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Apogee Consulting Inc

Micro-Stories: Small Biz Fraud and FCPA Follow-up

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We’re on TDY so were going to have to make this quick. Here are a couple of stories that our readers might find to be of interest.

Small Business Fraud

Our steady fountain of news stories, the Department of Justice, comes through again for us, with the announcement that “Maryland contractors and their president to pay United States for falsely obtaining Hubzone and SBA 8(a) contracts.” What’s the beef? According to the DOJ—

The United States alleged that Platinum One and Anthony Wright falsely represented to the SBA, the Navy and the Army that Platinum was controlled by a socially and economically disadvantaged individual. The government’s investigation found that Platinum One was actually controlled by Vernon J. Smith III, who is not socially or economically disadvantaged. The government alleged that Smith used Platinum’s 8(a) status to continue Capitol Contractor’s business operations after Capitol’s own 8(a) status expired in 2002. As a result of these false representations, Platinum obtained contracts from the Navy and the Army.

The United States also alleged that Platinum One and Anthony Wright falsely represented to the SBA and other government agencies that Platinum maintained its principal office in a designated HUBZone location. In fact, Platinum actually operated out of offices owned by Capitol that were not located in a HUBZone. Platinum One did not qualify for the HUBZone program, yet because of its false statements to the SBA and the Air Force, it obtained contracts that had been set aside by the Air Force for qualified HUBZone companies.

That little faux pas cost the companies and their President $200,000 “to settle claims that they used false statements to obtain contracts from the Department of Defense.”

BAE Systems Auditor is Audited

We previously reported about BAE Systems’ settlement(s) with UK and USA government entities for, among other things, false statements related to internal control adequacy and management’s commitment to ethical business conduct. At the time, we noted the statement of the BAE Systems CEO that the wrongdoing all took place “nearly a decade ago.” So that’s all water under the bridge, right?

Nope. The other shoe has dropped, and it’s dropped right on the head(s) of BAE Systems’ external auditors, KPMG. As one of our favorite sites, GoingConcern.com reported—

Yesterday, the Accountancy and Actuarial Discipline Board (AADB) in the UK announced that they would be reviewing a decade’s worth of audits performed by KPMG for BAE Systems, the British Defense Contractor. … So now, presumably because they thought it would be fun, the AADB is curious about what KPMG knew about these ‘commissions’ and ‘third parties’ … Well! The prospect for unlimited fine is interesting, to say the least. For their part, KPMG is cooperating with the investigation because, well, what else are they going to do? A spokesman told Reuters, ‘[T]he firm does not believe there has been any act of misconduct [and that] it will be cooperating fully with the AADB to ensure that the matter is brought to a swift conclusion,’ which, as we all know, runs on an audio loop on the firm’s automated press inquiries line. … The thing is, KPMG’s (or any accounting firm) involvement with BAE (or any defense contractor) has to be one of mixed feelings.

On the one hand, you’ve got extremely profitable international businesses that build all these cool toys that fly, blow things up and go into space. On the other, a lot of their customers are the shifty type, they probably keep lots of secrets and – OH YEAH – their products are designed to kill people. But once you get passed all that, you realize it’s simply a business needing professional services and who better to provide it than a Big 4 firm, amiright?

Taking what many might consider a less casual approach to reporting the story, Reuters had this to say—

Audits covering the 10 years between 1997 and 2007 will be investigated, as well as ‘commission payments paid by BAE’, Britain's Accountancy and Actuarial Discipline Board (AADB) said in a statement posted on its website on Monday.

‘The AADB has begun an investigation under its accountancy scheme into the conduct of KPMG Audit plc as auditors to BAE Systems plc,’ the regulator said. …

AADB said it would investigate KPMG's advice to BAE on the operations of three of its offshore companies, Red Diamond Trading, Poseidon Trading Investments and Novelmight. ‘The regulator is looking specifically at the audit of commissions paid by BAE to outside agents, any tax advice given by KPMG on commission payments and the status of three offshore companies linked to BAE ... penalties could include an unlimited fine for KPMG,’ said Credit Agricole analyst Thomas Mesmin.

And as you ponder the idea of the auditor being audited, we wish you good day.


 

Backlash from Changes to Proposal Audit Thresholds

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We first told you about changes to the DFARS PGI—changes that limited DCAA’s audits of contractor cost proposals—in this article. We are proud to claim to be one of the early reporters of the story, breaking it two weeks before other outlets reported it. To recap, we reported (with approval)—

What we see in the foregoing is a movement towards limiting DCAA’s role in DCMA proposal analysis. Fixed-price proposals valued at less than $10 million normally should not be reviewed by DCAA. Similarly, cost-type proposals valued at less than $100 million normally should not be reviewed by DCAA.

Well, other outlets finally caught up with the story, and they did not exhibit the same approval as we did.

First, the Project on Government Oversight (POGO) published an “alert”—or what might also be termed a “rant”—with the inflammatory title, “Pentagon Radically Reducing Oversight of Contracts Worth Tens of Billions”. The POGO rant linked to an October 18, 2010 MRD from DCAA (MRD 10-PSP-030(R)) that transmitted news of the PGI revisions to the agency’s auditors. There was nothing new in the DCAA audit guidance, but POGO made it sound like an insidious conspiracy was at work. POGO rhetorically asked its readers—

‘POGO has long feared contractors and their government allies would block DCAA from exposing contractor ripoffs,’ said Nick Schwellenbach, POGO’s director of investigations.  ‘Why are billions of dollars being put at risk when Secretary Gates is demanding cost savings?’

In addition, POGO reported—

The reason for this new restriction is DCAA’s attempt to perfectly comply with Generally Accepted Government Auditing Standards (GAGAS). With this standard, which requires meticulous documentation of findings, DCAA is unable to cover as much ground as they used to, thus the need to restrict ‘audits’ as defined by GAGAS.  The number of DCAA reports produced annually has plunged: 33,801 in FY 2007 to 30,352 in FY 2008 to 21,276 reports in FY 2009.

Rather than subjecting reviews of cost or pricing data to GAGAS, DCAA should consider these reviews as financial advisory services, which are not subject to all GAGAS requirements.  This would better protect taxpayers and warfighters by allowing DCAA to review cost data and deliver advice to contracting officers in a timely fashion.

We have a couple of thoughts on POGO’s rant. First, it is absolutely misleading to assert that oversight over DOD contracts is being reduced. That is not the case. In fact, what is being reduced is DCAA’s review of bids submitted to DOD. Some of those bids might become future contracts, in which case they will be subject to the full panoply of the Pentagon oversight regime. Until that time, DCAA’s review is simply to assist the DCMA Contracting Officer is preparing for negotiations. DCMA is the customer and it can request (or not request) DCAA review. In this case, the two DOD agencies are mutually agreeing that certain proposals will not be subject to DCAA review—which frees up audit resources to focus on larger and/or higher risk proposals. This is a good thing, though POGO makes it sound as if the criminals are being freed from jail.

Second, we actually agree with POGO that DCAA should exempt certain of its activities from GAGAS. In fact, we recommended that nearly a year ago, in this open letter to DCAA Director Pat Fitzgerald. So (to reword a bit) we are pleased to see that POGO agrees with our recommendation.

Robert Brodsky at GovExec.com was more restrained in his reporting (as we have come to expect from him). He reported—

In a statement, a Defense Department spokeswoman said the change will allow DCAA to focus on the highest-risk areas, and ‘actually increase savings to the department and warfighter.’ … The redistribution of audit assistance work came as no surprise to observers who have tracked DCAA's response to a stinging 2008 Government Accountability Office report. The watchdog found DCAA auditors often failed to comply with generally accepted government auditing standards, documented their audit opinions improperly and submitted sloppy working papers.

But, some auditors suggested DCAA managers overreacted to the report, and they now have embraced the time-consuming GAGAS process for all audits and reviews of cost data in contractor proposals. The result has been that reports take longer and require a field office manager's approval. Often contracts are issued before the DCAA reviews are complete.

Once again, we are pleased to see our position(s) agreed-with. In this article, we asserted, “So perhaps it’s not really the workload that’s causing ‘lingering audit problems,’ but might be instead the process by which audits are being executed?“

As always, comments on the GovExec.com site, from purported DCAA auditors, are brutal but illustrative. Here are a few of them for your edification:

  • Every audit takes longer to complete and then do over after the rules on what the agency expects change every other week. We don't audit really, we access risk for weeks, document sampling plans that are crazy and document work papers to a level of insanity. Once an audit is actually complete, the rules on how to do an audit change again. Then after four levels of review, no one wants to issue it anyway. But don't worry, by this point the contract has been awarded and we can cancel the assignment so no one gets Gigged. I have to believe that the people writing the audit guidance for proposal audits have never actually done one of these audits. Forward pricing proposals, should not be audited to GAGAS!!!!! Does anyone know how insane it is to tell a contractor that your unsupporting all their out year indirect rates for lack of budgetary data but by the way I want to test your pool and base amounts anyway for the current year? It will take me two weeks to document that sample plan and then you can pull the 750 transactions I need to look at. But don't worry by the time I'm done the contract will be awarded and most likely the assignment canceled. The report will never leave the DCAA family. Has anyone requested a basic assist audit from another DCAA office in the past nine months? Am I the only one who has noticed that basic requests for audit assistance, do not even get acknowledged anymore? How can they be acknowledged when the agency is in melt down mode? People are too busy documenting work papers to ever acknowledge a basic request for an audit. Why acknowledge it, when you know you never will issue it anyway?

  • All I can say to this is...What the #$%^? I don't even have a clue when I will get an audit back from DCAA...now they tell me that they will not look at a cost proposal under $100M.. We might as well terminate DCAA's charter and desolve their workforce because I'm lost on their utility for the majority of DOD actions.

In response to the foregoing (unwarranted and uneducated) criticism, DOD is trying to explain itself. This article at WashingtonTechnology.com reported—

The Project on Government Oversight watchdog group called it a “radical” reduction in the contracts to be reviewed, saying about $92 billion a year in contracts would be affected.

But defense officials believe the change will focus resources on high-risk areas and increase savings to the department.

‘Defense Procurement Acquisition Policy, in coordination with the acquisition community and DCAA, made the change to the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement,’ reads a statement distributed by a DOD spokeswoman on Nov. 1.

‘DCAA is working with the acquisition community to align our resources with the highest risk areas. DCAA believes this change will allow them to focus on audit areas with the greatest payback to the taxpayer and will actually increase savings to the Department and warfighter. Finally, DCAA has coordinated this change with DCMA, and are confident that they will be able to provide the necessary pricing coverage for the procurements below the threshold,’ the DOD statement said.

To sum up, the inflammatory and highly misleading tack taken by POGO is being picked up by other media outlets, and generating utterly unwarranted criticism aimed at the DOD. While there are some good points being made (i.e., those that agree with our previously published positions and recommendations), there is much nonsense being spouted as well.

As educated and experienced readers of this site, you know better.


 

We Don’t Make This Stuff Up—Honest!

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Noted Science Fiction author Charles Stross stole our title for today’s article: The Atrocity Archives. Okay, he didn’t steal it, but it would have been perfect for the following potpourri of mini-articles. Oh, well.

  1. The Boeing Company recently agreed to settle a “defective pricing” civil suit “alleging that the company unlawfully inflated the price it charged the Air Force to manufacture the Towed Decoy System for the B-1 bomber.” The Government alleged that “Boeing failed to disclose to Air Force contract negotiators that it had previously manufactured TDS kits for much lower costs, largely by outsourcing much of the work to outside vendors and subcontractors.” The case was dismissed without any admission of wrongdoing by Boeing.

  1. We certainly don’t want to be seen as being overly alarmist. So, we’re just saying that the so-called “Iranian Cyber-Army” “may have successfully infected as many as 20 million PCs.” Our cyber-security stories don’t interest many site visitors for some strange reason, but here’s a link to the story at computerworld.com. Again, there’s no reason to be overly concerned about this group, which may or may not be connected to the Iranian government, but which is known for having hacked both Twitter and Baidu. Don’t be worried about its for-rent botnet service. Ignore the fact that investigators found “an administration interface where people who want to rent the botnet can describe the machines they would like to infect and upload their own malware for distribution by the botnet.” According to one source quoted in the story, “’you provide the number of machines and their region. You then provide the malware download URL, and they will do the malware installation for you.’" Nope. Nothing to see here. Move along, please.

  1. And while you’re not looking at your lack of cyber-security, take no notice of Darnell Albert-El, of Richmond, Virginia, who was sentenced to serve 27 months in prison for “hacking into his former employer’s website” and “one count of intentionally damaging a protected computer without authorization.” Albert-El, a former IT Director for Transmarx, LLC, was fired by his employer. After his termination, “he used a personal computer and an administrator account and password to access the computer hosting the Transmarx website.” What did he do with his unauthorized access? He “caused the transmission of a series of commands that intentionally caused damage without authorization to the computer by deleting approximately 1,000 files related to the Transmarx website.” What was his motivation? According to the DOJ, “Albert-El admitted that he caused the damage because he was angry about being fired.” Note to self: When firing your IT director, make sure to disable his/her account access and passwords.

  1. Former Contracting Officer and Army Major Roderick Sanchez pleaded guilty to one count of bribery “for accepting money and items of value in return for being influenced in the awarding of Army contracts.” According to the DOJ, “Sanchez admitted that … he accepted illicit bribe payments from foreign companies seeking to secure Army contracts. In return, Sanchez used his official position to steer Army contracts to these companies. During the course of this criminal scheme, Sanchez accepted Rolex watches, cash payments and other things of value totaling more than $200,000.”

  1. Would you pay $6.50 per minute for video conferencing? Even if the phone bill ended-up being $55 million over a few months? Apparently, the Federal Communications Commission would. It wasn’t the pricing that led to trouble for Viable Communications, Inc., it was the conspiracy to commit mail fraud. Let’s let the DOJ tell the story—

Beginning in approximately fall 2007, they conspired with others to pay individuals to make fraudulent VRS phone calls using Viable’s [Video Relay Service] VRS service. … John and Joseph Yeh paid Mowl and Tropp, who then would pay others to make the fraudulent phone calls using Viable’s VRS service. Viable then submitted the fraudulent call minutes to the FCC and was paid approximately $390 per hour for all VRS calls that Viable processed. … VRS is an online video translation service that allows people with hearing disabilities to communicate with hearing individuals through the use of interpreters and Web cameras. A person with a hearing disability who wants to communicate with a hearing person can do so by contacting a VRS provider through an audio and video Internet connection. The VRS provider, in turn, employs a video interpreter to view and interpret the hearing disabled person’s signed conversation and relay the signed conversation orally to a hearing person. VRS is funded by fees assessed by telecommunications providers to telephone customers, and is provided at no cost to the VRS user. … In addition to the indictment charging the Yehs, Mowl, Tropp and Viable, five other indictments were unsealed … charging an additional 22 people with engaging in a scheme to steal millions of dollars from the FCC’s VRS program.  The indictments charge owners and employees of the following six companies with engaging in a scheme to defraud the FCC’s VRS program:


  • Viable Communications Inc. of Rockville, Md.;

  • Master Communications LLC of Las Vegas;

  • KL Communications LLC of Phoenix;

  • Mascom LLC of Austin, Texas;

  • Deaf and Hard-of-Hearing Interpreting Services Inc. (DHIS) of New York and New Jersey;

  • Innovative Communication Services for the Deaf Corp. (ICSD) of Miami Lakes, Fla.; and

  • Deaf Studio 29 of Huntington Beach, Calif.

Well, that’s the news for today. As we said, even though we could call this The Atrocity Archives, that title has already been taken. In any case, that was a work of fiction and these newlets are not fiction. We don’t make this stuff up.


 

Export Violations and False Claims

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We’re back with more hard-to-believe tales of poor judgment today. This story, which comes to us courtesy of the Department of Justice, interweaves several recurring themes readers see on this site. One of those themes would be compliance with export control laws and regulations. Another theme would be how noncompliance with laws and regulations can lead to allegations of violations of the False Claims Act. And yet another theme would be securing one’s supply chain against counterfeit parts. Sometimes we feel like a lone voice in the wilderness, warning companies to implement effective internal controls and to deploy controls (and monitoring) in their operations, so as to avoid “problems” with the Federal government.

And then we encounter a story like this one, where Rocky Mountain Instrument Company (RMI) makes our points for us, with an elegant simplicity that we can only aspire to reach. Sure, it cost RMI $2 million and put the company into Chapter 11 bankruptcy, but isn’t that really just a small price to pay for giving us such a perfect object lesson?

Let’s dish.

RMI settled with the DOJ on October 29, 2010 by agreeing to pay $1 million to resolve allegations of False Claim Act violations. As the DOJ notes—

This amount is in addition to a $1 million criminal forfeiture and five year probationary term ordered in connection with RMI’s June 22, 2010, plea of guilty to knowingly and willfully exporting defense articles without a license in United States v. Rocky Mountain Instrument Company, 10-cr-00139-WYD-01 (D. Colo.).

RMI was a subcontractor to “various” DOD prime contractors. RMI sold those prime contractors “optical and laser products” for which those primes subsequently billed the DOD. RMI must have been a low-bidder, because it sourced its products from “overseas” manufacturers. The problem with that approach, according to the DOJ, was that RMI exported “sensitive technical data” without a license to those overseas manufacturers so that they could produce the items. Oops!

Those pesky violations of Arms Export Control Act and International Traffic in Arms Regulations are going to get you in trouble every time. In this instance, they led to both civil and criminal charges, and put the company into Chapter 11.

What the DOJ announcement doesn’t mention is the effect RMI’s violations had on the prime contractors’ defense programs. Some poor prime contractors were counting on RMI to provide necessary items to be incorporated into their end products. Those contractors spent time and money sourcing RMI—a company they thought was a legitimate low-cost supplier. They were wrong. It’s not clear whether RMI’s products were or were not usable, but certainly nobody is going to want to use RMI as a source anytime in the near future.

And what about the sensitive technology that was exported? What effect will that technology have downstream to this country’s national security? Suddenly, $2 million strikes us as a woefully inadequate fine.


 

Why Can’t the FBI Manage its Programs?

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We’ve asked this question before, about other agencies and departments of the Executive Branch of the U.S. Government. Sometimes we imagine asking the question wryly, or archly, or sometimes with a cynical and knowing smirk. Other times we imagine asking the question in a plaintive or even despairing voice. We see Grandma Jane from Wichita or Bismarck, looking at the sky in supplication. We see Joe Six-Pack, wondering why his hard-earned taxes don’t get spent wisely.

(We are, perhaps, overly dramatic.)

In other words, this is the latest installment in an on-going series that (hopefully) probes the ability of the Federal government to manage its contractors and execute its programs. A quick review of our News Archive will lead you to other articles in the series, each starting with the word “Why”—which you can imagine in any voice you like.

Today is the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s turn in the barrel. What brings this respected law enforcement agency into our cross-hairs? For starters, try this article at FederalTimes.com. It reports that the FBI’s “Sentinel” project is “is $100 million over budget and nearly two years behind schedule,” according to a report released by the Justice Department’s Office of Inspector General (DOJ OIG), which has cognizance over the FBI.

Here’s a link to the DOJ OIG Audit Report.

As FederalTimes.com reported, the Sentinel project “is intended to replace the FBI's outdated Automated Case Management System. When fully implemented, it will provide FBI agents and analysts with a web-based case management system to manage evidence, automate document review and approval processes, and use expanded search capabilities.”

The FBI expected to implement Sentinel in four overlapping phases, each lasting 12 to 16 months. Each phase was intended to provide a stand-alone set of capabilities upon which subsequent phases would add further capabilities. The project’s first two phases were budgeted at $306 million; the FBI spent $405 million.

The entire project was scheduled to be completed by December 2009 at a total cost of $425 million. The project was rebaselined, and the at-completion estimate was increased by $26 million, based on project status in October 2007, when the first phase was completed. Now the project is scheduled to be completed in September 2011 for a total cost of $451 million.

In other words, the FBI has asserted (via its budget) that it can complete the final two phases of the work for between $20 and $46 million. And, in the word of the DOJ OIG, “we believe that the most challenging development work for Sentinel still remains.”

However, MITRE (who was hired by the FBI to independently assess the project) calculated that it will take the FBI another $351 million to complete the project—for an at-completion cost of $756 million (which would represent an overrun of 178% against the original project baseline budget of $425 million). Oh, and MITRE said it will take the FBI another six years to complete the project.

Naturally, the FBI doesn’t agree with MITRE’s assessment. According to the FederalTimes.com article—

‘We believe that the interim report does not accurately reflect the FBI's management of the Sentinel project, and fails to credit the FBI with taking corrective action to keep it on budget,’ according to a FBI news release. The agency noted that thousands of its employees are using the system to draft interview reports, send leads and manage their caseloads. … The FBI says Mitre estimate's assumes a ‘worst case scenario for a plan that we are no longer using.’

One of the planned corrective actions (according to the DOJ OIG) is that “the FBI will assume direct management of Sentinel development and significantly reduce the role of Lockheed Martin in developing Sentinel.” More on that innovative approach in a bit.

What went wrong? As usual, there were a number of decisions and factors that led the FBI (and its prime contractor, Lockheed Martin) to this point. Let’s look at the DOJ OIG report for some details.

On December 2, 2009, the FBI conditionally accepted delivery of Sentinel’s Phase 2, Segment 4, which included three of the eight electronic forms expected to be delivered in Segment 4, and their associated workflow. The FBI conditionally accepted this segment despite knowing that what was delivered had serious performance and usability issues and had received overwhelmingly negative user feedback during testing with FBI agents and analysts. As a result, the FBI did not deploy Segment 4 to the FBI’s agents and analysts when it conditionally accepted it in December 2009.

Then, on March 3, 2010, the FBI issued a partial stop-work order to Lockheed Martin for portions of Phase 3 and all of Phase 4, and also returned Phase 2, Segment 4 to the development phase from the operations and maintenance phase. FBI officials stated that the purpose of the partial stop-work order for Phases 3 and 4 was to focus Lockheed Martin’s efforts on delivering Phase 2, Segment 4 in a form that the FBI would find acceptable.

On July 26, 2010, the FBI deployed Segment 4 to FBI agents and analysts.

We can see from the foregoing that the project experienced an eight-month delay because of user satisfaction and system usability issues. But what we also see is a Government project management team that is indecisive and lacks leadership. First, they “conditionally accepted” the deliverables and three months later decided to “return” the accepted items back to “the development phase” for redesign and rework. Another five months passed before Lockheed Martin could rework the electronic forms to the satisfaction of the users—which indicates (to us) that there was some very extensive rework done. I.e., it was not a quick fix. So why were these forms initially accepted? One can only wonder.

What else did the DOJ OIG report?

As of August 1, 2010, the FBI had not decided on an approach for completing Sentinel, and FBI officials did not provide the OIG with detailed descriptions of the alternatives under consideration for completing Sentinel. At that time, however, the FBI Chief Technology Officer stated that the alternatives under consideration would allow the FBI to complete Sentinel within its $451 million budget by re-using portions of successful FBI IT projects, including Sentinel, taking advantage of technological advances and industry best practices, and increasing the reliance on FBI personnel to develop Sentinel. Yet, the Chief Technology Officer acknowledged that his estimate did not include the cost of maintaining Sentinel for 2 years after its completion – costs which had been included in all previous Sentinel budgets.

Yeah, about the FBI’s official at-completion estimate: We understand that one way to come in on budget it to forget to account for certain costs in the estimate; however, that’s not the way it’s supposed to be done.

Here are some other facts about the FBI’s project management to consider, as reported by the DOJ OIG.

  • [The DOJ OIG] found that the FBI has either limited in scope or eliminated several project management activities that were designed to help it monitor the progress of Sentinel’s development. … For example, in December 2009, the FBI discontinued Sentinel’s Project Health Assessments. Performed by the FBI’s Enterprise Requirements and Assessment Unit, these assessments provided an independent assessment of Sentinel’s cost, schedule, and scope.

  • The FBI stopped EVM reporting for Phase 2 in December 2009, and the EVM reporting for Phase 3 has not complied with OMB guidance since May 2010. EVM is an important risk management tool for major capital investments that measures the performance of a project by producing cost estimates, evaluating progress, and analyzing cost and schedule performance trends. … The FBI said that EVM and Project Health Assessments were discontinued as a result of the March 2010 partial stop work order because there was no schedule or baseline against which the FBI could measure its progress. While we [the DOJ OIG] agree there was not baseline to measure against, according to DOJ policy on implementing EVM, once the FBI realized that Sentinel was significantly behind schedule and over budget, the FBI should have established a new baseline for measuring Sentinel’s cost and schedule performance.

Going forward, the FBI told the DOJ OIG that it had a plan to assume more direct control of the project, so as to bring it to completion on-budget and on-schedule. According to the DOJ OIG—

Overall, the FBI plans to reduce the number of contract employees working on Sentinel from approximately 220 to 40. The FBI said that, at the same time, the number of FBI employees assigned to the project will also decrease from 30 to 12. The FBI asserted that this new, agile approach will streamline decision-making processes and allow the FBI to deliver Sentinel within budget.

The DOJ OIG enumerated nine concerns it had with the FBI’s proposed approach. Moreover, it reported that—

In September 2010 Carnegie Mellon’s Software Engineering Institute (SEI) performed an independent review of the FBI’s new approach for completing Sentinel. The SEI stated that the FBI’s decision to attempt an agile approach is ‘a positive step toward improvement over the prior development approach.’ However, SEI expressed similar concerns to ours, including the largely undocumented details of the FBI’s new plan, the FBI’s inexperience in using an agile development methodology, and the unknowns concerning the viable state of and path forward for the technical design of Sentinel.

To conclude, the DOJ OIG said that it had “significant concerns and questions about the ability of this new approach to complete the Sentinel project within budget, in a timely fashion, and with similar functionality as what the Sentinel project previously sought to provide.” Other than that, they were fine with it.

From our perspective, this is a cautionary tale about lack of project management skills, lack of rigor in measuring project status and using that information to make an accurate estimate-at-completion, and a corrective action plan that smacks of an alternate reality. Other than that, we’re fine with it.

On a more positive and less sarcastic note, this article is our 300th blog post on this website. That’s about three novels worth of over-the-top strident and politically incorrect hyperbole. Thanks for your support.


 


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Newsflash

Effective January 1, 2019, Nick Sanders has been named as Editor of two reference books published by LexisNexis. The first book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Cost Accounting Standards. Nick replaces Darrell Oyer, who has edited those books for many years.