contractors with approved billing systems” from DFARS
language discussing DCAA’s authority to “authorize direct submission of
interim vouchers for provisional payment to the [DOD] disbursing
office.” In other words, whether or not DCAA authorized a contractor to
directly submit its invoices to DFAS was no longer tied to the adequacy
of the contractor’s billing system.
We
thought this was great news, especially given DCAA official position on
the matter (as expressed in the DCAA Contract Audit Manual), which was:
“It is Agency policy to
obtain the maximum contractor participation in the direct submission
(direct billing) of interim vouchers program.” Great news, we thought,
because now DCAA could follow its policy and restore the direct billing
authority for all the contractors where that authority had been
withdrawn based on inadequate or unaudited business systems (which, by
the way, were not necessarily the contractors’ billing systems).
We
thought it was also great news for the audit agency, because it could
redeploy its scarce audit resources away from this non-valued-added
activity toward areas with more risk and vulnerability for waste, fraud,
and abuse. Given that the contractors were only submitting “interim
vouchers for provisional payment,” the risk of overpayment was minimal.
After all, those vouchers and contract costs were going to be reviewed
again during the audits of the contractors’ incurred costs. Redundant
audits made no sense, especially when DCAA was so under-resourced it
could only audit 65% of the audits it was required to perform (by its
own admission).
This was great news. Hallelujah! Or so we thought.
But we were wrong.
DCAA issued Memorandum for Regional Directors MRD 10-PPD-022(R)
on August 26, 2010, in order to clarify that DCAA’s policy of denying
contractors direct billing authority based on inadequate or unaudited
business systems was unaffected by the Class Deviation. The MRD stated—
This deviation does not impact current DCAA policy for authorizing
contractors direct billing authority (CAM 6-1007). Auditors should
continue to use existing policy for authorizing contractors direct
billing authority and the additional guidance provided in MRD
09-PPD-006(R), dated April 15, 2009.
Now it seemed to us that the intent of the Class Deviation was exactly aimed
at impacting the current DCAA policy. But DCAA not only disagreed with
our interpretation of the intent of the Class Deviation, it also
asserted that the Class Deviation was issued at its request! The MRD
reported—
The deviation was issued to address a DoDIG interpretation of the
subject DFARS language. The DoDIG has interpreted that the DFARS
language requires that a comprehensive evaluation of the billing system
internal controls is required for all contractors to participate in the
direct billing program. We determined that conducting such reviews at
smaller contractors would not be a prudent use of audit resources or
taxpayer dollars. DCAA currently performs other audit procedures
tailored to the risk to the Government when authorizing nonmajor
contractors to direct bill. Therefore, we requested the DFARS class
deviation to allow DCAA to use its existing policies and procedures for
authorizing the direct submission of interim vouchers for provisional
payment to the disbursing office.
So
according to DCAA, the Class Deviation applies only to “nonmajor”
contractors, such as small businesses. The “major” contractors will
continue to suffer delays in cash receipts.
First,
we question DCAA’s interpretation. We don’t care what DCAA intended the
Class Deviation to do; all we have to go on is what it says. The “plain
language” of the Class Deviation removes the linkage between direct
billing authority and business system adequacy. Period.
The Class Deviation does not contain any express language that would
limit its application only to businesses of a certain size or class.
While it may be true that the intent was to make the Class Deviation
applicable only to small businesses, that’s not what the regulation
says—either before or after the deletion of the language.
Granted,
DCAA has the authority to authorize or not authorize direct billing
authority, and it can do so based on whatever rationale it wants to cook
up. But at least its actions should be consistent with its own
published policy, or so it seems to us.
Second,
we note that, based on the date of the MRD, it should have been
published on the DCAA website already. The website says it includes all
audit guidance “open as of August 31, 2010”—but you can’t find this
particular one listed there. DCAA has told contractors that it publishes
all releasable open audit guidance every month, but this particular MRD
somehow slipped through the cracks. We have to ask whether DCAA is
trying to slip its flawed interpretation under the radar?
This
is not the first time that DCAA has delayed, for whatever reason,
publishing audit guidance for inspection by the public. Given the Obama
Administration’s push
for openness and transparency, we would have thought that DCAA would be
eager to share all of its audit guidance with the public in a timely
fashion. And just like our thoughts about the DFARS Class Deviation, we
would have been wrong.
Perhaps
we are overreacting to the situation. It wouldn’t be the first time!
But here’s how we see it: DCAA is interpreting the current DFARS
language (after implementation of the Class Deviation) in a manner that
appears to be arbitrary, capricious, and self-serving. It appears to be
interpreting the DFARS language in a manner that is inconsistent with
its own policy statements and in a manner that actually harms its own
self-interest, as it cannot redeploy audit resources to more fruitful
areas as it should.
DCAA
reports to DOD Comptroller Hale in a separate vertical from that of
DCMA. But given that the Class Deviation was issued by the DOD
Procurement and Acquisition Policy Directorate, one might think it would
carry some weight with the DOD auditors. Can DCAA simply ignore
promulgations it disagrees with—or reinterpret them in ways it finds
more palatable? Or is this situation something akin to insubordination?
We don’t know, but (frankly) nothing DCAA says or does surprises us
anymore.
Finally, President Obama has issued an Open Government Directive,
and that Directive applies to all Executive Agencies and
Departments—including the DOD and its auditors, the DCAA. That Directive
states—
Agencies
shall respect the presumption of openness by publishing information
online (in addition to any other planned or mandated publication
methods) and by preserving and maintaining electronic information,
consistent with the Federal Records Act and other applicable law and
policy. Timely publication of information is an essential component of
transparency. Delays should not be viewed as an inevitable and
insurmountable consequence of high demand.
Given
that DCAA is not publishing its audit guidance timely, one has to ask
whether it is meeting the expectations established by the President’s
Directive. Or is DCAA treating that Directive with the same strategy it
has applied to the DFARS Class Deviation?
But perhaps that’s not all … Dare we say it?
Yeah, let’s go there …
By
apparently ignoring the requirements of the Open Government Directive,
is DCAA being insubordinate to the lawful orders of the
Commander-in-Chief? In a time of war?
Okay, we admit it—we are definitely
overreacting to the situation. But we’re concerned, and we’re asking
tough (rhetorical) questions. If DCAA wants to email us an official
response, we’ll be happy to post it here. And we’ll post it timely, too.
And
you too can post your thoughts on this site. Every member can post
comments here, and you are welcome to do so. Agree, disagree, or have a
story to share? Feel free to leave a comment.
DCAA Helps Auditors to Communicate
administrator
We recently told you about brand-new audit guidance (MRD 10-PSP-023(R))
that encouraged DCAA auditors to support DCMA contracting officer
negotiations with contractors—but placed limits on that interaction. We
asserted that some of those limits would leave “the contracting officer
and buying commands stuck in limbo” for perhaps 90 days, “awaiting a
supplemental report in order to have DCAA officially alter its original
opinion based on receipt of new facts” provided by the contractors
during negotiations. We liked the idea that DCAA HQ was encouraging its
auditors to get back in the role of providing financial advisory
services to DCMA, but we didn’t much care for the stringent limits and
narrow-minded approach the audit agency placed on its auditors.
Thus,
we were very interested in receiving an official DCAA PowerPoint
presentation used to train auditors on the “’Rules of Engagement’ for
Auditor Communications.” The presentation we received included the
speaker’s notes in addition to the slides themselves. The presentation
was undated; however, we believe it to be contemporaneous with the
September 9, 2010 MRD discussed in the link above. If you are a site
member, you can find the entire presentation here. For the rest of you, here’s a brief overview.
The
presentation did more than encourage auditors to communicate with both
requestors of audits and those being audited—it actually stated that
such communications were required. The notes stated—
While
GAGAS specifically addresses communication at the planning and
reporting stages, communicating with the contractor and requestor
throughout all phases of an audit is necessary to comply with other
GAGAS requirements. For example, GAGAS 6.04b requires the auditor to
obtain sufficient evidence to provide a reasonable basis for the
conclusion expressed in the report. To obtain sufficient evidence, it is
essential for auditors to communicate with the contractor to ensure
that conclusions are based on a full understanding of all relevant
facts. In addition, discussions with the requestor may disclose
information relevant to the audit. Such discussions are a normal part of
an audit and can be conducted without impairing an auditor’s
independence.
As we’ve previously noted,
the U.S. Air Force recently implemented a new process designed to
facilitate the negotiation and final price agreement for Undefinitized
Contract Actions (UCAs). We also noted that the DCAA issued audit
guidance regarding the auditors’ roles in that process, which included
attending the mandatory “proposal walk-through” for Government
personnel. Tellingly, the presentation treated the Air Force’s focused
UCA definitization process as the norm for all contractor proposals, including proposals to establish final indirect cost rates. The presentation stated—
At
the commencement of the audit the contractor should provide Government
representatives (e.g., DCAA, ACO, and PCO) with a ‘walk-through’ of its
assertion (e.g., forward pricing proposal, incurred cost submission).
The walk-through should generally take place after the auditor performs
an initial adequacy review of the contractor’s assertion and may occur
either before or during the entrance conference. At these meetings, the
contractor should fully explain its assertion and allow the audit team
to ask questions to fully understand the contractor’s assertion. This
process will facilitate the early identification of any inadequacies
with the contractor’s assertion that needs to be addressed.
Yikes!
How did an Air Force process designed to expedite proposal negotiations
with the contracting officer, in order to meet specific statutory
deadlines, morph into this?
Apparently, the walk-through is now hosted by DCAA “either before or
during the entrance conference,” and not the contracting officer. It is
now to be expected for all proposals, not just those for large
sole-source procurements and for definitization of UCAs. And it is now
to be used by DCAA to identify inadequacies, instead of to facilitate
negotiations. How did we get from there to here? (Note: that was a rhetorical question.)
Much
criticism has been leveled at DCAA—by us and many others—regarding the
lack of communication with those being audited. In fact, we recently
wrote—
[Audit]
reports that have been issued, generally have been riddled with factual
errors and other quality shortcomings, because (a) auditors are afraid
to openly communicate with those they are auditing (as well as those
agency customers requesting the audits), and (b) once the auditors reach
a preliminary finding, everybody (from the auditor to the supervisory
auditor to the branch manager to the regional audit manager) is afraid
to change it—even when confronted by facts that would lead a reasonable
person to a different conclusion.
So
we were pleased to see the presentation emphasize that it’s perfectly
okay for auditors to actually communicate with contractors during an
audit. Moreover, preliminary findings should be discussed with the
contractor so as to see if there are any facts that would tend to lead a
reasonable person to a different conclusion. The presentation stated—
Discuss
matters as needed for a full understanding of contractor’s basis for
each item in submission or aspect of area being audited. Discuss
preliminary audit findings (potential system deficiencies, FAR/CAS
noncompliances, etc.) so that conclusions are based on a complete
understanding of all pertinent facts. Through-out the audit, the auditor
should discuss matters with the contractor as needed to obtain a full
understanding of the contractor’s basis for each item in the submission,
or each aspect of the area subject to audit. The auditor should discuss
preliminary audit findings (e.g., potential system deficiencies,
potential FAR/CAS noncompliances, etc.) with the contractor to ensure
conclusions are based on a complete understanding of all pertinent
facts. These types of discussions do not impair auditor independence and
are generally necessary to obtain sufficient evidence to support audit
conclusions.
We
were also pleased to see that an exit conference should be held
promptly “after completion of field work.” But despite that very helpful
language, the presentation also contradicted that statement, saying
that exit conferences were to be held “upon completion of field work and
after supervisory review and FAO manager approval (or all management
reviews if RAM/DAM review is required).” So which is it? We’ll post the
exact language below and let you decide—
Upon
completion of the field work, the auditor should hold the exit
conference to discuss the audit results and obtain the contractor’s
views concerning the findings, conclusions, and recommendations for
inclusion in the audit report as required by GAGAS. Except for audits
requiring RAM/DAM review, the exit conference may be held after the
supervisor completes his/her review of the working paper and draft
report but before the FAO manager completes the final review if the FAO
manager believes it is appropriate based on his/her involvement with the
audit, and/or the complexity of the audit and the experience of the
audit team. In such cases, the auditor should inform the contractor that
the results are subject to management review. For audits requiring
RAM/DAM review, all applicable management reviews must be completed
prior to holding the exit conference. The auditor should invite the
requestor/contracting officer to the exit conference, especially if
there are major or complex audit issues.
We
want to be excited about this, we really do. But we think it’s more
likely that the requirement for supervisory review of the draft report,
and potential FAO manager review of the working papers and draft report,
will mean that the contractor won’t hear about the auditor’s
findings/conclusions until it is too late to affect them with
explanations and facts. Yes, it’s true that “preliminary audit findings”
are to be discussed with the contractor, but that really doesn’t happen
very often. It’s great when it does happen, but the exit conference is
also an opportunity to hear and rebut preliminary findings—or at least
it used to be. Not so much anymore, apparently.
Moreover, the presentation included guidance that—
The
information provided to the contractor at or in anticipation of the
exit conference (i.e., draft report/results or, in the case of
forecasted costs subject to negotiations, factual information) should be
provided concurrently to the requestor/contracting officer.
So
by the time the contractor learns about the auditor’s official
findings/conclusions—but has not yet submitted a written response to
those findings/conclusions—so has the customer. The customer gets an
unrebutted audit report, one that lacks the contractor’s official
response. That’s nice. (Note: that was sarcasm.)
To
sum up, we expect to use this presentation in our interactions with
DCAA, to try to force more open communication, especially to try to
learn about preliminary audit issues before they get into draft audit
reports. But we know from experience that the strategy will not always
work. And now we know that if we don’t learn about those issues before
the exit conference, then it will be too late—because the DCMA
contracting officer will be receiving a one-sided report at about the
same time we’re hearing the auditor’s findings for the first time.
DCAA Tells Auditors How to Support Contracting Officer Negotiations
administrator
DCAA
has published some significant audit guidance recently, much of which
we have discussed on this website. We usually get access to new audit
guidance (issued in the form of Memoranda for Regional Directors) a
couple of weeks in advance of publication on the DCAA’s website.
Recently, however, DCAA has experienced delays in putting its new audit
guidance on the Internet; publication of some guidance has been delayed
as much as six weeks. Typically, we wait to discuss new guidance until
it’s available to the public, but now we’ve lost patience—and so we have
some things to discuss with you.
First,
you may remember that we’ve taken issue with the latest DCAA audit
guidance that provides direction to auditors on how to evaluate
contractors’ estimates of future indirect cost rates. For example, we
had very few nice things to say about MRD 10-PSP-021(R) and many negative ones. Prior to that, we had even fewer things--and many more negative things—to say about MRD 10-PSP-018(R). Our overarching thought, based on the recent guidance, is that, in essence, DCAA as an organization has gone insane.
You
can’t have worked in the arena of government contract cost accounting
for the past two years and not noticed the intense barrage of criticism
leveled at the audit agency—much of it politically driven, unwarranted,
and based on flawed review methodology. One of the more frequent
criticisms has been that DCAA has not met the independence standards
imposed by generally accepted government auditing standards (GAGAS).
That accusation hasn’t been true—or at least, it’s been rarely true—but
it has driven the audit agency into a virtual obsession
with maintaining independence. That obsession has impacted auditor
interactions with contractors, DCMA contracting officers, and buying
commands. As a result, issuance of audit reports has slowed to a crawl.
And those reports that have been issued, generally have been riddled
with factual errors and other quality shortcomings, because (a) auditors
are afraid to openly communicate with those they are auditing (as well
as those agency customers requesting the audits), and (b) once the
auditors reach a preliminary finding, everybody (from the auditor to the
supervisory auditor to the branch manager to the regional audit
manager) is afraid to change it—even when confronted by facts that would
lead a reasonable person to a different conclusion.
As
we’ve noted many times on this website, it now takes roughly three
times longer for DCAA to issue its audit reports, and those it does
manage to issue don’t provide much value to anybody. We know DCMA is
working hard to dissolve its dependence on the audit agency, and we
recently noted some criticism
from the DOD IG regarding DCMA’s efforts in that regard. Perhaps
sensing that something must be done to turn the tide, DCAA issued MRD 10-PSP-023(R) on September 9, 2010.
Entitled,
“Audit Alert on Auditor Attendance at Negotiations,” the audit guidance
“encourages” DCAA auditors to support DCMA contracting officer
negotiations—but also puts limits on that interaction. Following are a
selected few quotes from the audit guidance—
It
is DCAA’s policy to support contracting officers at negotiations where
DCAA has issued an audit report on the contractor’s submission (e.g.,
price proposals, incurred cost submissions, termination claims),
especially for complex submissions with significant audit issues.
Attendance at pre-negotiation meetings with the contracting officer when
requested to discuss audit report results is also encouraged.
Providing
support and technical advice based on the auditor’s technical knowledge
and expertise to help the contracting officer understand audit report
results does not impair auditor independence. Answering questions about
audit rationale/computations or giving advice regarding contractor
rebuttals to reported results helps the contracting officer understand
audit conclusions.
At
times, contractors provide information and/or data directly to the
contracting officer as a means to support their proposed positions in
anticipation of or during negotiations. … The contracting officer may
request DCAA assistance in understanding how that data impacts the
reported audit conclusions. Auditors should support the contracting
officer, to the extent possible, by providing advice on this data. This
may include, for example, providing advice on the contractor’s rationale
for a revised estimate, verifying data to the contractor’s books and
records or other supporting data, or running various Government position
scenarios using the data through audit report schedules and underlying
spreadsheets, where appropriate.
The MRD includes a Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) section. Here is a quote from that section of the MRD—
[The
auditor] should answer the cost analyst’s questions to help him
understand the audit conclusions and rationale. Providing such
explanations is a normal part of any audit and does not impair your
independence or otherwise violate GAGAS. … On occasion, it may also be
appropriate to provide selected working papers which support complex
audit computations to facilitate the contracting officer’s
understanding.
The
foregoing sounds good and would appear to be aimed at facilitating
negotiations. However (as we noted above), the guidance also limits
auditor interaction with the negotiating parties. In particular, the MRD
discusses circumstances in which the auditor should seek to issue a
“supplemental report” instead of supporting negotiations. The audit
guidance says—
… if
the data is complex and/or represents a significant update to the
audited proposal, and requires extensive review or analysis, the auditor
would generally need to issue a supplemental report. … When a
supplemental report is not issued, any documentation provided to the
contracting officer of the work performed should be clearly marked to
distinguish it from audit report results. For example, it should include
a statement noting that the documentation contains advice provided in
support of negotiations and does not represent audited data, nor a
revised audit opinion. Nothing short of a supplemental report will
result in a revised audit opinion.
We
note that, once again, DCAA refuses to let new facts get in the way of
its prior audit findings—leaving the contracting officer and buying
commands stuck in limbo awaiting a supplemental report in order to
have DCAA officially alter its original opinion based on receipt of new
facts. The FAQ emphasizes this audit guidance, stating that, where the
new facts require “extensive review or analysis,” then the auditor
should—
… recommend in writing that the contracting officer delay the negotiations
for that part of the proposal to allow time for [a supplemental report
to be issued]. … in the meantime, the contracting officer [should]
proceed with the negotiations for the other parts of the proposal.
[Emphasis added.]
The
MRD also directs that auditors cannot review data provided by
contractors during negotiations unless they have first performed
sufficient audit work to support an opinion on that data. In such
circumstances, the audit guidance directs auditors to “recommend to the
contracting officer that the FAO audit the costs and issue a
supplemental report.” That supplemental report, as you readers know,
will take roughly 90 days to issue. Meanwhile, negotiations are stalled,
the contract schedule becomes unattainable, and the resulting delay
leads to increased costs. Not to mention, somebody somewhere doesn’t get
what they need to accomplish their mission.
Undersecretary of Defense (A,T&L) Dr. Ashton Carter recently emphasized the importance of schedule in program execution. As this interview of Dr. Carter at DefenseNews.com reports—
Q. What's most important: requirements, cost, schedule?
A.
The variable we pay the least attention to is time. And time is money.
The default way of dealing with a program that is costing too much is to
buy it more slowly. The default way of dealing with a program that is
not meeting its requirements is to keep working on it until it does. So a
five-year program stretches 10 years, and a 10-year program stretches
to 15. That costs money. Those stretches don't cost more money per year,
and no one feels a cost increase over 15 years. We need more programs
with a philosophy of meeting a strict schedule.
Dr.
Carter, if you want to see programs embrace a philosophy of meeting a
strict schedule, you might want to start with evaluating why
negotiations drag on so long and program delivery dates have already
slipped before the first labor hour has been incurred. And should you do
so, you might want to review the impact of DCAA’s recent audit guidance
on that process.
We’re just saying.
Will A&D Industry Embrace Rapid Prototyping?
administrator
Our
aim here at Apogee Consulting, Inc. is to move above and beyond cost
accounting, contract administration, and other back-office matters, to
see a bigger picture that encompasses all facets of a company’s
business, including operations and program execution. We believe our
viewpoint, created (as it were) from a higher perspective, creates more
value for our clients. (Thus: the use of the term “Apogee” in our
corporate name.) We like to demonstrate our higher perspective, from
time to time, by focusing on issues such as technological innovations.
This is one of those times.
We previously discussed
issues associated with the U.S. Army’s NextGen Ground Combat Vehicle
(GCV). One of the more interesting aspects of that troubled program was
the interaction of the rather prosaic armored vehicle with the utterly
innovative approach to rapid prototyping and production envisioned for
it by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). As you may
recall, the Army reportedly intended to award nearly $1 billion during
Government Fiscal Year 2011, to “start development of new prototype
vehicles,” but the competition for the funding was halted because the
Pentagon reportedly saw “risks in proceeding as planned.” Exactly what
those risks were was not reported in any detail.
But
we were sensitized to the ideas that: (1) more than one GCV prototype
might be funded and those prototypes might be competed against each
other, and (2) one discriminator in the competition might be the ability
to rapidly field prototypes and subsequently modify those prototypes
quickly in response to design changes. That latter concept is much more
difficult to put into practice than it is to type on a page—especially
for the aerospace/defense industry. As DARPA noted, its innovative
prototyping/production concepts were “anathema to the current defense
industry trend of tightly coupling design and prototyping through
multiple design-build-test-redesign iterations.” Our thought is that the
team that could break through the historical prototyping approach (as
described by DARPA) would be able to dramatically reduce both cost and
schedule—which would obviously be a clear competitive advantage.
Our
heightened sensitivity led us to a recent Aviation Week & Space
Technology magazine article on Selective Laser Sintering (SLS). “What is
SLS?” we hear you asking. According to this article
on Wikipedia, it is “an additive manufacturing technique that uses a
high power laser … to fuse small particles of plastic, metal, ceramic,
or glass powders into a mass that has a desired 3-dimensional shape.”
The Wikipedia article continues—
The
laser selectively fuses powdered material by scanning cross-sections
generated from a 3-D digital description of the part (for example from a
CAD file or scan data) on the surface of a powder bed. After each
cross-section is scanned, the powder bed is lowered by one layer
thickness, a new layer of material is applied on top, and the process is
repeated until the part is completed. … SLS technology is in wide use
around the world due to its ability to easily make very complex
geometries directly from digital CAD data. While it began as a way to
build prototype parts early in the design cycle, it is increasingly
being used in limited-run manufacturing to produce end-use parts.
Here’s a five-minute infomercial on SLS.
The
AW&ST article had some nice things to say about SLS, including that
its “affinity for rapid prototyping of complex, thin-wall parts that
are lightweight and high quality was a natural fit for specialized
designs, like those in UAVs.” The article noted that the A&D
industry began to use SLS early in the decade, on such programs as the
F/A-18 and Boeing’s 787 Dreamliner—but so far the big users have been
the UAV programs, which have more of a “let’s try it” attitude.
Apparently, many defense programs prefer the cumbersome traditional
design/build process that DARPA wants to move away from. As if to
emphasize the cutting-edge nature of SLS, the article cautioned that “so
far, the attraction [of SLS] extends only in the transition from design
to reality [read: prototyping] and not into production.” Moreover, the
article reported that, “most A&D work is for non-structural parts”
and even the near-term growth curve includes only “structural non-flight
parts.” In other words, A&D companies have been slow to adopt the
new technology for parts produced in volume, and are afraid to embrace
the promise that SLS, and related technologies, offer for rapid
prototyping as well as full-rate production.
Is
the A&D industry justified in its caution regarding SLS and related
“additive manufacturing processes”? One individual read the
aforementioned AW&ST article and was moved to write a letter to the
magazine, stating that the article was “on the mark” regarding SLS
technology. He wrote—
I
spent 15 years in the telecom industry … In telecom, rapid prototyping,
quick-turn tooling, new product launch protocols and top-notch program
management help produce amazingly powerful and sophisticated products,
utilizing teams of hundreds of engineers, outsourced to multiple
facilities and complex supply chains, for a two-year cradle-to-grave
life-cycle device with the durability to be dropped 6feet, small enough
to fit in a pocket, and costing under $400. Thousands can be built for
the cost of one modern weapons unit.
I
returned to the defense industry as part of an outreach program
intended to bring in new perspectives … For years … I spoke of SLS,
3DSL, MIMs, 3D Printing and Rapid Tooling. I gave impassioned speeches
regarding the benefits of using prototype, dummy and rapid-molded parts
for developing assembly process methods during pilot runs. All attempts
were met with: “This is the defense industry, things don’t work that way
here … we don’t have that kind of time/financing.” Yet, we blew past
schedules, dumped tons more money into programs and struggled with
quality issues.
It’s
pretty clear that DARPA thinks defense manufacturing is ripe for
fundamental change, a kind of quantum leap driven by cutting edge
technology such as additive processes. Yet even though the benefits of
fully embracing such technology are obvious, too many companies prefer
to move slowly, one small step at a time. So the question is: where is
the leadership that wants to drive the kind of revolutionary change
DARPA is looking for? Where are the risk-takers? Where is the company
that is ready to dramatically reduce the duration from design to
prototype to full-rate production, and that will reap the commensurate
benefits?
Congress Adds Teeth to Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
administrator
The
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) has two main provisions—(1)
anti-bribery, and (2) books-and-records. The anti-bribery provision is
enforced by the Department of Justice (DOJ), and the books-and-records
provision is enforced by the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC). See
our previous article on the topic here.
As we told you, the FCPA originated from public revelations of corrupt
payments made by Lockheed (now known as Lockheed Martin) in order to
induce foreign governments to purchase its planes. So the
inter-relationship between aerospace/defense companies and the FCPA goes
back to the beginning.
Military services contractor Blackwater (now known as Xe Services LLC) was accused of committing bribery (but not violations of the FCPA) in April, 2010. Here’s a blog post that explores the allegations against the company. It states that several company executives—
--were
charged with 15 counts of conspiracy to violate firearms laws, making
false statements and representations on federally licensed firearms
dealers' records, possession of machine guns, possession of other
firearms (short-barrelled shotguns) not registered in the National
Firearms and Registration and Transfer Record, and aiding and abetting
The blog post linked to a November, 2009 article
by the New York Times alleging that senior Blackwater executives
“authorized secret payments of about $1 million to Iraqi officials that
were intended to silence their criticism and buy their support after a
September 2007 episode in which Blackwater security guards fatally shot
17 Iraqi civilians in Baghdad, according to former company officials.”
The blog post summed-up the situation thusly—
Four former employees the Times
interviewed for the November story claimed the payments were approved
by the company's president and money was wired to Iraq from accounts in
Jordan. The employees didn't know if the payments were actually made.
The [Times] report said ‘Blackwater’s strategy of buying off the
government officials, which would have been illegal under American law,
created a deep rift inside the company, according to the former
executives.’
A report by the Times Friday said,
‘While the indictment is somewhat limited in scope, it could be the
government’s opening salvo in a broader offensive to bring criminal
charges against the company. They could include charges for bribery and
export violations, according to officials familiar with the case,
perhaps under a strategy of turning former and current executives of the
company against one another.’
From
Lockheed to Blackwater, defense contractors have been caught up in the
apparent need to offer illegal inducements to foreign officials, in
order to secure favorable treatment. But a recent law aims to add teeth
to the U.S. enforcement mechanisms.
This GovExec.com story by Robert Brodsky reported that the U.S. House of Representatives had passed the 2010 Overseas Contractor Reform Act (H.R. 5366). Mr. Brodsky’s story reported that the law (if passed and signed) “would
require agencies to debar companies and individuals found in violation
of the 1977 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, and sever their existing
government contracts and grants.”
The
proposed bill contains a provision for an agency head to waive the
penalty. In addition—as Mr. Brodsky notes—many contractors have been
able to craft artful settlement agreements with the DOJ “that allowed
them to admit wrongdoing, but not necessarily confess to bribery.” Thus,
companies such as Halliburton and BAE Systems, that have paid millions
of dollars in FCPA settlement agreements, might escape the bill’s
intent.
This article at Corporate Compliance Insights noted some other issues—
Because
most FCPA enforcement actions are settled through a non-prosecution
agreement (NPA) or deferred prosecution agreements (DPA) … the bill may
need some tweaking if it is to be effective.
Among
other issues will be: is a company that agrees to an NPA or DPA to
resolve an FCPA case ‘found to be in violation of the FCPA.’ Likely not.
Also,
the bill defines ‘final judgment’ as when ‘all appeals of the judgment
have been finally determined, or all time for filing such appeals has
expired.’ Again, this assumes that all FCPA enforcement actions are
resolved through actual judicial proceedings – which is not how FCPA
enforcement works in many cases.
Other
potential shortcomings with the bill is that it only applies to
violations of the FCPA’s antibribery provisions. Thus, the bill would
not be triggered by the recent ‘bribery, yet no bribery’ cases (Daimler,
BAE, and Siemens) … In these cases, despite DOJ allegations that would
seem to establish that the company violated the FCPA’s antibribery
provisions, none of these companies were charged with violating the
FCPA’s antibribery provisions. Instead, non-FCPA charges or FCPA books
and records and internal controls violations were charged in an attempt
to avoid application of the European Union debarment provisions. …
The
big picture flaw with H.R. 5366 (as currently drafted) is it assumes
all FCPA enforcement actions are resolved through judicial proceedings
and it assumes all FCPA enforcement actions are resolved with charges
that actually fit the facts.
Neither of these assumptions are accurate ….
So
perhaps H.R. 5366 is not the giant-killer its drafters hoped it would
be. The biggest targets will likely continue to skate around the FCPA
rocks without tripping. But for other (smaller) companies, it might be
the “death penalty” as they lose the ability to be awarded new U.S.
Government contracts, based on a poorly crafted settlement agreement.
Effective January 1, 2019, Nick Sanders has been named as Editor of two reference books published by LexisNexis. The first book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Cost Accounting Standards. Nick replaces Darrell Oyer, who has edited those books for many years.