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Apogee Consulting Inc

What We’ve Been Doing ….

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Our fanatical loyal readers may have noticed a recent drop-off in blog article production. Nobody actually accused us of slacking-off, but we know you were thinking it. Well, yes. We have been lazing around the house, catching-up on reality TV shows. But we’ve also been busy writing a new article.

We try to submit two articles a year. We’ve had past success with West’s Government Contract Costs, Pricing, & Accounting Report (Karen Manos, Editor). (It may help that Nick Sanders is on the Advisory Board of that publication….) We’ve also had some success in getting articles published in the NCMA’s Contract Management magazine.

This time around, while we were aiming for another CM submission, our final product turned out about 50% too long and with too many endnotes (more than 50 of them). So we submitted it to Bob Antonio over at Where in Federal Contracting? and it was accepted.

Here’s a link to our article. While you’re over at Bob’s most excellent site, make sure to check out his blog (which includes articles from multiple sources) and the discussion forum. Truly, we think WIFCON is a treasure and we use its resources frequently.

We will resume our normal blog article production schedule next week – which (as you may know) sets as a target the publication of between 2,500 and 5,000 words per week on government contract cost accounting, administration, and program management topics.

 

At What Risk? Letting Politicians Set DOD Contract Oversight Policy

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It’s no secret that the DCAA has been under fire from nearly all sources over the past 30 months. The GAO issued two scathing reports alleging widespread noncompliance with generally accepted governmental auditing standards (GAGAS) and various other audit quality issues. The DOD Inspector General issued several reports related to DCAA audit quality—not only confirming GAO’s 2008 findings but alleging several others of a more recent vintage. The Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs permitted an “ad hoc” group of Senators (prominently featured among them Claire McCaskill of Missouri) to establish a Subcommittee on Subcommittee on Contracting Oversight, which has held several hearings devoted to problems at DCAA. The House of Representatives’ Armed Services Committee (HASC) convened a Panel on Defense Acquisition Reform that recommended several fixes to the DOD oversight environment, some of which ended-up in the 2011 National Defense Authorization Act.

And from Robert Brodsky at GovExec.com to Nick Schwellenbach at the Project on Government Oversight, the media have fanned the fires of outrage regarding audit lapses, oversight failures, and just plain bureaucratic bungling at the Department of Defense’s premier audit agency.

(No, we are not going to link to our previous articles discussing the foregoing. Use of our site search feature will be left as an exercise for our readership.)

But there’s one place where the DCAA seems to get the kid-gloves treatment, one safe harbor where softball questions are tossed so that DCAA representatives—whether it be April Stephenson or Pat Fitzgerald—get to make their talking points without interference. There’s one group of interlocutors that always seems to bend over backwards to praise DCAA (often while criticizing DCMA), and whose main concern seems to be that there aren’t enough auditors to audit all the contractors receiving government funds.

Can you guess what safe haven we’re talking about? Can you guess DCAA’s safe harbor?

Yes, indeed. It’s the “independent, bipartisan” Commission on Wartime Contracting. If you guessed the answer, give yourself a prize.

While the CWC was praising DCAA and calling its auditors “recognized experts on accounting matters, internal controls, and business systems,” the GAO was telling Senators “about shoddy reviews and inappropriate changes made to multimillion-dollar audit reports ….” As a result of GAO’s review findings, the DCAA rescinded eighty (80) individual audit reports—a figure that GAO called “unprecedented” in testimony before the Senate. Yet the CWC never seemed troubled by the GAO’s concerns.

While the HASC Panel on Defense Acquisition Reform was hearing testimony about DCAA’s audit quality failures, the CWC was criticizing DCMA for taking “untimely—or no—action on DCAA findings.” While Senator McCaskill was grilling then-Director April Stephenson, the CWC thanked Ms. Stephenson for her “excellent cooperation” and “candid responses” to their questions.

So with those thoughts in the background, when the Commission on Wartime Contracting issues another “interim report” to Congress, perhaps we might be forgiven for wondering how tough it’s going to be on the Federal auditors who largely execute DOD’s contract oversight mission (from a dollars and cents perspective).

“At What Risk? Correcting Over-Reliance on Contractors in Contingency Operations,” is the CWC’s second interim report, and it offers thirty-two (32) recommendations designed to “address the underlying causes of the poor outcomes of contracting,” and “institutionalize changes so as to have lasting effects.” Candidly, we did not review all thirty-two recommendations in great detail. Some of the recommendations struck us as infeasible in today’s environment of slash-n-burn fiscal conservatism. Others struck us as naïve or even misguided. Others we thought fell into the “too little, too late” category. And then there were the recommendations on contractor competition and contractor oversight ….

Infeasible recommendations included such items as “grow agencies’ organic capacity,” “establish a contingency contracting directorate in the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,” and “establish a new, dual-hatted position at OMB and the NSC to provide oversight and strategic direction for contingency operations.” Look folks, Secretary of Defense Gates and USD (AT&L) Dr. Ash Carter are currently on the warpath to cut DOD bureaucracy in a bid to drive “efficiency” and “affordability” into DOD programs. They are cutting heads and functions and directorates; we’re not seeing them as being eager to add some back into the mix.

“But gosh,” we hear you arguing. “Won’t those additional positions pay for themselves many times over through reductions in contingency contractors’ notorious waste, fraud and abuse?” Yeah, about that. No. Not in our estimation anyway.

Don’t get us wrong. We’re not saying that there’s zero waste, fraud and abuse over in Southwest Asia. Lord knows we’ve posted enough stories on the topic. But hiring more HQ REMFs won’t solve that problem. What you want to do is add more investigators, more police-types, more experienced auditors, who actually will put boots on the ground and go in there and pull some paperwork for an in-depth review. Adding more (and more competent) COTRs --- great idea! Training-up Contracting Officers and ensuring there are enough to manage the contractors – great idea! The other stuff? Not so much.

Naïve/misguided recommendations included such items as “restrict reliance on contractors for security,” and “measure senior military and civilian officials’ efforts to manage contractors and control costs.” Our big concern here—and it’s one that the CWC never saw fit to investigate—is that what little data has been reviewed shows that it is cheaper to use private security contractors than it is to use government employees for the same function. So if you want to reduce the number of contractors in theater, then you better pony up some extra appropriations and funding plus-ups. Which is going to go over nicely with the new freshmen Congressmen, don’t you think?

In addition, we really don’t endorse the concept of getting into the faces of “senior military officials” and impacting their careers based on how they manage contractors and control costs. Really, we think their proper focus ought to be on achieving military objectives and we’re fine with grading them on how they do in that arena. You want to make civilian staff more accountable? That’s fine with us. But let’s all leave the military leadership alone to focus on winning the war(s), so we can bring the troops home as quickly as possible.

“Too little, too late” recommendations included “require competition reporting and goals for contingency contracts,” “break out and compete major subcontract requirements from omnibus support contracts,” and “limit contingency task-order performance periods.” Folks, we’re winding down major activities in Iraq. Though we’ll have a large force there for a very long time, supported by contractors (of course), the fact of the matter is that it’s simply too late to affect the LOGCAP contracts at this late stage of the game. Do you really want to recompete what’s already in place? We sure as heck don’t. We say, let the contractors finish their work and get them out of the theater as quickly as possible. Save the scarce and precious DOD acquisition resources you would waste on recompeting the work and use them instead to properly manage the contractors in Afghanistan. And speaking of Afghanistan, if you want to break out major subcontracts from the LOGCAP contractors management systems, then you better plan to have plenty of new acquisition resources to manage them.

What’s that? You say you don’t have enough contracting officers, technical representatives, and functional specialists as it is? You can’t handle the additional workload? Oh, yeah—about that whole insufficient acquisition workforce thing? Maybe you’re going to want to pay those evil LOGCAP contractors to manage the subcontractors for you until you figure out how to pay for all the new DCMA heads you’re going to need. Which is why breaking-out the LOGCAP subcontract efforts isn’t the smartest near-term idea to be published this month.

Okay, let’s wrap this up by talking about some of the CWC recommendations that hit close to home—the ones dealing with contract competition, oversight and audit.

Recommendation #20 – Allow contractors to respond to, but not appeal, agency performance assessments. Sure. Except for the whole U.S. Court of Federal Claims precedent that permits contractors to appeal their agency performance assessments. That’s going to be overturned by Congress? We guess that hokey old three Branches of Government thing in the Constitution was just for show, right? And of course, the unspoken assumption here is that the government always gives contractors accurate and fair past performance ratings. Hey, we’ve got a recommendation! How about contracting officers and technical representatives certify, under penalty of perjury, that they have given a fair and supportable past performance rating? If you’re not willing to consider that one, then we’re not willing to accept that they always get it right. The status quo seems about right to us.

Recommendation #26 – Make consent to U.S. civil jurisdiction a condition of contract award. Sure, let’s ignore current court decisions on legal jurisdiction and make those foreign companies that support our warfighters have to comply with Cost Accounting Standards, Truth in Negotiation Act, the False Claims Act and all the same burdens we impose on our domestic companies. Because that’s working out so well (for lawyers anyway).

Let’s impose our legal system on all those nasty foreigners who hide behind their country’s sovereignty and won’t subject themselves to our super-fast and inexpensive investigations and trials. Just like McDonnell Douglas Service and its subcontractor, Alsalam, who were accused of defective pricing in 2001 (after a 3 year-long audit by DCAA), and received a final decision from a contracting officer in June, 2008. An appeal was filed three months later and, in December 2009, a decision was issued by the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA). Just to be clear, the U.S. “justice” system took eleven years for Alsalam to be cleared of wrong-doing, though (to be fair) the company eventually had its case dismissed on a legal technicality (the Contract Disputes Act’s statute of limitations). Yeah, no. Our standing in the world is already too low as it is; let’s not expose any more foreign companies to first-hand encounters with the legal framework surrounding contract oversight.

Our counter recommendation? Require DCAA to issue all audit reports within six months of beginning them. Require DCMA to issue a final decision on DCAA audit reports within six months of receiving them. Require Department of Justice and military investigators to commence prosecutions within one year of receiving referrals, or let the contractor in question go on its way. Establish an expedited hearing process for contingency contractors. In other words, speed up the legal system before you bog it down with more cases from companies currently exempt from its jurisdiction.

Recommendation #31 – Strengthen authority to withhold contract payments for inadequate business systems. Well, it’s nice that the CWC acknowledges what we (and others) have pointed out to the DAR Council, which is that DOD contracting officers already have sufficient authority to reduce or withhold payment for inadequate business systems. But we must say that giving that same authority to civilian agencies seems to be a bit of a paper tiger, since those same civilian agencies lack sufficient manpower to audit those business systems. But whatever….

You know, if the CWC has done nothing else, it’s focused the rule makers on contractor “business systems” (which is a term the CWC invented because “internal control system” sounds so boring and accountant-y). We’re okay with that—to some extent. But we can’t help noting that the criteria that define what makes a business system “adequate” spring largely out of the DCAA’s audit programs and from nowhere else. There is very little input from any objective, independent third party regarding when a timekeeping system (for example) is adequate. And the adequacy of a contractor’s business systems will be determined by a contracting officer based on findings in a DCAA audit report—from those same auditors that the GAO and DOD IG said couldn’t audit the broad side of a barn. So forgive us, but we’re just a tad skeptical that this is going to work out all fair and reasonable for the contractors, with no unsupported or erroneous audit findings leading to a negatively impacted cash flow.

Recommendation #32 – Amend access-to-records authority to permit broader access to contractor records. Here’s another recommendation that will overturn legal precedent and make contractors provide “reports and documentation related to … internal audits and to other types of management reviews” so that … well, there’s really no rationale for this one. This recommendation simply reiterates a long-standing DCAA grievance that the agency’s auditors can’t look at whatever they want to see and talk to whomever they want to talk with, with no accountability for audit procedures and no relationship between any possible audit objective and the information being demanded. Frankly, it undercuts the credibility of the other recommendations, in our view.

We’ve already blown-up the notion that there is any widespread problem obtaining contractor records. There’s no industry-wide “access to records” problem and even the DOD has pooh-poohed the idea. DCAA can’t complete the audits it starts and is starting fewer and fewer each year—and that situation has almost nothing to do with any lack of contractor cooperation.

Moreover, exactly what information does DCAA (and/or the CWC) expect will be provided in the contractors’ internal audit reports? Do they think that there’s going to be a flashing red neon arrow pointing to an internal finding of fraud, waste, and/or abuse? Going a bit further, do they expect that, once contractors know those reports will be reviewed by DCAA on a regular basis, they are going to keep pumping them out with the same frequency and keep all the findings intact? Really, nobody can be that naïve.

Okay. That’s about it for now. Looking back over this article, we think we should clarify that we don’t hate the CWC or think that the Commission hasn’t performed a valuable function. We respect the Commissioners and think that contract oversight is a fruitful area for probing and investigating. It’s just that it’s all so … well, so political. It doesn’t seem that this has about substance; but instead more about show. Many of the people proffering testimony before the CWC were the “usual suspects” who repeated the same clichéd talking points. Others offered glib sound bites without sufficient support. Many unsupported assertions were accepted as being gospel instead of being challenged, and found their way into this interim report.

It’s hard to get to meaty recommendations when you’re on the rubber chicken circuit.

And some of the Commission members may not be as independent as the casual reader might think. A Google search on the employment histories of Michael Thibault and Charles Tiefer, for instance, might lead one to a better understanding as to why DCAA always seemed to fare so well before the Commission, and why contractors always seemed to fare so poorly.

As always, your comments in support of this article—or in derision—are welcomed.

 

Thank You to Our Readership

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Just over two years ago we tried an experiment: a blog dedicated to government accounting and contracting issues. We looked for issues relevant to the aerospace and defense industry, focusing on oversight and controls, with a leavening of space and technology issues. Frankly, it was a gamble. We weren’t sure of anything at the time.

We weren’t sure anybody would read the articles, or care about the content. We weren’t sure if we could attract a readership. We weren’t sure we could find sufficient content to generate articles. We weren’t sure that we could actually publish articles on the internet, that we could muster the technical skills to post articles and link to other sites. (It’s not our forte, actually.) And most of all, we were unsure we could find the time and the energy to write between 2,000 and 6,000 words a week.

But we did. We posted several articles per week over the past two years, and now we have about 350 individual articles in our news archive, representing a nice two-year history of regulatory changes affecting government contractors.

Another aspect of the gamble was the “branding” associated with the blog. There are a number of blogs out there in the blogosphere, and (in our view) only a few offer a point of view that questions the status quo and does so with supporting facts and figures. We were advised that our point of view could ruffle some feathers and negatively impact our brand in the marketplace. Maybe so. Maybe our ranting and hyperbole has turned-off some potential clients and cost us some business. But we figured that a government contracts-related blog without a point of view was simply a rehashing of the regulations—and who would want to read that?

If we couldn’t interest ourselves, how could we interest any potential readers?

So we developed a sharp tongue and a point of view that (we hope) dared to ask the questions we were all thinking—but that nobody was willing to ask publicly. We hope that we dared to grumble about the things we all grumbled about over a beer or behind closed doors—but that nobody was willing to grumble in public about. In short, we aspired to be brave enough to “speak truth to power” and we hoped our willingness to risk our principles and integrity would attract the kind of clientele we would want to work with.

And you know, it’s all worked out so far. The business side of the house is more than okay, and we have great clients and more work than we can fit into the blog schedule. So as far as we can tell, the gamble has paid off.

And our site readership has grown. In December, 2009, we started keeping statistics. In that first month, we had 68 visitors, 255 visits, and 791 page views of our site. In the month of February, 2011 (fifteen months later), we had 2,420 visitors, 3,012 visits, and 4,578 page views. Here’s a chart showing our growth:

So thank you, thank you all for caring enough about these arcane and often complex issues to keep coming back. We couldn’t or (more accurately, wouldn’t) do it without you.

And if this were an Academy Award acceptance speech we would also have to thank the Commission on Wartime Contracting, the Defense Contract Audit Agency, and the Defense Contract Management Agency. Not to mention Senator Claire McCaskill, the Project on Government Oversight, Robert Brodsky at Government Executive, and all the bureaucrats and regulation-drafters who keep us puzzled and frustrated enough to keep writing these articles.

 

Proposed DFARS Rule Requires Additional IR&D Reporting

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We can’t pretend we were surprised to see this one hit the Federal Register.

Way back in September 2010, we noted that Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L) Dr. Ashton Carter published 23 “principal actions” he planned to take to drive “affordability” into defense programs, and among those 23 actions was to increase DOD’s focus on contractor Independent Research and Development (IR&D or IRAD) spending so as “to improve the return on IRAD investments for industry and government.”

At the time, we were concerned that the foregoing was code for “micromanage and reduce contractors’ IR&D spending” though several colleagues thought we might be overreacting. Were we? You be the judge.

On March 2, 2011, the Federal Register published a proposed revision to the supplemental DFARS cost principles, that proposed to recreate the alleged “loss of linkage between funding and technological purpose” by requiring contractors with more than $50,000 in annual IR&D spending to report information to the Defense Technical Information Center. As the proposed rule states—

The reporting requirements, as mandated by 10 U.S.C. 2372, will provide in-process information from DoD-sponsored IR&D projects to increase effectiveness by providing visibility into the technical content of industry IR&D activities to meet DoD needs and promote the technical prowess of the industry. Without the collection of this information, DoD will be unable to maximize the value of the IR&D funds the Department disburses without infringing on the independence of contractors to choose which technologies to pursue in IR&D programs.

The proposed rule would revise DFARS supplemental cost principle 231.205-18 to read—

For a contractor's annual IR&D costs in excess of $50,000 to be allowable, the IR&D projects generating the costs must be reported to the Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC) using the DTIC's on-line input form and instructions. The inputs must be updated at least annually and when the project is completed. Copies of the input and updates must be made available for review by the cognizant administrative contracting officer (ACO) and the cognizant Defense Contract Audit Agency auditor to support the allowability of the costs.

So contractors with more than $50,000 in annual IR&D costs may see those costs disallowed unless they provide DTIC with the required information at least once per year.

Looking at the cited statute, which allegedly enables the regulatory revision, we see a couple of interesting things.

First, we see the following—

(b) Costs Allowable as Indirect Expenses. - The regulations prescribed pursuant to subsection (a) shall provide that independent research and development and bid and proposal costs shall be allowable as indirect expenses on covered contracts to the extent that those costs are allocable, reasonable, and not otherwise unallowable by law or under the Federal Acquisition Regulation.

So the first thing we see is that the proposed regulation is establishing allowability criteria that are not sanctioned by the statute. Quite the contrary, in fact, since the statute expressly requires that allowability be established through determining (a) allocability, (b) reasonableness, and (c) compliance with the provisions of FAR cost principles.

That said, we also note that the statute does permit the Secretary of Defense to limit IR&D reimbursement by the DOD “to work which the Secretary of Defense determines is of potential interest to the Department of Defense.” In addition, the statute requires the Secretary of Defense to promulgate regulations that implement “regular methods of transmission … of information regarding progress by the contractor on the contractor's independent research and development programs.”

So to sum up, our point of view is that the statute permits (or requires) the Secretary of Defense to obtain contractor IR&D information “in a reasonable manner.” But the statute does not permit the DOD to make a contractor’s IR&D expenditures unallowable if it fails to comply.

As always, you can submit your comments to the DAR Council. The proposed rule (link above) explains how.

 

DMCA Issues Guidance Re: DCAA Forward Pricing Rate Recommendations (FPRRs)

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Have you been following the messy trail left by Dr. Ashton Carter’s drive for “affordability” in defense programs? If you answered, “no” to that question, you must not have been reading our articles on the topic.

Let’s start here, in September 2010, wherein we reported that Dr. Carter (USD, AT&L) had issued a 17-page memo laying out Pentagon tactics to be used to drive down the cost of defense programs—which he asserted would lead to huge savings. In that article we reported that Dr. Carter directed that his DOD contracting officers—

Use Forward Pricing Rate Recommendations (FPRRs) in lieu of Forward Pricing Rate Agreements (FPRAs). In particular, ‘where DCAA has completed an audit of a particular contractor’s rates, DCMA shall adopt the DCAA recommended rates as the Department’s position with regard to those rates.’

We opined at the time that, “The substitution of DCAA audit findings for DCMA discretion and negotiation ability strikes us as a spectacularly bad idea….”

In January 2011, we followed-up with an article about Shay Assad’s Memo clarifying the roles and responsibilities of DCMA and DCAA. As part of the memo, Mr. Assad (Director, DPAP) told DOD contracting officers that—

In those cases where DCAA has completed an audit of a particular contractor’s rates, DCMA shall adopt the DCAA recommended rates as the Department’s FPRR position. … This policy supports the goal of better aligning the work of the two agencies by ensuring a single department rate position is provided to DCMA/DCAA customers at all times.

Naturally we had a problem with that direction. Although we grant you that DCAA recently changed its mission statement to acknowledge the de facto truth that the taxpayers of the United States of America are its ultimate customers, the practical reality is that those who issued audit requests to the audit agency are its real customers—chief among those the very same DOD contracting officers whom Mr. Assad was concerned may not have been fully aligned with DCAA’s “rate position”. Suffice to say, our view is that Mr. Assad’s direction that DCAA’s audit position “shall” be adopted by the cognizant DCMA Administrative Contracting Officer (ACO) as the official DOD position was (and still is) a cure in search of a disease.

We’re not the only ones who think that way either. If you check out this article on recent testimony before the Senate’s HSGA’s ad hoc Committee on Contracting Oversight, you’ll see that we pointed attention to testimony from Sandy Hoe, an Inside-the-Beltway government contracts attorney from the respected firm McKenna, Long & Aldridge (testifying on behalf of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce). Mr. Hoe testified that—

The January 4 DPAP memorandum indicates that contracting officers will apparently now issue final [Forward Pricing Recommended] rates as determined by DCAA without the contractor having the opportunity to demonstrate to the Administrative Contracting Officer (‘ACO’) why such rates may be unreasonable. Unless the contractor elects to contest the rates by submitting a claim under the Contract Disputes Act (‘CDA’), it will, at a minimum, lose the ability to recoup the lost amounts allocated to fixed price contracts based upon the DCAA-determined rates. This approach would be unfair to contractors and directly conflict with established regulatory law.

Moreover, in the Summer 2010 edition of the ABA’s Public Contract Law Journal, John Pachter (Partner, Smith Pachter McWhorter PLC) wrote an article entitled, “The Incredible Shrinking Contracting Officer.” In that article, asserted that—

A number of factors have emerged that tend to marginalize the Contracting Officer as other players occupy more of the stage and clamor for action. … Contracting Officers must confront the notion, expressed in various ways, that auditors’ advice is presumptively correct. Rather than being allowed to rely on the advice of auditors and then make a considered decision as the FAR contemplates, Contracting Officers now have the burden of justifying their decisions when they differ from those of auditors. The result is pressure on Contracting Officers to acquiesce in the recommendations of auditors. … Accordingly, the underlying message to Contracting Officers … is, ‘Go easy on yourself. You can avoid having to justify your decisions to higher authorities if you simply accept the auditor’s recommendations in the first place.’

(Internal footnotes omitted.)

With all that background in mind, we were very interested in a January memo from Ronald Youngs, Acting Executive Director, Contracts, DCMA, implementing Mr. Assad’s direction. The memo, entitled Information Memorandum 11-108, “Forward Pricing Rate Recommendations (INFORMATION),” can be found here. It said (in part)—

Effective immediately our policy regarding FPRR development is amended as follows.

  • When a contractor submits a FPRP, the ACO shall review the proposal as soon as possible and may issue a new FPRR. When developing the FPRR the ACO shall follow the FPRR documentation and internal review requirements set forth in paragraph 6 of the [DCMA] Forward Pricing Rates Instruction.

  • After issuing the FPRR, the ACO shall inform DCAA of any new information that may impact the rates or the FPRP audit.

  • Upon ACO receipt of the audit report, the DCAA recommended rates shall be reviewed by the ACO within 5 working days and the DCAA recommended rates shall be issued immediately thereafter as the Government’s recommended position.

  • If the FPRP contains unsupported costs, the ACO shall work with DCAA to obtain the required supporting data from the contractor. The ACO shall opine on any unsupported cost elements in the audit report and shall include that opinion in the FPRR memorandum that accompanies the issuance of the DCAA recommended rates.

Importantly, the memo also states—

In those rare circumstances when the ACO notes significant deficiencies in the audit report which render the report untenable, the ACO shall immediately contact DCAA to coordinate a revision to the recommended rates. If the issues cannot be resolved at the local level, the issues shall be elevated for a Contract Management Board of Review following the FPRR documentation and internal review requirements set forth in paragraph 6 of the Forward Pricing Rates Instruction.

That, dear readers, is what we in the business call “a loophole.” It provides an ACO with an option other than simply accepting DCAA’s audit results without question. Although long and painful, the Board of Review process may offer contractors a slight chance that their voice, calling attention to “deficiencies” in the DCAA audit report, might just be heard.

Sure, we agree with your objection(s) that: (1) it’s unlikely your ACO is going to relish the idea of disagreeing with DCAA and submitting that disagreement to a “Board of Review” for adjudication, (2) it’s unlikely that the “Board of Review” is going to want to approve a public disagreement with DCAA, and (3) it’s unlikely that Shay Assad and/or Pat Fitzgerald is going to accept that “Board of Review” adjudication, regardless of the merits of the decision. (Actually, it’s worse than that, since there will be multiple “Boards of Review” at various levels of the DCMA hierarchy.) So, yes, our “loophole” is more like the eye of a needle.

But it exists!

This situation reminds us of the Concordat of Bologna, that 1516 agreement between France’s King Francis I and Pope Leo X. As this online article explains—

In 1516 the Concordat of Bologna confirmed François I's right to make appointments to benefices, but gave the Pope the right to veto unqualified candidates and to collect a year's revenue from each post. Although this gave the Pope many rights, it gave the king more. The king of France had enormous powers to dispose of the Church's wealth and he could (and did) use the offices of bishops, abbots, etc. to provide sinecures for his faithful followers.  This also meant that lords of the church were usually quite worldly people, often quite unfit for their offices if spirituality or theological learning is considered a requirement. (The Pope's veto was hardly ever exercised.)

So think of DCAA as the French King, and DCMA as the Pope, and the “Board of Review” process as the Pope exercising his official right to veto unqualified appointments. Maybe we’re overreaching, but we see some resemblance.

But maybe there’s another, more ancient parallel to discuss. In A Dictionary of Greek and Roman Antiquities, Volume 2, Sir William Smith wrote in 1891—

… the king has no power to pardon; that pardon resides with the people, the ultimate sovereign. … though the provocatio existed in the regal period, yet the citizens have no standing right of appeal against the king like that secured by the Lex Valeria. The King Tullus Hostilius allows the appeal; and the fact that the appeal might not have been so allowed, and was a matter not of law but of constitutional usage, is shown by the similar freedom of the early dictatorship from the necessity of allowing the appeal. The limitations of the king’s power came here, as elsewhere, not from the force of law, but from the necessity of observing formalities once established.

(Internal citations omitted; emphasis in original.)

According to Sir William Smith, even though the Roman monarch permitted an appeal “from the necessity of observing formalities once established,” the last king “had broken through the constitutional usages of the monarchy”—which led inexorably to a revolution that established the Roman republic. Now we’re not saying that DOD is heading for a regime change … but we did note a parallel between the king allowing an appeal and the DCMA Boards of Review process.

Okay, our journey from ancient Rome to sixteenth century France to the 2011 bureaucratic proclamations of the Department of Defense is now complete. We hope you enjoyed the journey.

 


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Newsflash

Effective January 1, 2019, Nick Sanders has been named as Editor of two reference books published by LexisNexis. The first book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Cost Accounting Standards. Nick replaces Darrell Oyer, who has edited those books for many years.