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Apogee Consulting Inc

2010 Ends with More Cases of Fraud and Corruption

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Before we get into 2011 stuff, we wanted to make sure we wrapped up 2010 securely. Naturally, the majority of year-end stories concerned fraud, corruption, bribery, and ancillary wrong-doing in the public procurement arena.

First, another press release from the Department of Justice, related to an “ongoing investigation related to the award of construction services contracts at Fort Carson,” a U.S. Army installation located in Colorado Springs, Colorado. According to the December 10, 2010 announcement, Wendel P. Torres pleaded guilty to a felony count of “providing an illegal gratuity to a contracting officer.” The contracting officer in question, William T. Armstrong, was “former chief of the construction division of the Fort Carson Directorate of Contracting, who was authorized to award contracts for construction projects on behalf of the U.S. Army.” In September 2010, Mr. Armstrong pleaded guilty to one count of violating the False Statements Act.

The DOJ press release provided some salacious details, which we now provide to you.

Armstrong had awarded multiple construction contracts at Fort Carson to Torres’ company. Armstrong contacted Torres in approximately April 2007 regarding construction materials he needed for his home. After some discussion, in May of 2007, Torres arranged for delivery of the construction materials to Armstrong’s home. Torres informed Armstrong that he did not need to pay for the materials and Armstrong did not pay for the materials.

According to the press release, Mr. Torres agreed to cooperate with the ongoing investigation.

Second, BAE Systems reportedly ended a six year long probe into its sale of a £28 million radar system to Tanzania by cutting a deal with Britain’s Serious Fraud Office (SFO) on December 21, 2010. The plea bargain deal was valued at £30 million, which included a fine of £500,000 and court costs of £250,000. As reported—

‘The residue of the agreed 30 million pounds will be paid by BAE to the people of Tanzania by a mechanism yet to be agreed,’ an SFO spokesman told Reuters. … ‘The victims of this way of obtaining business, if I have correctly analysed it, are not the people of the UK, but the people of Tanzania,. said [Judge] Bean in his sentencing notes.

As we understand the situation, BAE Systems was within 24 hours of being sentenced for its crimes, but the Judge felt he needed more information regarding £8 million in payments from BAE Systems to “companies controlled by Tanzanian businessman Shailesh Vithlani between January 2000 and December 2005.” Judge Bean criticized the “hastily drafted” plea agreement, but finally imposed the monetary fine(s) discussed above. He specifically noted that he could not sentence BAE Systems “for an offence for which the prosecution failed to charge”—such as “false accounting or conspiracy to corrupt.” At the end of the day, BAE Systems was fined for “failing to keep proper records” of its payments to Mr. Vithlani. As part of the plea deal, BAE Systems did not admit to making any corrupt payments.

On these two notes, we end our 2010 discussions of corruption in the public procurement arena. However, you can be sure that we’ll be back in 2011, with more stories to report.

 

Congratulations to Master Sergeant Mark Morgan, US Army Ranger and Top Pastry Chef

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Morgan_Mark_MSG_highWe here at Apogee Consulting, Inc. offer our congratulations to U.S. Army Ranger Master Sergeant Mark Morgan, recently named as one of the top three pastry chefs in the world. Morgan represented the U.S. at the November, 2010, World Association of Chefs Societies’ Culinary World Cup in Luxembourg, where he won two gold medals (with the team) for his skills. The World Cup is held every four years.

Morgan is an Army-trained chef, a member of the U.S. Army Culinary Arts Team, and “the first American service member selected for the ACF Culinary National Team USA.”

His local paper reported the story thusly—

His peanut butter ganache earned him third place among 55 pastry chefs. Morgan also prepared four desserts, which together were called “Pumpkin and Spice”. They included a spiced pumpkin custard; walnut cake inside a coconut blossom; red currant compote; and a cinnamon beignet on poached pumpkin petals, [including] a trio of cranberry, and honey, yogurt and pumpkin sorbet with pumpkin-thyme essence.

Master Sergeant Mark Morgan is no cream-puff. He’s served six tours of duty in Southwest Asia—two in Iraq and four in Afghanistan—where he was awarded the Bronze Star. He currently serves as an aide to General Martin Dempsey at the U.S. Army’s TRADOC at Fort Monroe, Virginia.

Again, our congratulations to Master Sergeant Morgan!

And a tip of the hat to GovExec.com, which brought this story to our attention.

 

Boeing 777 Rises While 787 Falls

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We’ve been struck by a barrage of recent news stories about Boeing’s commercial aircraft. Unlike the usual one-dimensional “Boeing is evil” or “Boeing is All-American” stories, some of the recent ones were “think-pieces” that caused us to nod our heads in agreement.

Our interest in Boeing’s supply chain and program management challenges is well-established, with published articles such as this one discussing “surprise production delays” to the 787 program, or this one discussing the 787 program’s nightmarish supply chain management problems. We believe that lessons learned too late and too painfully by Boeing’s commercial aircraft programs can be used to avoid similar problems on our clients’ complex defense programs. So we thought we’d recap some of the recent news stories for your edification.

First, on December 20, 2010, Bloomberg reported that “Boeing plans to boost output of the 777 jet 66 percent by 2013” to more than 8 aircraft per month. Boeing had previously announced (in March 2010) that 2011 production rates would be increasing from 5 to 7 planes per month.

Bloomberg reported that—

The 777 is offered in a variety of configurations and seats more than 400. The average list price is about $258.2 million. Boeing has delivered 907 of the 777 aircraft since it entered service in 1995 and has an order backlog of more than 260 planes.

But while the 777 program flies high, the troubled 787 “Dreamliner” program is mired in continued problems. As Bloomberg reported, “delays [are mounting] on the Dreamliner, now about three years behind schedule amid parts shortages, manufacturing mistakes, and redesigns.” The article reported that Boeing was preparing “to announce a seventh delay” to the program, which “may be more than six months because of fresh problems….”

On that same day (December 20, 2010), the Seattle Times reported that “After a good long time of bashing workers in the Puget Sound region, Boeing's Chicago executives are now depending on them to fix the unfolding disaster of the Long Delayed 787 Dreamliner.” Finding silver lining where others saw only ominous clouds, the author (Jon Talton) noted that, “Ironically, [Boeing’s] troubles are providing a backstop for local aerospace employment at a time when Washington [State’s] modest jobs recovery has stalled.” But that fortunate happenstance didn’t detract from the “ominous truth” that “Boeing has bet the company on the Dreamliner and now faces cost overruns of $12 billion or more,” according to the article.

Going a bit deeper, Mr. Talton probed the Boeing management culture and asserted that it contributed to the precarious 787 program situation. He wrote—

At the least, the experience of doing the 787 on the cheap with a globalized supply chain should shake the foundations of ‘Welchism,’ the brutal management style, intimidating anti-employee bias and mania for quick results of retired General Electric chief executive Jack Welch. Yes, the one once foolishly lionized as the best CEO in history and whose influence has ruined countless companies. GE itself has quietly backed away from many Welch ideas gone sour, not least the financial services play that became part of the global banking panic. Boeing's executive suite is populated with Welch disciples who long poo-pooed Boeing's historic careful, engineering-based culture.

Mr. Talton pointed his readers at an “astonishing article” published in the Seattle Times just a few days before, on December 18, 2010, that provided details of the Dreamliner’s panoply of current problems. The article, penned by Dominic Gates, asserted that—

As Boeing prepares to announce yet another delay for the 787 Dreamliner — at least three months, possibly six or more — the crucial jet program is in even worse shape than it appears. The problems go well beyond the latest setback, an in-flight electrical fire last month that has grounded the test planes. A year after the airplane's first flight, the cascade of systems failures caused by that fire, as well as two major problems since summer with the 787's Rolls-Royce engine, have raised red flags with aviation regulators.

A top Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) official 10 days ago warned Boeing that without further proof of the plane's reliability, it won't be certified to fly the long intercontinental routes that airlines expect it to serve.

Meanwhile, on the production side, one veteran employee on the 787 said he's witnessing ‘the perfect storm of manufacturing hell.’ The global supply chain is at a standstill, and outside the Everett factory the rows of partly finished jets will take many months to complete. …

Among the 787's lesser ongoing problems is ‘rain in the plane,’ the term used for heavy condensation dripping inside the jet's composite plastic fuselage. Yet that issue is piddling compared with the major flaws that have brought a wave of successive delays.

Mr. Gates wrote—

Boeing has bet its future on the 787 … the company aimed to reduce the cost and risk by outsourcing an unprecedented share of manufacturing and design work to partners around the globe. … Yet the 787 has run into more trouble than any previous Boeing jet. … The 20 built but incomplete Dreamliners sitting in Everett are emblematic of all that has gone wrong. They are so far from done that the total number of unfinished jobs [tasks] exceeds 105,000. … Mechanics can complete only about 500 jobs a month out on the field, and perhaps 1,000 jobs a month … inside the factory.

These jets have no seats or sidewalls, and many interior systems are missing or incomplete. … Mechanics installed temporary air conditioning units after those fitted initially kept failing. Horizontal tails poorly built by Alenia in Italy are still being reworked. With the workmanship on the tails varying from one plane to the next, mechanics have to painstakingly customize the fixes plane by plane.

According to the article, Boeing has developed a controversial work-around plan to address the 20 problem planes needing work. That work-around plan is to—quite literally—work around the problems. As Mr. Gates reported—

With its parked Dreamliners many months from completion, Fancher said Boeing is likely to skip over earlier planes that need more work and move up the delivery of some later-built, more completed jets.

‘You may see us hopping around a bit,’ he said, adding that it's a matter of balancing the most efficient way to finish the work with the customers' need to get a specific jet by a specific date.

The worker dealing with the backlog puts it differently: ‘They've dug a hole so deep, they have no choice but to go around it and leave the hole there.’

In addition, Mr. Gates reported on several significant problems with the 787 engines—designed and build by Rolls-Royce. He reported that, “the engine and electrical issues have also raised crucial questions late in the program about the plane's reliability, potentially affecting regulators' certification of the airplane.” Reportedly, the FAA has warned Boeing executives that, “in the current state of the program, the jet cannot be certified for long-distance transocean and transpolar flights,”

Mr. Gates also noted that, “Also drawing separate FAA scrutiny is repeated poor-quality workmanship in the 787 fuel tank, including issues with fasteners.” He reported that latter problem “reaches back into the 787 supply pipeline, which continues to stutter.” According to the article, Boeing has had to halt movement of planes on its final assembly line, as well as halt deliveries of “major sections” of the aircraft to Everett, in order to create a “balancing act” that allows “some suppliers to catch up with others and to slow the flow onto Paine Field of new planes needing to have the latest fixes applied.”

To sum up his article, Mr. Gates reported that—

Employees working on the 787 complain about insufficient oversight of suppliers and a management system that the senior engineer called ‘totally broken.’ ‘This program is not like anything we've seen,’ said the veteran 787 employee. ‘It's a screwed-up mess.’

Normally we would stop there, but there’s one more thought-provoking article to bring to your attention. It discusses a problem that may be far worse than any reported in the Seattle Times or Bloomberg. Mr. Michael Mandel wrote an article with the interesting title, “Knowledge Capital Writedown at Boeing?” in the Wall Street Pit online publication.

Mr. Mandel postulated that, “What’s going on here is a breakdown of Boeing’s outsourcing strategy, and a possible breakdown of Boeing as well.” He noted that, “In the short run, outsourcing may have increased the risks and costs [of the 787 Dreamliner program] rather than decreased them.” According to Mr. Mandel, “Part of the problem is low quality of parts from partners who were supposed to shoulder a lot of the burden.” But Mr. Mandel asserts that the supplier quality problems are not the real long-term issue, because “these problems can all be fixed, at a cost.”

In his view, the real problem with Boeing’s strategy is the loss of its intellectual property—the knowledge of how to design and build commercial aircraft.

Mr. Mandel cites a year-old Harvard Business Review blog post by Dick Nolan, who is a professor at the University of Washington. Mr. Mandel quotes Professor Nolan as follows—

In trying to keep down Airbus, Boeing may be creating a much more dangerous competitor, one that likely will come from Japan, China, or India — countries that will own the markets for new airplanes in the near future and are in various stages of building their own commercial-airplane-manufacturing industries.

To finance the development of the 787 and secure global orders, Boeing agreed not only to outsource an unprecedented amount of the plane’s parts to partners in Europe, Japan, and China, but also to transfer to them unprecedented know-how. Before the 787, Boeing had retained almost total control of airplane design and provided suppliers precise engineering drawings for building parts (called ‘build to print’). The only exception was jet engines, which have long been designed and manufactured by suppliers such as GE, Rolls-Royce, and Pratt & Whitney.

The 787 program departed from this practice. Boeing effectively gave Tier 1 suppliers a large part of its proprietary manual, ‘How to Build a Commercial Airplane,’ a book that its aeronautical engineers have been writing over the last 50 years or so. Instead of ‘build to print,’ Boeing provided suppliers with performance specifications for parts and components and collaboratively worked with them in the design and manufacturing of major components such as the wing, fuselage section, and wing box

According to Mr. Mandel, one of the beneficiaries is the Commercial Aircraft Corp. of China, who has just “taken its first set of orders for the C919, a potential competitor to the … Boeing 737.”

Taken together, these recent stories present a picture of an utter failure of a supply chain management strategy. It seems clear (in hindsight) that Boeing pushed design responsibility down to suppliers that were unready to take it, relied on the quality and workmanship of untried and possibly untrained foreign workforces, and failed to compensate for the lack of a quality-focused culture by implementing rigorous quality inspections at every hand-off. As a result, Boeing has experienced long schedule delays, huge cost overruns, and a production nightmare that it may not be able to overcome in the short term. And in the long term, it may have sold off its intellectual property “crown jewels” for a pittance, and given its competitors the means they needed to compete against it in the global marketplace.

And yet, as we ponder those Boeing executives who blessed the failed strategy, who trumpeted the cost and risk reductions from global outsourcing, and who presided over the failure of that strategy—we’re confident that they all received very nice salaries and large incentive compensation packages.

 

Subcontractor Challenges Prime Contractor’s Refusal to Pay Rate Adjustment Vouchers—and Wins!

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We noticed a recent PR announcement from the Centre Law Group touting its December 15, 2010 victory in Virginia’s Fairfax Circuit Court for its client, Thomas Computer Solutions, LLC (TCS). TCS was a subcontractor to L-3 Communications. Pursuant to the terms of its cost-reimbursement subcontract, TCS submitted interim adjustment vouchers for variances to its indirect cost rates. According to the press release, L-3 refused to pay those adjustment vouchers “until the Defense Contract Audit Agency conducted a final audit” and recommended final indirect cost rates.

As our readers know, DCAA can take several years to commence its final indirect rate audits, and the audits themselves can last for a year or more. (This situation has recently been exacerbated by DCAA halting initiation of new indirect rate audits for many contractors, because it has redirected its audit resources elsewhere—such as the unnecessary audit of interim vouchers because of the withdrawal of “direct billing authority”.) Thus, neither L-3 nor TCS could reasonably expect that TCS would have final audited rates for many, many years. And L-3’s refusal to pay TCS’ adjustment vouchers would significantly impair TCS’ cash flow and—potentially—TCS’ financial capability.

At one point, L-3 offered to pay TCS 70% of its requested amounts, but then withdrew that offer. As the press release notes, that about-face “occurred at a time when TCS and L-3 began competing for the same government contracts to provide linguistic services to support the war effort.” Moreover (according to the press release)—

In addition to failing to pay the invoices due, L-3 also refused to provide past performance (when it had done so previously) and trashed TCS to the government client by falsely stating (without solicitation) in an e-mail ‘[t]he solvency of TCS is an issue (not sure if they even still exist)…’  The Court found that this was an attack on a competitor.

Even though the parties “went through a lengthy and time consuming reconciliation process to verify the invoices and correct any mistakes,” L-3 refused to pay TCS for its indirect rate variances, which was (allegedly) “contrary to FAR 52.216-7, which allowed for interim rate adjustments prior to contract closeout.”

The press release doesn’t mention other helpful FAR language, which we post here for your use.

FAR 42.704(b) clearly permits some latitude in the establishment of billing rates (rates used on vouchers prior to the establishment of final indirect cost rates). It says—

The contracting officer (or cognizant Federal agency official) or auditor shall establish billing rates on the basis of information resulting from recent review, previous rate audits or experience, or similar reliable data or experience of other contracting activities. In establishing billing rates, the contracting officer (or cognizant Federal agency official) or auditor should ensure that the billing rates are as close as possible to the final indirect cost rates anticipated for the contractor’s fiscal period, as adjusted for any unallowable costs. When the contracting officer (or cognizant Federal agency official) or auditor determines that the dollar value of contracts requiring use of billing rates does not warrant submission of a detailed billing rate proposal, the billing rates may be established by making appropriate adjustments from the prior year’s indirect cost experience to eliminate unallowable and nonrecurring costs and to reflect new or changed conditions.

In addition, FAR 42.704(e) states—

When the contractor provides to the cognizant contracting officer the certified final indirect cost rate proposal in accordance with 42.705-1(b) or 42.705-2(b), the contractor and the Government may mutually agree to revise billing rates to reflect the proposed indirect cost rates, as approved by the Government to reflect historically disallowed amounts from prior years’ audits, until the proposal has been audited and settled. The historical decrement will be determined by either the cognizant contracting officer (42.705-1(b)) or the cognizant auditor (42.705-2 (b)).

Given the foregoing, we tend to agree that L-3 didn’t have much of a leg to stand on. And when one adds in the negative comments, we are unsurprised that TCS prevailed and obtained a $3.3 million verdict described by the Centre Law Group as, “one of the ten largest reported verdicts in Virginia this year and the fourth largest verdict involving business claims.”

 

More Changes Ahead for Pentagon Procurement Practices

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Our recently discovered favorite website, FierceGovernmentIT, carried a couple of recent stories that indicate some significant changes are in the works for DOD acquisition folks.

First, the site reported that the reintroduced 2011 Defense authorization bill, H.R. 6523, contained in its Section 806, a very interesting provision. The Bill, which was passed by the House and delivered to the Senate on December 17, 2010, provides that for acquisitions of certain “covered” (national security) systems, the Department of Defense may—

  1. Exclude sources that fail “to meet qualification standards established in accordance with Section 2319 of Title 10 of the United States Code [10 U.S.C. 2319] for the purpose of reducing supply chain risk in the acquisition of covered systems.”

  2. Exclude sources that fail “to achieve an acceptable rating with regard to an evaluation factor providing for the consideration of supply chain risk in the evaluation of proposals for the award of a contract or the issuance of a task or delivery order.”

  3. Withhold consent for contractor to subcontract with “a particular source or to direct a contractor for a covered system to exclude a particular source from consideration for a subcontract under the contract.”

Moreover, the legislation would prohibit the action(s) taken above from a bid protest review by the GAO “or in any Federal court”. And the determinations regarding supply chain risk that lead to those actions could be provided to other DOD components “or other Federal agencies”.

What is “supply chain risk”? The legislation defines the term thusly—

The term ‘supply chain risk' means the risk that an adversary may sabotage, maliciously introduce unwanted function, or otherwise subvert the design, integrity, manufacturing, production, distribution, installation, operation, or maintenance of a covered system so as to surveil, deny, disrupt, or otherwise degrade the function, use, or operation of such system.

As the FierceGovernmentIT story reported—

The bill also would require establishment of four cybersecurity pilot programs, including one for ‘processes for securing the global supply chain.’ Such a pilot program would establish a framework and taxonomy for evaluating the supply chain and ‘an assessment of the viability of applying commercial practices for securely operating in an uncertain or compromised supply chain.’

Those who’ve read our rants reasoned, yet passionate, calls for managing supply chain risk will see this as yet another compelling reason to focus on such issues. For those who are new to this site, please see this article, or this one, which provide a good starting point for more research.

In a second story, FierceGovernmentIT reported that the DOD is planning to change “how it funds, buys and manages IT projects”. In a recently published report, DOD listed many reform efforts it plans to make. FierceGovernmentIT published a list of those reforms here.

As the FierceGovernmentIT article stated—

New reforms will be implemented incrementally and could require Congress to change elements of U.S. code. The report identifies five guiding principles: Deliver fast and often; incremental and iterative development and testing; rationalized requirements; and flexible/tailored processes.

The reforms involve significant changes to IT project funding, which are outlined in the article. We were interested to see that one of the reforms would be to exempt IT projects from the DOD 5000 approach to program management, “in favor of more frequent decisions”. The article also reports that the report calls for reforms to the traditional systems engineering approach. It states—

The department will shift away from the waterfall engineering process in favor of newer practices such as test-driven development, model-driven development and feature-driven developments, the report adds. Creation of a common IT infrastructure with non-proprietary interfaces will enable agile development. …

The FierceGovernmentIT article (link above) provides a link to the original DOD report, for those interested in further research.

 


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Newsflash

Effective January 1, 2019, Nick Sanders has been named as Editor of two reference books published by LexisNexis. The first book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Cost Accounting Standards. Nick replaces Darrell Oyer, who has edited those books for many years.