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Apogee Consulting Inc

Industry and President Obama Align While DOD Continues to Attack Its Industrial Base

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OBAMA WEAPONS Production
We almost titled this article, “The Vast DOD Conspiracy,” because it seems to us that there is something amiss here, as if the Department of Defense didn’t get the memo about jobs and exports and manufacturing and—did we mention jobs? We decided to go with a less catchy, more awkward title, because we have no evidence the Secretary of Defense Gates and his military service chiefs are engaged in a conspiracy to sabotage President Obama’s attempts to jump-start the economy (and perhaps win reelection) through focusing on manufacturing and exporting durable goods such as defense articles.

You be the judge.

Fact 1:

On March 11, 2010, President Obama issued Executive Order 13534, entitled “National Export Initiative”. EO 13534 established as policy the initiative—

… to improve conditions that directly affect the private sector’s ability to export. The NEI will help meet my Administration’s goal of doubling exports over the next 5 years by working to remove trade barriers abroad, by helping firms—especially small businesses—overcome the hurdles to entering new export markets, by assisting with financing, and in general by pursuing a Government-wide approach to export advocacy abroad, among other steps.

EO 13534 established an Export Promotion Cabinet (EPC) to develop and coordinate implementation of the NEI. Fourteen (14) positions were named to the EPC—among them the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Commerce and the Secretary of Labor. Notably absent from the EPC was the Secretary of Defense, even though aerospace/defense exports are a large component—and among the fastest growing—of total U.S. exports.

Fact 2:

On December 9, 2010, the Whitehouse announced significant changes to the existing export control system, designed to “ease restrictions on items that are less security-sensitive,” according to one report. This editorial at National Defense Magazine notes that, “Unlike previous attempts at revamping export regulations, this one comes at a time when the United States needs to create jobs, and export sales are seen as essential to future recovery.” Although Secretary of Defense Gates has supported arms export control reforms in past speeches, his voice seemed to be missing from the current efforts, as were the voices of the Joint Chiefs and the leaders of the military services. A search of the DOD website failed to locate any recent articles on the topic.

Fact 3:

On December 15, 2010, President Obama held “his largest private meeting with [private industry] chief executive officers since he entered the White House,” according to this story at Bloomberg.com. Among the CEOs at the meeting were James McNerney (Boeing), David Cote (Honeywell), Greg Brown (Motorola), and Jeffrey Immelt (GE). According to this Wall Street Journal report, “President Barack Obama pressed 20 corporate chief executives Wednesday to suggest policies that would spur them to ‘start investing in job creating enterprises.’”

Fact 4:

A recent editorial by Lt. General Lawrence Farrell, Jr. (USAF, Retired) in National Defense Magazine questioned the Department of Defense’s commitment to its industrial base. He wrote—

As the defense sector heads toward a future of flat or declining budgets, the health of the industrial base and its critical capabilities becomes a prime concern.

It is not yet apparent that senior policy makers have begun to assess what industrial capabilities must be preserved. Ensuring that the United States is able to maintain core industrial competencies must be a priority before a fiscal downturn becomes reality.

Although General Farrell listed several specific concerns, one that caught our attention is the impact of bureaucratic procurement processes—and intrusive DCAA audits—on the ability of munitions industry to support the needs of warfighters. General Farrell wrote—

For many companies, the contracting process continues to create unnecessary burdens that hamper their ability to support the military’s needs. … [Munitions industry] Survey responders said that a lack of timely procurements has affected business …. Seven of 12 said these delays have caused production lines to go cold, and half of the companies laid workers off. Finally nine of 12 stated that these delays in contracting caused a reduction in revenue for the year. Based on the results of the survey, it appears that the cutbacks in industry were not a result of reduced budgets, but were caused by bureaucratic delays — including Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) audits — that have impeded the timely execution of appropriated funds.  … One company reported that a post-award audit started in 2007 and is currently on hold. Another reported that a contracting officer removed a DCAA auditor after a year of little progress and restarted the audit. In some cases, the trouble is inconsistent DCAA procedures, which may vary from one region of the country to another. Different audit functions within a single program are conducted separately and not coordinated. This has resulted in multiple repetitive audits by different agencies and individuals. Adding to these issues are poor communications between procurement contracting officers and auditors, and a general lack of experience in contracting officers. All of the issues have led to slow, cumbersome processes and a lack of qualified experts in critical positions.

We are not going to make any over-the-top accusations in this article. We will ask, however, whether Pentagon leadership shares its Commander-in-Chief’s focus on job creation through partnership and the easing of regulatory burdens (such as antiquated arms export control rules). From our perspective, DCAA and DCMA are well into the process of imposing bureaucratic roadblocks, attacking defense contractors through flawed (but headline-grabbing) audit findings, and paralyzing the already slow-as-molasses defense acquisition system.

President Obama clearly has signaled that he understands the U.S. economic recovery is dependent on job creation and that manufacturing exports are an important part of that initiative. DCAA and DCMA are acting in ways that tend to undercut the President’s agenda. It is time for DOD leadership to provide some course correction to these wayward agencies.

Why have Pentagon leaders gone silent?

 

A Government Contractor in Trouble

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money investigation
Headquartered in Columbia, Maryland, Integral Systems is “a leader in the secure management, delivery and distribution of data and information from space and terrestrial-based platforms into networks for military, government and commercial satellite and aerospace customers.” According to the company’s 10-K (Annual Report)—

Our revenues are derived primarily from customers in the aerospace and defense industry, particularly the Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (“C4ISR”) market, and to a lesser extent, customers in other industries such as telecommunications and media. The aerospace and defense community is comprised of major government operations (including defense, civil, and homeland security) and large-scale commercial operators including satellite operators, communications companies, and other media companies. The C4ISR market primarily services the Department of Defense (‘DoD’), the intelligence community, and other governmental agencies by providing complex, networked, mission-critical systems enabling command and control of data collection, analysis and dissemination from multiple sources as well as managing key tactical communications and decision support systems. While overall defense spending is expected to grow at a slower rate than in previous administrations, we believe that the C4ISR market, and our role within it will continue to see funding priority resulting in stable or moderate growth in the marketplace. We believe that these programs, integrating advanced electronics and software to enhance the capabilities of current systems and provide the integration of multiple sensor and battle management platforms will continue to be required as the U.S. defense budget continues to respond to the current and future security environment.

That sounds promising, doesn’t it? Integral Systems seems to have found a sweet, stable market niche in one of the fastest growing areas of the aerospace and defense marketplace. Which is a good thing, since about three-quarters (72%) of company revenue comes from sales to the U.S. Government. Reflecting its key niche, 2010 revenues are up, from $160 million to $178 million.

So why can’t Integral Systems make a profit? Why did the company record a $1.5 million loss from operations, and a $2.4 million net loss?

Naturally, the answer to such a question is both long and complex. But let’s note a few—admittedly superficial—facts that may lead toward an answer to our question.

First, we note that the company made several recent acquisitions in its Product Group segment. The acquisitions created an integration challenge, according to this story at SpaceNews.com. The story reported—

Integral in 2010 incurred costs related to its acquisition of CVG-Avtec. [CEO Paul] Casner said this acquisition took management’s attention away from other aspects of the business and is in part responsible for what he said were disappointing financial results.

‘There’s no two ways about it, this has been a tough year and our shareholders have shouldered much of the burden,’ Casner said.

Casner said the Satcom Solutions division did not perform to expectations in 2010, in part because of the CVG-Avtec acquisition. He referred to the division’s results as ‘the elephant in the room’ at Integral. Part of the problem, he said, was delayed contract awards and a mix of contracts that, taken together, resulted in lower profitability.

We took a look at Integral’s 10-K and noted that the Products Group segment saw a revenue increase of more than 40%, but that the revenue increase was offset by a 60% increase in segment operating expenses. According to management, the increase in operating expenses was attributable to—

… an increase in corporate allocated expenses of $8.2 million, an increase in operating expense of $3.6 million incurred by the SATCOM Solutions division, $1.9 million relating to the satID division, which was acquired in the second quarter of Fiscal Year 2009, $2.1 million of overhead expense associated with the reclassification to selling, general, and administrative expense, $0.3 million relating to an increase in selling expense, and $0.3 million relating to research and development.

We don’t have all the details, but we also noted that the company’s percentage of fixed-price contract work increased, from a 2009 level of 55% to a 2010 level of 67%. The accounting changes described above, coupled with an increase in fixed-price work, would certainly tend to negatively impact operating results.

One lesson that might be learned here is to consider the impact of an acquisition on such items as allocated corporate expenses before deciding to make the acquisition. If the new revenue and headcount attracts more corporate costs, then the existing project portfolio will become more expensive. If the work is firm fixed-price, then the company will see degradation in project gross margins.

But of course that’s not the whole story—nor do we mean to imply that we can tell the whole story in this article. Again, we are simply noting some interesting points that came to our attention while researching the company.

We also noted that the company has faced some legal problems in its recent past. According to the 10-K report—

On March 1, 2007, we learned that the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) had issued a formal order of investigation regarding the Company, and we and subsequently certain of our then officers received subpoenas in connection with the investigation. The investigation by the SEC and a related inquiry by NASDAQ included questions as to whether Gary A. Prince was acting as a de facto executive officer of the Company prior to his promotion to the position of Executive Vice President and Managing Director of Operations of the Company in August 2006. The investigation and inquiry also included questions as to whether Mr. Prince was practicing as an accountant before the SEC while an employee of the Company. Mr. Prince agreed with the SEC in 1997 to a permanent injunction barring him from practicing as an accountant before the SEC, as part of a settlement with the SEC related to Mr. Prince’s guilty plea to charges brought against him for conduct principally occurring in 1988 through 1990 while he was employed by Financial News Network, Inc. and United Press International. In March 2007, we terminated the employment of Mr. Prince. Under the supervision of a Special Committee established by the Board, the Company also took other remedial action and provided full cooperation to the SEC in the investigation.

 

On July 30, 2009, the SEC and the Company each announced that a final administrative settlement had been reached concluding the SEC’s investigation as to the Company. Under the administrative settlement the Company… consented to a ‘cease and desist’ order requiring future compliance with certain provisions of the Securities Exchange Act and the SEC Exchange Act rules. The order does not require the Company to pay a monetary penalty. The SEC states in the order that in determining to accept the settlement it considered both the remediation efforts promptly undertaken by the Company, and the cooperation the SEC staff received from the Company. Shortly after the settlement with the SEC, representatives of the Company met with various officials at NASDAQ. As a result of that meeting the Company learned that the NASDAQ inquiry had been closed out with no actions required of the Company.

 

In conjunction with its announcement of the administrative settlement, the SEC also disclosed that it was instituting separate civil actions against Mr. Prince and two other former officers of the Company. The Company has indemnification obligations to these individuals pursuant to the terms of separate Indemnification.

Certainly, company management was distracted by the potentially damaging SEC investigation and legal actions, by the NASDAQ inquiry, and by the ongoing civil actions against the former company executives. But that’s not the whole story, either. The company also had significant problems with its DCAA auditors.

The company reported in its 10-K—

Our Military & Intelligence Group cost-plus contracts are driven by pricing based on cost incurred to perform services under contracts with the U.S. government. Cost-based pricing is determined under the Federal Acquisition Regulation, which provide guidance on the types of costs that are allowable in establishing prices for goods and services and allowability and allocability of costs to contracts awarded by the U.S. government. We have incurred allocable costs that we believe are allowable and reimbursable under our cost-plus-fee contracts, and that are included in our revenue. These costs are subject to audit by the Defense Contract Audit Agency (“DCAA”); therefore, revenue recognized on our cost-plus contracts is subject to adjustment upon audit by DCAA. We established a revenue rate reserve of $6.6 million for costs incurred for which ultimate reimbursement is uncertain. The Incurred Cost Submission (“ICS”) for our Columbia-based government operations has been audited by the DCAA through the Fiscal Year ended September 30, 2005. The ICS for our RT Logic subsidiary has been audited by the DCAA through September 30, 2006. The ICS for our SATCOM Solutions division has been audited by the DCAA through December 31, 2005. Newpoint, SAT, and Lumistar are not currently subject to audits by the DCAA. ….

 

In the fourth quarter of Fiscal Year 2010, the DCAA formally issued a Report on Audit of Post Award Accounting Systems (the “Accounting Systems Audit Report”) that found, as of January 27, 2010, our accounting system to be inadequate and identified certain significant deficiencies in our accounting systems, controls, policies and procedures. As a result of this determination … our administrative contracting officers are required to consider, with respect to cost-plus contracts, whether it is appropriate to suspend a percentage of progress payments or reimbursement of costs proportionate to the estimated cost risk to the U.S. government, considering audit reports or other relevant input, until we submit a corrective action plan acceptable to the contracting officers and correct the deficiencies. In addition, in order for us or any other entity to be awarded any new cost-plus contract, the administrative contracting officer must determine that such entity has the necessary operating and accounting controls to be determined ‘responsible’ under the Federal Acquisition Regulation. … We do not believe that the issues raised in the Accounting Systems Audit Report have materially adversely affected our business, financial condition or results of operations up to now, and we do not believe that they will have a material adverse impact on our business, financial condition or results of operations in the future. We are working diligently to resolve these accounting deficiencies and believe that they will be successfully resolved. However, the Accounting Systems Audit Report has the potential to materially adversely impact our ability to obtain future cost-plus contracts from the U.S. government, could result in certain payments under existing cost-plus contracts being delayed or suspended, and the DCAA could, as a result of a subsequent audit, reduce the billing rates that it has provisionally approved, causing us to refund a portion of the amounts we have received with respect to cost-plus contracts.

The SpaceNews.com made much of the company’s DCAA problems. It reported—

The Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) has determined in an audit that Integral Systems has ‘internal control deficiencies’ in the way it handles cost-plus contracts for the Defense Department, which is Integral’s biggest customer.

In a Dec. 8 conference call with investors, Casner said the DCAA audit findings have not affected any contracts or revenue. But in a Dec. 8 filing with the SEC, Integral said the audit could put into jeopardy the company’s future cost-plus contracts with the Defense Department.

Integral Chief Financial Officer Christopher B. Roberts said during the call that the company has made progress in addressing the financial control issues but was not able to complete the job in fiscal year 2010.

We noted that, in addition to the DCAA findings regarding the company’s accounting system internal controls, the company also established a $6.6 million reserve for potential questioned costs related to its incurred costs. When profitability is so tight, that’s gotta hurt.

To sum up, we don’t know this company. We’ve never worked for them or with them, and we don’t know anybody who has. But we look at the company and see a government contractor in trouble, struggling to comply with myriad contract compliance issues while integrating multiple acquisitions and supporting outside investigations and litigation.

We see a company that ought to be making a decent profit while growing each year, but that can’t seem to overcome its challenges. We hope 2011 will be kinder to Integral Systems than 2010 was.

 

D.C. Circuit Appellate Court Vacates SAIC’s False Claims Act Conviction

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On December 3, 2010, the Court of Appeals (D.C. Circuit) vacated an October, 2008, judgment by the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, which had found SAIC liable for False Claims Act violations and breach of contract. The Appellate Judges remanded the suit for a new trial, finding that the Government’s theories of corporate “collective knowledge” were unpersuasive, and rejecting several of the Government’s aggressive theories of damage quantification.

The violations allegedly occurred on two contracts with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in the 1990s. In those contracts, SAIC provided technical assistance to the NRC rulemaking personnel regarding clearance, recycling and release of radioactive materials. In 1999, the NRC terminated SAIC’s contracts, alleging that SAIC breached the contracts’ conflict-of-interest (COI) prohibitions. In 2004, the Government brought suit under the False Claims Act, alleging that its invoices submitted under the two contracts—though accurate in every mathematical respect—were nonetheless tainted (and thus false) because SAIC obtained the contract through false pretenses and submitted false statements.

As Judge Richard Roberts opined in 2008—

SAIC’s failure to disclose its potential conflicts of interest led to SAIC earning millions in income under a federal contract which SAIC might not have otherwise been eligible to be awarded. … there was evidence that SAIC employees know of evidence not disclosed to the [NRC] and intentionally hid information from the NRC that would have suggested the appearance of a conflict of interest.

The D.C. District’s 2008 opinion can be found here.

According to this POGO blog article—

The jury found that SAIC knowingly submitted 60 false claims for payment and made 17 false statements, and therefore awarded the government $1.97 million in damages, which are tripled to $5.91 million under the False Claims Act.  The jury also determined that SAIC breached its contract with the NRC and tacked on another $78 in damages. 

Yes, it was the additional $78 in damages that caused SAIC to appeal the jury verdict, not the additional $577,500 in penalties associated with the allegedly false statements and claims. (Note: Sarcasm.) In any case, Judge Roberts denied SAIC’s motion for a new trial or judgment notwithstanding the jury’s verdict, and the company appealed.

Here is the appellate decision. Here is a nice summary by the top-notch law firm of Gibson Dunn.

According to the decision, SAIC argued as follows—

SAIC argued (1) that the government failed to prove that the company submitted false claims under an implied certification theory because the record contained no evidence that payment under the contract was expressly conditioned on SAIC’s compliance with organizational conflict of interest obligations, (2) that the evidence precluded the jury from finding, as it did, that SAIC acted “knowingly” under the FCA when it submitted false claims and statements because SAIC’s belief that it had no conflicts as defined by the applicable contractual provisions and regulations was reasonable, (3) that various jury instructions were erroneous and prejudicial, including an instruction that the jury could find that SAIC possessed knowledge based on the “collective knowledge” of its employees, and (4) that the government failed to prove that it suffered any damages from SAIC’s false claims, and in the alternative that the district court’s damages instruction was erroneous and prejudicial. The district court rejected each argument. …

As SAIC compellingly points out, without clear limits and careful application, the implied certification theory is prone to abuse by the government and qui tam relators who, seeking to take advantage of the FCA’s generous remedial scheme, may attempt to turn the violation of minor contractual provisions into an FCA action. In our view, however, instead of adopting a circumscribed view of what it means for a claim to be false or fraudulent, this very real concern can be effectively addressed through strict enforcement of the Act’s materiality and scienter requirements.

As Gibson Dunn summarized—

On appeal, the D.C. Circuit vacated the judgment against SAIC and remanded for a new trial.  In so doing, the D.C. Circuit rejected the district court's "collective knowledge" instruction, which permitted the jury to find that SAIC acted with scienter even if no particular employee knew the company's claims were false.  The court held that the so-called ‘collective knowledge’ theory is legally deficient because it permits ‘a plaintiff to prove scienter by piecing together scraps of 'innocent' knowledge held by various corporate officials, even if those officials never had contact with each other or knew what others were doing in connection with a claim seeking government funds.’  The theory, the court continued, ‘provides an inappropriate basis for proof of scienter because it effectively imposes liability, complete with treble damages and substantial civil penalties, for a type of loose constructive knowledge that is inconsistent with the Act's language, structure, and purpose.’

 

The court also agreed with several of SAIC's other arguments, thereby raising the threshold for FCA plaintiffs--including qui tam relators--to succeed in future litigation.  First, the D.C. Circuit rejected the government's sweeping damages theory as ‘flawed’ and instead adopted the benefit-of-the-bargain standard proposed by SAIC.  At the government's urging, the district court had instructed the jury that it was barred from considering the value of the services that SAIC actually provided.  That instruction ‘compelled the jury to assess as damages the actual amount of payments the government made to SAIC.’  The D.C. Circuit held that the government's ‘automatic equation’ of its payments with its damages was ‘mistaken’ because it ‘essentially required the jury to assume that SAIC's service had no value even in the face of possible evidence to the contrary.’  The court concluded that the ‘proper measure of damages’ was a ‘benefit-of-the-bargain framework’ that requires the government to prove ‘that the performance [it] received was worth less than what it believed it had purchased.’

Second, the court rejected the government's theory that false statements constitute separate violations of the FCA even if they were not used to get a false claim paid.  That theory, the court explained, ‘rest[ed] on a misunderstanding of the FCA's structure’ because knowingly false statements are ‘separately actionable under FCA section 3729(a)(2) . . . only if’ they are used to get a false claim paid.

With respect to the latter point made in the summary above, the Appellate Court agreed with SAIC’s contention that “the government is entitled to no damages because it received the full value of the services covered by the contract.” The Court decided that, “This automatic equation of the government’s payments with its damages is mistaken.” Under the “benefit-of-the-bargain” framework—

Because SAIC’s services under its NRC contract had no ascertainable market price, the district court should instruct the jury to calculate the government’s damages by determining the amount of money the government paid due to SAIC’s false claims over and above what the services the company actually delivered were worth to the government.

To sum up, this is a significant decision in the complex, ever-changing world of False Claims Act litigation. While it likely won’t affect the manner in which compliance professionals execute their day-to-day tasks, it might just let their attorneys breathe a bit easier.

 

Two Engineers Convicted of Theft of Commercial Trade Secrets

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trade secret diagram
Clark Roberts (age 47) and Sean Howley (age 39) were both engineers with Wyko Tire Technology, Inc., located in Greenback, Tennessee. And they both had a problem. Although their employer was “in the business of making tire building equipment for Goodyear and other tire manufacturers,” the company’s Chinese customer, the Haohua South China Guilin Rubber Company Limited (HHSC), had paid them $1.2 million to design a piece of tire building equipment they had never designed before. Known as a “swab down device,” the equipment was used during the manufacture of large off-the-road radial (OTR) tires, such as those used in earth moving and mining equipment.

It was important to finish the design of the swab down device, but they were “having difficulty” with the project. Apparently, the project was in jeopardy and they needed an “out-of-the-box” solution to their problems.

What to do? What to do?

These two intrepid engineers came up with a daring plan. In the words of this Department of Justice news release--

On May 30 and 31, 2007, Roberts and Howley, traveled to a Goodyear tire manufacturing facility located in Topeka, Kan., to service Wyko equipment located in the Goodyear plant with the intention of taking photographs of Goodyear’s swab down device to assist them with completing their design even though they knew Goodyear protected the swab down device as a trade secret. On May 31, 2007, the defendants used a cell phone camera to surreptitiously take seven unauthorized photographs of a Goodyear swab down device, without the knowledge or permission of Goodyear. The defendants then emailed the unauthorized photographs to employees at a Wyko subsidiary located in Dudley, England, who used the trade secret information contained in the photographs to complete a similar piece of tire building equipment for the HHSC contract.

As you might expect from seeing this story on our website, there was no happy ending for the two engineers. According to the DOJ—

After a one-week trial, the jury found Roberts and Howley guilty of one count of conspiracy to commit trade secret theft, one count of trade secret theft, one count of unlawful photographing of trade secrets, three counts of transmittal of trade secrets, one count of possession of trade secrets, two counts of wire fraud and one count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud.

That’s 10—ten—felony convictions each, for those keeping track in their programs.

And what did our engineers win for their efforts at saving their company from a breach of contract from its nonperformance? According to the DOJ, “The defendants face a maximum of 10 years in prison for each trade secret count, 20 years in prison for each wire fraud count and $2.5 million in fines.”

For those doing the math, that is a very, very long time in prison. One assumes the malefactors will receive less than the maximum sentence. One might wonder why they didn’t plea bargain for a lesser sentence before trial. During the trial, one might wonder what defense they thought was going to save them from the charges. In any case, our two Tennessee engineers—now former Wyko employees—soon will have plenty of time to ponder those and other questions.

 

Another Version of DFARS Business Systems Rule Out for Comment

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On December 3, 2010, another version of the proposed DFARS Business Systems rule (DFARS Case No. 2009-D038) was published for public comment. Here is a link to the Federal Register notice—all 28 pages of it.

You and your company should review the proposed rule and provide comments back to the DAR Council at the address provided in the Federal Register notice. The previous version received “370 comments from 25 respondents,” according to the new version. Apogee Consulting, Inc. was one of those 25 respondents.

You might think that a mere 25 responses would not be sufficient to sway the rule-makers, but you would be wrong. The language in the new version indicates that some—perhaps many—of the 370 comments were considered. If your company does business with the Department of Defense, you would be quite foolish indeed to ignore the potential impact the rule will have on your business (and cash flow) if implemented as currently drafted.

In addition to our official comments, we had some choice words for the initial version of the proposed rule. Here’s a link to our original blog article. So what do we think of the new version of the proposed rule?

We think it’s a significant improvement. The mandatory withhold amounts have been reduced. As currently drafted, the rule would impose a five percent payment withhold for each business system that the Administrative Contracting Officer (ACO) determines to have significant deficiencies—although small businesses would be only subject to a two percent withhold. The cumulative amount of payments that can be withheld has been reduced from 100 percent to 20 percent (10 percent for small businesses).

The revised draft permits the ACO to reduce payment withholds upon receipt of an adequate corrective action plan from the contractor, and to eliminate the withholds when it is believed that the corrective actions have been successfully implemented—even though a formal DCAA audit report to that effect has not yet been received by the ACO.

However, the revised rule is far from perfect. In fact, one commenter already said that the rule “has gone from terrible to just bad.” The rule-makers still insist that withholds must be mandatory when necessary “to mitigate the Government’s risk when contractors fail to comply with the terms and conditions of their contracts by failing to maintain adequate business systems necessitates this rule.”

The proposed rule permits the ACO to impose withholds even when the Government is not reasonably at risk of financial harm. For example, deficiencies in an Earned Value Management system (EVMS) can lead to withholds. Moreover, the withholds are to be implemented on all payments, including contract financing payments on Firm Fixed-Price contract types—as well as on Performance-Based Payments (PBPs).

There is more to say, but we’ll save it for our comment letter. In the meantime, why don’t you get on the stick and see what you think about the proposed rule. This may be your last opportunity to affect it, before it is implemented and you see your cash flow take a hit.

One thing you might want to do is to compare the criteria for “adequate business systems” against your current practices to see how you stack up. If you don’t like the result, you might want to consider beefing-up your policies, procedures, and practices.

This rule, when finalized, is going to be significant. Don’t say you weren’t warned.

 


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Newsflash

Effective January 1, 2019, Nick Sanders has been named as Editor of two reference books published by LexisNexis. The first book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Cost Accounting Standards. Nick replaces Darrell Oyer, who has edited those books for many years.