DMCA Issues Guidance Re: DCAA Forward Pricing Rate Recommendations (FPRRs)
Have you been following the messy trail left by Dr. Ashton Carter’s drive for “affordability” in defense programs? If you answered, “no” to that question, you must not have been reading our articles on the topic.
Let’s start here, in September 2010, wherein we reported that Dr. Carter (USD, AT&L) had issued a 17-page memo laying out Pentagon tactics to be used to drive down the cost of defense programs—which he asserted would lead to huge savings. In that article we reported that Dr. Carter directed that his DOD contracting officers—
Use Forward Pricing Rate Recommendations (FPRRs) in lieu of Forward Pricing Rate Agreements (FPRAs). In particular, ‘where DCAA has completed an audit of a particular contractor’s rates, DCMA shall adopt the DCAA recommended rates as the Department’s position with regard to those rates.’
We opined at the time that, “The substitution of DCAA audit findings for DCMA discretion and negotiation ability strikes us as a spectacularly bad idea….”
In January 2011, we followed-up with an article about Shay Assad’s Memo clarifying the roles and responsibilities of DCMA and DCAA. As part of the memo, Mr. Assad (Director, DPAP) told DOD contracting officers that—
In those cases where DCAA has completed an audit of a particular contractor’s rates, DCMA shall adopt the DCAA recommended rates as the Department’s FPRR position. … This policy supports the goal of better aligning the work of the two agencies by ensuring a single department rate position is provided to DCMA/DCAA customers at all times.
Naturally we had a problem with that direction. Although we grant you that DCAA recently changed its mission statement to acknowledge the de facto truth that the taxpayers of the United States of America are its ultimate customers, the practical reality is that those who issued audit requests to the audit agency are its real customers—chief among those the very same DOD contracting officers whom Mr. Assad was concerned may not have been fully aligned with DCAA’s “rate position”. Suffice to say, our view is that Mr. Assad’s direction that DCAA’s audit position “shall” be adopted by the cognizant DCMA Administrative Contracting Officer (ACO) as the official DOD position was (and still is) a cure in search of a disease.
We’re not the only ones who think that way either. If you check out this article on recent testimony before the Senate’s HSGA’s ad hoc Committee on Contracting Oversight, you’ll see that we pointed attention to testimony from Sandy Hoe, an Inside-the-Beltway government contracts attorney from the respected firm McKenna, Long & Aldridge (testifying on behalf of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce). Mr. Hoe testified that—
The January 4 DPAP memorandum indicates that contracting officers will apparently now issue final [Forward Pricing Recommended] rates as determined by DCAA without the contractor having the opportunity to demonstrate to the Administrative Contracting Officer (‘ACO’) why such rates may be unreasonable. Unless the contractor elects to contest the rates by submitting a claim under the Contract Disputes Act (‘CDA’), it will, at a minimum, lose the ability to recoup the lost amounts allocated to fixed price contracts based upon the DCAA-determined rates. This approach would be unfair to contractors and directly conflict with established regulatory law.
Moreover, in the Summer 2010 edition of the ABA’s Public Contract Law Journal, John Pachter (Partner, Smith Pachter McWhorter PLC) wrote an article entitled, “The Incredible Shrinking Contracting Officer.” In that article, asserted that—
A number of factors have emerged that tend to marginalize the Contracting Officer as other players occupy more of the stage and clamor for action. … Contracting Officers must confront the notion, expressed in various ways, that auditors’ advice is presumptively correct. Rather than being allowed to rely on the advice of auditors and then make a considered decision as the FAR contemplates, Contracting Officers now have the burden of justifying their decisions when they differ from those of auditors. The result is pressure on Contracting Officers to acquiesce in the recommendations of auditors. … Accordingly, the underlying message to Contracting Officers … is, ‘Go easy on yourself. You can avoid having to justify your decisions to higher authorities if you simply accept the auditor’s recommendations in the first place.’
(Internal footnotes omitted.)
With all that background in mind, we were very interested in a January memo from Ronald Youngs, Acting Executive Director, Contracts, DCMA, implementing Mr. Assad’s direction. The memo, entitled Information Memorandum 11-108, “Forward Pricing Rate Recommendations (INFORMATION),” can be found here. It said (in part)—
Effective immediately our policy regarding FPRR development is amended as follows.
-
When a contractor submits a FPRP, the ACO shall review the proposal as soon as possible and may issue a new FPRR. When developing the FPRR the ACO shall follow the FPRR documentation and internal review requirements set forth in paragraph 6 of the [DCMA] Forward Pricing Rates Instruction.
-
After issuing the FPRR, the ACO shall inform DCAA of any new information that may impact the rates or the FPRP audit.
-
Upon ACO receipt of the audit report, the DCAA recommended rates shall be reviewed by the ACO within 5 working days and the DCAA recommended rates shall be issued immediately thereafter as the Government’s recommended position.
-
If the FPRP contains unsupported costs, the ACO shall work with DCAA to obtain the required supporting data from the contractor. The ACO shall opine on any unsupported cost elements in the audit report and shall include that opinion in the FPRR memorandum that accompanies the issuance of the DCAA recommended rates.
Importantly, the memo also states—
In those rare circumstances when the ACO notes significant deficiencies in the audit report which render the report untenable, the ACO shall immediately contact DCAA to coordinate a revision to the recommended rates. If the issues cannot be resolved at the local level, the issues shall be elevated for a Contract Management Board of Review following the FPRR documentation and internal review requirements set forth in paragraph 6 of the Forward Pricing Rates Instruction.
That, dear readers, is what we in the business call “a loophole.” It provides an ACO with an option other than simply accepting DCAA’s audit results without question. Although long and painful, the Board of Review process may offer contractors a slight chance that their voice, calling attention to “deficiencies” in the DCAA audit report, might just be heard.
Sure, we agree with your objection(s) that: (1) it’s unlikely your ACO is going to relish the idea of disagreeing with DCAA and submitting that disagreement to a “Board of Review” for adjudication, (2) it’s unlikely that the “Board of Review” is going to want to approve a public disagreement with DCAA, and (3) it’s unlikely that Shay Assad and/or Pat Fitzgerald is going to accept that “Board of Review” adjudication, regardless of the merits of the decision. (Actually, it’s worse than that, since there will be multiple “Boards of Review” at various levels of the DCMA hierarchy.) So, yes, our “loophole” is more like the eye of a needle.
But it exists!
This situation reminds us of the Concordat of Bologna, that 1516 agreement between France’s King Francis I and Pope Leo X. As this online article explains—
In 1516 the Concordat of Bologna confirmed François I's right to make appointments to benefices, but gave the Pope the right to veto unqualified candidates and to collect a year's revenue from each post. Although this gave the Pope many rights, it gave the king more. The king of France had enormous powers to dispose of the Church's wealth and he could (and did) use the offices of bishops, abbots, etc. to provide sinecures for his faithful followers. This also meant that lords of the church were usually quite worldly people, often quite unfit for their offices if spirituality or theological learning is considered a requirement. (The Pope's veto was hardly ever exercised.)
So think of DCAA as the French King, and DCMA as the Pope, and the “Board of Review” process as the Pope exercising his official right to veto unqualified appointments. Maybe we’re overreaching, but we see some resemblance.
But maybe there’s another, more ancient parallel to discuss. In A Dictionary of Greek and Roman Antiquities, Volume 2, Sir William Smith wrote in 1891—
… the king has no power to pardon; that pardon resides with the people, the ultimate sovereign. … though the provocatio existed in the regal period, yet the citizens have no standing right of appeal against the king like that secured by the Lex Valeria. The King Tullus Hostilius allows the appeal; and the fact that the appeal might not have been so allowed, and was a matter not of law but of constitutional usage, is shown by the similar freedom of the early dictatorship from the necessity of allowing the appeal. The limitations of the king’s power came here, as elsewhere, not from the force of law, but from the necessity of observing formalities once established.
(Internal citations omitted; emphasis in original.)
According to Sir William Smith, even though the Roman monarch permitted an appeal “from the necessity of observing formalities once established,” the last king “had broken through the constitutional usages of the monarchy”—which led inexorably to a revolution that established the Roman republic. Now we’re not saying that DOD is heading for a regime change … but we did note a parallel between the king allowing an appeal and the DCMA Boards of Review process.
Okay, our journey from ancient Rome to sixteenth century France to the 2011 bureaucratic proclamations of the Department of Defense is now complete. We hope you enjoyed the journey.
Combat Laser Pointers II

What a combat laser pointer may look like. Source: B.E. Meyers.
Our very first, fumbling attempt to try a blog article on government contracting matters discussed the use of laser pointers in combat. In what we called a “great victory” the U.S. Army’s Rapid Fielding Initiative had provided green laser pointers (also known as “Visual Warning Technology” or VWT) to combat troops in Iraq. The laser pointers were used in checkpoint operations, to warn oncoming drivers to stop. We thought that was pretty cool.
In fact, it was so cool that—as we reported—the Canadian Defence National Forces had spent C$7.2 million to acquire 750 “VWT systems and ancillaries” (including the ability to operate the “pumped-up green laser pointers” remotely) for its troops in Iraq.
So far, so good. From PowerPoint presentations to check-point operations. It seemed to us that the DOD was doing a great job of adopting commercial technology for its troops in an effective and rapid manner.
But a recent article by FierceGovernmentIT caused us to rethink our initial euphoria. The article pointed a finger at the U.S. Marine Corps, and accused USMC leadership of failing their Marines by unnecessarily delaying acquisition of similar laser pointers.
According to the story, “an urgent need” by the Marine Corps for VWT (or what FierceGovernmentIT and the DOD Inspector General called “laser dazzlers”) “went unfulfilled for six months longer than necessary thanks mostly to disagreement over which laser dazzler to buy.” The article, citing a DOD Inspector General audit report, said that “the Marine Corps Combat Development Command took 15 months in total to respond to an urgent field request from the forward deployed Second Marine Expeditionary Force in Iraq for the dazzlers.”
Marines at checkpoints were relying on “smoke signals and flares” to warn civilians they were approaching a Marine position, and issued “an urgent request” for combat laser pointers to halt movement of potential threats without the need to fire on them. According to the FierceGovernmentIT story—
The [Marine Corps] development command initially responded briskly to an urgent request for dazzlers filed by June 9, 2005 by the commanding general of the Second [Marine Expeditionary Force] MEF. But, when a force rotation replaced the Second MEF with the First MEF, the command deferred further processing of the request because the commanding general of the new forward deployed MEF disagreed with the choice of dazzler, the [DOD IG] report says.
The new commanding general preferred a dazzler that lacked a favorable positive safety recommendation--and, when the Marine Corps Requirements Oversight Council approved a contract for the originally selected dazzler in September 2006, the First MEF commanding general reacted by buying 28 of the non-approved dazzlers anyway for $323,324. Those dazzlers were never fielded, the report adds.
The DOD IG report (link above) found problems with oversight of the urgent needs fulfillment process and some significant administrative delays.
With respect to the issue(s) summarized by FierceGovernmentIT, the DOD IG found that, ”Nine days after MARCORSYSCOM awarded the contract for 400 GBD-IIIC lasers, I MEF (Forward) purchased 28 [Compact High Power Laser Dazzlers] CHPLDs.” The DOD IG recommended that “the Commandant of the Marine Corps perform a review of the circumstances that led to the purchase of the 28 unapproved lasers and, if appropriate, initiate administrative action.” That said, the IG “did not find any evidence of criminal negligence in Marine Corps processing” of the initial urgent request for laser pointers. According to the IG report—
The Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration responded for the Commandant of the Marine Corps. The Deputy Commandant agreed with the recommendation and stated that the Marine Corps will review the circumstances relating to the purchase of the 28 Compact High Power Laser Dazzlers.
We have previously reported on Defense Science Board findings that DOD bureaucracy impeded effective acquisition of materiel and services needed by warfighters. The DSB told Secretary of Defense Gates that “Current long standing [DOD] business practices and regulations are poorly suited" to the “dynamics of a rapidly shifting threat environment."
In addition, we have also described the procurement problems at the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), who took six months to acquire $121,000 in needed IT network equipment, first going through the General Services Administration and then conducting a “best value” source selection—only to finally go back to the original source that was always going to provide the equipment anyway, and paying that source the appropriate market rate. Meanwhile, during that six month period of flailing about—
About a third of all National Archives and Records Administration personnel have lost regular access to email [and] personnel within NARA's office of general counsel have lost email service for at least a full day and senior management, including officials in the office of the archivist, have had diminished access,
So we can’t really say we’re surprised by the USMC failures described by the DOD Inspector General and reported by FierceGovernmentIT. But it saddens us that Marines in the field, risking their lives in service to this country, weren’t better served by their leadership and by the acquisition teams that support them. We hope all affected parties will do better—much better—next time.
|
Bribery, Kickbacks and the U.S. Navy
In other articles on this website, we’ve pondered, albeit somewhat rhetorically, whether fraud is simply an endemic part of the public procurement process. We’ve inquired, in writing, whether bribery and conspiracy is “business as usual” in the defense industry. We’ve published article after article, Department of Justice link after link, and yet the stories keep coming at us like a tortious tsunami of wrongdoing. And so we keep publishing them in the (perhaps futile) hope that somebody, somewhere, is taking notes and designing controls to deter this type of malicious mischief in the public fisc.
Today’s story is no different that many others. The details are not quite the same; maybe the dollars are a bit bigger and the alleged actions more brazen—but this seems to us to be just another story in the hit parade of procurement fraud.
Today’s story concerns the U.S. Navy and a NAVSEA Program Manager/Senior Systems Engineer name Ralph Mariano, age 52, of Arlington, Virginia. The story also concerns Anjan Dutta-Gupta, 58, of Roswell, Ga., who is (or was) founder and President of Advanced Solutions for Tomorrow (ASFT). Each of these two individuals was recently charged with bribery, as Dutta-Gupta allegedly paid Mariano and “his relatives and friends” about $10 million in order to secure “millions of dollars” of Navy contracts for ASFT. Here’s a link to one of the early stories.
According to the Providence Journal story (link above)—
‘The payments come in the form of checks, cash and wires, and are funneled through ASFT’s subcontractors and Mariano’s relatives and friends,’ says an affidavit attached to the criminal complaint.
The affidavit says that business and banking records show that the alleged arrangement between Mariano, Dutta-Gupta and unnamed ASFT subcontractors had been going on since 1999.
The affidavit alleges that an unnamed cooperating witness, CW 1, has participated in the scheme with Mariano and Dutta-Gupta for more than a decade. The witness lives in Rhode Island and established an entity to launder the millions of dollars in kickbacks.
‘I have found no evidence to support a legitimate purpose for the payments to Mariano, and the majority of the payments to Mariano’s relatives and associates and to Dutta-Gupta’s entities were for services not performed,’ wrote Special Agent Patrick J. Hegarty, of the Defense Criminal Investigative Service.
The affidavit says that Mariano regularly sent CW 1 text messages and e-mails seeking weekly payments of $3,500.
Helpfully, the Providence Journal also provided a link to the formal criminal complaint.
What makes this story perhaps a tad different from most is the possible link between ASFT and the Congressional delegation from Rhode Island. The Providence Journal reported (in a separate story) that the individuals involved (as well as ASFT) “have been active backers of the Rhode Island congressional delegation’s election campaigns for at least nine years.” The legislators, for the most part, issued statements noting how upset they were with the actions of the two men, and supporting the law enforcement officials who were investigating the wrongdoing.
Further investigation by journalists revealed that some of the legislators had “earmarked” funds for ASFT. For example, this article by the Providence Journal reported that Rhode Island Senator Jack Reed had helped ASFT to “secure ‘earmarks’ for $9.15 million worth of submarine-related work over the past four years….” But the article also noted that Senator Reed had promised to give all campaign donations received from those two men, ASFT, and related individuals, to a charity.
In a sad turn of events, ASFT laid-off its entire staff on February 14 — nearly 100 in total. According to this story at the Boston Globe, the acting CEO of ASFT told the employees that “the company’s assets had been frozen and it could no longer operate.” The article also noted that the fallout from the scandal might reach beyond ASFT and its employees to other companies. It reported—
Economic Development Corp. Executive Director Keith Stokes said one area of concern was how the closure would affect companies in ASFT's supply chain, such as its janitorial firm or other subcontractors.
‘We don't want to see them penalized,’ he said.
So we wrap up this story saddened at the impact on the lives of innocent employees and hopefully a bit wiser for the lesson. We still wonder how much of this pile of scandal after scandal might have been avoided had better controls been put into place. But in any case, we hope that publicizing the true impacts of such egregious wrongdoing might deter future incidents.
Another Peek into the Fraud Files
As we write this, Hosni Mubarak has just resigned and regime change is in the air. From Tunisia to Egypt to … DCAA? But enough about contract audit. Let’s talk about fraud.
We talk about fraud so much, of course, because there is so much fraud in the public procurement process to talk about. Though we do not always agree with government oversight officials or “independent” gadfly organizations when they accuse government contractors of being war profiteers and/or crooks, the fact is that there are enough crooked contractors to taint them all. (And as we keep pointing out, there seem to be as many crooked government officials in the game. as well.) We write about fraud in the government contracting arena because we think contractors need to learn from the mistakes of others. We think contractors ought to invest in internal control systems, and employee training, and in robust “self-governance” mechanisms to assure themselves that their employees are toeing the straight-and-narrow line of compliant and ethical business practices.
The prevailing zeitgeist in today’s government contracting environment seems to be that simply having a written ethics/business conduct policy, and pushing training videos to employees once or twice per quarter, is a sufficient investment. In these times of intense pressure to cut non value-added overhead spending, we are told, nobody has the budgets to stand-up anything more than a token internal audit department. Besides, we are told too often, companies’ Sarbanes-Oxley certifications are sufficient to demonstrate both adequate controls and compliance therewith. So there’s no budget—and no need—to establish the kind of internal control systems that both detect and prevent employee wrongdoing.
Yeah, we’ve heard that same refrain over the past 20 years, in good times and in bad. Nobody, it seems, wants to spend sufficient money to provide robust assurance that employee wrongdoing is not taking place. We get it. No VP or other corporate executive ever earned a bonus for suggesting. “Hey, you know what? Let’s spend some more overhead.” Quite the opposite in fact—as executives routinely score big incentive comp checks for cutting overhead and “streamlining” back-office processes.
Yet when that first subpoena hits, or when that first DCIS phone call is received—and when that first of many checks to outside investigators and legal counsel gets written—somehow nobody ever thinks to point the fingers back at those company executives who vetoed putting preventive and detective controls in place. In 30 years of this business, we have never, ever, heard about Boards of Directors or Compensation Committees or Audit Committees ever reaching back two or three years and asking for the return of those old bonus checks because the executives’ “innovative out-of-the-box” idea to cut overhead by cutting back on non value-added personnel such as internal auditors and contract compliance personnel ended-up costing the company millions in dollars. (Not to mention the hits to the stock price and to the brand reputation.) We have never heard about companies holding those decision-makers—those that earn the big bucks—accountable for their decisions.
Moreover, what happens over and over is that people get awarded even bigger bonus checks for successfully managing the crisis—the same crisis that could have and should have been avoided in the first place. Instead of being held accountable for shorting the shareholders and the customers by cutting-back on controls, the executives are rewarded for seeing their crisis through to the end (which is typically a DOJ settlement involving a large payment and a deferred prosecution agreement).
And by the way, if our point of view has not been clearly communicated in previous blog articles, we feel very much the same about Federal government agencies as well as military commands, where everybody seems quite happy to spend millions of dollars on large multi-month investigations of suspected miscreants—but nobody wants to put effective controls into place that would prevent wrongdoing in the first place.
So, let’s jump off the soapbox and peek into the fraud files to see which entities failed to implement adequate internal controls.
Foreign Corrupt Practices
You are responsible for the actions of your foreign subsidiaries, as Maxwell Technologies, Inc. learned to its chagrin. According to the Dept. of Justice, “Maxwell Technologies Inc., a publicly-traded manufacturer of energy-storage and power-delivery products based in San Diego, has agreed to pay an $8 million criminal penalty to resolve charges related to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) for bribing Chinese government officials to secure sales of Maxwell’s products to state-owned manufacturers of electric-utility infrastructure in several Chinese provinces.” According to the DOJ—
Maxwell’s wholly-owned Swiss subsidiary, Maxwell S.A., engaged a Chinese agent to sell Maxwell’s products in China. From at least July 2002 through May 2009, Maxwell S.A. paid more than $2.5 million to its Chinese agent to secure contracts with Chinese customers, including contracts for the sale of Maxwell’s high-voltage capacitor products to state-owned manufacturers of electrical-utility infrastructure. The agent in turn used Maxwell S.A.’s money to bribe officials at the state-owned entities in connection with the sales contracts. Maxwell S.A. paid its Chinese agent approximately $165,000 in 2002 and increased the payments to the agent to $1.1 million in 2008. In its books and records, Maxwell mischaracterized the bribes as sales-commission expenses. According to court documents, Maxwell’s U.S. management discovered the bribery scheme in late 2002. … Maxwell also reached a settlement of a related civil complaint filed by the SEC charging Maxwell with violating the FCPA’s anti-bribery, books and records, internal controls and disclosure provisions. As part of that settlement, Maxwell agreed to pay $5.654 million in disgorgement of profits and nearly $700,000 in prejudgment interest relating to those violations.
Let’s see, how many internal auditors could make how many trips to Maxwell’s foreign subsidiaries for how long for $14 million dollars? We wonder if Maxwell’s shareholders are asking themselves that question.
Corrupt Foreigners
Export controls are burdensome and we understand that the Obama Administration is moving to streamline them in order to facilitate exports (and create jobs). In the meantime, companies need to be careful to whom they sell sensitive items, as this DOJ announcement warns. According to the DOJ—
From about February 2004 through about August 2007 … [Milad] Jafari engaged in a conspiracy to defraud the United States and to cause the export of goods to Iran in violation of the U.S. embargo and without the required U.S. government licenses for such exports. In carrying out the conspiracy, Jafari and his conspirators allegedly solicited orders from customers in Iran and purchased goods from U.S. companies on behalf of these Iranian customers. Jafari and others allegedly wired money to the U.S. companies as payment, concealed from the U.S. companies the end-use and end-users of the goods, and caused the goods to be shipped to Turkey and later to Iran.
For instance … in July 2006, Sanam Industrial Group – an entity in Iran that is controlled by Iran’s AIO and has been sanctioned by the United States and United Nations for involvement in nuclear and ballistic missile activities -- issued to Jafari’s company, STEP, a request for quote for 660 pounds of a specialized steel welding wire with aerospace applications. In May 2007, Jafari allegedly caused an order to be placed for 660 pounds of this exact type of welding wire with a Nevada company. The following month, the Nevada firm received more than $38,000 from Jafari’s company, Macpar.
In another instance … in August 2006, Heavy Metals Industries in Iran placed an order with Jafari’s company, STEP, for 3,410 pounds of precipitation hardening steel made in the United States. The following year, Jafari caused Macpar to place an order with an Ohio company for 4,410 pounds of a high-grade, temperature resistant, stainless steel known to have aerospace applications. Jafari informed the Ohio firm that the steel would not be shipped to Iran. In August 2007, the stainless steel shipment was detained by the Department of Commerce’s Office of Export Enforcement before it left the country.
Corrupt Government Employees
Osama Esam Saleem Ayesh, 36, was a resident of Jordan hired by the Department of State as a shipping and customs supervisor at the embassy in Baghdad, who oversaw the shipments of personal property of embassy officials and personnel in Iraq. According to the DOJ’s press release—
Ayesh used his State Department computer to create a phony e-mail account in the name of a real Iraqi contractor and used that e-mail account to impersonate the contractor in communications with embassy procurement officials. He also established a bank account in Jordan under his wife’s name to further his criminal scheme and falsified wire transfer instructions that directed U.S. government electronic funds transfers to that account.
Court records and evidence at trial [where he was convicted] showed that Ayesh was personally involved in establishing and operating blanket purchase agreements for the provision of customs clearance and delivery services to the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad. From November 2008 to June 2010, Ayesh submitted false invoices in the name of an Iraqi contractor – which Ayesh fabricated on blank stationery he kept in his embassy apartment – and caused the U.S. Department of State to wire $243,416 to his wife’s account in Jordan.
Corrupt Corporate Employees
After a three-week trial, the jury found Wen Chyu Liu, aka David W. Liou, 74, of Houston, guilty of one count of conspiracy to commit trade secret theft and one count of perjury. Liu/Liou was a former research scientist with the Dow Chemical Company, where he was employed from 1965 to 1992. According to the DOJ—
Liou conspired with at least four current and former employees of Dow’s facilities in Plaquemine and Stade, Germany, who had worked in Tyrin CPE [chlorinated polyethylene] production, to misappropriate those trade secrets in an effort to develop and market CPE process design packages to various Chinese companies.
Liou traveled extensively throughout China to market the stolen information, and evidence introduced at trial showed that he paid current and former Dow employees for Dow’s CPE-related material and information. In one instance, Liou bribed a then-employee at the Plaquemine facility with $50,000 in cash to provide Dow’s process manual and other CPE-related information.
So, basically, this former employee was helping to establish a new CPE factory in China, aided by current company employees. That new factory was going to compete with Dow, not only impacting its ability to sell into China, but also to sell its goods globally. We’re guessing his Dow retirement package was not to his liking.
Conclusion
The DoJ doesn’t provide much helpful information that tells us how this malefactors were caught. But we think these vignettes provide evidence that fraud is rampant, both at contractors and in the ranks of government employees. Even retirees seem to be getting into the act!
If you think your workforce is immune to wrongdoing, if you think your government customer is beyond reproach, if you think your foreign subsidiaries are all following your corporate guidance to the letter, well we hope you’re right. But we think it would be a whole lot better, for both you and your shareholders, if you checked once in a while to make sure.
|