DCAA Successfully Pushes DOD to Ignore FAR Definition of Competition
We do not know Shay Assad, Director of Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy (DPAP) and Assistant Secretary of Defense for Acquisition (ASD(A)). We don’t know him, but we’ve written about him—mostly with approval. We’ve talked to people who do know him and they all have nice things to say. Apparently, Mr. Assad is an intelligent, knowledgeable, thoughtful person and has done well over the past couple of years in the bureaucratic infighting we’ve termed “The DOD Oversight War”.
So why is he playing the “Yes Man” by issuing guidance that implements one of Dr. Ash Carter’s (Undersecretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology & Logistics) less wonderful acquisition improvement initiatives without any push-back?
Or—as we intend to show you—did DCAA just pull a fast one and take away yet another tool of the DCMA Contracting Officers?
In fairness, we don’t know that Mr. Assad didn’t put up a strong fight before acquiescing to issue his November 24, 2010 memo entitled, “Improving Competition in Defense Procurements”. We don’t know whether he went to bat against DCAA and its Director. But there’s no evidence he did so and, regardless of any efforts he may have made, the results speak for themselves. The DOD repudiated the FAR definition of adequate competition, and it did so via a memo from Mr. Assad.
Effective “immediately,” the memo informs DCMA Contracting Officers of the following—
To maximize the savings that are obtained by competition, contracting officers will no longer use the standard at FAR 15.403-1(c)(1)(ii) or (iii) to determine that the offered price is based on adequate competition when only one offer is received.
We are dismayed that Mr. Assad, who has such a strong reputation amongst the contractor community, would stoop to sign his name to the memo—even if his boss ordered him to do so.
What are we talking about? Here’s some background.
In our previous article on Dr. Carter’s September 2010 17-page memo (link above) we noted that one of his “principal actions” was to ignore the efficiency offered by the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR). He wrote—
When only one bid or offer is received by the DOD, require Contracting Officers to obtain non-certified cost or pricing data, even if the FAR definition of ‘adequate competition’ has been met.
We were not the only critic of Dr. Carter’s initiatives and his memo describing them. On an internet public discussion forum, Vern Edwards had some choice observations. He wrote—
There is not one thing in that memo that has not been tried already, except for the goofy taxonomy of services. There is not one new idea. … This is one of the dumbest things I have ever seen from DOD.
The biggest problem with the memo is that it does not take into account the political, economic, institutional, and cultural sources of the problems we have experienced for so long: inter-service rivalry, excessive technical optimism, short-term program management assignments among military personnel, the uncertainty arising from the appropriations process, requirements creep, and on and on, all of which have been well documented since the late 1950s. The memo reflects the apparent belief that we can circumvent those sources of difficulty by adopting certain processes, like should cost analysis. We can't. We have tried before, and we cannot do it.
Without getting overmuch into the technical details, let’s summarize the situation (as we see it).
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The policy of the United States, as expressed at 48 C.F.R. § 15.402(a) is as follows: “Contracting officers shall purchase supplies and services from responsible sources at fair and reasonable prices.”
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The FAR provides the Contracting Officer with two primary methods to determine whether a proposed price is fair and reasonable: (1) price analysis (discussed at § 15.404-1(b)), and (2) cost analysis (discussed at § 15.404-1(c)).
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Price analysis is simply the examination and evaluation of proposed bottom-line prices without examination of individual cost elements and proposed profit. In contrast, cost analysis is the review and evaluation of separate cost elements and profit or fee in a bidder’s proposal, and includes “the application of judgment to determine how well the proposed costs represent what the cost of the contract should be, assuming reasonable economy and efficiency.”
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Given the foregoing, it should be obvious that price analysis is much quicker and less costly than cost analysis. If you’ve got two bids from responsible bidders competing independently, then the one that’s lower is, by definition, fair and reasonable. Done and done. Performing cost analysis, on the other hand, requires in-depth analysis. But the real kicker in performing cost analysis is that DCAA will likely be called in to perform an audit of the bidder’s cost data. Those readers who’ve followed our articles on recent DCAA audit guidance dealing with such audits (see, for example, this one) will understand the reluctance on the parts of both buying command and DCMA Contracting Officer to involve DCAA in the process—unless absolutely necessary. Indeed, it should be crystal clear that if price analysis is available, it is the preferred approach.
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The overarching prerequisite for the use of price analysis is there must be “adequate competition”. FAR § 15.403-1(c)(1) defines when adequate competition has been achieved. If there is no adequate price competition, then the Contracting Officer is forced to use cost analysis.
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Importantly, if there is not adequate competition, then the bidder(s) will likely be asked to submit “certified cost or pricing data” (i.e., what used to be called simply “cost or pricing data”), in accordance with the format and requirements of FAR Table 15-2. In addition, the requirements of the Truth-in-Negotiations Act (TINA) will be invoked, subjecting the successful bidder to the risk of “defective pricing” if it is later shown that it inaccurately certified that it had submitted “accurate, current, and complete” information to the Contracting Officer to support the cost analysis and subsequent negotiations. In sum, not only is the Contracting Officer motivated to determine that adequate competition has been achieved, but so are the contractors.
To establish the record, here is the current definition of “adequate competition” as set forth at 48 C.F.R. § 15.403-1(c)(1).
(1) Adequate price competition. A price is based on adequate price competition if—
(i) Two or more responsible offerors, competing independently, submit priced offers that satisfy the Government’s expressed requirement and if—
(A) Award will be made to the offeror whose proposal represents the best value (see 2.101) where price is a substantial factor in source selection; and
(B) There is no finding that the price of the otherwise successful offeror is unreasonable. Any finding that the price is unreasonable must be supported by a statement of the facts and approved at a level above the contracting officer;
(ii) There was a reasonable expectation, based on market research or other assessment, that two or more responsible offerors, competing independently, would submit priced offers in response to the solicitation’s expressed requirement, even though only one offer is received from a responsible offeror and if—
(A) Based on the offer received, the contracting officer can reasonably conclude that the offer was submitted with the expectation of competition, e.g., circumstances indicate that—
(1) The offeror believed that at least one other offeror was capable of submitting a meaningful offer; and
(2) The offeror had no reason to believe that other potential offerors did not intend to submit an offer; and
(B) The determination that the proposed price is based on adequate price competition, is reasonable, and is approved at a level above the contracting officer; or
(iii) Price analysis clearly demonstrates that the proposed price is reasonable in comparison with current or recent prices for the same or similar items, adjusted to reflect changes in market conditions, economic conditions, quantities, or terms and conditions under contracts that resulted from adequate price competition.
Let’s all notice that there are three means of determining whether or not there is adequate competition. The second standard permits the Contracting Officer to determine that there has been adequate competition even if only one bid is received, so long as “there was a reasonable expectation … that two or more responsible offerors, competing independently, would submit priced offers….” In testimony before the Commission on Wartime Contracting, DCAA Director Pat Fitzgerald expressed his agency’s concerns with this regulatory “loophole”. He told the Commissioners that—
DCAA has taken exceptions to several subcontract pricing actions where the prime contractor asserted a fair and reasonable subcontract price based on ‘adequate competition’ where in fact only one bid was received by the prime contractor. DCAA is concerned about the risks created by current regulations permitting awards to subcontractors using competitive pricing procedures when only one bid is actually received. Again, in these cases, we believe it would be beneficial for the prime contractor and contracting officer to have access to subcontractor cost data to determine fair and reasonable contract prices. The Adequate Pricing Subcommittee under Mr. Assad’s Panel on Contracting Integrity is taking a look into this area. They are ascertaining the need to revise this ‘loophole’ in the regulation that we believe leads to subcontract prices being awarded at unreasonable prices. I will continue to work this issue as the Chair of this Subcommittee. (Emphasis added.)
Apparently, Mr. Fitzgerald’s Subcommittee recommended that the “loophole” be closed and that recommendation made its way into Dr. Carter’s contractor affordability initiatives. But closing that “loophole” would mean revising the FAR, and that would mean following the official rule-making process, including publishing the proposed revision(s) for public comment. Somebody at DOD found a more clever way of achieving their objective: Mr. Assad simply directed DCMA’s Contracting Officers to ignore the FAR. Mr. Assad’s memo directs that, even when the FAR would permit a Contacting Officer to use price analysis and not involve DCAA in auditing a bidder’s costs, the Contacting Officer may not avail himself (or herself) of the opportunity. The receipt of one bid now leads inexorably to the Contracting Officer entering into negotiations based on “either certified cost or pricing data or other than certified cost or pricing data, as appropriate.”
But there’s more to this story.
Mr. Assad’s memo also directs that, if only one bid is received in response to a solicitation, then the competition may need to be re-opened and re-advertised in order to attempt to generate more bids. That’s not going to help meet the schedule needs of the buying commands.
Moreover, the memo reminds its recipients that when a DCMA Contracting Officer negotiates with a bidder in a situation where only one bid has been received (despite all efforts to generate more offers), then—
Contracting officers shall document the results of the negotiations in the Business Clearance/Pricing Negotiation Memorandum in accordance with FAR 15.406-3 and DFARS PGI 215.406-3 in the same manner as any negotiated procurement. Contract Review Boards or other similar review mechanisms should be used to ensure the Business Clearance/Pricing Negotiation Memorandum documents the process and supports the negotiated price as being fair and reasonable. The Peer Reviews conducted post award will be the mechanism for assessing the application of this process.
In our view, Mr. Assad’s memo describes a process designed by bureaucrats to avoid achieving any process efficiency whatsoever. The situation was bad enough before Mr. Fitzgerald, Dr. Carter and Mr. Assad got involved; it is now worse for their involvement.
Let’s wrap this up.
More than a year ago (in August 2009) we published an article entitled, “DOD Is Too Bureaucratic to Meet Needs of Warfighter, Defense Science Board Tells SecDef.” (Here’s a link to that article.) We posted some telling quotes from the DSB report to SECDEF Gates. Here are a few of them—
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“Current long standing [DOD] business practices and regulations are poorly suited" to the “dynamics of a rapidly shifting threat environment."
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"Today, the DOD is saddled with processes and oversight built up over decades, and managers leading them who are often rewarded for risk aversion."
We look at Mr. Assad’s memo in light of the Defense Science Board’s concerns with a risk averse bureaucracy, and with Secretary of Defense Gates’ concerns with “overhead” and the multiple layers of management that inhibit agile decision-making. To refresh your memory, SECDEF Gates said in a speech (link above)—
Another category ripe for scrutiny should be overhead – all the activity and bureaucracy that supports the military mission. According to an estimate by the Defense Business Board, overhead, broadly defined, makes up roughly 40 percent of the Department’s budget. … Almost a decade ago, Secretary Rumsfeld lamented that there were 17 levels of staff between him and a line officer. The Defense Business Board recently estimated that in some cases the gap between me and an action officer may be as high as 30 layers. …
We look at Mr. Assad’s memo in light of those touchstones, and we don’t like what we see. There is nothing about this memo—from the bureaucratic maneuvering to avoid the transparency of the public rule-making process, to the willful blindness to existing regulatory flexibility within a regulatory schema not known for flexibility—that we think has any merit.
We don’t like the misleading title of the memo, which implies that the existing process is being “improved”. Nor do we like the glib rationale, which states that the new policy will lead to “more effective use of the Department’s resources and savings for the taxpayer.” We are dismayed that Mr. Assad affixed his name to this memo.
We don’t like the memo and we don’t like what is portends for the Defense acquisition environment. We don’t like it at all.
GAO Bid Protest Case Illustrates Epic Levels of Incompetence As DCAA Ignores GAGAS and Accepts Customer-Imposed Scope and Procedural Limitations
Frankly, we’ve been sitting on this one for a while, thinking about how to best approach this case of what today’s youngsters might call “epic failure” on the parts of both DCAA and agency contracting officials. There’s just so much to say, and so many ways to say it, that we were stumped for a few weeks. Then we thought, “Screw it! Let’s just mash it all up and see how it reads.” So here we are. Get ready for a roller-coaster ride, folks.
We first discussed the strange bid protest case of PMO Partnership Joint Venture in one of our more popular articles—“Government Accounting Issues Associated with Joint Ventures”—link here. In that article, we reported that PMO’s JV indirect rate structure was found unacceptable and, by the way, noncompliant with CAS 401. The GAO rejected the Federal Transit Administration’s (FTA’s) rejection of PMO’s proposal on several grounds, not the least of which was that, as a small business, PMO was exempt from the Cost Accounting Standards.
We first mentioned DCAA’s bizarre interpretation of the requirements of FAR 15.408 in this article. Here’s what we said—
The [DCAA] audit guidance opined that the ‘overarching principal of FAR Part 15’ [sic] is that ‘the contracting officer must purchase supplies and services at fair and reasonable prices.’ That’s more or less correct, but then the audit guidance states, ‘Contractors are generally required to follow the Table 15-2 instructions for submitting proposals as contained within FAR 15.408.’ Well, that’s not true at all. Contractors are only required to follow the proposal format instructions found in FAR Table 15-2 when they are submitting cost or pricing data. (Or, if you will, ‘certified’ cost or pricing data, based on the recently revised FAR definition(s).) If the contractor is not submitting cost or pricing data, it is not required to follow the format of Table 15-2.
(We also noted some ambiguity in the revised FAR definitions of “certified cost or pricing data” and “cost or pricing data”. The link embedded in the quoted paragraph above discusses those definitional issues in more detail.)
It’s become clear to us that DCAA believes that every proposal needs to follow the format and instructions found in Table 15-2. If a proposal doesn’t follow the prescribed format, DCAA considers it to be inadequate. We think DCAA is crazy respectfully disagree with DCAA’s audit guidance on this issue. And so, apparently, do the administrative judges at GAO, based on their comments in a recent bid protest—link here.
The GAO bid protest in question concerns PMO Partnership JV, covering the exact same 2008 FTA competition on which GAO previously opined. In the previous protest ruling, GAO recommended that FTA “reevaluate” the PMO proposal based on GAO’s findings. In the more recent protest (link above), PMO was again back at the GAO, this time protesting FTA’s reevaluation.
In the first, flawed, evaluation, FTA contracted the pre-award audit to Booth Management Consulting, LLC (BMC). In the reevaluation, FTA asked DCAA to conduct a review of PMO’s proposal. According to the GAO, FTA “requested that the DCAA ‘conduct an adequacy review of PMO-JV’s proposal using the applicable regulatory criteria contained within FAR [§] 15.408, Table 15-2—Instructions for Submitting Cost/Price Proposals When Cost or Pricing Data Are Required.’”
The problem with FTA’s direction to DCAA was that the original 2008 solicitation specified that offerors were not submitting cost or pricing data. The GAO decision provided the original proposal instructions, which were—
(1) Adequate price competition is expected to exist, and this action is therefore exempt from the requirement for submission of cost or pricing data. However, all Offerors (prime and subContractors) shall submit a budget summary for the entire contract period of performance. … This information is necessary to determine the adequacy of the Offeror’s proposal, e.g., information adequate to validate that the proposed costs are consistent with the technical proposal, or cost breakdowns to help identify unrealistically priced proposals.
(2) Any information submitted must support the price proposed. Include sufficient detail or cross-reference to clearly establish the relationship of the information provided to the price proposed. Support any information provided by explanations or supporting rationale as needed to permit the Government to evaluate the documentation . . . Such information is not considered cost or pricing data, and will not require certification in accordance with FAR [§] 15.406-2.
[(3)] If, after receipt of offer, the Contracting Officer concludes there is insufficient information available to determine price reasonableness and none of the exceptions described in FAR [§] 15.403-1 applies, then cost or pricing data shall be obtained. As a minimum, a budget summary shall be submitted for each year of the contract period (reference paragraph 1 above.)
As we’ve previously written, offerors are only required to comply with FAR Table 15-2 when they are submitting cost or pricing data. Though the recent regulatory changes may blur the distinction between “cost and pricing data” and “information other than cost or pricing data” to the point where it no longer matters for purposes of formatting one’s cost proposal, back in 2008 when PMO submitted its original bid, the distinction was bright-line clear. Clearly, PMO was not required to follow the requirements of FAR Table 15-2, and FTA should not have referenced those requirements in its direction to DCAA.
For its part, DCAA accepted FTA’s direction in its entirety, even when that direction was in conflict with its normal audit procedures. The GAO quoted DCAA’s audit report as follows—
The DCAA noted that its ‘effort does not constitute an audit or attestation engagement under generally accepted government auditing standards (GAGAS).’ Thus, the DCAA did not ‘express an opinion on the adequacy of the proposal for price negotiation.’ The DCAA also stated that its analysis was not conducted in accordance with its normal procedure … Instead, in accordance with FTA’s request, the DCAA did ‘not execute this additional coordination with the contractor as it is generally conducted to obtain a revised proposal that meets the adequacy requirements stipulated by the FAR.’ The DCAA further clarified that its ‘proposal adequacy assessment was limited to reviewing, to the extent possible, the cost data contained in the compact disk [FTA] provided on January 22, 2010, without requesting additional data from PMO.’
Wow. There’s a whole lotta fail in that paragraph.
Adding to the level of incompetence is the GAO’s notation that, in its original bid protest decision addressed FTA’s contention that (among other things), PMO’s accounting system was inadequate. In the original decision, GAO said—
… if the agency has problems with PMO-JV’s accounting system, it may open a dialogue to resolve these issues without such dialogue necessarily being considered discussions, given that this is a matter relating to PMO-JV’s responsibility, so long as PMO-JV does not change its proposed cost or otherwise materially modify its proposal. If PMO-JV’s accounting system is found adequate, the agency should determine whether PMO-JV’s proposal is otherwise acceptable and in line for award, and if so award should be made to that firm. If PMO-JV’s accounting system is found inadequate and its proposal rejected for this reason, the matter, which involves the responsibility of a small business concern, must be referred to the Small Business Administration for a Certificate of Competency (COC) determination.
In the current decision, GAO reported that—
On the record provided to us, it appears that the agency did not request a reevaluation of the adequacy of PMO-JV’s accounting system, which was why the agency previously rejected PMO/JV’s proposal. Instead, this new request was focused on evaluating the adequacy of PMO-JV’s cost/price proposal using FAR § 15.408, Table 15-2–Instructions for Submitting Cost/Price Proposals When Cost or Pricing Data Are Required.
To recap the story so far, FTA requested that DCAA “review” PMO’s cost proposal instead of its accounting system, using the wrong criteria, in violation of both GAGAS and DCAA’s normal procedures, and without interacting with the contractor to resolve any issues (in violation of the recently issued DCAA “Rules of Engagement”). And DCAA accepted the direction, possibly because the assignment was being reimbursed under inter-agency procedures. (I.e., DCAA was billing FTA for its time and expenses.) But let’s be clear, gentle readers: DCAA exhibited a startling lack of independence and good judgment in accepting the scope and procedural limitations imposed by its customer. DCAA’s audit report was issued in June 2010—well after the controversies over audit quality and well after DCAA had recommitted to following GAGAS and maintaining its independence at all costs.
Although FTA was ridiculously inept in every aspect of its handling of PMO’s proposal, DCAA displayed a similar level of incompetence. And we’re sure no reader of this article is surprised that DCAA’s flawed procedures resulted in a flawed audit report.
As the GAO reported—
The DCAA found various inadequacies relating to PMO-JV’s proposed subcontract (subconsultant) costs. For example, the DCAA reported that PMO-JV failed to provide adequate cost or pricing data, or a cost or price analysis, for any of the [deleted] subcontract consultant services included in the Contract Pricing Summary Sheet (Attachment J-6), and concluded that this failure violated the requirements contained in FAR § 15.408, Table 15-2…. The DCAA additionally reported six more ‘cost or pricing data’ inadequacies, based on its comparison of PMO-JV’s cost proposal to FAR § 15.408, Table 15-2, that related to its and its subcontractor’s proposed direct labor rates and indirect expense rates.
The FTA used DCAA’s review findings to reject PMO’s proposal for a second time. The FTA told PMO that its cost proposal “was inadequate” because it did not comply with “the documentation requirements of FAR [§] 15.408, Table 15-2, Instructions for Submitting Cost/Price Proposals When Cost or Pricing Data are required.” Because PMO’s cost proposal did not comply with the requirements of FAR Table 15-2, FTA found that the cost proposal “did not provide for an acceptable basis for negotiating a fair and reasonable price.” Thus, PMO was eliminated—once again—from the competition.
By now, readers will be unsurprised that GAO had a problem with both the reevaluation of PMO’s proposal and FTA’s second rejection. PMO’s second bid protest was sustained and GAO recommended that FTA reimburse PMO’s “reasonable costs of filing and pursuing the protest, including reasonable attorneys’ fees.” The GAO judges used language that was rather more restrained than ours, but we want to quote a lot of it as a reference for you, our loyal readers. (Because we’re nice like that.)
In accordance with the terms of the solicitation, PMO-JV did not submit cost or pricing data with its cost proposal, nor did it submit data in the format specified at FAR § 15.408, Table 15-2. PMO-JV instead submitted other than cost or pricing data on Attachment J-6, Contract Pricing Summary, with supporting back-up material, and a budget summary as requested by the RFP.
However, the FTA contracting officer limited DCAA’s review of PMO’s cost proposal to verifying whether the data was presented as required by FAR § 15.408, Table 15-2. This was improper because the use of these requirements are [sic] only appropriate where cost or pricing data is required by the solicitation. We also note that this table was neither referenced nor incorporated into the RFP, and there is nothing in the RFP to put offerors on notice that the agency would evaluate cost proposals against FAR 15.408, Table 15-2; to the contrary, the solicitation expressly stated that cost or pricing data was not required.
As indicated, DCAA’s constrained adequacy review found various inadequacies in PMO’s cost proposal because supporting data required by FAR § 15.408, Table 15-2 was not included. For example, DCAA reported that PMO-JV’s Contract Pricing Summary Sheet (Attachment J-6) failed to include a price analyses of all subcontractor proposals and a cost analyses for subcontract proposals exceeding the threshold for cost or pricing data ($650,000), as required by FAR 15.408, Table 15-2, II.A.(2). However, the RFP’s cost proposal instructions did not indicate that PMO-JV had to conduct and submit such analyses.
An agency may not induce offerors to prepare and submit proposals based on one premise, then make source selection decisions based on another. [Legal citations omitted.] The problems found by DCAA were based upon FAR requirements that are only applicable when cost or pricing data is required. Because the RFP expressly provided that cost or pricing data was not required, and because the RFP did not otherwise indicate that the data should be presented in this format, the agency’s evaluation of PMO-JV’s cost proposal was unreasonable.
Moreover, the record, which includes numerous audits of the cost proposals of the other offerors (including the 18 awardees), shows that none of these cost proposals were evaluated for adequacy based on the instructions contained in FAR § 15.408, Table 15-2. It is fundamental that the contracting agency must treat all offerors equally, and therefore it must evaluate offers evenhandedly against common requirements. [Legal citation omitted.]
Furthermore, the agency’s prohibition on DCAA communications with PMO-JV concerning the adequacy of its submitted cost data appears inconsistent not only with DCAA practice, but with FAR § 15.404-2(d), which states:
The [administrative contracting officer] or the auditor, as appropriate, shall notify the contracting officer immediately if the data provided for review is so deficient as to preclude review or audit. . . . The contracting officer immediately shall take appropriate action to obtain the required data. Should the offeror/contractor again refuse to provide adequate data, or provide access to necessary data, the contracting officer shall withhold the award . . .
In this case, we think that questions about the adequacy of the submitted cost data should have been a subject of dialogue between the agency (or DCAA) and PMO-JV before that firm’s proposal was rejected for this reason, particularly given that the previous awards under this solicitation were made over a year ago
Well, that about ends the saga of PMO Partnership JV and its two bid protests. But before we go, there are some remaining loose ends to identify (since we can’t tie them up). Ponder these questions, if you will.
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Why did FTA expressly direct DCAA to evaluate PMO’s cost proposal based on the requirements of FAR Table 15-2, when it was well aware that its own solicitation had clearly identified that cost or pricing data was not to be submitted?
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Why did FTA violate the mandatory requirements of FAR 15.404-2(d)?
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Why did FTA tell PMO that its proposal did not form an adequate basis for negotiations when DCAA’s audit report clearly stated that it did not express an opinion on the adequacy of the proposal for price negotiations? What caused the FTA contracting officer to reach this conclusion, if not the DCAA audit report?
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Where is the evidence of independent judgment and discretion on the part of the FTA contracting officer? Did the contracting officer use the two audit reports (first BMC and then DCAA) as a pretext for rejecting PMO’s otherwise acceptable proposal from the competition?
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Why did DCAA accept customer direction that compromised its independence and conflicted with its own audit guidance?
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Why did DCAA permit its auditors to violate GAGAS, after being subjected to such harsh criticism for doing so in the past?
We have no answers for the questions above, gentle readers. But we fervently believe that answering them would be a big step on the road to getting the Federal acquisition environment back to the level at which it needs to be.
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It’s Not You: It’s DCAA
We recently received a Google alert taking us to this article at The Washington Business Journal. The Bizjournal article reported that DCAA has issued fewer audit reports in Government Fiscal Year (GFY) 2010 than it has in a long time, continuing a very unfortunate trend. The article reported a “rather alarming dip in the number of audits completed” by DCAA, which reported 11,746 audit reports issued in the GFY ending September 30, 2010, down from 16,213 in the previous GFY. For those doing the math, that’s a 28% drop in productivity—at the same time that DCAA was hiring additional staff.
Actually, the news article is wrong. The productivity drop is much worse than it reported. We did some research on the DOD Inspector General’s historical Semi-Annual Reports (SARs) to Congress, and found out that DCAA’s GFY 2009 output was 21,276 reports—not the 16,213 reported by The Washington Business Journal. (Note that our value was confirmed in written testimony from DCAA Director Pat Fitzgerald to the Commission on Wartime Contracting (CWC).) For those keeping track, that’s a productivity drop of a whopping 45 percent!
We looked at Mr. Fitzgerald’s testimony to the CWC and the DOD IG SARs, and developed the following chart for your perusal—
As can be seen from the foregoing, although DCAA has added roughly ten percent to its auditor staffing levels, its audit report output has declined precipitously. What in the heck is happening to the DOD’s premier audit agency?
The journalist at The Washington Business Journal asked a DOD spokesperson the same question. The article reported that DOD attributed the fall-off in audit report output to “greater diligence” on the part of DCAA auditors. The DOD spokesperson was quoted as saying, “The decrease in audits over the last few years is largely due to an increase emphasis on quality and implementing additional audit procedures.”
Well, maybe. Certainly we have experienced larger sample sizes and additional transaction testing. But we would assert that there were other, more proximate, causes for the productivity drop-off, including additional redundant reviews of audit working papers, additional required working paper documentation, and (dare we say?) mismanagement of agency resources.
But perhaps the real story is that DCAA is starting fewer audits than at any time in its recent history. It’s tough to generate output when the input has dwindled.
The BizJournal article referenced a recent “Clarity report” issued by Deltek, in which survey respondents discussed their experiences with DCAA. According to the BizJournal article, “35 percent of those surveyed said their last internal control audit … was more than a year ago, a 14 percent increase compared to last year’s survey.”
Similarly, an article at WashingtonTechnology.com referenced the Deltek survey, and reported that it’s taking government contractors longer to collect payments from the Federal government and that profit margins were dropping. In addition, Rich Wilkinson (Deltek Vice President) was quoted as saying that “DCAA appears to be in chaos.” He added, “While we aren’t seeing more audits, we are seeing more adverse results.”
We were interested in the Deltek Clarity report and downloaded it. (Thank you, Deltek, for making that report available.)
The first thing we noticed was that the BizJournal’s statistics on DCAA ICAP-type audits (quoted above) were misleading. The true story is that the number of survey respondents that reported more than a year lag since an internal control audit increased by 14 points, from 21 percent to 35 percent of respondents. That’s not a 14 percent increase: that’s a 67 percent increase! According to the Deltek report, more than one-third of all respondents had not experienced a DCAA internal control audit in more than a year. (We noted that another 35 percent of survey respondents reported that they had never had an audit of their internal control systems.)
In addition, Deltek reported that “The number of firms reporting a decrease in government oversight spiked from 2% in 2009 to 20% this year—a tenfold leap.”
Deltek also reported that “Relationships with auditors are worsening. Not only was there a ten-point drop in the percentage of respondents reporting Excellent relationships [with DCAA], but for the first time, nearly 3% of firms characterized their relationships as Poor.” Looking at trends, Deltek reported that nearly 20 percent of survey respondents assessed their relationships with DCAA as “Worsening”.
Deltek summarized the situation thusly—
It is clear that the DCAA is in a period of change. In spite of guidance from 2 years ago suggesting we would see more Internal Control Reviews, this year’s study indicates firms have experienced a significant drop. It is possible that changes at the Agency have diverted resources from this initiative. Based on reported Agency priorities for 2011, it is also possible the number of reviews conducted this next year may go down even further. Related to this, the number of firms reporting a decreased level of oversight this year was a surprise. We surmise that the resource constraints in the Agency are resulting in fewer audits and a perception of less oversight.
We’ve already mentioned our thoughts on the causes for the current environment. They differ somewhat from those of the Deltek folks. But the thing is, we both agree that DCAA is in turmoil, is “diverting” resources, and that the trend indicates things will get worse before they get better.
For our clients and other readers of this blog article, you should understand that it’s not you. Your problems are not uniquely yours. In fact, your DCAA audit problems are nearly universal across the industry and they are shared by your competitors and team members. Nearly every contractor has the same problems and nearly every contractor is wrestling with the same concerns.
It’s not you: it’s DCAA.
Technology Fraud
Ask any government contract accounting or compliance practitioner about the riskiest compliance environments, and we bet you’ll hear about those companies that are mostly commercial, but which have a small percentage of sales to the Federal government. In those environments, we frequently hear complaints about burdensome rules and regulations—“the tail wagging the dog”—and how the government refuses to accept the efficiencies of commercial practices and instead imposes bureaucratic and non-value-added controls. (We also hear complaints about intrusive and inept auditors, but those complaints are universal.)
It’s difficult to invest in appropriate internal controls at such companies, because management believes that the costs of such controls will erode their competitive position in the commercial marketplace. We have a term to describe such companies. We call them “penny-wise and pound-foolish”.
Such companies see little need to “turn square corners” in their dealings with the Federal government and they think corner-cutting is smart business. Such companies would rather pay fines and penalties instead of investing in controls. After all, nobody gets a bonus for adding more bureaucracy; yet a crisis successfully managed can make one a hero. (Ignore the fact that the crisis should have been avoided in the first place.)
Why are so many of these companies located in the technology marketspace? Here are a couple of recent examples but—believe us—we could have Googled quite a few more if we’d had the mind to. Also note that we have reported similar stories on certain technology companies here on this site. Here is some new news on the topic of technology fraud, courtesy of the Society of Corporate Compliance and Ethics (SCCE).
Hewlett-Packard Settles
Here’s a link to a story at the Houston Chronicle, reporting that “Hewlett-Packard will pay more than $16 million to settle a lawsuit alleging they violated competitive bidding rules with the Houston and Dallas school districts to win technology contracts.” As the result of an investigation into local business practices, a False Claim Act qui tam lawsuit was filed. The Chronicle reported—
The investigation accused Houston businessman Frankie Wong of setting up a group of companies, including Hewlett-Packard, that came to be known as ‘The Consortium.’ They applied for technology contracts with both HISD and the Dallas Independent School District.
Because of their close connection with district officials, thanks to the suspect gratuities, the bid requirements were worded in such a way that only they could satisfy them, officials said.
Wong — who was also involved in the DISD deal - was found guilty of bribery in July 2008 and sentenced to more than 10 years in prison.
HISD officials announced in March they had signed an $850,000 settlement with the federal government for their role in the case. It allowed them to receive nearly $90 million in technology funding that they had lost because of the investigation.
They also agreed to hire a compliance officer to monitor the money HISD receives through the E-rate program.
Oracle Dances with Dept. of Justice
This link takes you to a June, 2010, story at ComputerWorld.com discussing the U.S. Government’s False Claims Act suit against Oracle Corporation for violations of pricing and discount practices. As the article reported that the whistleblower alleged that—
Oracle was finding ways around the GSA restrictions in order to give commercial customers even deeper discounts, according to the complaints. One alleged practice saw Oracle ‘selling to a reseller at a deep discount ... and having the reseller sell the product to the end user at a price below the written maximum allowable discounts,’ [the complaint] states.
This more recent article discusses Oracle’s attempts to get the suit dismissed. The article reported—
In a strongly worded motion filed in late September, Oracle argued the government's allegations should be dismissed partly on grounds they are too old and exceed the statute of limitations.
The government's case is ‘a hodgepodge of inadequately pled, inconsistent, and, in many cases, untimely theories of liability that no set of facts can rescue,’ Oracle's filing reads in part. Its ‘most obvious problem is timeliness,’ the motion adds. ‘One of its primary allegations is that Oracle made false disclosures relating to discounting practices to the General Services Administration ... during 1997 contract negotiations. But this allegation ignores a 1998 pre-award audit of Oracle's discounting practices, which was distributed to a host of responsible Government officials.’
‘Rather than taking action then, the Government sat on its hands, and in the subsequent thirteen years, witnesses have died, memories have faded and documents have disappeared -- the very reasons that statutes of limitations exist,’ the motion states.
Motions for summary judgment are de rigueur in such litigation. Motions and counter-motions and replies and sur replies are the Kabuki dance of modern jurisprudence. In the ritual dance, Oracle appears to have scored a few points with the judge, who dismissed—
… any claims based upon the 1997 disclosures; (2) any claims alleging common law fraud occurring before May 29, 2004; and (3) any claims alleging False Claims Act violations, breach of contract, or quasi-contract violations occurring before May 29, 2001.
The ComputerWorld article reported that—
… by Nov. 16 the government must file an amended complaint ‘stating only common law fraud claims based upon conduct occurring on or after May 29, 2004, along with any False Claims Act and breach of contract or quasi-contract claims based upon conduct occurring on or after May 29, 2001.’
Okay, we don’t want to belabor the point—but notice that the one thing these two very large technology companies have in common is that they are not known for being government contractors. They are known for their commercial sales and, indeed, sales to the Federal government do not comprise a large percentage of either company’s sales.
Ask any government contract accounting or compliance practitioner about the riskiest compliance environments, and we bet you’ll hear about large commercial technology companies. You know: the entities that prize employee intelligence and practice sharp business dealings. Like Hewlett-Packard and Oracle.
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