NASA’s SBIR Program Filled with Fraud—According to People Who Are Wasting 100 Times as Much
In 1982, Congress created the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program “to stimulate technological innovation, increase participation by small businesses and disadvantaged persons in federally funded research and development, and increase private-sector commercialization of innovations derived from federally funded research and development efforts.” Of the 11 Federal agencies that participate in the SBIR program, NASA’s program is the third largest—awarding more than $100 million annually over a four-year period to 422 small business participants.

According to news reports, NASA’s SBIR program is rife with fraud and waste. Naturally, we wanted to learn more. Here’s what we learned.
NASA’s Office of Inspector General (OIG) audited 67 of NASA’s SBIR contracts and “found that 17 (25 percent) included unallowable or unsupported costs.” The NASA OIG Report stated—
Specifically, we found unallowable travel and equipment costs, unallocable costs, and unsupported costs in the sample of SBIR contracts we examined to include:
- Unallowable travel costs. NASA awarded contracts with unallowable travel costs totaling $9,255 on 4 of the 36 (11.1 percent) Phase 1 SBIR awards we reviewed.
- Unallowable equipment costs. NASA awarded contracts with unallowable equipment costs totaling $234,354 on 6 of the 67 (8.9 percent) awards we reviewed.
- Unallocable costs NASA awarded $167,014 in unallocable direct costs on 7 of the 67 (10.4 percent) awards we reviewed.
- Unsupported costs. NASA awarded contracts containing $117,932 in unsupported costs in 2 of the 67 (3 percent) awards we reviewed.
Based on our statistical projections, we estimate that NASA awarded contracts with $2.7 million in unallowable and unsupported costs during program year 2008 alone.
Well, we don’t necessarily think that a finding amounting to less than 3 percent (especially one based on a projection) is all that big a deal. But before we get into throwing our opinion around, let’s see what else the NASA OIG had to say about its audit findings.
The OIG reported that unallowable travel costs were identified because NASA awarded SBIR contracts based on proposals that included travel costs, in violation of the SBIR solicitation provisions that prohibited contractors from proposing travel costs. NASA awarded SBIR contracts based on proposals that contained direct costs for equipment, even though the SBIR solicitation provisions prohibited contractors from proposing the purchase of “equipment, instrumentation or facilities … as a direct cost.”
The OIG reported that it found “unallocable” costs in SBIR contractor proposals. It noted an example of proposed Other Direct Costs (ODC) such as “rent and utilities, Internet access, cell phones, accounting and tax services, public relations, office supplies, and licenses”—and opined that “these costs should have been included in the contractor’s indirect cost pool and recovered through an indirect cost rate.” It also noted “unallocable overhead costs” in another contractor’s SBIR proposal. Its conclusion that such overhead costs were unallocable was based on the contractor allocating its overhead to costs of its subcontractors. According to the NASA OIG, that was an impermissible cost accounting practice.
The OIG reported that it found unsupported costs in contractor’s SBIR proposals. It provided two examples. One example was $23,000 worth of proposed testing costs that lacked any explanation regarding what would be tested. When questioned by the contracting officer, the contractor offered to withdraw the $23,000, but the contracting officer awarded the company the full amount of its proposed costs anyway. The second example involved $75,000 in proposed material costs for “’ materials such as polymers, electronic [sic], sensors, electrodes, chemicals, fabrication costs, and lab supplies.’” The OIG concluded that the explanation “did not provide sufficient information to allow NASA to determine that the budgeted amount … was fair and reasonable.”
So what do we think?
As mentioned above, we’re not convinced that the sky is falling in NASA’s SBIR program. Frankly, the amounts involved are trivial in the scheme of things. Sure, some of the findings seem a little embarrassing, but one needs to keep in mind that—by definition—only small businesses are proposing. Thus, it’s hardly surprising that some mistakes were made.
We also think a more rigorous audit approach would have been to audit how the SBIR contractors actually spent their funds, rather than simply reviewing cost proposals. We think it’s quite likely that actual costs did not exactly match proposed costs, and consequently the unallowable, unallocable, or insufficiently supported items may not actually have been incurred by the contractors. But we’ll never know whether those costs were incurred or not, because NASA’s OIG did not choose to look.
Perhaps predictably, media outlets took the OIG report and ran with it, creating some headlines that may not have exactly matched the facts. For example, the National Journal headline read, “Audit: NASA Not Doing Enough to Combat Fraud in Small Business Program.” According to the National Journal, “The audit was initiated after an investigation found unscrupulous applicants collected payments multiple times.”
The Hill blog ran with “IG Finds $2.7 Million Waste and Fraud in NASA Small-Biz Program.”
Congress was quick to use the NASA OIG report as grist for its eternal quest for effective Federal contractor oversight. Senators Jay Rockefeller and Olympia Snowe issued a statement expressing their concern.
Senator Rockefeller said—
Government-supported scientific research and innovation is one of the keys to our country's future economic growth. We can't afford to lose any of our precious research and development dollars to waste, fraud or abuse. I congratulate the NASA Inspector General for taking a clear, hard look at the way NASA awards, administers and tracks SBIR funds. I urge NASA to quickly implement the Inspector General's recommendations and put an end to the problems the IG has identified.
Senator Snowe said—
I commend NASA's Office of Inspector General for performing this thorough audit, and for recommending substantive suggestions that can help eliminate waste, fraud, and abuse at the agency. Today's report highlights the need for Congress to pass comprehensive legislation reauthorizing the SBIR program and providing agencies with the necessary tools to improve their oversight efforts, which the Senate passed unanimously last month. I look forward to working with my colleagues in the Senate and House to ensure that this legislation passes both chambers.
In case our readers were looking for a more—shall we say—prominent case of waste at NASA, we found one. And it’s Congress that is wasting the taxpayers’ money.
The issue first came to our attention through this story at GovExec.com. It reported—
A provision in a fiscal 2010 omnibus appropriations bill forbids NASA from canceling contracts for the Bush-era Constellation rocket and space capsule program. But two months after he signed the spending bill, President Obama terminated Constellation; since then, the space agency's hands have been tied as it continued to pump millions into a program it no longer intended to field.
The article stated that NASA’s OIG had reported “that the cash-strapped agency would waste more than $215 million funding it by the end of next month” because of that “fiscal catch-22.” The article said—
According to an IG letter sent to [Senator] Nelson and other key lawmakers, NASA would have considered ending or at least scaling back many of the aspects of the Constellation program protected by the spending measure. Provisions in last year's spending bill remain in effect because the government is operating under a stop-gap continuing resolution that funds most programs at fiscal 2010 levels.
The issue, according to the agency's watchdog, requires ‘immediate action by Congress.’ By the end of the fiscal year, NASA could waste $575 million on the program if Congress does not either pass legislation that repeals the 2010 appropriations language or approve a new spending bill that lifts the prohibition.
So, basically, while Congress is pointing the finger at NASA’s lack of internal controls over its SBIR program, which led to (allegedly) less than $3 million in wasteful spending, it’s own legislation is causing NASA to waste at least $215 million—and perhaps as much as $575 million.
Somehow the situation strikes us as more than a bit ironic.
New for 2011—Fraud and Corruption!
Well, dear readers, it’s been too long without some good stories about fraud and corruption. So let’s hit some “highlights” of recent Department of Justice press releases, shall we?
January 13, 2011—Former NASA Employee Charged with Illegally Exporting Military Technology to South Korea. Kue Sang Chun, 66, of Avon Lake, Ohio, was charged with one count of illegally exporting defense articles—namely, Infrared “Focal Plane Array detectors” and Infrared “camera engines”—to the Republic of Korea. Chun was a “longtime employee at the NASA Glenn Research Center,” but the violation of arms control regulations is not connected with his employment at NASA. The DOJ press release states Chun is also charged with a false income tax return, related to the $83,400 in taxable income earned in 2005 that he failed to report.
January 13, 2011—Minnesota-based National Hardware Store Distributor Fastenal to Pay U.S. $6.25 Million to Resolve False Claims Act Allegations. Fastenal Company, a “national hardware store distributor,” agreed to pay the United States $6.25 Million as part of settling allegations of several violations of contract requirements related to the company’s GSA Multiple Award Schedule contract. According to the press release—
The settlement resolves issues discovered during a GSA post-award audit of Fastenal’s contract. The GSA Office of Inspector General learned that Fastenal knowingly failed to meet its contractual obligations to provide the GSA with current, accurate and complete information about its commercial sales practices, including discounts afforded to other customers.
In addition, the settlement resolves allegations that Fastenal failed to comply with the price reduction clause of its GSA contract, overcharged government customers, and improperly assessed delivery and sales tax charges on government sales. As a result, the United States paid more than it should have for Fastenal products. The settlement also resolves allegations that Fastenal violated the Trade Agreements Act when it knowingly sold products to the United States that were manufactured in countries that do not have trade agreements with the United States, e.g., China.
As the result of the foregoing, Fastenal was also charged with submitting False Claims to the GSA.
In what may perhaps be somewhat related news, the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), Major General Arnold Fields (USMC, Retired), resigned on January 11, 2011. According to The Washington Post—
The Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, or SIGAR, is charged with oversight of the $56 billion that the United States has committed since 2002 to nonmilitary development and humanitarian assistance programs.
But an August review of the office by the Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency found that its audits were of poor quality and that the office lacked a strategic plan.
The Post noted that—
A bipartisan group of senators, led by Sen. Claire McCaskill (D-Mo.), asked President Obama in September to ‘begin the process of removing’ Fields based on concerns they had raised repeatedly since early 2009. ‘I don't mean to be cruel,’ McCaskill told Fields at a November hearing. ‘I don't think you're the right person for this job.’
The hearing, of the Senate homeland security committee's contracting oversight subcommittee, focused on SIGAR's completion of only four contract audits. The agency had identified only $8 million in misspent money with its $46 million in office expenditures.
Fields was also criticized for awarding a $96,000 no-bid, two-month contract last year to Joseph Schmitz, who resigned as the Defense Department inspector general in 2005, to ‘monitor’ SIGAR's performance.
Recently, General Fields fired two of his deputies. At the time, the Post reported—
In an interview with The Associated Press, Fields said that the organization's upper ranks needed ‘new blood,’ and he rejected the idea that the changes were made to keep him from being fired. ‘This is not about saving Arnie Fields' job. This is about making SIGAR a better organization,’ he said, using the shorthand name for his office.
The Post also reported Senator McCaskill’s reaction to the firings. The article said—
McCaskill said Tuesday that she's glad Fields is acknowledging improvements are needed in his office, but she said she still wants Obama to dismiss him. ‘SIGAR's shortcomings start at the very top and the changes need to happen there, as well,’ she said in an e-mailed statement. ‘Until there is new leadership, my concerns remain.’
Readers may remember Senator McCaskill from the 2009 hearings on DCAA audit quality, where she called for the resignation of then-Director April Stephenson. Apparently, she is an equal-opportunity audit criticizer, whose criticism generates results.
Stay tuned, gentle readers, for more stories of this ilk, as we move into 2011.
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Contractors Face Suspension—and Worse!—for Failing to Pay Subcontractors
We often write about supply chain management—sometimes called subcontract management—and have told readers many times that effective supply chain management is the key to successful program execution. Well, yes. But we thought it went without saying that effective supply chain management included, you know, actually paying your subcontractors.
For a point of reference, the FAR states (in the Allowable Cost and Payment Clause, 52.216-7) that—
(1) For the purpose of reimbursing allowable costs (except as provided in paragraph (b)(2) of this clause, with respect to pension, deferred profit sharing, and employee stock ownership plan contributions), the term “costs” includes only—
(i) Those recorded costs that, at the time of the request for reimbursement, the Contractor has paid by cash, check, or other form of actual payment for items or services purchased directly for the contract;
(ii) When the Contractor is not delinquent in paying costs of contract performance in the ordinary course of business, costs incurred, but not necessarily paid, for—
(A) Supplies and services purchased directly for the contract and associated financing payments to subcontractors, provided payments determined due will be made—
(1) In accordance with the terms and conditions of a subcontract or invoice; and
(2) Ordinarily within 30 days of the submission of the Contractor’s payment request to the Government;
(B) Materials issued from the Contractor’s inventory and placed in the production process for use on the contract;
(C) Direct labor;
(D) Direct travel;
(E) Other direct in-house costs; and
(F) Properly allocable and allowable indirect costs, as shown in the records maintained by the Contractor for purposes of obtaining reimbursement under Government contracts; and
(iii) The amount of financing payments that have been paid by cash, check, or other forms of payment to subcontractors.
Note that the foregoing is but one example (of several) that we could have quoted.
So, generally, subcontractor costs are billable to the U.S. Government (or to a higher tier contractor) only when they have been actually paid or will be paid “in the ordinary course of business.” Problems arise when subcontractors don’t get paid—especially when costs have already been claimed as being “incurred” in invoices.
We have previously discussed the case of a subcontractor who had its indirect rate adjustment vouchers denied for payment by its prime. (The subcontractor successfully sued its prime.) Today we present two stories of subcontractors who didn’t receive payment, and what happened to the higher-tier contractors involved.
First we offer this story about Red Sea Engineers and Constructors, a contractor that was identified as “the second-largest recipient” in Afghanistan of payments by the U.S. Joint Contracting Command. Red Sea E&C received roughly $500 million in contract awards between 2007 and 2009. The company has been in existence since 2002, but it’s experienced some rough times recently. According to the Washington Post story, “The company's registration to be a U.S. government contractor expired in January, according to a federal database. Its license to do business in Afghanistan expired in September.”
Among its recent problems, Red Sea’s CEO, Roy Carver (age 75) was jailed by the Afghan government for failing to pay the company’s Afghan suppliers. Ouch.
The situation is confusing. According to the Post’s story, Rea Sea E&C said the “source of the problem is late payments by … DynCorp International, that had subcontracted work to Red Sea.” But DynCorp said that “Red Sea was not paying its own Afghan workers, who then walked off the job site. To keep construction going, she said, DynCorp began paying the Afghan employees directly.”
So the crux of the issue seems to be, were the Afghan subcontractors getting paid, or not? According to DynCorp, yes. According to the Afghan government, no. Meanwhile, Mr. Carver sat in an Afghan jail, where he “shares a cell with several inmates.” Red Sea E&C employees were “taking food, medicine, and blankets” to their boss while he awaited resolution of the issue. (We note that Mr. Carver was subsequently released and is “working to make sure the vendors are compensated”—according to a January 5, 2011 article by the Washington Post (link in paragraph below. It’s not clear why the suppliers would need to be paid if DynCorp had already paid them….)
The second story also comes from the Washington Post, who reported that two construction firms operating in Afghanistan were recently suspended from receiving future Federal contract awards “because of an ongoing investigation into allegations that they are not paying their Afghan subcontractors.” According to the Post’s article, “The military identified the firms as Bennett-Fouch Associates and K5 Global, both owned by a U.S. citizen identified as Sarah Lee.”
The Post’s story references an announcement from the U.S. Central Command. We searched but were unable to locate CENTCOM”s press release on the contractor suspensions. However, an article on ArmyTimes.com had this to say about the situation—
Coalition forces said in a statement that several Afghan companies brought allegations of nonpayment against Bennett-Fouch Associates and K5 Global, both of which are owned by the same person, identified as an American woman named Sarah Lee.
‘The failure of firms to pay their local national workforce or local national subcontractors adversely affects counterinsurgency strategy,’ the coalition said in the statement.
The local companies that brought the allegations provided documents showing that Bennett-Fouch, which was involved in construction contracts at military bases in Afghanistan, had claimed it had not been paid by the U.S. government, the statement said. However, the coalition said that ‘in reality, the U.S. government had paid Bennett-Fouch for the work on the construction projects.’
The company had closed its local offices and bank accounts in Afghanistan, the coalition statement said.
‘Bennett-Fouch’s subcontractors were Afghan companies who depended on the revenue to pay workers and complete projects. U.S. law does not allow the government to pay subcontractors directly,’ the statement said, adding that the local companies had been ‘informed of their opportunity for recourse against the contractors through the U.S. court system.’
The suspension of could last 18 months while the case is being investigated, it said, and the companies could be barred from further contracts depending on the results of the investigation, meaning they would not be able to ‘conduct business with the U.S. for a period commensurate with the seriousness of the crimes or causes of the debarment, normally not to exceed five years.’
The latter case seems a bit more cut-and-dried to us. Bennett-Fouch was (apparently) the prime contractor who submitted invoices to the U.S. Government (or agents thereof) that included costs of its Afghan subcontractors. Yet those subcontractors claim they never received payment. If the allegations are proven true, then the prime may be looking at possible violations of the False Claims Act (among other charges). There are criminal and civil versions of the False Claims Act—and either version might apply here, based on the fact pattern. Thus, suspension from new contract awards may turn out to be the least of the potential problems facing these companies.
Each of the three companies discussed in this article was accused of failing to pay its foreign subcontractors. These were very serious allegations, obviously taken very seriously by the governments involved. As we started off by saying, we often preach the importance of supplier management as the key to effective program management. That’s true insofar as it goes. But before you get to effective program management, you need to first successfully master the basics. Like paying your suppliers.
How to React to DOD Budget Cuts?
Naturally, we all saw this coming, right? We’re not only talking about article after article published on this website, predicting and warning of upcoming DOD budget problems, but also the rather sudden national realization that, yes indeed, spending more than the country takes in—year after year after year—is not sustainable in the long-term. (And also the rather sudden realization by many that the long-term was now defined as essentially today.)
Despite the claim of many that their commitment to fiscal conservatism dates back as far as 1980, we think the reality of the situation is that the economic downturn of 2007-2008, coupled with the bailout of both the U.S. automotive industry and major financial institutions, coupled with the election of a new Presidential Administration ostensibly dedicated to changing many of the prior Administration’s practices, sparked a sea-change in the priorities of many U.S. voters. Instead of focusing on ensuring security at any price, voters decided that they’d had enough and wanted to see cut-backs in Washington, D.C.—similar to the cut-backs they’d made to their personal spending. And that change of heart led to electing new Legislators who would commit to similar priorities. Thus, here we are in January 2011, looking at looming cuts to U.S. defense spending.
As part of understanding where we are, let’s do a quick recap of some recent history.
During 2010, Secretary of Defense Gates created initiatives designed to generate $101 Billion in internal savings that would be used to fund DOD programs whose cost would otherwise drive budget increases. We posted several articles on the DOD “efficiency” and “affordability” initiatives. Although SecDef Gates should be commended for a proactive approach to heading-off budget cuts, the reality is that his gambit was, at best, only partially successful. DOD spending was simply too big a piece of the discretionary spending pie; it was too big and too obvious, and even otherwise conservative “red state” Legislators who believed in a strong defense seemed to feel a need to talk about Defense spending cuts—if only to show their constituents something tangible in the way of deficit reduction.
At year-end 2010, reports began to emerge of White House-mandated DOD budget cuts. For example, on December 23, 2010, Federal Times carried a story that reported, “White House budget officials have ordered the Pentagon to shed $78 billion from its annual budgets over the next five years, starting with a $12 billion cut in 2012.” The Federal Times article included this interesting tidbit—
Meantime, a hot piece of speculation around Washington is the Defense Department will not submit a 2012 funding request until April or May. That's because Congress, which just passed a continuing resolution that funds all federal government agencies and programs at 2010 levels through March, likely will not approve a defense funding bill until the spring months, sources said.
‘It will be hard to know how much money programs need in 2012 without first knowing how much they actually received for 2011,’ said Loren Thompson of the Lexington Institute. ‘So the administration could wait until after the continuing resolution expires and it gets a real 2011 budget before it sends its request for next year to Congress. Some think the 2012 request might not make it to the hill until May.’
(Readers may recall that we often report what Dr. Thompson has to say, because we like his “contrarian” viewpoint and think that he often makes a lot of sense.)
On January 6, 2011, SecDef Gates delivered a speech entitled, “Department Budget and Efficiencies.” He recounted the savings each military service had “proposed”—which, in the aggregate, totaled roughly $99 Billion. The “proposed” savings included—
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Air Force ($34 Billion)
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Army ($29 Billion
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Navy ($35 Billion)
There were some details underneath those numbers but, quite candidly, we wonder how credible they were. Readers can find those details by following the link above.
In addition to the foregoing military spending cuts, SecDef Gates said that the DOD bureaucracy had generated additional internal savings (projections) of $54 Billion. Much of those savings will come from reductions in contractor support staff, according to SecDef Gates. (Never mind that studies indicate contractors are cheaper than full-time government employees.) At the same time, the DOD plans to cut its workforce. For example, SecDef Gates said—
I have approved the elimination of more than 100 general officer and flag officer positions out of the roughly 900 currently on the books. Of those, 28 are billets that were created after 9/11, primarily for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and they will be reduced as appropriate as major troop deployments wind down. More than 80 general or flag officer billets in the services, OSD, and the Combatant Commands will be eliminated or downgraded. Additionally, I have directed the elimination or downgrading of nearly 200 civilian Senior Executive Service or equivalent positions out of a total of 1,400 civilian executives.
Moreover, SecDef Gates announced the termination of several on-going programs. Program terminations include—
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SLAMRAAM surface-to-air missile (US Army)
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Non-Line-of-Sight launch system (US Army)
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Marine Corps Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (US Navy)
Consistent with his previous messaging, SecDef Gates asserted that not all of the DOD savings would be returned to taxpayers. Instead, some $70 Billion will be spent on “high priority military capabilities.” Where will the funds be spent?
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Increase procurement of Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicles (US Air Force)
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Replace mechanical scanned array radars on F-15s with active electronically scanned array radars (US Air Force)
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Initiate a new program for a long-range, nuclear capable penetrating bomber (US Air Force)
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Modernize existing ground vehicle forces (US Army)
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Accelerate tactical communications network (US Army)
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Procure more MC-12 reconnaissance aircraft (US Army)
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Accelerate acquisition of Grey Eagle UAVs (US Army)
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Initiate a new program to develop a vertical unmanned air system (US Army)
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Accelerate development of next generation electronic jammers (US Navy)
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Develop a “new generation of sea-borne” unmanned strike and surveillance aircraft (US Navy)
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Procure more F/A-18 fighters (US Navy)
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Purchase addition ships—including “a destroyer, a Littoral Combat Ship, an ocean surveillance vessel and fleet oilers.” (US Navy)
Okay, so are there any lessons in the foregoing?
The first lesson is one we have asserted many, many times on this site: program execution matters. Some of the terminated programs had cost and schedule problems. For example, the Marines’ EFV came in for some criticism from SecDef Gates. He said—
The EFV’s aggressive requirements list has resulted in an 80,000 pound armored vehicle that skims the surface of the ocean for long distances at high speeds before transitioning to combat operations on land. Meeting these demands has over the years led to significant technology problems, development delays, and cost increases. The EFV, originally conceived during the Reagan Administration, has already consumed more than $3 billion to develop and will cost another $12 billion to build – all for a fleet with the capacity to put 4,000 troops ashore. If fully executed, the EFV – which costs far more to operate and maintain than its predecessor – would essentially swallow the entire Marine vehicle budget and most of its total procurement budget for the foreseeable future.
To be sure, the EFV would, if pursued to completion without regard to time or cost, be an enormously capable vehicle. … As with several other high end programs cancelled in recent years, the mounting cost of acquiring this specialized capability must be judged against other priorities and needs.
Moreover, SecDef Gates also singled-out the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program for some special scrutiny, putting one of its three versions “on two-year probation”. He said—
The Joint Strike Fighter program received special scrutiny given its substantial cost, ongoing development issues, and its central place in the future of U.S. military aviation. In short, two of the JSF variants, the Air Force version and the Navy’s carrier based version, are proceeding satisfactorily. By comparison, the Marine Corps’ short take-off and vertical landing variant is experiencing significant testing problems. These issues may lead to a redesign of the aircraft’s structure and propulsion – changes that could add yet more weight and more cost to an aircraft that has little capacity to absorb more of either.
As a result, I am placing the STOVL variant on the equivalent of a two-year probation. If we cannot fix this variant during this time frame and get it back on track in terms of performance, cost and schedule, then I believe it should be cancelled. We will also move the development of the Marine variant to the back of the overall JSF production sequence.
So what does this all mean? Where do we go from here?
Well, according to this story, one analyst sees Gates’ speech as good news for some contractors. Raytheon, Boeing, Northrop Grumman, General Dynamics, Lockheed Martin, L-3 Communications and RTI International were identified as likely winners based on Gates’ budget priorities. (Readers may note those seven companies are among the biggest of the big defense contractors.)
In addition, defense contractors continue to prepare for their worst-case scenarios. In recent news, ITT Corporation announced it would separate into three separate and independent companies (much like Northrop Grumman plans to spin-off its shipbuilding business). One of the new ITT businesses will be its Defense and Information Solutions business segment. According to the ITT press release—
… the existing Defense & Information Solutions segment will be renamed and rebranded as a new standalone company that is an industry-leading provider of innovative technologies and operational services to meet the enduring requirements of the global military, government and commercial customers. The company's products and services will include premier technologies such as next generation night vision, integrated electronic warfare, networked communications, force protection, radar, global intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance systems, composite structures, space-based satellite imaging, weather and climate monitoring, and navigation and imaging systems, as well as maintenance, engineering and professional services. The business will continue to focus on growth beyond the core Department of Defense customer, with nearly 30 percent of revenues already coming from adjacent markets, such as air traffic management, information and cyber security as well as strong international growth prospects.
Pro forma 2011 revenue for the new defense and information solutions business is estimated at $5.8 billion.
On another front, leaders of defense contractors recently called on President Obama to establish “an industrial base policy” that would “help defense firms grappling with tighter defense dollars” reduce their uncertainty regarding how much and were to invest their scarce independent research and development (IR&D) dollars—according to this story at GovExec.com. Noting that defense companies will be “leery” and “choosy” about IR&D spending, the article quoted Jim Albaugh (President and CEO of Boeing’s Commercial Airplanes business) as saying—
‘Let's make sure we're all putting our money in the right areas. Without a road map, we're guessing where we need to put the [research and development] funds that we have. There's a lot of uncertainty now, I think, on the military side. I think companies will take a real hard look at where they want to make their investment.’
The article also reported—
While recognizing the potential for changing defense priorities, Albaugh also raised concerns about declining investments in several areas, including the lack of plans for a new manned aircraft program to follow the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, which is now in testing. Other areas of concern, he said, include the ability to design and produce new space shuttles and communications satellites without any plans for specific programs in those areas.
‘Certainly our industrial base has had a lot to do with our success,’ Albaugh said. ‘We want to make sure that doesn't get destroyed over time.’
Readers of this site may recall that Mr. Brett Lambert (Director of DOD’s Industrial Policy Directorate) has the responsibility for establishing policy to address “loss of critical skills during the upcoming defense spending downturn” and maintenance of the “skills necessary to support our war fighters in the near term and long term.” It’s not at all clear how much progress the IP Directorate has made on that important tasking. Instead, we suspect Mr. Lambert and his apparatchiks have been focused on helping the DOD respond to SecDef Gates’ call for internal cost savings. One of the facts that support our assertion is that, since December 2009, there have been no new presentations added to the DOD IP website. On any topic. Yet, in mid-2010, Mr. Lambert published guidance on implementation of Gates’ initiatives.
Look, we get that it’s difficult to focus on both the internal and external at the same time. (For example, try managing audits by both internal and external auditors at the same time. While responding to DCAA audit requests. See? It’s not so easy, is it?) Yet multi-tasking is a way of life these days. So where is the DOD on managing its industrial base?
We’ve asked the question before. In our rant reasoned analysis, we quoted an op-ed piece by Lt. General Larry Farrell (USAF, Retired), in which he said—
It is not yet apparent that senior policy makers have begun to assess what industrial capabilities must be preserved. Ensuring that the United States is able to maintain core industrial competencies must be a priority before a fiscal downturn becomes reality.
We, like General Farrell and his National Defense Industrial Association, like Jim Albaugh and its Aerospace Industrial Association, are still waiting for answers from Mr. Lambert and his Directorate. And time has just about run out, as far as we can tell.
We note, however, a May 2010 report from the DOD IP Directorate to Congress (as required by statute), that promises a more “forward-leaning” approach to managing the defense industrial base. The report states—
In order for the defense industry to remain a source of strategic advantage well into the future, the Department and our nation require a consistent, realistic, and long term strategy for shaping the structure and capabilities of the defense industrial base. Toward this end, the Department is committed to being more forward-leaning in its ongoing assessments of the industrial base – refocusing our efforts on our future needs, not just our past performance; closer OSD cooperation with the Services to foster an integrated approach to the overall industrial base; and placing transparency and dialogue with industry at the forefront of our agenda.
Well, what can we say? One can forward-lean into the ribbon to win a race, or one can forward-lean into a buzz saw. It’s all about the results. Ultimately, the market and the companies that comprise the defense industrial base will react as they always have: in their best interests (as they see them). Whether those actions ultimately align with the DOD’s best interests, or the Presidential Administration’s best interests, remains to be seen.
If the foregoing is too airy-fairy for you practical business types or applied engineers, let’s offer a differ tack. Perhaps you should let the funding games play out as they may, trusting that your political action committees and lobbyists will do their jobs while you do yours. To that end, may we suggest (once again) that program execution and supply chain management be your priorities. In this new age of fiscal slash-and-burn, with a new (and perhaps newly focused) Congress sensitive to taxpayers’ concerns, nobody wants any more bad news. Your program’s on-time delivery and on-budget spending will be the good news that may guarantee you continued funding, now and into the future.
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