Ho-hum. Another week; another spate of stories of corruption and fraud coming out of the Department of Justice. Let’s look at what transpired in the past 10 days.
HUBZone Contract Fraudulently Obtained
Hard to get more domestic than Northern Virginia.
On November 10, 2010, the DOJ reported that “CFP Group, located in McLean, Va., and its president, Roberto Clark, have agreed to pay the United States $150,000 to settle claims that they used false statements to obtain a contract from the Department of Veterans Affairs.”
“But wait!” we hear you cry. “Didn’t we just see a similar story on this website?” Yes. Yes you did. And it’s right here. Only that was a Maryland contractor, and this is a Virginia contractor.
Much like the Maryland contractor, CFP Group allegedly “made false statements to the Small Business Administration (SBA) to obtain certification as a Historically Underutilized Business Zone (HUBZone) company”. CFP Group then allegedly “ used this certification to wrongfully obtain a Veterans Affairs contract for fire alarm installation.”
According to the DOJ—
On the application, Clark represented that CFP Group’s principal office was located in a designated HUBZone in Maryland. In fact, the United States alleged, no company employees worked at that location and Clark’s office was actually in Vienna, Va., which is not a designated HUBZone location. Based on the false application, the SBA certified CFP Group as a HUBZone small business company. CFP Group then used this certification to obtain a fire alarms systems contract from the Department of Veterans Affairs, which had been set aside for a qualified HUBZone company. The company is no longer participating in the HUBZone program and has relocated to McLean, Va.
Yes, we approve of that corporate move from Vienna to McLean. Moving 3 miles down the Beltway will definitely help with rebranding the company’s image. (Note: Sarcasm.)
USAID Loses $2 Million to International Fraudsters
Monrovia, Liberia is in Africa, far from the Washington, D.C. Beltway. It is hard to imagine a more stark contrast between the two locations. And yet the DOJ managed to link them for us, by reporting on November 16, 2010, that “Two former humanitarian aid workers were convicted today for defrauding the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) of $1.9 million”. This is serious stuff, according to the DOJ—
Morris B. Fahnbulleh, 40, and Joe O. Bondo, 39, … were each convicted on one count of conspiracy to defraud the United States, four counts of mail fraud, two counts of wire fraud and four false claims counts. Fahnbulleh was also convicted of one count of conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud. Bondo was also convicted of two counts of witness tampering. Fahnbulleh and Bondo have been in custody since their arrests in 2009. … At sentencing, the defendants face up to 20 years in prison.
What’s the story? The DOJ reported—
After Liberia’s 14-year civil war, USAID awarded a grant in 2005, through Catholic Relief Services, to World Vision, an international non-profit Christian humanitarian foundation. The grant was a two-year humanitarian project in Liberia for community reconstruction projects. Under the agreement, Fahnbulleh and Bondo were assigned to supervise World Vision employees as they assisted Liberian communities with infrastructure projects, including road, latrine and water well construction. In return for their labor, USAID, through World Vision, was supposed to then distribute food to the residents of these communities.
However, in 2008, an internal audit conducted by World Vision revealed that up to 91 percent of the food never reached its intended beneficiaries. According to the trial evidence, the defendants sold the food and pocketed the proceeds; they then instructed World Vision employees to falsify the documents used to track food distributions. The defendants also directed USAID-salaried employees to perform work on their personal compounds and further concealed these activities from World Vision headquarters, Catholic Relief Services and USAID by intimidating the World Vision employees with threats of job loss and by paying some subordinates ‘hush money’ to cement their silence and cooperation.
The good news in the foregoing is that World Vision, the subrecipient of the USAID grant, had an internal audit function that actually discovered the corrupt actions. The bad news is that it took them three years to do so, and that less than 10 percent of the grant funds were spent as intended.
Student Loan Fraud
Moving back to domestic acts of fraud and corruption, the DOJ announced that, on November 17, 2010, “Four student aid lenders have paid the United States a total of $57.75 million to resolve allegations that they improperly inflated their entitlement to certain interest rate subsidies from the U.S. Department of Education in violation of the False Claims Act.”
As the DOJ reported—
Nelnet Inc. and Nelnet Educational Loan Funding Inc. have paid $47 million to the United States. Southwest Student Services Corp. has paid $5 million. Brazos Higher Education Authority and Brazos Higher Education Service Corp. have paid $4 million. Panhandle Plains Higher Education Authority and Panhandle Plains Management and Servicing Corp. have paid $1.75 million. Dr. Oberg will receive a total of $16.65 million from these settlements.
The settlements resolve allegations … that several lenders participating in the federal student financial aid programs created billing systems that allowed them to receive improperly inflated interest rate subsidies from the Department of Education. The United States did not intervene in this action, which was litigated by the whistleblower, but it provided assistance at many stages of the case, including during the settlement process.
Interestingly, although this False Claim Act suit was initiated by a whistleblower, the United States did not intervene in the suit (meaning that the DOJ did not take over the suit and prosecute on behalf of the U.S.). Instead, the qui tam relator and his attorneys led the case all the way—which we take to mean that their share of the settlement will be that much higher. Nice.
More Socioeconomic Fraud
We’re not done yet. Here’s another DOJ story (from Friday, November 19, 2010) about two Michigan construction firms that have agreed to pay the U.S. Government $1.4 million to resolve allegations that that they submitted False Claims related to their work at Detroit’s Wayne County Metropolitan Airport (which was funded by the Federal government).
The DOJ reported the allegations as follows—
John Carlo Inc. and Angelo Iafrate Construction Company, falsely claimed that they had used Disadvantaged Business Enterprises (DBEs) for part of the work on the project when they had not. The DBE program provides assistance to businesses owned by minorities, women, and other socially and economically disadvantaged individuals to enter federally-funded construction and design industries.
Under their contracts, the two firms were required to comply with the Department of Transportation’s (DOT) DBE regulations and accurately report their DBE contracting to obtain and maintain the construction contracts. The companies claimed BN &M Trucking, a DBE, performed substantial work on the contracts when, in fact, the trucking firm did not and was merely a pass-through used to obtain the appearance of DBE participation.
It’s Not a Commercial Company When It Receives Federal Funds
No, we’re still not done yet. We have a final story about bribery and fraud that took place in a seemingly commercial environment. Unfortunately for James Woodason, New York Consolidated Edison (Con Ed) receives approximately $10,000 of federal funds each year, so that made his actions Federal felonies. Oops!
As the DOJ reported on November 19, 2010, Woodason pleaded guilty to accepting approximately $807,000 in bribes from industrial pipe suppliers and then giving them supply contracts. DOJ announced—
According to a four-count felony charge, Woodason, a former department manager of purchasing at Con Edison, accepted bribe payments from two industrial pipe supply vendors, in exchange for steering contracts to each of those vendors. The department said that Woodason was responsible for purchasing and awarding contracts for millions of dollars in goods and services and managing inventory on behalf of Con Edison. …
Woodason is charged with two counts of conspiracy, each of which carries a maximum penalty of five years in prison and a $250,000 fine. Woodason is also charged with income tax evasion, which carries a maximum penalty of five years in prison and a $250,000 fine. The bribery count carries a maximum penalty of 10 years in prison and a $250,000 fine. The maximum fine on each count may be increased to twice the gain derived from the crime or twice the loss suffered by the victims of the crime, if either of those amounts is greater than the statutory maximum fine.
These charges arose from an ongoing federal antitrust investigation of bid rigging, bribery, fraud and tax-related offenses in the power generation industry
Well, that about wraps it up, gentle readers. Ten days worth of domestic and international fraud and corruption. And we’re not even going to count the problems of Senior U.S. District Court Judge Jack T. Camp, Jr., who learned the hard way about attempting to purchase drugs from an FBI agent posing as a drug dealer. Because we’re nice that way.
Procurement Problems of NARA Illustrate What’s Wrong with the System
Nick Sanders
Yes, we know: What’s NARA? Of course yourecognize the acronym of the National Archives and Records Administration, but for the other readers, let us provide a link to its website. As you can see, NARA is “the nation’s record keeper”. And, as we will learn today from this story at FierceGovernmentIT.com---
About a third of all National Archives and Records Administration personnel have lost regular access to email [and] personnel within NARA's office of general counsel have lost email service for at least a full day and senior management, including officials in the office of the archivist, have had diminished access,
We think NARA’s story is illustrative of the problems faced by many Executive Branch agencies, and show the unintended consequences of protectionist legislation, such as the Trade Agreements Act. The TAA was enacted in 1979, and was aimed at implementing trade agreements with other countries. Implemented in § 25.4 of the FAR, it permits a waiver of the Buy American Act in certain circumstances. The Buy American Act (BAA) restricts purchases of supplies to end products made in the United States. We note that there is a two-part test for determining whether a product qualifies as a domestic end product; and we further note that several exceptions to the Buy American Act are available to a contracting officer (as enumerated at FAR § 25.103).
Regarding the TAA, Wikipedia reports—
In general, a product is ‘TAA compliant’ if it's made in the United States or a ‘Designated Country.’ Designated Countries include
those with a free trade agreement with the US (e.g., Canada, Mexico, Australia, Singapore, etc.) countries that participate in the World Trade Organization Government Procurement Agreement (WTO GPA), including Japan and many countries in Europe; a least developed country (e.g., Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Laos, Ethiopia, and many others);
Caribbean Basin countries (Aruba, Costa Rica, Haiti and others).
Notably absent from the list is the People’s Republic of China. A full list of Designated Countries is in FAR 25.003
We haven’t had much to say about the TAA before this, though we’ve tangled with it in the past. It’s a bit complicated, but is implemented in contracts through (among other clauses) the solicitation provision 52.225-6 (“Trade Agreements Certificate”). That provision requires offerors to identify the country of origin for all products that are not made in the United States or designated countries. As noted above, sometimes this can work in a company’s favor, since certain countries are exempted from the restrictions of the Buy American Act. But many times it can hurt the chances of a contract award, since—
The Government will consider for award only offers of U.S.-made or designated country end products unless the Contracting Officer determines that there are no offers for such products or that the offers for those products are insufficient to fulfill the requirements of this solicitation.
Okay, back to the story of NARA, as told by our friends at FierceGovernmentIT.com.
Early in the summer of 2010, NARA “discovered a need for … HP network equipment—a host bus adapter card and a fiber channel pass through module”. The estimated cost of the necessary equipment was about $121,000. According to the story—
They first tried buying the equipment through a General Services Administration schedule, but learned that they couldn't, since the adapter card doesn't comply with the Trade Agreements Act, which is embodied in Part 25 of the Federal Acquisition Regulation. The TAA mandates that when federal agencies buy equipment worth more than $203,000, the gear should originate either domestically or from a long list of countries party to certain kinds of trade relationships with the United States. … Although the NARA equipment value clearly is below the TAA threshold, GSA has made it a condition of granting a schedule to private sector companies that allequipment, irrespective of size order, sold through a schedule must be TAA compliant. Other government-wide purchasing vehicles, such as NASA's SEWP program, don't require that.
Let’s stop right there for some critical examination. Look at the end of the paragraph above—the part where the writer reports that GSA requires that “allequipment, irrespective of size order … must be TAA compliant.” We checked and, yes indeed, GSA has interpreted the TAA to apply to every Multiple Award Schedule contract. Moreover, GSA websites states, “In accordance with the TAA, only U.S.-made or designated country end products shall be offered and sold under Schedule contracts.”
GSA’s interpretation strikes us as plain stupidoverly simplistic. For example, it ignores the exceptions to the BAA provided by the FAR. And as a result of its position, GSA has self-limited the number of companies that might be willing to offer the Federal government goods at prices significantly discounted by the insanely high volume that would be generated. In fact, if memory serves, Sun Microsystems (“one of the government’s top technology providers”) cancelledits GSA schedule in 2007 because of issues with its pricing practices.
But let’s move on and finish the NARA story. Finding it could not purchase the necessary IT equipment from the GSA, what did the archivists do? FierceGovernmentIT.com reported—
NARA officials then tried buying the equipment by issuing a stand-alone solicitation. But, when they awarded a contract, the equipment they received turned out to a likely counterfeit, the J&A states. ‘At the very least the equipment was 'grey market' such that HP would not honor the warranty,’ it adds. NARA's inability to procure the necessary HP equipment has resulted in an ever expanding deterioration of email service to approximately 1,400 NARA users,’ the J&A says.
So what did NARA do next? Six months after noting its need, it decided to enter into a sole source contract with Hewlett-Packard, the maker of the equipment, to procure what it needed.
Now, an inexperienced observer might say “what a waste of time and effort!” NARA knew it needed HP equipment, and it knew how much it should cost. What could be more obvious? Why waste six months trying to go through the GSA and then running a competition for such a trivial (in terms of Federal government procurements) sum of money? Didn’t the NARA procurement people have better things to do? Well, no, they didn’t.
Remember that the U.S. Government very much prefers to buy its goods and services via competition, in order to get the “best value”. In fact, the Obama Administration has made it a priority to reduce sole source acquisitions—as we’ve reportedin the past. So it takes quite a bit of bureaucratic effort to get a sole source justification approved, even for something as obvious as these items.
And notice that the competition did result in an apparent “low bidder” or “best value” contract … but for parts so suspicious that HP wouldn’t warranty network performance with them installed. Consider, if you will, whether national security networks ought to rely on similar competitions—or if they should simply go directly to the appropriate sources on a sole-source basis (as we would assert is obviously the right move).
It strikes us that this is a good “poster child” story for much that is wrong with the current Federal acquisition environment. Many people would tell the NARA procurement folks to go do what they needed to do and quit fooling around for such a trivial amount of money. Other people would tell GSA to get over its TAA-phobia and get with the commercial practices of the global marketplace. But in fact the current system is set up to frustrate “common sense” acquisition approaches, and to emphasize compliance with overly restrictive rules and regulations that act to limit true competition while, at the same time, mandating it.
And woe to the contracting officer who risks his or her career by taking the common-sense approach, especially when doing so might run afoul of a Presidential (and Congressional) hyper-sensitivity to single and sole-source awards. The fact is that sometimes you can’t get competition, and sometimes trying to obtain competition is just plain silly. We think this story of NARA’s half-year search for $121,000 worth of HP-compatible parts is illustrative of that point. And we think it ought to spark some discussions in Washington, D.C., about fixing the system so that the procurement folks can get their jobs done with a minimum of fuss.
Or maybe the status quois just fine as is? After all, the more complex the rules and regulations are, the more the need for consultants who understand them and can advise contractors (and their attorneys) on how to comply with them.
Hmmm …
Forget we said anything. Carry on.
DCAA/DCMA Team-Up to Collect Contractors’ Cash
Nick Sanders
From time to time, the top-notch legal practitioners at the firm Crowell & Moring publish “Government Contracts Bullet Points” to bring issues of interest to the attention of clients and potential clients. We recently received a Bullet Point publication entitled “Resolving Old Audit Issues” that caught our eye. The Crowell & Moring publication reported that DCAA and DCMA had announced a joint initiative to “’disposition’ approximately 400 ‘reportable audits’ and 300 Form 1s that are awaiting ACO action.” They provided a link to the joint DCAA/DCMA announcement, and we do the same for you.
The purpose of the initiative is to “aggressively target contractual opportunities to recover taxpayer dollars by dispositioning reportable audits, suspended/disallowed costs, cost accounting practice changes, and other cost allowability and allocability issues” so as to enable “the Department and contractors to move forward and focus on current contracting challenges.” The memo states that there is at least $295 million worth of actions currently “awaiting the Administrative Contracting Officer’s (ACOs) disposition.”
The memo outlines the resolution process as follows:
… each agency assumes its own roles and responsibilities. DCMA will identify and prioritize issues needed for disposition by contractor and establish milestones in consultation with DCAA. ACOs will assess each issue assigned and request DCAA assistance if additional accounting and financial advice is needed. In addition, ACOs will make decisions in consideration of the DCAA audit report, additional DCAA accounting and financial advice, and any other pertinent information available to them.
If you look closely at the resolution process, and the roles and responsibilities, you’ll see that DCMA has all the actions. Moreover, you’ll see that DCMA has to make its dispositions “in consideration of the DCAA audit report”—which seems very much like direction to the ACOs to “accept the DCAA audit report as if it had merit”. Well, after nearly three years of GAO and DOD IG criticism of the quality of DCAA audit reports, we don’t expect that guidance to result in many fair, reasonable and/or correct ACO decisions.
Further, it seems to us that there is a reason those issues haven’t been resolved before now. We think it’s because they are complex matters involving disputes—or potential disputes—between the three parties (DCAA, DCMA, and contractor). So instead of collecting cash, the issues are likely to be pushed into litigation. Which is a fine thing if you’re an attorney or expert witness, but not so fine if you were hoping to resolve the issues through the contract administration process.
As the attorneys at Crowell & Moring wrote—
Based on our experience, many of these unresolved audits and Form 1s are likely to raise issues that the ACO and the DCMA lawyers recognize to be without merit, but that the ACO has been unwilling to close because the ACO cannot or will not try to obtain approval to reject the DCAA position by going through the DCMA Board of Review process, so this initiative is likely to result either in the issuance of a large number of non-meritorious final decisions or politically dangerous decisions to overrule the DCAA audit position -- and bad final decisions may be more likely as a practical matter than disagreeing publicly with the auditors.
We completely agree. This Cost Recovery Initiative is Good News for DCAA, because the agency will look like it is saving the taxpayers money. And the Initiative is Good News for DCMA, because the agency will look like it is taking prompt action based on DCAA audit recommendations. And the Initiative is Good News for the DOD, because it will look like the two oversight organizations are cooperating and not locked in a “dysfunctional” relationship. And, as noted above, the Initiative is likely to prove to be a Good Thing for government contracts attorneys (such as those at Crowell & Moring).
But we predict it will be Bad News for DOD’s contractors, whose counter-factual arguments and red-faced finger-pointing at the inept DCAA audits will very likely avail them nothing—and they will be forced to either concede or litigate.
UPDATES: Cyber-Command, NGC’s Shipbuilding Biz, and More Drama for Dreamliner and F-35 JSF
Nick Sanders
Because we thought you’d like to know … quick follow-ups to previously posted articles.
DOD’s Cyber-Command
Your company likely is not doing enough to secure its computer networks, not nearly enough. Even the story of the Stuxnet Virus probably didn’t get your attention. Check out this video for details—
Assuming you took the two minutes to watch the video, what about that threat did you not understand? Well, the DOD gets it. Although they are reacting years too late, they are at least reacting. On November 3, 2010, the DOD announced that the U.S. Cyber Command had reached full operational capability.
According to this Washington Post article, the Cyber Command isn’t focused only on defense; it’s also pushing for authority to conduct offensive operations. According to the article—
Offensive actions could include shutting down part of an opponent's computer network to preempt a cyber-attack against a U.S. target or changing a line of code in an adversary's computer to render malicious software harmless. They are operations that destroy, disrupt or degrade targeted computers or networks.
We (and others) have predicted a future theater of operations located entirely in cyberspace. This is not science fiction; this is reality. The threat is real.
Northrop Grumman
We previously reported that Northrop Grumman was planning to consolidate its Louisiana and Mississippi shipyards, and was considering “a possible spinoff of its shipbuilding business.” At the time, it seemed that NOC was truly looking to divest itself of its maritime businesses. But according to thisBloomberg article, the company has decided to end talks aimed at selling the business—and instead will pursue a true “spinoff” with the intention of creating an independent company with separate management. The article reported—
Bids weren’t high enough to keep pursuing an auction ….. A sale might have raised $2.5 to $3 billion before taxes, while a spinoff might be valued at $2 billion …. Bain Capital LLC, KKR & Co., TPG Capital and Carlyle Group had been bidding, people had said. Northrop filed documents with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on Oct. 15 to start the process of spinning off the ship unit as an independent company, which would avoid a tax bill and wouldn’t generate cash.
More Dreamliner Drama
An electrical fire damaged an electrical panel and forced an emergency landing of a 787 test flight—causing Boeing to ground all aircraft while investigating the incident. Many observers are predicting further delays to the troubled program. For example the Washington Post reported—
Even in a best-case scenario, with no fundamental electrical flaws, further delays are ‘inevitable’ because it will be difficult to continue those specific tests with repairs underway, said Douglas Harned, a Sanford C. Bernstein analyst. He pushed his estimate for the first delivery of the plane back to the third quarter of 2011.
F-35 News
We should probably devote an entire article to the recent travails of the F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter program. Instead, we’ll note rumors about further cost increases and schedule slips in advance of a key pre-Thanksgiving Defense Acquisition Board review and briefing for Secretary of Defense Gates. But perhaps these are more than rumors. For instance, on November 4, 2010, Lockheed Martin CEO Robert Stevens said in an interview that the program’s development phase “will likely take longer and cost more money than expected”—according to this Bloomberg article.
The article reported—
The U.S. Defense Department and the company are ‘probably going to examine the need for more time, more people and more dollars,’ Stevens said in an interview today in Washington. … The Marine Corps model is the most complex of the three versions being developed and has fallen short of flight-test goals. As of Oct. 31, it has flown 168 times compared with a target of 209 tests … a Lockheed spokesman, said in a statement today. Including flight tests of the Navy’s carrier- variant and the conventional-takeoff model, the plane has completed 321 flights, 28 more than planned by October, he said.
The model’s basic flying characteristics, propulsion system and structural integrity ‘are performing well,’ Stevens said. By contrast, ‘supplier-provided components’ such as cooling fans ‘are not demonstrating early reliability,’ he said.
As a result, Lockheed is focusing more attention than planned on correcting supplier deficiencies. ‘That takes time, and that means we’re going to have to re-examine the flight-test schedule and program,’ he said. … The $50 billion development phase may cost as much as $5 billion more, according to preliminary estimates in [Admiral] Venlet’s review, the two government officials said on condition of anonymity because the review hasn’t been made public yet.
Separately, Pentagon cost analysts now estimate the JSF may be as much as 1 1/2 times more expensive to maintain than the warplanes it will replace.
Slippage in the JSF’s timetable may be as much as one year for the Air Force and Navy versions, and two to three years for the Marine Corps model, the officials said.
More evidence, if more evidence was needed, that effective supply chain management is absolutely critical to program execution.
That’s it for the updates. Stay tuned for further developments.
DOD Inspector General Criticizes DCAA (Again)
Nick Sanders
The Department of Defense Inspector General (DOD IG)—which has itself been criticized for “doing less with more” and “drifting away from its core mission of conducting contract audits”—blasted DCAA again in two recent audit reports.
On October 29, 2010, the DOD IG issued two reports that were critical of DOD’s premier audit agency. In the first report (D-2011-6-001), the DOD IG investigated hotline complaints of “harassment” in DCAA’s Western Region. Readers will recognize the Western Region as the original home of the 2008 audit quality issues raised by the GAO, as well as the home of allegations of supervisor and management harassment of an auditor who ended up testifying before Congress. Readers may also remember that DOD IG issued a report that substantiated many of the GAO’s audit quality findings.
So, nearly three years later, what did DOD IG have to say that had not yet been said? What dirty laundry had not been fully aired? In a nutshell, the DOD IG confirmed what everybody already knew: DCAA did harass the auditor. The report said—
We substantiated the allegations that DCAA Western Region management had harassed the complainant by unjustifiably lowering the complainant’s performance ratings, impeding her ability to comply with generally accepted government auditing standards, and creating a highly stressful environment which forced her to take a lower graded position.
The rest of the short (13 page) report simply elaborated on that finding. It noted that a February 2010 DCAA Internal Review team had also substantiated the harassment, but asserted that the Internal Review team did not properly reevaluate the auditor’s performance ratings. In addition, the DOD IG found that “DCAA Western Regional management failed to hold management officials accountable for their misconduct or revise any related procedures.”
Here are the related findings:
We substantiated the allegation that Western Region management used the performance appraisal process as a means of harassing the complainant. … The appraisal ratings and promotion potential scores given to the complainant after she transferred to the Western Region were inaccurate, unfair, and lacked credibility.
We substantiated the overarching allegation that management impeded the complainant’s ability to comply with Generally Accepted Government Auditing Standards (GAGAS), with one exception related to technical guidance requests. Management did impede compliance with GAGAS by imposing unreasonable time constraints and excessive emphasis on metrics. In doing so, Western Region management hindered the complainant’s ability to perform a quality audit. The Internal Review report cited certain audits where management overemphasized metrics and imposed unreasonable time constraints, while appearing to ignore audit quality. We also agree with Internal Review’s conclusion that the supervisor’s flawed process for requesting budget hour increases could impact GAGAS by impeding the complainant’s ability to perform quality audits.
As we have previously reported, it is likely that justice has already been meted out to at least one person responsible for the issues substantiated by the DOD IG.
So let’s look at the second DOD IG report (D-2011-6-002).
The second DOD IG report is a “quality control review” of the “single audit” performed by the “Big 4” accounting firm, Deloitte & Touche LLP (Deloitte), and the DCAA on The Aerospace Corporation, under the auspices of OMB Circular A-133. The Aerospace Corporation is a not-for-profit Federally Funded Research and Development Center (FFRDC) and, as such, is essentially an adjunct of the U.S. Air Force. As the DOD IG report noted: “The Deloitte & Touche office in Los Angeles, California performed the audit of the financial statements. Deloitte & Touche and the DCAA South Bay Branch Office in Gardena, Califomia performed a coordinated audit of the research and development program cluster.” (Note that the South Bay Branch Office is a part of DCAA’s Western Region.)
The DOD IG quality control review report was generally complimentary of the work performed by Deloitte. It stated that Deloitte’s audit of the financial statements and the R&D program cluster “generally met auditing standards and Circular A-133 requirements.” The report was far less complimentary of DCAA’s audit efforts. It said—
DCAA did not comply with Circular A-133 reporting requirements. … We also identified deficiencies in the performance of fraud risk assessment procedures, information technology internal control testing and working paper documentation that need to be corrected in future audits.
Oh, but there’s more to be said. And the DOD IG said it. And we quote it for your edification.
DCAA did not plan and perform sufficient fraud risk assessment procedures and they failed to properly evaluate a deficiency in internal control with cash management requirements in accordance with auditing standards and Circular A-133 requirements.
DCAA did not perform all the planned testing of key information technology internal controls and did not adequately document their working papers to support its conclusions for the compliance requirements tested and the scope of audit procedures performed by the DCAA Field Detachment office.
DCAA did not perform sufficient fraud risk assessment procedures during the planning and performance of the audit. As documented in the audit working papers, the evaluation of the fraud indicators was based solely on information in the permanent files and auditor experience with Aerospace. Based on this evaluation, the auditor concluded that there were no indications of potential fraud which would require additional audit procedures.
DCAA did not properly evaluate and report a finding in internal control disclosed during the review of the internal control over compliance with the cash management requirements. DCAA relied on the internal control testing performed in the FY 2008 direct billing review for the review of cash management requirements. … The auditor identified and tested four key internal controls intended to prevent noncompliance with this requirement. One of the key controls tested was that billing requests contained the appropriate level of management approval as required under Aerospace policies and procedures. The auditors sampled sixteen billings and found that three billings were not approved by management prior to requesting reimbursement from Federal agencies.
DCAA did not complete the testing of key information technology controls as planned and the documentation did not provide a clear understanding of the audit work performed or the procedures relied on. Auditing standards require auditors to obtain an understanding of information technology controls that are relevant to planning the audit and, when there is an expectation that the auditor will rely on those controls, require the auditor to perform tests of the controls to determine their operating effectiveness.
DCAA did not adequately document the internal controls tested for the cash management and special tests and provisions requirements, the criteria used for activities allowed or unallowed and allowable costs/cost principles compliance testing, and the coordination of the scope of audit work performed by the DCAA Field Detachment office. In addition, the audit file contained a voluminous amount of work papers, many of which simply duplicated the same information. Although we acknowledge that the auditors believed that they were providing a good audit trail, we found the format and content of the working papers lacked clarity and contributed to instances of inconsistencies between working papers and the lack of required information in other working papers.
The DCAA auditors did not adequately document the review of compliance for the activities allowed or unallowed and allowable costs/cost principles requirements. Specifically, the documentation did not identify the specific cost principle criteria used to review costs for allowability; did not provide the basis for the judgment that internal control exceptions noted during floorchecks were not considered significant; and did not document the procedures performed and the results of those procedures to verify the existence of employees not present during the floorchecks. In addition, the auditors did not document that they verified the timecard authorizations within the electronic timekeeping system.
But before we move on, we want to note something amazing from the DOD IG report. It relates to an instance of fraud that was disclosed by The Aerospace Corporation to the DCAA during their audit. As the DOD IG report explained—
DCAA was informed by the Director of Internal Audit of a disclosed fraud involving a full-time employee who worked for another government contractor while employed by Aerospace for a period of several years. There was no indication in the audit documentation that DCAA considered designing and performing procedures in response to this identified risk of labor mischarging as required under auditing standards. We discussed this issue with the audit supervisor and were advised that the auditors determined the identified fraud to be an isolated incident not indicative of a systemic internal control risk and therefore, they did not believe that additional effort was warranted. However, there was no documented evidence to support the DCAA conclusion.
So, apparently, The Aerospace Corporation employed an employee on a full-time basis, who also worked “for another government contractor” on a full-time basis—“for a period of several years”. YES! That’s how to do it—pick up two salaries at the same time! We can see it now ….
EMPLOYEE ARRIVES AT WORK ON TIME AT 8:00 AM. S/he attends meetings, replies to e-mails, and approves reports until lunch time.
EMPLOYEE TO ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT: Jane, I’ve got meetings across the street all afternoon. I’ll see you tomorrow. I’ll have my BlackBerry if anybody needs to reach me right away.
ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT: See you tomorrow morning!
EMPLOYEE ARRIVES AT WORK AT 1:00 PM. S/he attends meetings, replies to e-mails, and approves reports until dinner.
EMPLOYEE TO ADMINSTRATIVE ASSISTANT: Mark, I’ve got meetings in the other building all morning tomorrow. I’ll be in after lunch. I’ve got my BlackBerry if anybody needs to reach me right away.
ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT: See you tomorrow afternoon!
[REPEAT FOR SEVERAL YEARS.]
Seriously, we’ve heard of this before, but we always discounted it as being just another urban myth. We were flabbergasted to see the “myth” confirmed in writing by the DOD Inspector General. Wow, is all we can say.
To wrap this up, let’s note that DCAA Director Pat Fitzgerald has been in his position for a full year now. He has made changes to the management of the Western Region. Clearly, he and his Western Region management have much more work ahead of them, as they struggle to issue high-quality audit reports. Importantly, as Congress and the FAR Councils try to implement tighter controls on contractors’ “business systems,” they need to realize that the level of audit quality necessary to properly evaluate those business systems’ controls simply isn’t there yet—as evidenced by these DOD IG reports.
Effective January 1, 2019, Nick Sanders has been named as Editor of two reference books published by LexisNexis. The first book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Cost Accounting Standards. Nick replaces Darrell Oyer, who has edited those books for many years.