• Increase font size
  • Default font size
  • Decrease font size
Apogee Consulting Inc

Shay Assad Gets DCMA to Hold Hands with DCAA and Promise to Play Nice

E-mail Print PDF

It’s been a favorite claim of Pentagon critics seeking to increase oversight of DOD contractors that the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) Contracting Officers and the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) auditors don’t work well together. We’ve posted on this topic several times—notably this gem from 2009 in which we reported that the Commission on Wartime Contracting, “thinks DCMA has failed in its oversight role and should possibly merge with DCAA in order to eliminate ‘dysfunctionality’ between the two DOD agencies.”

mediate

We reported that—

The Commission called for the dysfunctional relationship between DCAA and DCMA to come to an end and, according to the report, put the onus on DCMA to resolve the problems.  Co-Chair Shays was quoted as saying, ‘both of you up there, you're on the same team, but it doesn't sound like it and it doesn't look like it. ... With no disrespect to [DCMA], we think there needs to be more adjustment on DCMA's part than on DCAA's part.  I think that's fairly clear.’  Neither Shays nor his Co-Chair Michael Thibault (former Deputy Director of DCAA) addressed recent GAO findings on DCAA's lack of audit quality and independence.

As part of that same article, we also noted that then-Director of DCAA April Stephenson called for “accountability” for DCMA’s disposition of DCAA audit recommendations—which was a shift from her previous position that all of DCAA’s recommendations should be mandatory for DCMA to implement. Readers may recall it was under Ms. Stephenson’s watch that DCAA promulgated audit guidance (MRD 09-PAS004(R)) directing its auditors to file a report that may be forwarded to the DOD Inspector General when (in the view of the auditor) “a contracting officer ignores a DCAA audit report and takes an action that is grossly inconsistent with procurement law and regulation….”

Even so, we were never convinced that the relationship between the two agencies was as dysfunctional as the critics asserted. Attributing DCMA’s lack of action on DCAA recommendations to a dysfunctional relationship ignored the elephant in the room—which was the timeliness and quality of DCAA’s audit reports. We would assert that it would be unreasonable to expect a DCMA Contracting Officer to take action on audit findings and/or recommendations that were poorly worded, or insufficiently supported, or that were clearly contrary to existing regulations. In all candor, we would apply those descriptions to many—perhaps the majority—of the hundreds of DCAA audit reports we have reviewed in the past ten years. In other words, while critics focused on the easy target (DCMA’s lack of action) they simply ignored the tough problem (DCAA’s lack of quality audit reports). And that was the story.

Regardless of whether the two DOD oversight agencies were as dysfunctional as many alleged, it became clear that they needed to shake hands and commit to a better working relationship. The Honorable Shay Assad, Director, Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy (DPAP), emerged in late 2009 as a mediator between the two agencies. In December 2009 Mr. Assad issued a memo outlining a “process for resolving disagreements” between the two agencies—though at the time we noted that the memo failed to address many significant areas of potential disagreement. We wrote—

The memo seems to omit any discussion of how DCMA and DCAA would resolve differences of opinion regarding the adequacy of contractor internal control ‘business systems’ or noncompliances with Cost Accounting Standards or allegations of ‘defective pricing’.  Thus, it focuses on a subset of oversight interactions but not the entire universe of activity.  And the omitted areas are the areas the critics have pointed at, such as the adequacy of contractor control systems.

Still and nonetheless, it was tangible progress and appeared to appease some of the more vocal critics. And recently, more than a year after the previous memo, came another memo from Mr. Assad’s office with a long title that included the phrase, “Align Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) and Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) Processes to Ensure Work is Complementary”. The ostensible goal of the memo was to implement Dr. Ash Carter’s September 2010 call for “better work alignment and reduction in DCMA/DCAA overlap”.

(Readers may recall Dr. Carter’s directive was subtly different. He wrote that the Director of DPAP was to “develop guidance that will clearly spell out the roles and responsibilities” of DCMA and DCAA in order to “avoid duplication and overlapping roles.” As you review the memo, ask whether Dr. Carter’s directive was actually implemented.)

The latest Assad Alignment Memo reiterated a couple of things that will be old news to readers of this site. The memo discusses DCAA’s new thresholds for performing audits of contractor cost proposals, and changes to how DOD will implement Forward Pricing Rate Agreements (FPRAs). But there were some new items as well. They include—

  • DCAA will no longer perform Financial Capability Reviews. These reviews will now be performed solely by DCMA during the Pre-Award Survey process. The memo reported that, “DCMA has established a Financial Analysis Division under its Cost and Pricing Center and is adding additional staff to meet the increased workload requirements.”

  • DCAA will no longer participate in DCMA’s review of Contractor Purchasing Systems. The memo stated that, “DCMA has a Purchasing System Review Center under its Contracting Division and is increasing both the number of analysts assigned to the Center and reviews performed per year to meet the increased workload requirements.” However, the memo noted that, “DCAA will continue to audit subcontract costs as part of its incurred cost audits and [will] report any deficiencies found in the contractor’s system to the ACO for resolution.”

And that’s it. Oh, the memo also noted that details regarding oversight of other internal control systems will be covered as part of the DFARS “business systems rule” that is currently pending. It stated—

When implemented, the revised policy will clearly define DCMA/DCAA responsibility with respect to each Agency’s role in assessing and determining status of the contractor’s Accounting, Estimating, Earned Value Management, Material Management and Accounting, Purchasing, and Property Systems.

Well, we looked pretty closely at the proposed revision to the DFARS rules on contractor systems. We even provided a comment or two to the DAR Council for consideration. And in our opinion, we didn’t see very much “clear” definition regarding each agency’s role in the process.

So we look forward to yet another memo from DPAP, one that clearly spells out the contractor oversight roles and responsibilities of each agency. And we note that there is much more to contractor oversight than reviewing business systems (though obviously that’s a significant part of the oversight process). We await clarity regarding resolution of Cost Accounting Standards administrative matters (such as Disclosure Statements that aren’t timely determined to be adequate and compliant, or cost impact proposals that sit for years and years without any DOD action), timely resolution of allegations of “defective pricing” violations of the Truth-in-Negotiation Act, reviews of Contractor Disclosures of violations of its Ethics and Business Conduct policy, and the like.

The two DOD oversight agencies aren’t really dysfunctional. But the processes by which the DOD effectuates its oversight are too often broken. And the personnel involved in the processes seem to be incentivized to defer decisions rather than exercise their FAR-given authority and discretion to resolve issues. We look forward to a future USD(AT&L) memo exploring those fundamental leadership failures. Until then, this DPAP memo will have to suffice.

 

DFARS Case 2009-D038 Business Systems—Definition and Administration

E-mail Print PDF

Dear Mr. Gomersall,

This letter provides comments in response to the proposed rule, as revised, that would significantly revise the definition of contractor business systems, and DOD’s administration thereof.

Full text can be found here.

 

Second Annual Open Letter to Mr. Patrick Fitzgerald, Director, Defense Contract Audit Agency

E-mail Print PDF

Dear Mr. Fitzgerald,

Happy New Year!

The last time I wrote you a letter you had been in your position just about 60 days. As I noted, you came into your position with a clear mandate for change, but you had a huge challenge in front of you. In the spirit of helpfulness, I offered a couple of suggestions for your consideration. My suggestions included:

  • Introduction of more flexibility into the audit process by creating a risk profile unique to each contractor, and then using that risk profile to drive the types of audits to be performed.

  • Permit the contractor to review (and discuss) draft audit report findings before DCAA management review, so as to permit Supervisory Auditors and other management levels to review both sides of the story without having to “backstep” from a previously established position.

  • Consider dividing DCAA audits into GAGAS-compliant versus non-GAGAS-compliant groupings, so as to avoid criticism when auditors act in their “advisory” capacity to DCMA.

  • Bring back the concept of materiality into the audit process, and recognize that not all deficiencies are significant or material deficiencies.

  • Empower auditors (with sufficient training and experience) to exercise discretion in the performance of their audits, so as to avoid “papering” audit files with worthless documentation that adds nothing except to demonstrate compliance with documentation requirements.

Well, Mr. Fitzgerald, I have to say that I’m disappointed that more of my suggestions weren’t implemented during 2010. I’m not saying you weren’t busy (you were) or that you didn’t accomplish some necessary reforms (you did). But I have to say that not enough was done. In particular, I don’t think your audit agency implemented enough of the right reforms and, in some cases, took a step or two in the wrong direction.

Let me elaborate, if you will.

First, you focused your efforts on overseas contingency contractors, effectively doubling the audit workforce assigned to the Southwest Asia area. Perhaps that was a necessary step, but it clearly took personnel and funding away from other areas. At the same time, you increased the number of “Field Audit Offices” (FAOs) rather significantly, causing a massive need for Branch Managers and ancillary administrative staff. And normal attrition took its toll on your senior staff. Although you added staff, the majority of the new hires were young, untrained and inexperienced. In other words, you needed a large influx of senior staff who could fill the ranks from Supervisory Auditor to FAO Manager, but what you got was a bunch of bright-eyed and eager-to-please kids.

But that’s not all, sir. You also created workload for your auditors in non-value-added areas such as reviewing interim vouchers (which would be subject to completion reviews in any case) because you took away contractors’ “direct billing authority”. You also created multiple layers of management review that focused on the amount of workpaper documentation (and not the workpaper quality), creating an unseemly focus on file documentation at the expense of timely and informative audit reports. And many of those reviewers were not permanently assigned and had no “skin in the game” of generating high-quality audit reports.

In fairness, you did replace the management of the Western Region, your “problem child” and the subject of several adverse GAO and DOD IG reports. But you also took some flack on that action, because the replacement appeared to be an old buddy of yours from the Army Audit Agency, who was (apparently) not required to have deep expertise in FAR or CAS. Critics wondered how the new leadership of the Western Region would ensure audit quality if they lacked sufficient expertise to properly review audit reports?

You also re-emphasized auditor “rules of engagement” with contractors and customers, and (in some limited circumstances) okayed the discussion of interim audit findings prior to release of the official draft report. Though (as we said at the time) we thought you should have done more in that area.

In order to solve the personnel problems you created, you created a domino-like series of rotating temporary assignments, moving people from position to position, and from office to office, so that there was no permanence in many auditor or management assignments. And with that lack of permanence came confusion regarding the chain of command, and a lack of accountability for results. As a result, audits were handed-off from auditor to auditor (and from SA to SA) like hot potatoes, with a corresponding loss of knowledge and degradation of audit quality. And did I mention the lack of audit completions during the year? As I reported on my website, in 2010 DCAA issued 45 percent fewer audit reports than it did in 2009. That is not a statistic of which to be proud, in my view.

Another action you took was to focus on the big guys, effectively ignoring the contract audit requirements of the smaller contractors. Your agency no longer expects to audit fixed-price proposals valued at less than $10 million or cost-reimbursement proposals valued at less than $100 million. And you drove a change in the direct billing authority rules that allowed you to permit small business contractors to retain their direct billing authority, even if (under the rules your agency established) they should have lost it. One might draw a trend line here and be tempted to forecast that, in the future, DCAA will only audit major contractors and the little guys will go scot-free from any audit oversight.

Unfortunately, the results of your initial efforts were noted by the DOD Inspector General. In its quality control review of your audit of The Aerospace Corporation, the DOD IG reported that—

DCAA did not comply with Circular A-133 reporting requirements. … We also identified deficiencies in the performance of fraud risk assessment procedures, information technology internal control testing and working paper documentation that need to be corrected in future audits.

Moreover, contractors provided some feedback for your consideration, as well. We quoted one knowledgeable critic as saying, “DCAA appears to be in chaos.” We found a survey from Deltek that reported that more than one-third of respondents hadn’t been audited on their internal control systems for at least one full year—while another 35 percent of respondents said that they had never been audited on their internal control systems!) Let’s be clear: about 70 percent of Deltek’s survey respondents reported that DCAA wasn’t auditing internal control (or “contractor business systems”) any longer. In addition, Deltek reported that “The number of firms reporting a decrease in government oversight spiked from 2% in 2009 to 20% this year—a tenfold leap.”

There you go, sir. That’s the report card for your first year, as provided by both the defense industrial base and by a peer audit agency. Let us both agree that DCAA did not receive the highest possible marks.

So where do you go from here?

  1. Your Executive Steering Committee (ESC) has got to go. You need new blood, with a new vision and the drive to change for the better. The old guard has a vested interest in perpetuating the status quo. The old guard wants to point the finger at the contractors and blame them for the lack of timely and high-quality audits. While there may be some truth to that accusation, the reality is that contractors and their lack of responsiveness are not the big drivers of audit quality. High quality auditors, well trained and with sufficient resources and adequate supervision, are the big drivers of audit quality. Your ESC is part of the problem; a new ESC can be part of the solution.

  2. You need to drive the concept of materiality back into audits. The lack of materiality in audit findings is perhaps the number one problem in your agency’s audit reports, leading to unwarranted recommendations for internal control system disapprovals, unnecessary CAS 405 noncompliances, and other similar disputes that require a lengthy (and expensive) adjudication by DCMA and/or the Courts. If your Assistant Director of Policy and Plans can’t get behind that concept, then see recommendation No. 1, above.

  3. Stop the staff turnover. Auditors should be assigned to an audit and should be accountable for completing it. Supervisory Auditors should be assigned to an area of responsibility and should be accountable for it. FAO Managers should be assigned to offices on a permanent basis, and should be accountable for what happens in their offices. Sure, jury duty and unplanned sicknesses happen. But audit hand-offs should be the exception and not the rule. I believe you will never achieve high-quality audit reports until you address the churn and burn within the staff.

  4. Stop the funding game. Too many FAOs have a disconnect between funding and headcount, or between funding and program plans. It’s a silly and completely unnecessary game, in my view. You get a budget; assign it. Assign it by Region. Let the Regions assign it by FAO if they must. But once budgets are assigned, don’t worry about assigning funding. Don’t track funding (or spending) at a level lower than the Region, and empower your Regional management to manage their finances—and then hold them accountable for results. You are wasting precious Agency resources on tracking this minutia. And what’s worse, funding “problems” are driving auditor reassignments (see recommendation No. 3, above).

Seriously, Mr. Fitzgerald. Everybody wants an effective DCAA. Even the contractors want to deal with high-quality audit findings that are performed and issued on a timely basis. You can do better. What’s more: you must do better. We are counting on you, sir. Please don’t let us down.

 

Mystery at Manas

E-mail Print PDF

Percolating around the upper strata of Pentagon and State Department policy wonks is concern over the “Mystery at Manas,” and whether Pentagon officials “were complicit in apparent tax-dodging schemes by contractors providing crucial fuel supplies for the U.S. military.”

Pentagon-Pirate

This issue was brought to our attention by Bob Antonio at WIFCON.com, who linked to this blog article at ForeignPolicy.com. The article discusses two contractors—Mina and Red Star Corps.—described as “shadowy companies that provide hundreds of millions of dollars a year in jet fuel to the American military's Manas Air Base in Kyrgyzstan and Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan.”

That’s kind of an understated description. Let’s be clear: We are talking about roughly $3 Billion “in single-source contracts he has obtained over the last seven years to deliver jet fuel for the war in Afghanistan.”

Reportedly, the companies are owned by Doug Edelman, “who resides in London and registers his companies in the tax shelter of Gibraltar, but under the name of his French wife and Kyrgyz business partner.” According to the article, Mr. Edelman’s only known previous business experience was ownership of a “burger joint” in Bishtek.

The Washington Post raised concerns about the awarding of contracts by the Pentagon to what appeared to be shell companies in November, 2010. Apparently (according to the Post), it took eight years (and billions of dollars in contract awards) before the Pentagon folks got around to asking for, and receiving, “details of who owns the operation.” The Post reported, “Mina and Red Star … went to great lengths to conceal the ownership role of Edelman's wife - who has no known experience in jet fuel logistics - and Bekbolotov behind a web of offshore entities.”

The Post article noted that the situation with Minas and Red Star Corp. has angered the Kyrgyzstan government. It said—


The [most recent contract] award infuriated Kyrgyz officials, who want private contractors replaced by a Russian-Kyrgyz joint venture.


A statement issued by the Foreign Ministry in Bishkek, the Kyrgyz capital, said that Washington must ‘suspend cooperation’ with Mina until the completion of an investigation by state prosecutors. It cited ‘corrupt schemes around fuel deliveries’ to the U.S. base and demanded steps to ‘ensure transparency and remove suspicion.’

Further, the Post noted that, “a serious rupture between Washington and Bishkek could jeopardize the future of a U.S. base that is used to fly troops to and from Afghanistan and houses a fleet of aero-tankers that do in-flight refueling over the Afghan combat zone.” According to the Post’s story—


Kyrgyz officials have repeatedly accused the companies of corrupt ties to the family of former president Kurmanbek Bakiyev, who was ousted in April. But they have provided no proof of wrongdoing and a six-month investigation by the House subcommittee on foreign affairs and national security has found no credible evidence of corruption.


The companies have denied wrongdoing and say they are the victims of misinformation spread by rivals.

The ForeignPolicy.com story reported on allegations that “Mina is part of a veritable empire stretching from East Europe to Africa and Afghanistan. It includes an Internet company in Kabul, investment services in Africa, energy pipelines in Afghanistan, and trade and financial investments, not to mention the billion-dollar-jet-fuel business.”

Readers may be surprised to learn that the companies are tied to the April 2010 ouster of the Kyrgyz President, Kurmanbek Bakiyev. According to the ForeignPolicy.com article—


As you recall, Kyrgyz poured into the streets when gasoline prices suddenly went through the roof after Russia clamped on a substantial new customs tariff. Observers surmised that Moscow was punishing Bakiyev for reneging on a supposed agreement to expel Manas in exchange for $2 billion in aid for the country.


Not so, according to the House report -- it was because Mina and Red Star lied to Russia as to its ultimate customer. The companies said -- and Kyrgyz officials backed up the story -- that they were buying Russian jet fuel for civilian use. This was to get around a Russian policy prohibiting the export of strategic assets -- in this case jet fuel -- for purposes of war.


In a statement today, Mina and Red Star say that Gazprom Neft, the direct seller of the fuel, knew about the military fuel contract all along. That may be the case, but the report goes on to say that the Russian public apparently didn't know, and ultimately the Russian Duma and the FSB (the domestic intelligence service) decided to investigate -- and when they did, subsequently determining that the fuel was for U.S. jets, a cutoff in the gasoline supply followed. The tariff came after that, along with a 30 percent increase in gas prices on the street.

If true, this is kind of an amazing development: We would have a private company buying Russian jet fuel and then turning around and selling it to the United States for its military operations in Southwest Asia. We doubt that even Tom Clancy could envision such a situation in his best-selling techo-thrillers! Yet, that appears to be exactly what transpired. The ForeignPolicy.com article stated, “in this case, the Russians -- the sellers of the fuel -- allegedly didn't know the fuel-buying was going on; neither did the Pentagon, the buyers of the fuel; nor, the report goes on, did the American Embassy in Bishkek, where the fuel contract was the stuff of daily reporting and griping …”

Is this a description of contractors that are operating—apparently legally—within the hidden “gaps” of existing international law? Is this entrepreneurship at the highest international level, or merely at a level higher than the associated oversight protocols? Before you decide, note this comment from the ForeignPolicy.com article:

Mina and Red Star are covered by a diplomatic agreement between the United States and Kyrgyzstan that sets its tax rate (apparently zero), and prevents the Kyrgyz from interfering with its operations.

We could hardly believe this story as we researched it for this article. Moreover, we would certainly understand if you, gentle readers, thought this was simply another example of our tendency to hyperbole.

Need more evidence? Then check out the official report on the matter, issued by the U.S. House of Representatives’ Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, released on December 21, 2010.

 

2011 National Defense Authorization Act Contains “Interesting” Provisions, Including New Mandates on Contractor Business Systems

E-mail Print PDF

“May you live in interesting times.”—Ancient Chinese curse (apocryphal)

In one of its final actions, on December 22, 2010, the “lame duck” Congress passed H.R. 6523, the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011. As we write this, it is awaiting Presidential signature. (It will become Law in any case, if the President doesn’t sign it within 10 days of passage.) The 2011 NDAA has a history that should trouble contract administration and compliance practitioners (and their legal counsel) because of the speed of passage and lack of deliberation. As Bob Antonio of WIFCON.com noted—

The bill was in Congress for about a week.  There was no conference, no conference report, and no explanation of where sections of the bill came from. … The ISNDAA was slapped together by members of Congress without any explanation.  The clear congressional intent of the ISNDAA was for a lame duck Congress to pass something quickly so it could head home for the holidays.

Before we move on, we want to note that we are indebted to Bob for putting together a section-by-section analysis of the NDAA on his most excellent website, Where in Federal Contracting?. But even his prodigious talents were strained on this effort. He wrote—

H. R. 6523, The Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 (ISNDAA), was introduced in the House of Representatives on December 15, 2010.  Two days later on December 17, 2010, it passed the House.  Five days later, on December 22, 2010, it passed the Senate with an amendment―striking one title of the bill.  On that same day, the House agreed to the Senate amendment.  … There is [also] Senate bill S. 3454, a defense authorization bill that never passed the Senate.  Then there is House bill H. R. 5136, a defense authorization bill that actually passed the House.  Both of these bills include some similar sections that appear in H. R. 6523 and each has a report explaining their sections.  However, neither of these bills is the basis for the Improve Acquisition Act which is a major part of the ISNDAA. That ‘honor’ goes to H. R. 5013, the Implementing Management for Performance and Related Reforms to Obtain Value in Every Acquisition Act of 2010.  H. R. 5013 did pass the House with an earlier report explaining its sections.  During consideration of H. R. 5136, it was adopted as an amendment and pasted to the end of H. R. 5136. 

In other words, when trying to figure out exactly what the language of the final public law is (or will be), one has to look at three different bills in the House of Representatives and one Senate bill. So our analysis needs to be caveated with words of warning: subject to change.

That said: let’s move on to some really interesting provisions of the 2011 NDAA.

In one of our first blog articles, we noted a report to the Secretary of Defense from the Defense Science Board that told SecDef Gates his Pentagon bureaucracy was too bloated to meet the needs of the warfighter. We reported a few of the DSB’s findings—

-- The DOD is ‘not geared to acquire and field capabilities in a rapidly shifting threat environment.’

-- ‘Current long standing [DOD] business practices and regulations are poorly suited" to the dynamics of a rapidly shifting threat environment.’

-- ‘Today, the DOD is saddled with processes and oversight built up over decades, and managers leading them who are often rewarded for risk aversion.’

-- ‘All of DOD's acquisition needs cannot be met by the same acquisition processes.’

Somebody was listening to the DSB. Section 804 of the 2011 NDAA requires the Secretary of Defense to “complete a review of the process for the fielding of capabilities in response to urgent operational needs and submit a report on the review to the congressional defense committees.”

As long-time readers know, we are passionate about improving supply chain management practices and, in particular, securing the supply chain against counterfeit or sabotaged parts and software code. We recently reported that the upcoming NDAA was likely to contain provisions regarding supply chain risk; the bill would permit sources to be excluded from competitions based on a finding of undue risk in the supply chain, and that those exclusions would be exempted from review by the GAO or any Federal court.

If you had been listening, you would have been prepared for Section 806 of the 2011 NDAA, which carries the exact language we warned you about. Here are some important features of the law—

SUPPLY CHAIN RISK- The term ‘supply chain risk’ means the risk that an adversary may sabotage, maliciously introduce unwanted function, or otherwise subvert the design, integrity, manufacturing, production, distribution, installation, operation, or maintenance of a covered system so as to surveil, deny, disrupt, or otherwise degrade the function, use, or operation of such system.

For “covered systems”, the head of a “covered agency” may make a finding that an individual prime contractor—or an individual subcontractor—has undue supply chain risk, and exclude that entity from receiving a contract award, or withhold consent to issue a subcontract. Question for your consideration: how will you demonstrate the integrity of your supply chain?

To address program execution risk, Congress mandated, in Section 812, that the Secretary of Defense must issue “comprehensive guidance on the management of manufacturing risk in major defense acquisition programs.” As part of that guidance, the SecDef must “require the use of manufacturing readiness levels as a basis for measuring, assessing, reporting, and communicating manufacturing readiness and risk on major defense acquisition programs ….”

Okay, we’ve saved the “best” for last. We warned you about this earlier in the year. DCAA’s failure to move more quickly in implementing audit quality reforms caused Congress to get involved. Section 893 of the 2011 NDAA is titled, “Contractor Business Systems”—which usually sets-off alarm bells. This time is no different. Let’s quote—

 

(a) Improvement Program- Not later than 270 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall develop and initiate a program for the improvement of contractor business systems to ensure that such systems provide timely, reliable information for the management of Department of Defense programs by the contractor and by the Department.

(b) Approval or Disapproval of Business Systems- The program developed pursuant to subsection (a) shall--

(1) include system requirements for each type of contractor business system covered by the program;

(2) establish a process for reviewing contractor business systems and identifying significant deficiencies in such systems;


(3) identify officials of the Department of Defense who are responsible for the approval or disapproval of contractor business systems;


(4) provide for the approval of any contractor business system that does not have a significant deficiency; and


(5) provide for--


(A) the disapproval of any contractor business system that has a significant deficiency; and

(B) reduced reliance on, and enhanced scrutiny of, data provided by a contractor business system that has been disapproved.


(c) Remedial Actions- The program developed pursuant to subsection (a) shall provide the following:


(1) In the event a contractor business system is disapproved pursuant to subsection (b)(5), appropriate officials of the Department of Defense will be available to work with the contractor to develop a corrective action plan defining specific actions to be taken to address the significant deficiencies identified in the system and a schedule for the implementation of such actions.

(2) An appropriate official of the Department of Defense may withhold up to 10 percent of progress payments, performance-based payments, and interim payments under covered contracts from a covered contractor, as needed to protect the interests of the Department and ensure compliance, if one or more of the contractor business systems of the contractor has been disapproved pursuant to subsection (b)(5) and has not subsequently received approval.


(3) The amount of funds to be withheld under paragraph (2) shall be reduced if a contractor adopts an effective corrective action plan pursuant to paragraph (1) and is effectively implementing such plan.


(d) Guidance and Training- The program developed pursuant to subsection (a) shall provide guidance and training to appropriate government officials on the data that is produced by contractor business systems and the manner in which such data should be used to effectively manage Department of Defense programs.


(e) Rule of Construction- Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit an official of the Department of Defense from reviewing, approving, or disapproving a contractor business system pursuant to any applicable law or regulation in force as of the date of the enactment of this Act during the period between the date of the enactment of this Act and the date on which the Secretary implements the requirements of this section with respect to such system.

(f) Definitions- In this section:


(1) The term `contractor business system' means an accounting system, estimating system, purchasing system, earned value management system, material management and accounting system, or property management system of a contractor.


(2) The term `covered contractor' means a contractor that is subject to the cost accounting standards under section 26 of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act (41 U.S.C. 422).


(3) The term `covered contract' means a cost-reimbursement contract, incentive-type contract, time-and-materials contract, or labor-hour contract that could be affected if the data produced by a contractor business system has a significant deficiency.

(4) The term `significant deficiency', in the case of a contractor business system, means a shortcoming in the system that materially affects the ability of officials of the Department of Defense and the contractor to rely upon information produced by the system that is needed for management purposes.

When this is coupled with the DFARS regulatory changes on contractor business systems (currently pending as this is written), we are seeing multiple compliance regimes with multiple corresponding audit objectives. Contractors with the DFARS language in their contracts will be subject to one set of compliance standards. (The proposed DFARS language would apply to all contracts containing the clause language and would mandate payment decrements to be applied to firm fixed-price contracts where contracting financing payments, including Performance-Based Payments, are utilized.) Contractors with both DFARS and CAS-covered contracts will be subject to another set (since the statutory language above permits discretionary payment decrements only to CAS-covered contracts and not to firm fixed-price contracts). Finally, contractors without DFARS language will be subject to the existing FAR set of requirements, which is far less specific and does not mandate any payment decrements (though individual contract clauses, such as those invoked when contract financing payments are utilized, already permit discretionary reductions to such payments).

In other words, contractors are going to have to track multiple compliance requirements and corresponding remedial actions, DCAA is going to have to create multiple audit programs, and DCMA contracting officers are going to have to track when payment withholds are mandatory and when they are discretionary. Hey, good luck with all that!

In still other words, we expect 2011 to be an “interesting” year, in the sense of that ancient Chinese curse we quoted at the beginning of this article.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 


Page 214 of 279

Newsflash

Effective January 1, 2019, Nick Sanders has been named as Editor of two reference books published by LexisNexis. The first book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Cost Accounting Standards. Nick replaces Darrell Oyer, who has edited those books for many years.