• Increase font size
  • Default font size
  • Decrease font size
Apogee Consulting Inc

Honeywell Pays $11.8 Million to Resolve Criminal Environmental Complaint

E-mail Print PDF

 

Of course the game is rigged. Don't let that stop you--if you don't play, you can't win.

-- Robert A. Heinlein

 

We focus quite a bit on compliance with statutes and regulatory matters (not to mention contract terms) related to cost accounting, contract administration, and program management. However, that list does not exhaust the Pantheon of potential compliance issues facing government contractors, as Honeywell International recently learned to its chagrin.

The U.S. Department of Justice announced on March 11, 2011 that Honeywell International had agreed to plead guilty to one felony count (storing hazardous waste without a permit) and to pay a $11.8 million criminal fine, in order to resolve criminal charges stemming from its onsite storage of radioactive potassium hydroxide (KOH) “mud” at its facility in Metropolis, Illinois. (Yes, there really is a city called Metropolis.)

Honeywell’s facility in Southern Illinois has been in operation since 1958. In 1964, the facility was “mothballed” until reopening in 1968. Honeywell operates the facility under a license from the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). The facility is the only site that converts uranium in its natural state into uranium hexafluoride (UF6). The UF6 is then further enriched into nuclear fuel and reportedly used in nuclear power plants.

According to the Dept. of Justice—

At the Metropolis facility, air emissions from the UF6 conversion process are scrubbed with potassium hydroxide (KOH) prior to discharge. As a result of this process, KOH scrubbers and associated equipment accumulate uranium compounds that settle out of the liquid and are pumped as a slurry into 55-gallon drums.

(The slurry is called “KOH mud.”)

Up until 2002, Honeywell used a “wet reclamation” process to reclaim the uranium from the KOH mud; however, in 2002 Honeywell ceased using that process and, instead, decided to store the KOH mud on site. (We cannot find any discussion of why Honeywell chose to end its reclamation process.) As a result of its decision, Honeywell entered the KOH mud storage business, having to store drum upon drum of the contaminated sludge on its site—which happens to be located relatively near the Ohio River.

Unfortunately for Honeywell, the contaminated KOH mud was classified as a “corrosive hazardous waste” under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. § 6901. Accordingly, Honeywell was required to obtain a RCRA permit to store the KOH mud at its site for longer than 90 days. According to the DOJ, Honeywell knowingly violated RCRA’s requirements.

The thing is, we’re not so sure about the “knowingly” part. Obviously we’re not environmental scientists or RCRA specialists—far from it, in fact. However, though the waste treatment and storage rules under RCRA are complex (to say the least) we noticed some ambiguity. For example, what might a jury make of this statement found in the 2001 final rule?

Our rule will allow qualified generators of LLMW to claim a conditional exemption from the regulatory RCRA definition of hazardous waste for mixed wastes stored and treated by the generator under a single NRC or NRC Agreement State license. This conditional exemption acknowledges that NRC regulation for low-level waste (LLW) provides protective regulation of storage and treatment of mixed waste in tanks and containers. This regulatory flexibility applies only to generators of low-level mixed waste who are licensed by NRC or an NRC Agreement State.

Based on the foregoing, it might be argued that Honeywell honestly believed it was exempt from RCRA permit requirements because its operation was licensed by the NRC. But in any case Honeywell apparently realized it needed a RCRA permit, because in July 2007 the company requested a modified storage permit from the Illinois EPA, which was received in July 2008. According to the DOJ, the permit allowed “Honeywell to store drums containing KOH mud only in a KOH container storage area designed to contain any spills, leaks or precipitation that accumulates in the drum storage area.”

Which would seem to have cured the problem, unless one were to realize that “by September 2008, Honeywell had accumulated over 7,000 drums of KOH mud.” And by April 2009, that number was up to 7,500 drums of waste—all of which the U.S. EPA alleged were not being stored in accordance with the terms of the RCRA permit. According to the DOJ, it was not until March 2010 that Honeywell was in compliance with its RCRA storage permit.

Thus, the criminal charge and the largish fine.

DOJ reported that, in addition to the $11.8 million fine—

In accordance with the terms of the criminal plea agreement, Honeywell will serve a five-year term of probation. As a condition of probation, Honeywell must comply with the terms of the interim consent order entered into with the Illinois Attorney General’s Office and the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency, filed on April 21, 2010, and any subsequent revisions, which imposes a schedule for the processing of KOH mud. As a further condition of probation, Honeywell must implement a community service project in the community surrounding the Metropolis facility, whereby Honeywell will develop, fund and implement a household hazardous waste collection program and arrange for proper treatment, transportation and disposal of this waste collected during at least eight collection events over a two-year period, at a cost of approximately $200,000.

The point to this story is that there’s more to compliance that FAR and CAS. A robust compliance program isn’t simply about back-office bean-counters making sure the beans are appropriately categorized. A robust compliance program integrates the back office with operations, and ensures that all statutory and regulatory (and contractual) requirements are considered. All facets of the operation must be examined for compliance requirements, lest one slip through the cracks.

 

Proposed DFARS Rule Would Make Display of DOD IG Hotline Posters Mandatory

E-mail Print PDF

 

DOD_Hotline_PosterWay back in 2007 and 2008, the FAR was significantly revised to eliminate the twenty year-old contractor “voluntary” disclosure program in favor of a new mandatory disclosure program. (For background, see our article right here.) A few months after the new “contractor disclosure program” started, we posted an update over here.

The FAR revisions mandated disclosure to the cognizant agency Inspector General, without regard to materiality. That led to a huge increase in disclosures (as compared to the volume of disclosures in the old “voluntary” program), and caused the DOD Inspector General to add staff in order to handle the workload. Moreover, the majority of the disclosures was of the garden variety “labor mischarging” type versus the headline-grabbing product substitution or falsified quality inspection report type. So the end result was the same as under the old voluntary program—the contractor credited the appropriate cost objective and that was pretty much the end of the story. It’s just that there were more players and more process steps to go through (which cost everybody more money).

From what we’ve heard and observed since then, we see no reason to change our initial assessment. Without revealing privileged information, suffice to say that we have had first-hand experience with nearly 30 contractor disclosures over the past two years. All of them were mundane, stupid, labor-charging issues. Some of them were largish, but the many were valued at less than $25,000. And what’s even more upsetting is that many labor-charging issues were not to a single contract, but were instead to indirect cost pools or to multiple contracts—thus diluting the Government’s “damages” even more.

So if your metric is quantity of disclosures, then the new “mandatory” disclosure program is a great success. But if your metric is dollars of government cost recovery or dollars of quantum versus administrative dollars spent disclosing and/or supporting audits of disclosures, then maybe you’re less sanguine about the situation.

So along comes a new, proposed, DFARS rule that purports to solve a problem that in reality doesn’t exist, and will tend to exacerbate an already tough situation.

On March 11, 2011, the DAR Council issued a proposed DFARS rule that “would require contractors to display the DoD Hotline in common work areas.”

Currently, the applicable FAR rule requires contractors to display the DOD IG Hotline poster in common work areas, but provides an exception when the contractor “has implemented a business ethics and conduct awareness program, including a reporting mechanism….” The proposed DFARS rule would eliminate that exception for DOD contractors, creating a situation where they must both maintain an internal reporting mechanism and display the DOD IG Hotline poster. Which either gives employees a choice of reporting mechanism or sows seeds of confusion, depending on your point of view.

Why the need for such a rule? According to the DAR Council—

GAO Report GAO-09-591, Regarding the Display of DoD Inspector General Fraud Hotline Posters by DoD Contractors, recommended that the DoD IG determine the need for defense contractors' display of the DoD IG's fraud hotline poster, including directing a contractor to display the DoD IG hotline poster in common work areas for performance of DoD contracts.

The DoD IG determined that DoD contractors, including contractors who have an ethics and compliance program that includes a reporting mechanism such as a hotline poster, need to display DoD fraud hotline posters in a common work area within business segments performing work under the contract and at contract work sites. …

The DoD IG finds that this exemption has the potential to make the DoD hotline program less effective by ultimately reducing contractor exposure to DoD IG fraud hotline posters and diminishing the means by which fraud, waste, and abuse can be reported under the protection of Federal whistleblower protection laws. Some contractor's posters may not be as effective as the DoD poster in advertising the hotline number, which is integral to the fraud program. The DoD IG is also revising the DoD IG fraud hotline poster to inform contractor employees of their Federal whistleblower protections.

Well, there you have it. After an exhaustive analysis, the DOD IG determined that it would be more effective to mandate display of DOD IG Hotline posters. Never mind that the current contractor disclosure program was generating so many disclosures that the IG needed to add staff. Never mind that employees might be confused regarding which reporting mechanism to use. And never mind that, if the current volume of allegations coming to the IG increased, then even more staff would have to be added.

Oh, wait. To that last point, about adding staff. Does anybody other than we here at Apogee Consulting, Inc. think that may have been a factor in the IG’s determination? Is this just another excuse for bureaucratic empire-building?

Well, maybe it is just us, then.

 

Update on the Camp Arifjan “Sixteen”

E-mail Print PDF

 

corruptionWe have devoted considerable word count to describing the nearly unbelievable levels of corruption at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait. For example, back in February 2010, in this article, we reported that Terry Hall had pleaded guilty to a conspiracy to pay more than $3 million in bribes to various U.S. Army contracting officers stationed at Camp Arifjan, in order to secure more than $21 million in contract awards. We reported that Hall had been indicted “along with U.S. Army Major Eddit Pressley … and his wife Eurica Pressley.…”

In this story we told you about Bill Collins, a U.S. Army contracting officer who pleaded guilty to soliciting “more than $17,000 in bribes and other payments from an Egyptian businessman in Kuwait.” Mr. Collins was also employed at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait.

In another article recapping various legal outcomes, we noted that Dorthy Ellis had been sentenced to prison for her part in the schemes, including “providing Momon and Murray access to secret bank accounts established on their behalf in the Philippines to enable Hall and others to transfer bribe payments to them” and for obtaining “confidential Army contract pricing information from Momon that was designed to give Hall an unlawful advantage in the bidding process for an ice contract from the DoD.”

Finally, we summed up the situation at Camp Arifjan thusly:

 

We griped about lax oversight and ineffective controls in the article on Bagram.  When we wrote about Captain Mike—who did everything he could to get caught, but who would have gotten away with his crimes but for … his neighbors who reported him to the IRS—we bemoaned the failed command environment and asked whether his commanding officer was disciplined for negligence.  (Apparently, Captain Mike’s CO kept a safe with about a million dollars in it and never checked to see how much was still there, even after Captain Mike rotated back to the States.)  But we never imagined a military base so corrupt that 14 individuals ‘who were regularly receiving unlawful payments’ could operate for so long without getting caught.

Camp Arifjan may just have set the bar—at a new low—for government contract-related corruption.

Which is emphatically not a good thing.

So when we tell you that folks from Camp Arifjan are back in the news, you’ll be as unsurprised as we were.

In this announcement, the Department of Justice trumpeted the conviction of Eddie Pressley and his wife, Eurica, “on 22 counts in connection with a bribery and money laundering scheme related to defense contracts awarded in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom.” (Remember Eddie and Eurica? We mentioned them in the first paragraph above.) According to the DOJ press release, they were found guilty “of one count of bribery, one count of conspiracy to commit bribery, eight counts of honest services fraud, one count of money laundering conspiracy and 11 counts of engaging in monetary transactions with criminal proceeds.”

Remember how we were all upset about 14 corrupt individuals operating at one contracting activity at one U.S. Army base? Well, about that. We may have misunderstood the true situation. According to the DOJ, its investigative efforts have (to date) resulted in “16 individuals including the Pressleys, have pleaded guilty or been found guilty at trial for their roles in the scheme.“ So now the count is sixteen (16) fraudsters not fourteen (14) as we previously reported.

The DOJ reminded readers that wrongdoing may lead to consequences. It reported that “Eddie and Eurica Pressley each face a maximum sentence of 15 years in prison for bribery, five years in prison for conspiracy, 20 years in prison for each of the eight counts of honest services fraud, 20 years in prison for money laundering conspiracy and 15 years in prison for each of the counts of engaging in monetary transactions with criminal proceeds.  They also face maximum fines of $250,000 per count. Following the guilty verdict, the defendants agreed to forfeit $27,178,407. U.S. District Judge Virginia Emerson Hopkins scheduled sentencing for June 29, 2011.”

For those keeping score, the couple is looking at 215 years in prison. With time off for good behavior, of course.

 

DCAA Issues Guidance to Auditors on Contract Recovery Initiative

E-mail Print PDF

We told you back in November 2010 that DCMA and DCAA had been directed to work together to “aggressively target contractual opportunities to recover taxpayer dollars by dispositioning reportable audits, suspended/disallowed costs, cost accounting practice changes, and other cost allowability and allocability issues”. This joint project, dubbed the “Cost Recovery Initiative,” was designed to address nearly $300 million worth of issues “currently awaiting the Administrative Contracting Officer’s ... disposition.”

We opined at the time that—

This Cost Recovery Initiative is Good News for DCAA, because the agency will look like it is saving the taxpayers money. And the Initiative is Good News for DCMA, because the agency will look like it is taking prompt action based on DCAA audit recommendations. And the Initiative is Good News for the DOD, because it will look like the two oversight organizations are cooperating and not locked in a ‘dysfunctional’ relationship. And, as noted above, the Initiative is likely to prove to be a Good Thing for government contracts attorneys (such as those at Crowell & Moring).

But we predict it will be Bad News for DOD’s contractors, whose counter-factual arguments and red-faced finger-pointing at the inept DCAA audits will very likely avail them nothing—and they will be forced to either concede or litigate.

In January 2011, the DCAA issued guidance to its auditors (MRD 11-PAC-001(R), dated January 18, 2011) that may prove troubling for any contractors that have outstanding Cost Accounting Standards (CAS) cost impact analyses awaiting disposition. The guidance memo directs auditors to prepare Rough Order of Magnitude cost impacts (“ROMs”) to aid the cognizant ACOs in issuing demand letters to those contractors who have, for various reasons, not yet submitted their cost impact analyses. To be clear: if the contractors cannot (or will not) estimate the gross dollar magnitude cost impact related to its CAS issue, then the DCAA will calculate it for them.

The guidance memo notes that “The timely resolution of these audit issues is of the highest importance since delays in resolving these issues may impact the Government’s ability to recover the amounts owed.” Yeah, that whole pesky Contracts Dispute Act statute of limitations can really get in the way, can’t it? You’d think that six years would be plenty of time to resolve even the thorniest of CAS disputes—or get the litigation started—but (apparently) you’d be wrong.

The fact that this is even an issue, that six years may not be sufficient time to resolve difficult issues, shows just how screwed-up the DOD oversight environment is. Anybody seeking to fix the system has to first address why it takes so dang long to move the ball forward when the parties can’t agree on the issues.

Anyway, back to the guidance.

Our first problem with the guidance is that it lumps issues related to (alleged) CAS noncompliances with issues related to voluntary changes in cost accounting practice. Though DCAA loves to approach each in the same, one-size-fits-all way (and indeed 2005 changes to FAR 30.6 and related CAS contract clauses confused and conflated the distinction between the two all to hell), the fact is that each is a distinct issue within CAS administration and each has a different objective for the Federal government. With respect to CAS noncompliances, the Government’s objective is to recover any resulting overpayments (with interest).  With respect to voluntary changes to cost accounting practice, on the other hand, the Government’s objective is to prevent payment of increased costs (in the aggregate). While the distinction may be subtle, it is nonetheless crucial.

Our second problem with the guidance is the ROM itself. The ROM is neither a Gross Dollar Magnitude (“GDM”) cost impact nor a Detailed Cost Impact (“DCI”) proposal. It is neither fish nor fowl. As the MRD states—

The ROM should be a high level estimate of the cost impact of the accounting change or noncompliant practice and would not be at the level of detail or format required in a GDM or a DCI. The ROM will be used by the ACO to implement the 10 percent withholds authorized in FAR 30.604(i) and 30.605(i) and/or issue a final decision and unilaterally adjust affected contracts. The basis of the ROM needs to be adequately documented and be a good faith estimate by the auditor based on the data available. If the FAO is missing critical data necessary to compute the ROM and experiences difficulty in obtaining the data timely, it should request ACO assistance in obtaining the data.

Importantly, DCAA is to calculate the ROM as part of “nonaudit services” that are not subject to GAGAS. Moreover, the DCAA guidance asserts that generating a ROM will not impair the auditors’ independence and they will be free to audit the contractor’s subsequent cost impact proposal, even though they already have submitted a number to the ACO and may have some pride of authorship about it. (This point strikes us as simply whistling in the dark. But whatever ….)

Tell us what you think of this paragraph in the MRD guidance—

Because the ROM is a high level estimate of the cost impact and is not at the level of detail or format required to be submitted by the contractor in a GDM or a DCI, performing the ROM calculation as a nonaudit service will generally not impair independence for an audit of the cost impact, should the contractor subsequently submit one. The contractor’s cost impact proposal (generally a GDM) should be based on the FAR requirements and the level of detail and methodology used will generally be significantly different from the FAO’s ROM calculation. If it is not, the FAO should consider whether the contractor’s cost impact proposal is adequate based on the FAR requirements. In those rare cases where the FAO determines that the contractor’s cost impact proposal is adequate and it is substantially the same as the FAO’s ROM calculation (e.g., based on the level of detail, the methodology, and estimates used), the FAO should coordinate with Headquarters PAS through the regional office for further guidance regarding possible independence concerns.

So to sum up, the DCAA auditors will be calculating their own cost impact numbers using their own methodology, and they will not be following GAGAS when doing so. The cognizant ACO (or “CFAO” as the position is called in CAS terminology) will use DCAA’s guess to implement payment withholds. And when the contractor does issue its formal cost impact proposal, the same auditors who already told their management (and the DCMA) one number will be “independently” reviewing another number calculated by the contractor.

And this whole process is designed to speed things up and disposition old, thorny, issues that the parties couldn’t agree on in the first place. This is supposed to be an improvement over the current approach.

 

Shoddy Property Record-Keeping Leads to False Claims Allegations

E-mail Print PDF

Government_Property

Kellogg-Brown & Root Services (KBR) is the poster child for those who claim that government contractors are evil war-profiteers engaged in fraud, waste and abuse. Nary a Commission on Wartime Contracting hearing goes by without at least a token finger being pointed at the company; and we’ve devoted several blog articles to its travails. For example, DCAA Director Pat Fitzgerald testified before the CWC that his auditors had recently questioned “more than 40 percent” of KBR’s proposed subcontractor costs because of a lack of supporting documentation. We also reported that, in April 2010, the U.S. Department of Justice had filed suit against KBR, alleging violations of the False Claims Act stemming from KBR’s use of private security subcontractors. In that same article, we noted that “hundreds” of National Guardsmen had filed suits against KBR for allegedly exposing them to hexavalent chromium … not to mention the “Franken Amendment” that reportedly originated from a KBR employee’s rape at the hands of her co-workers. We could continue but we think the point’s been made.

In short, KBR’s LOGCAP III and LOGAP IV contracts have made it one of the largest defense contractors in the world—but that success has come at a price. The price is a tattered reputation in the eyes of the general public.

The latest chapter in this tawdry tale is kind of puzzling, though. The U.S. DOJ announced that it had intervened in a False Claims Act qui tam suit filed by a former KBR employee, alleging that KBR had violated the False Claims Act on its LOGCAP III contract “because it was unable to account for materials paid for” under a subcontract with a Turkish company named Yuksel-Reysas. According to the announcement, Yuksel-Reyas performed operations and maintenance (O&M) services at various U.S. Army camps located near Mosul, Iraq.

Which is kind of puzzling, isn’t it? Because while failing to account for contractor-acquired material may be a lot of things—such as violations of the property control system, or breakdowns of the material management and accounting system, or even violations of accounting system internal controls—it’s hard to picture how that would lead to presentation of a knowingly false claim to the U.S. Government.

But the Project on Government Oversight (POGO) was able to dig up some more details. While we’ve not always been kind to POGO, we can’t deny that the group often supplements the official record with interesting and useful facts. POGO found the qui tam relator’s original complaint and reported that the relator “alleges that at least $31 million worth of property and materials purchased under the subcontract was lost--air conditioners, refrigerators, generators and motor vehicles, among other valuable items, just vanished into the desert air.”

Looking at the complaint, we saw that the relator was a Government Property Administrator employed by KBR, and allegedly tasked to investigate an $80 million “overexpenditure” on the Yuksel subcontract. During that investigation, the relator alleged that the subcontractor had spent at least $31 million in “unauthorized purchases of property and materials”—which had never been entered into the property control system. (The relator’s complaint appeared to acknowledge that roughly $5 million of that amount was subsequently located, leaving $26 million of unaccounted-for property.)

Because of KBR’s alleged property control system failures and inaccurate property reports, the relator alleged a “reverse False Claim” situation—which is (in layperson’s terms) where a knowingly false statement is made with the intention of wrongfully lowering an amount of money normally due to the U.S. Government. The thing is, we’re not sure that KBR would normally owe the U.S. Government any money even if $31 million worth of stuff had gone missing.

Obviously, we don’t have access to KBR’s LOGCAP III contract and we don’t know the exact language of its property clauses. But normally, the standard Government Property clause (52.245-1) states—


(h) Contractor Liability for Government Property.

(1) Unless otherwise provided for in the contract, the Contractor shall not be liable for loss, theft, damage or destruction to the Government property furnished or acquired under this contract, except when any one of the following applies—

(i) The risk is covered by insurance or the Contractor is otherwise reimbursed (to the extent of such insurance or reimbursement). The allowability of insurance costs shall be determined in accordance with 31.205-19.

(ii) The loss, theft, damage or destruction is the result of willful misconduct or lack of good faith on the part of the Contractor’s managerial personnel.

(iii) The Contracting Officer has, in writing, revoked the Government’s assumption of risk for loss, theft, damage or destruction, due to a determination under paragraph (g) of this clause that the Contractor’s property management practices are inadequate, and/or present an undue risk to the Government, and the Contractor failed to take timely corrective action. If the Contractor can establish by clear and convincing evidence that the loss, theft, damage or destruction of Government property occurred while the Contractor had adequate property management practices or the loss, theft, damage or destruction of Government property did not result from the Contractor’s failure to maintain adequate property management practices, the Contractor shall not be held liable.


Astute readers will notice that there are several scenarios where a contractor (such as KBR) might be held liable for the loss, theft, damage, or destruction of government property. As we said, though, normally the U.S. Government prefers to “self-insure”. So it seems to us that the relator and the U.S. Department of Justice will have a tough time proving to a judge and jury why KBR would go to such lengths to lie about missing and/or unaccounted-for materials.

Well, we’ve seen sketchier allegations before. Time will tell whether the prosecution can prove its case.

 


Page 209 of 279

Newsflash

Effective January 1, 2019, Nick Sanders has been named as Editor of two reference books published by LexisNexis. The first book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Cost Accounting Standards. Nick replaces Darrell Oyer, who has edited those books for many years.