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Apogee Consulting Inc

Maybe the U.S. Marine Corps Knows How to Manage Its Programs After All

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CH53-K

On January 6, 2011, Secretary of Defense Gates announced the termination of the Marine Corps’ Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV). At the time, he said—

The EFV’s aggressive requirements list has resulted in an 80,000 pound armored vehicle that skims the surface of the ocean for long distances at high speeds before transitioning to combat operations on land.  Meeting these demands has over the years led to significant technology problems, development delays, and cost increases.  The EFV, originally conceived during the Reagan Administration, has already consumed more than $3 billion to develop and will cost another $12 billion to build – all for a fleet with the capacity to put 4,000 troops ashore.   If fully executed, the EFV – which costs far more to operate and maintain than its predecessor – would essentially swallow the entire Marine vehicle budget and most of its total procurement budget for the foreseeable future. …  As with several other high end programs cancelled in recent years, the mounting cost of acquiring this specialized capability must be judged against other priorities and needs.

This article opined as follows—

The cancelled EFV ended up costing over ten times as much as the $2.5 million AAV7 (taking inflation into account). … The EFV has been threatened with cancellation for several years, mainly because the vehicle was too expensive and didn't work. Well, parts of it worked. A year ago, tests revealed that the EFV had similar survivability characteristics to MRAPs, when hit with roadside bombs or anti-vehicle mines. The EFV needed all the good news it could get, but marines were already using MRAPs in Afghanistan, and are quite happy with them. What they don't really need, and may never need, is a high speed (in the water) armored vehicle that can cross 50 kilometers of open water to assault a defended beach. There has been no need for that since 1950.

For the last three years, the EFV developers have been making changes in the electronics, waterproofing of electrical elements, the gun turret and the stabilizers (for when it is moving in the water), trying to get the vehicle approved for production. … Under the original plan, the EFV was to enter service three years ago, and cost less than half its current price. … Three years ago, existing prototype EFVs had one failure, on average, for every 4.5 hours of operation. The marines insisted they had fixed the reliability and protection issues, and this persuaded Congress to provide money to build seven of the modified EFVs to confirm that. … But in the end, it was the sheer expense of the vehicle. The marines can't afford the EFV, which would cost $16 billion (for 573 of them). That comes to $29 million each, including all the development cost, making each EFV costing more than four times what the most recent model M-1 tank does. …

The EFV has been in development for over a decade, and has been delayed largely because of a complex water-jet propulsion system which, when it works, allows it to travel at 60 kilometers an hour while in the water. This capability was specified to reduce the danger (from enemy fire) when the EFVs were moving from their transports to shore, a distance of 30-50 kilometers. The additional gear required for the water jet system made the vehicle less robust and reliable, and fixing those problems has taken a lot of time. …

So in the end, the EFV was terminated because the Marines couldn’t afford it. But that’s not the only USMC program that’s been in trouble.

And we’re not even talking about the Marines’ version of the F-35 that’s been put on two-year “probation” by the DOD. No, we’re talking about the Sikorsky CH-53K heavy lift helicopter.

An April 2011 report by the GAO told Congress that the program “has addressed early difficulties and adopted strategies to address future [program] risks”—which is basically what you want GAO to say when your program has experienced a 3-year schedule delay and a 30 percent cost growth.

We thought the GAO report was interesting, given our periodic focus on program management. (For those who don’t know what we’re talking about, there is a series of articles on this site that all start with the phrase, “Why Can’t So-and-So Manage…,” by which you may take it that (in our view) not many entities actually can manage.)

Let’s take a closer look at the report.

The CH-53K program is important to the Corps, because it needs the heavy lift capability the helicopter will provide. As the GAO reported—

Its major improvements include upgraded engines, redesigned gearboxes, composite rotor blades and rotor system improvements, fly-by-wire flight controls, a fully integrated glass cockpit, improved cargo handling and capacity, and survivability and force protection enhancements. It is expected to be able to transport external loads totaling 27,000 pounds over a range of 110 nautical miles under high-hot conditions without refueling and to fulfill land- and sea-based heavy-lift requirements.

The GAO reported that Sikorsky was given the contract on a sole-source basis in December 2005—meaning that there was no competition. Despite the Obama Administration’s official stance disapproving of such non-competitive awards, and despite the DOD’s recent efforts to minimize them, there was no hint in the GAO report that the lack of competition had any impact on the program’s cost, schedule, or quality.

Instead, the GAO found that the program’s reported cost increase—from $18.8 billion to $25.5 billion—was primarily related to the Marine Corps ordering 200 aircraft instead of the 156 it had originally planned to acquire.

The GAO did find certain program-related issues. It noted that the program started development “before determining how to achieve requirements within program constraints, which led to cost growth and schedule delays.” In addition, the GAO reported—

Problems with systems engineering began immediately within the program because the program and Sikorsky disagreed on what systems engineering tasks needed to be accomplished. As a result, the bulk of the program’s systems engineering problems related to derived requirements.

Importantly, the GAO reported—

While Marine Corps officials commented that requirements are often difficult to define early in the engineering process and changes are expected during design maturation, they noted that in this case the use of a firm fixed-price contract with the subcontractor made it difficult to facilitate changes. As a result, completing this task took longer than the program had estimated and the program’s CDR was delayed. … To mitigate the risk of production cost growth, the contractor established long-term production agreements with its subcontractors. According to program officials, in these agreements subcontractors committed in advance to pricing arrangements for the production of parts and spares. While the contractor used this strategy to reduce program risk, it resulted in a delay and the major subcontracts were awarded later than needed to maintain the program’s initially planned schedule.

Let’s stop and think about the preceding paragraph. Sikorsky’s emphasis on awarding long-term fixed-price subcontracts may have mitigated some program risks (which we frankly doubt) but at a price. As a result of Sikorsky’s decision to lock-down its suppliers before it had completed its design, the program not only experienced schedule delays, but it also experienced downstream problems implementing the inevitable design changes.

We would assert that Sikorsky awarded the wrong contract types to its suppliers; they should have been under a cost-type development contract (perhaps with incentives) so that the program team operated as…well, a team. We would further assert that Sikorsky may well have incurred more cost managing changes on its fixed-price supplier subcontracts, than it would have spent on managing cost-type subcontracts.

Despite its early missteps, the program has recovered nicely—according to the GAO. It reported—

… the program delayed technical reviews until it was prepared to move forward, thereby becoming more of an event-driven rather than a schedule-driven program. An event-driven approach enables developers to be reasonably certain that their products are more likely to meet established cost, schedule, and performance baselines. For instance, the program delayed CDR—a vehicle for making the determination that a product’s design is stable and capable of meeting its performance requirements—until all subsystem design reviews were held and more than 90 percent of engineering designs had been released. … At the time CDR was held, the program had released 93 percent of its engineering drawings, exceeding the best practice standard for the completion of system integration. According to best practices, a high percentage of design drawings—at least 90 percent—should be completed and released to manufacturing at CDR. Additionally, the program office stated that all 29 major subsystem design reviews were held prior to the start of CDR, and that coded software delivery was ahead of schedule. In the end, the Technical Review Board, the approving authority for CDR, determined that the program was ready to transition to system demonstration—a period when the system as a whole demonstrates its reliability as well as its ability to work in the intended environment—and identified seven action items, none of which were determined by the program office to be critical.

Again, if you can’t receive top-marks on your program from the GAO, at least you’ve got a report saying you’ve recovered from your early problems. Kudos to Sikorsky and the US Marine Corps!

 

Raytheon Builds on Supply Chain Management Successes

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Reminder: Our blog articles are neither sponsored, sanctioned, nor endorsed by The Raytheon Company nor any of our clientele.

From time to time we like to remind readers that even the most compliant cost accounting and contract management means little if the firm’s portfolio of projects is executing poorly. Who cares about FAR and CAS if your project/program is behind schedule, over budget, and missing key quality and technical specifications? Companies that fail to focus on executing the project/programs they have quickly find that it’s difficult to win new work, and when new work dries up even the accountants need to find new employment. Every back-office bean-counter needs to remember that it is the programs that keep people employed.

Once upon a time we were part of a dedicated group focused on examining effective project/program management, and two truisms emerged from our time with that group:

  1. The current environment in which aerospace/defense programs are being executed is significantly different from the environment in which such programs used to be executed during the Cold War and the Space Race.

  2. Many A&D companies—perhaps the vast majority of companies—not only have failed to make the necessary management changes to address the impact of the changed execution environment, they have failed to recognize the significance of the changes.

One of the environmental changes with the most impact to program execution is that the execution of the project/program has migrated from personnel employed by the prime contractor to personnel employed by first-tier (and lower tier) subcontractors. Thus: the line between project/program management and subcontractor/supplier management has blurred and it may be accurate to say that the distinction no longer matters. We would go farther and say that continuing to make that distinction may actually be counterproductive to effective project/program management.

So, if project/program execution is important, then so is subcontractor/supplier management. In fact, one of the other truisms we learned during our time looking at the issue is that supply chain management may well be the key to program execution success. Which is why we are interested in how companies are transforming their historic supply chain management practices to address issues in the current project/program management environment.

To that end, we’ve published several blog articles on the topic. Use of our site’s search function will lead interested readers to those other articles. About six months ago we discussed the problems Lockheed Martin was dealing with on its THAAD program for the U.S. Missile Defense Agency, and contrasted those problems with the success of Raytheon is winning the Small Diameter Bomb Increment II competitive award.

With respect to Lockheed Martin’s woes, we wrote the following—

Program quality and execution risk cannot be transferred to suppliers. The prime contractor is responsible to the customer for the program. Period. If your attorney counsels otherwise, you should hire another attorney. If your subcontract manager or buyer or procurement specialist tells you that cost or schedule or quality or performance risk has been controlled by pushing it downwards in the supply chain, you should put a better support team in place.



Because you cannot build a wall between team members on a program; you cannot say, ‘This is your responsibility and this is my responsibility.’ You cannot transfer risk; the most you can do is to share it. The more that design information and risk information is shared, and communicated, and managed as a team, the better the outcome. When you treat your suppliers as individual entities that succeed, or fail, on their own, then you will always suboptimize your outcome. That is axiomatic. It is a nearly inviolate law of 21st century program management.



As Lockheed Martin learned to its chagrin.

With respect to Raytheon’s success, we wrote the following—

… Raytheon invested in its supply chain and worked with its suppliers in a partnership to develop common processes and align approaches.



This is how it is done, folks. This is how you build a program team that shares risks and responsibilities, as opposed to an adversarial team where the overall program objectives are subliminated to the needs of the individual business entity.

Well, now we’re back with another story about Raytheon’s supply chain management philosophy. We don’t focus on Raytheon because we know the company; we focus on Raytheon because what’s happening there represents a tangible implementation of the philosophy we have espoused for years. And it’s working for them.

Here’s a recent IndustryWeek article that discussed Raytheon’s supply chain philosophy. It talked about a recent “strategic sourcing initiative” that focuses on common procurement of certain commodities across all the company’s businesses. The article made it seem like that’s some kind of innovative thinking when, quite candidly, it’s old-school. In fact, we noted in an article on “real acquisition reform” that if the U.S. Department of Defense were to implement centralized strategic sourcing and management for acquisition of its titanium, it could save between $100 and $300 million each year. So Raytheon’s preoccupation with centralized procurement and strategic sourcing was just not that interesting to us.


But what was interesting to us was what Raytheon says it want to do with its smaller number of strategic suppliers. The article said—

Eventually, the company plans to consolidate its supply base so it's using a smaller number of key suppliers to purchase commodities. With a smaller, more focused supply base … Raytheon will be able to set expectations on performance and improve enforcement of requirements.



As Raytheon selects key suppliers, the company will share its technology roadmaps with them so all parties are aligned on systems and business plans. Raytheon will provide suppliers with extended inventory visibility by allowing them access to its material requirements planning system. In turn, Raytheon will gain improved visibility to supplier risk issues so it can proactively mitigate potential snags. The company also will increase its use of supplier-managed inventory in the process….

Now that’s cutting-edge supply chain management, in our view.

Raytheon is not simply cutting down the number of suppliers it uses solely to leverage buying power to obtain better prices. Clearly, it’s also seeking to partner with its suppliers, in order to enhance project/program performance. It’s going to share technology roadmaps to create synergies in research and development spending. It’s going to give its suppliers access to its internal MRP system to that delivery timing can be improved. And in turn, it’s going to seek to “gain improved visibility” into “supplier risk issues” so that it can “proactively mitigate potential snags.”

That, gentle readers, is how it’s done.

But before we move on, let’s note another article on “supply chain transformation” authored by the respected Gartner Group. (Note that the Gartner Group site has a .pdf file download that is the meat of their thinking.) Looking at the article and .pdf file, we noted the following (quoted) points for your consideration:

  • [Raytheon] has a process to align engineering and supplier technology road maps, teams focused on reducing product and service complexity, and council-driven collaboration that aligns learning, technology, compliance and import/export requirements. A strong governance process, with steering committees, helps ensure this cross-functional alignment.

  • Raytheon has embedded members of its supply chain team at the earliest stages of the bidding process to ensure synchronization between what is promised and the capability to deliver it. Its integrated product development process has multiple gates commonly found across manufacturing. However, Raytheon has achieved a level of supply chain involvement that expands beyond mere participation to influencing designs that shape demand and mitigate risk.

Finally, the Gartner Group brochure quotes Bill Swanson, Raytheon’s CEO, as saying the following—

"Raytheon's supply chain is quickly becoming a competitive differentiator and strategic advantage for the company. It is an integral part of our focus on delivering strong operating performance for our shareholders and the best value for our customers. Initiatives such as our center-led and cross-functional approach to supplier selection and centralized procurement enable Raytheon to maximize supplier-partner relationships while minimizing variation and risk in our supply base. In addition, an enterprise services approach harnesses the collective strength of Raytheon efficiently while at the same time moving us forward with speed and agility."

Okay, we can all dispense with the flowery advertising language. But when you look at Raytheon’s win rate and improved project/program execution, we bet you’ll have to agree that there’s something happening over at that company.

Something pretty special.

 

Contractor Ineligible Dependent Health Care Costs—The Gift That Keeps on Giving

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Attention interested defense acquisition policymakers and DOD leadership.  This article is for you.  We want to show you what’s wrong with your system.  Here’s an object lesson on how your oversight agencies take a molehill and create a mountain—a mountain that takes hundreds if not thousands of person hours, millions of dollars, and years to undo.
 
We’re talking—once again—about the costs of ineligible dependents who participate in employee healthcare plans in violation of contractor policy.
 
By way of background, we first reported this issue here, way back in August, 2009.  We told you about new “troubling” DCAA audit guidance that “targeted” the unallowable costs associated with ineligible dependents—i.e., employee family members who were covered by contractor healthcare plans even though they were ineligible under plan rules and contractor policy.  
 
We also reported—
 

DCAA auditors ‘should verify that contractors have adequate procedures to ensure payment of insurance premiums or claims are only being made related to employees and their eligible dependents.’  A contractor's failure to have adequate procedures in this area will treated as ‘an internal control deficiency in the contractor's accounting system and a CAS 405 noncompliance, if applicable.’  Further, inclusion of costs related to ineligible dependents/spouses in cost estimates may be treated as inadequacies in the contractor's estimating system.  Previous DCAA audit guidance (MRD 08-PAS-403(R), dated 12/19/2008) directs that a single control objective failure should lead to a recommendation o system inadequacy.  An inadequate estimating system is a nuisance, but an inadequate accounting system can prevent a contractor from receiving any cost-reimbursement contract.  (Ref. FAR 16.301-3(a)(1).)  Accordingly, a threat to the adequacy of a contractor's accounting system internal controls must be taken very seriously.

 
We followed up with this article, in which we noted that DCMA Headquarters, in another example of a continuing ceding of business judgment and authority to DCAA, issued guidance to its contracting officers that healthcare costs associated with ineligible dependents were to be treated as “expressly unallowable” costs.  We opined that the 2002 Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA) decision in General Dynamics (ASBCA No. 49372, reversed on other grounds) established a clear—and difficult to meet—test for determining whether a cost was “expressly unallowable.”  The DCMA direction to its contracting officers not only ignored the ASBCA’s test, it also contradicted other aspects of its own guidance regarding how final indirect cost rates were to be established.
 
Now comes additional DCAA audit guidance, in the form of MRD 11-PAC-002(R), dated February 4, 2011.
 
Here’s what you need to know about DCAA’s more recent audit guidance:
 
  1. A contractor’s inclusion of healthcare costs associated with ineligible dependents in its indirect costs will not only be treated as inclusion of “expressly unallowable” costs, it will also be treated as a noncompliance with Cost Accounting Standard 405.
  2. As part of resolving the CAS noncompliance, contractors must submit a “cost impact proposal” calculating the impact to affected to their CAS-covered contracts.
  3. The cost impact proposal must calculate the impact(s) to all affected contracts for all years in which the contractor included the “expressly unallowable” costs.
  4. By “all years” the DCAA means “all affected years, including years that have had the indirect rates settled (closed years).”
  5. If the contractor’s cost impact proposal “does not include both open and closed years,” then the DCAA auditors should report it as “inadequate for audit.”
  6. If the contractor “refuses to submit an adequate cost impact,” then the auditors will “develop a reasonable estimate of the cost impact (a ROM) and recommend that the Contracting Officer pursue remedies as outlined in FAR 30.605(i) and 30.604(i).”
There are so many problems with the guidance that it’s difficult to muster the patience to even organize the issues in a logical fashion.  To keep us from tearing our hair out or howling at the moon, we’re going to pose our concerns in the form of questions—in a quasi-Socratic dialog kind of thing.
 
Question:  The contractor’s costs associated with ineligible dependents are unallowable because such costs violate its policies and the plan coverage rules.  Why are such costs thought to be expressly unallowable?
 
Question:  If the costs are unallowable because they violate policy and plan rules, can the contractor make such costs allowable by (a) changing its policy and (b) renegotiating plan rules?
 
Question:  Under CAS 416, insurance costs are measured on the basis of (a) premium paid or (b) projected average loss.  Use of actual claims experience or actual claims paid is not an acceptable measurement method, unless the actual experience approximates one of the accepted methods.  Given this—
 
  1. Premium costs are shared between company and employee.  For many companies, the family rate is the highest rate and the number of dependents is irrelevant.  So, what is the company’s share of premium costs associated with ineligible dependents when there are sufficient eligible dependents to qualify for family coverage in any case?
  2. By and large, ineligible dependents are adult children who have reached age 21 without attending college the requisite amount.  What is the incremental premium cost associated with young adults?  Is it higher, or lower, than the premium cost associated with mature adults in their 40’s, 50’s, and/or 60’s?
Question:  Given the forgoing, are the costs associated with ineligible dependents likely to be material in amount, or immaterial, when compared to a company’s costs of providing healthcare coverage to its employees?
 
Question:  If the company can show that the costs of providing healthcare coverage to ineligible dependents is immaterial in amount, when compared to the entirely cost company healthcare costs, can the company then be found to be in noncompliance with CAS 405?  Can any contractor ever be found to be in noncompliance with any Cost Accounting Standard when the amount of cost at question is immaterial in amount?
 
Question:  What is the purpose of negotiating a final indirect cost rate, and “closing” a year to further adjustment, or “closing” a contract to further adjustment, when DCAA and the FAR Councils think that contracts in closed years should be part of a cost impact analysis?
 
Question:  Given that FAR 4.703 states that records must only be retained by a contractor for three years after receipt of final payment associated with its government contracts, why would anybody expect that a contractor would be able to prepare an adequate cost impact proposal for its closed years?
 
Question:  Given that the enabling CAS Board statute reserves the right to interpret CAS regulations exclusively to the CAS Board, what was the statutory basis for the FAR Councils’ 2005 interpretation of the cost impact regulations that required contracts in closed fiscal years to be included in the cost impact proposal?
 
Question:  Where in FAR or CAS is the DCAA given authority to review a contractor’s cost impact analysis for “adequacy”?  Where in the CAS regulations are the criteria for an “adequate” cost impact analysis spelled out?
 
Question:  If the contractor cannot or will not provide sufficient information to calculate a cost impact, how will DCAA calculate its ROM impact?  What level of accuracy do you think DCAA will be able to achieve on its own?
 
Question:  If you are a contractor caught in this swamp bog of bureaucratic bungling, this morass of regulatory misadventure, this mountain from a molehill, this tempest in a teapot, then how to you resolve it—other than by litigation?  If you litigate, how much time and effort will that take?  Who is going to pay for all that?
 
Answer:  This insanity can be stopped, but only if adults step in to supervise the children.  DCMA and DCAA are clearly caught up in “much ado about nothing” and DOD leadership needs to realize the price that is being paid by its contractors, who will have to resolve these issues through the courts—since they see no other avenue available to them.

Contractor Ineligible Dependent Health Care Costs—The Gift That Keeps on Giving

 

 

Attention interested defense acquisition policymakers and DOD leadership. This article is for you. We want to show you what’s wrong with your system. Here’s an object lesson on how your oversight agencies take a molehill and create a mountain—a mountain that takes hundreds if not thousands of person hours, millions of dollars, and years to undo.

 

We’re talking—once again—about the costs of ineligible dependents who participate in employee healthcare plans in violation of contractor policy.

 

By way of background, we first reported this issue here, way back in August, 2009. We told you about new “troubling” DCAA audit guidance that “targeted” the unallowable costs associated with ineligible dependents—i.e., employee family members who were covered by contractor healthcare plans even though they were ineligible under plan rules and contractor policy.

 

We also reported—

 

DCAA auditors ‘should verify that contractors have adequate procedures to ensure payment of insurance premiums or claims are only being made related to employees and their eligible dependents.’  A contractor's failure to have adequate procedures in this area will treated as ‘an internal control deficiency in the contractor's accounting system and a CAS 405 noncompliance, if applicable.’  Further, inclusion of costs related to ineligible dependents/spouses in cost estimates may be treated as inadequacies in the contractor's estimating system.  Previous DCAA audit guidance (MRD 08-PAS-403(R), dated 12/19/2008) directs that a single control objective failure should lead to a recommendation o system inadequacy.  An inadequate estimating system is a nuisance, but an inadequate accounting system can prevent a contractor from receiving any cost-reimbursement contract.  (Ref. FAR 16.301-3(a)(1).)  Accordingly, a threat to the adequacy of a contractor's accounting system internal controls must be taken very seriously.

 

We followed up with this article, in which we noted that DCMA Headquarters, in another example of a continuing ceding of business judgment and authority to DCAA, issued guidance to its contracting officers that healthcare costs associated with ineligible dependents were to be treated as “expressly unallowable” costs. We opined that the 2002 Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA) decision in General Dynamics (ASBCA No. 49372, reversed on other grounds) established a clear—and difficult to meet—test for determining whether a cost was “expressly unallowable.” The DCMA direction to its contracting officers not only ignored the ASBCA’s test, it also contradicted other aspects of its own guidance regarding how final indirect cost rates were to be established.

 

Now comes additional DCAA audit guidance, in the form of MRD 11-PAC-002(R), dated February 4, 2011.

 

Here’s what you need to know about DCAA’s more recent audit guidance:

 

  1. A contractor’s inclusion of healthcare costs associated with ineligible dependents in its indirect costs will not only be treated as inclusion of “expressly unallowable” costs, it will also be treated as a noncompliance with Cost Accounting Standard 405.

  2. As part of resolving the CAS noncompliance, contractors must submit a “cost impact proposal” calculating the impact to affected to their CAS-covered contracts.

  3. The cost impact proposal must calculate the impact(s) to all affected contracts for all years in which the contractor included the “expressly unallowable” costs.

  4. By “all years” the DCAA means “all affected years, including years that have had the indirect rates settled (closed years).”

  5. If the contractor’s cost impact proposal “does not include both open and closed years,” then the DCAA auditors should report it as “inadequate for audit.”

  6. If the contractor “refuses to submit an adequate cost impact,” then the auditors will “develop a reasonable estimate of the cost impact (a ROM) and recommend that the Contracting Officer pursue remedies as outlined in FAR 30.605(i) and 30.604(i).”

 

There are so many problems with the guidance that it’s difficult to muster the patience to even organize the issues in a logical fashion. To keep us from tearing our hair out or howling at the moon, we’re going to pose our concerns in the form of questions—in a quasi-Socratic dialog kind of thing.

 

Question: The contractor’s costs associated with ineligible dependents are unallowable because such costs violate its policies and the plan coverage rules. Why are such costs thought to be expressly unallowable?

 

Question: If the costs are unallowable because they violate policy and plan rules, can the contractor make such costs allowable by (a) changing its policy and (b) renegotiating plan rules?

 

Question: Under CAS 416, insurance costs are measured on the basis of (a) premium paid or (b) projected average loss. Use of actual claims experience or actual claims paid is not an acceptable measurement method, unless the actual experience approximates one of the accepted methods. Given this—

 

  1. Premium costs are shared between company and employee. For many companies, the family rate is the highest rate and the number of dependents is irrelevant. So, what is the company’s share of premium costs associated with ineligible dependents when there are sufficient eligible dependents to qualify for family coverage in any case?

  2. By and large, ineligible dependents are adult children who have reached age 21 without attending college the requisite amount. What is the incremental premium cost associated with young adults? Is it higher, or lower, than the premium cost associated with mature adults in their 40’s, 50’s, and/or 60’s?

 

Question: Given the forgoing, are the costs associated with ineligible dependents likely to be material in amount, or immaterial, when compared to a company’s costs of providing healthcare coverage to its employees?

 

Question: If the company can show that the costs of providing healthcare coverage to ineligible dependents is immaterial in amount, when compared to the entirely cost company healthcare costs, can the company then be found to be in noncompliance with CAS 405? Can any contractor ever be found to be in noncompliance with any Cost Accounting Standard when the amount of cost at question is immaterial in amount?

 

Question: What is the purpose of negotiating a final indirect cost rate, and “closing” a year to further adjustment, or “closing” a contract to further adjustment, when DCAA and the FAR Councils think that contracts in closed years should be part of a cost impact analysis?

 

Question: Given that FAR 4.703 states that records must only be retained by a contractor for three years after receipt of final payment associated with its government contracts, why would anybody expect that a contractor would be able to prepare an adequate cost impact proposal for its closed years?

 

Question: Given that the enabling CAS Board statute reserves the right to interpret CAS regulations exclusively to the CAS Board, what was the statutory basis for the FAR Councils’ 2005 interpretation of the cost impact regulations that required contracts in closed fiscal years to be included in the cost impact proposal?

 

Question: Where in FAR or CAS is the DCAA given authority to review a contractor’s cost impact analysis for “adequacy”? Where in the CAS regulations are the criteria for an “adequate” cost impact analysis spelled out?

 

Question: If the contractor cannot or will not provide sufficient information to calculate a cost impact, how will DCAA calculate its ROM impact? What level of accuracy do you think DCAA will be able to achieve on its own?

 

Question: If you are a contractor caught in this swamp bog of bureaucratic bungling, this morass of regulatory misadventure, this mountain from a molehill, this tempest in a teapot, then how to you resolve it—other than by litigation? If you litigate, how much time and effort will that take? Who is going to pay for all that?

 

Answer: This insanity can be stopped, but only if adults step in to supervise the children. DCMA and DCAA are clearly caught up in “much ado about nothing” and DOD leadership needs to realize the price that is being paid by its contractors, who will have to resolve these issues through the courts—since they see no other avenue available to them.

 

 

 

MARK:

 

On “here” link to: http://www.apogeeconsulting.biz/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=108:new-dcaa-audit-guidance-targets-contractors-unallowable-health-benefit-costs&catid=1:latest-news&Itemid=55

 

On “this article” link to: http://www.apogeeconsulting.biz/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=444:update-dcma-agrees-with-dcaa-that-some-contractor-health-care-costs-are-expressly-unallowable&catid=1:latest-news&Itemid=55

 

On “MRD 11-PAC-002(R)” link to: DCAA MRD – Contractor Ineligible Healthcare Costs.pdf file attached

 

 

Contractor Ineligible Dependent Health Care Costs—The Gift That Keeps on Giving
 
 
Attention interested defense acquisition policymakers and DOD leadership.  This article is for you.  We want to show you what’s wrong with your system.  Here’s an object lesson on how your oversight agencies take a molehill and create a mountain—a mountain that takes hundreds if not thousands of person hours, millions of dollars, and years to undo.
 
We’re talking—once again—about the costs of ineligible dependents who participate in employee healthcare plans in violation of contractor policy.
 
By way of background, we first reported this issue here, way back in August, 2009.  We told you about new “troubling” DCAA audit guidance that “targeted” the unallowable costs associated with ineligible dependents—i.e., employee family members who were covered by contractor healthcare plans even though they were ineligible under plan rules and contractor policy.  
 
We also reported—
 

DCAA auditors ‘should verify that contractors have adequate procedures to ensure payment of insurance premiums or claims are only being made related to employees and their eligible dependents.’  A contractor's failure to have adequate procedures in this area will treated as ‘an internal control deficiency in the contractor's accounting system and a CAS 405 noncompliance, if applicable.’  Further, inclusion of costs related to ineligible dependents/spouses in cost estimates may be treated as inadequacies in the contractor's estimating system.  Previous DCAA audit guidance (MRD 08-PAS-403(R), dated 12/19/2008) directs that a single control objective failure should lead to a recommendation o system inadequacy.  An inadequate estimating system is a nuisance, but an inadequate accounting system can prevent a contractor from receiving any cost-reimbursement contract.  (Ref. FAR 16.301-3(a)(1).)  Accordingly, a threat to the adequacy of a contractor's accounting system internal controls must be taken very seriously.

 
We followed up with this article, in which we noted that DCMA Headquarters, in another example of a continuing ceding of business judgment and authority to DCAA, issued guidance to its contracting officers that healthcare costs associated with ineligible dependents were to be treated as “expressly unallowable” costs.  We opined that the 2002 Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA) decision in General Dynamics (ASBCA No. 49372, reversed on other grounds) established a clear—and difficult to meet—test for determining whether a cost was “expressly unallowable.”  The DCMA direction to its contracting officers not only ignored the ASBCA’s test, it also contradicted other aspects of its own guidance regarding how final indirect cost rates were to be established.
 
Now comes additional DCAA audit guidance, in the form of MRD 11-PAC-002(R), dated February 4, 2011.
 
Here’s what you need to know about DCAA’s more recent audit guidance:
 
  1. A contractor’s inclusion of healthcare costs associated with ineligible dependents in its indirect costs will not only be treated as inclusion of “expressly unallowable” costs, it will also be treated as a noncompliance with Cost Accounting Standard 405.
  2. As part of resolving the CAS noncompliance, contractors must submit a “cost impact proposal” calculating the impact to affected to their CAS-covered contracts.
  3. The cost impact proposal must calculate the impact(s) to all affected contracts for all years in which the contractor included the “expressly unallowable” costs.
  4. By “all years” the DCAA means “all affected years, including years that have had the indirect rates settled (closed years).”
  5. If the contractor’s cost impact proposal “does not include both open and closed years,” then the DCAA auditors should report it as “inadequate for audit.”
  6. If the contractor “refuses to submit an adequate cost impact,” then the auditors will “develop a reasonable estimate of the cost impact (a ROM) and recommend that the Contracting Officer pursue remedies as outlined in FAR 30.605(i) and 30.604(i).”

 
There are so many problems with the guidance that it’s difficult to muster the patience to even organize the issues in a logical fashion.  To keep us from tearing our hair out or howling at the moon, we’re going to pose our concerns in the form of questions—in a quasi-Socratic dialog kind of thing.
 
Question:  The contractor’s costs associated with ineligible dependents are unallowable because such costs violate its policies and the plan coverage rules.  Why are such costs thought to be expressly unallowable?
 
Question:  If the costs are unallowable because they violate policy and plan rules, can the contractor make such costs allowable by (a) changing its policy and (b) renegotiating plan rules?
 
Question:  Under CAS 416, insurance costs are measured on the basis of (a) premium paid or (b) projected average loss.  Use of actual claims experience or actual claims paid is not an acceptable measurement method, unless the actual experience approximates one of the accepted methods.  Given this—
 
  1. Premium costs are shared between company and employee.  For many companies, the family rate is the highest rate and the number of dependents is irrelevant.  So, what is the company’s share of premium costs associated with ineligible dependents when there are sufficient eligible dependents to qualify for family coverage in any case?
  2. By and large, ineligible dependents are adult children who have reached age 21 without attending college the requisite amount.  What is the incremental premium cost associated with young adults?  Is it higher, or lower, than the premium cost associated with mature adults in their 40’s, 50’s, and/or 60’s?

 
Question:  Given the forgoing, are the costs associated with ineligible dependents likely to be material in amount, or immaterial, when compared to a company’s costs of providing healthcare coverage to its employees?
 
Question:  If the company can show that the costs of providing healthcare coverage to ineligible dependents is immaterial in amount, when compared to the entirely cost company healthcare costs, can the company then be found to be in noncompliance with CAS 405?  Can any contractor ever be found to be in noncompliance with any Cost Accounting Standard when the amount of cost at question is immaterial in amount?
 
Question:  What is the purpose of negotiating a final indirect cost rate, and “closing” a year to further adjustment, or “closing” a contract to further adjustment, when DCAA and the FAR Councils think that contracts in closed years should be part of a cost impact analysis?
 
Question:  Given that FAR 4.703 states that records must only be retained by a contractor for three years after receipt of final payment associated with its government contracts, why would anybody expect that a contractor would be able to prepare an adequate cost impact proposal for its closed years?
 
Question:  Given that the enabling CAS Board statute reserves the right to interpret CAS regulations exclusively to the CAS Board, what was the statutory basis for the FAR Councils’ 2005 interpretation of the cost impact regulations that required contracts in closed fiscal years to be included in the cost impact proposal?
 
Question:  Where in FAR or CAS is the DCAA given authority to review a contractor’s cost impact analysis for “adequacy”?  Where in the CAS regulations are the criteria for an “adequate” cost impact analysis spelled out?
 
Question:  If the contractor cannot or will not provide sufficient information to calculate a cost impact, how will DCAA calculate its ROM impact?  What level of accuracy do you think DCAA will be able to achieve on its own?
 
Question:  If you are a contractor caught in this swamp bog of bureaucratic bungling, this morass of regulatory misadventure, this mountain from a molehill, this tempest in a teapot, then how to you resolve it—other than by litigation?  If you litigate, how much time and effort will that take?  Who is going to pay for all that?
 
Answer:  This insanity can be stopped, but only if adults step in to supervise the children.  DCMA and DCAA are clearly caught up in “much ado about nothing” and DOD leadership needs to realize the price that is being paid by its contractors, who will have to resolve these issues through the courts—since they see no other avenue available to them.
 
 
 
MARK:
 
On “here” link to:  http://www.apogeeconsulting.biz/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=108:new-dcaa-audit-guidance-targets-contractors-unallowable-health-benefit-costs&catid=1:latest-news&Itemid=55
 
On “this article” link to:  http://www.apogeeconsulting.biz/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=444:update-dcma-agrees-with-dcaa-that-some-contractor-health-care-costs-are-expressly-unallowable&catid=1:latest-news&Itemid=55
 
On “MRD 11-PAC-002(R)” link to:  DCAA MRD – Contractor Ineligible Healthcare Costs.pdf file attached
 
 
 

Think Pieces

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And now, for something completely different ….

We are working on a rather longish article at the moment. It may not be ready for a while. But in the meantime, we wanted to share the thoughtful blog posts of others. These pieces are not necessarily about government contracting matters. Some contain bad words. Some may espouse political positions with which you are in strong disagreement.

Still, we think each is worthy of your time. Each is a thoughtful piece, well-written and full of challenging concepts. Check them out and see if you agree.

Jim Wright, Master of Stonekettle Station. Jim is a retired U.S. Navy Chief Warrant Officer who lives in Alaska, roughly 8 miles from Sarah Palin’s house.

In this article, which went viral across Facebook, Jim explores the phenomenon of people who say they love America but show by word and deed how much of America they really hate.

In this follow-up article, Jim answers critics who challenged him to discuss what he loved about America.

John Scalzi, Proprietor of Whatever. John is an author, blogger, and currently serves as President of the Science Fiction Writers of America. Whatever is one of the oldest and most popular blogs on the Internet.

In this popular article, John discusses differences between the haves and have-nots of America, and the impact of tax increases (both perceived and real) on the well-to-do set.

In this short but poignant article, John explores difficulties faced by so many of us, each day—difficulties that we need to consider when we interact with others.

Okay, for those of you who want something—anything—related to government contracts, here’s Vern Edwards, blogging on WIFCON. WIFCON, of course, is a must-read site for anybody into government contracting matters. Vern, of course, is the master of government contracting advice—alternately stern, acerbic, frustrated, and fatherly, often he is quite literally the last word in WIFCON’s discussion forum.

In this absolutely must-read article, Vern provides 14 tips to would-be government contractors.

Here’s a very helpful article on the real nature of the United States Code.

Finally, here’s a text of a speech that Vern gave to Air Force Space Command, Space and Missile Systems Center.

Okay, we’re getting back to work on our pièce de résistance, to be published as soon as we can polish it off. Until then, consider the words of these other authors ….

 

FAR Revisions Add More Difficulties to Use of Other than Firm, Fixed-Price Contracts

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Public Law 110-417—better known as The Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) of 2009—was enacted into law on October 14, 2008. That was more than two-and-a-half years before the date of this article.

October, 2008. Only 36 months ago, but it might as well be a different era.

Back then, Wall Street and various financial institutions were in the first stages of a months-long meltdown and Congress had just passed the first “bailout” package. General Petraeus had just been appointed to lead CENTCOM. And a couple of Presidential candidates were in the midst of slugging through the last days of a bruising battle.

To be clear then, P.L. 110-417 was the final NDAA of President Bush’s eight-year term as President. It reflects the lessons learned from nearly seven years of the Global War on Terror, including the sojourn in Iraq and the difficulties in Afghanistan. And it reflects the sensibilities of a partisan battle led by Representative Henry Waxman on the alleged waste, fraud, and abuse of the Bush Administration’s spending priorities—particularly DOD spending on its efforts in Southwest Asia.

So what does this bit of ancient history have to do with us today? Well, among other things, the FAR Council is just getting around to implementing some of the requirements established by that Public Law.

One of the interesting provisions of the 2008 NDAA was Section 864, entitled, “Regulations on the Use of Cost-Reimbursement Contracts.” Section 864 said (in part)—

(a) In General- Not later than 270 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Federal Acquisition Regulation shall be revised to address the use of cost-reimbursement contracts.

(b) Content- The regulations promulgated under subsection (a) shall include, at a minimum, guidance regarding--

(1) when and under what circumstances cost-reimbursement contracts are appropriate;

(2) the acquisition plan findings necessary to support a decision to use cost-reimbursement contracts; and

(3) the acquisition workforce resources necessary to award and manage cost-reimbursement contracts.

(c) Inspector General Review- Not later than one year after the regulations required by subsection (a) are promulgated, the Inspector General for each executive agency shall review the use of cost-reimbursement contracts by such agency for compliance with such regulations and shall include the results of the review in the Inspector General's next semiannual report.

The foregoing seems fairly straightforward. As Representative Waxman, commented, “Section 864 requires regulations to address the use of cost-reimbursement-type contracts.” How hard could that be to misinterpret?

Well, here’s the FAR Councils’ interim rule intended to implement Section 864—what do you think?

Let’s first note that the FAR Councils believed that the numerous revisions to the FAR connected with this rule needed to be implemented on an interim basis, without benefit of public comment on a proposed rule, because of “urgent and compelling reasons”—including the fact that they had dawdled so long over the rule that the Inspector General was in danger of not being able to conduct its required compliance review in time to get any findings into its next semi-annual report.

And when we say “numerous revisions,” we mean it. Despite the seemingly straightforward nature of the law, the FAR Councils felt the need to revise the following FAR provisions—

  • 1.602

  • 1.603

  • 1.604

  • 2.101

  • 7.102

  • 7.103

  • 7.104

  • 7.105

  • 16.103

  • 16.104

  • 16.301

  • 32.1007

  • 43.302

  • 50.205

Interestingly enough, the FAR Councils also saw fit to go beyond the requirements of the Public Law, in order to require that contracting officers justify the use of any contract type other than firm, fixed price type. For example, FAR 16.103 (Negotiating Contract Type) was revised to read as follows—

(1) Each contract file shall include documentation to show why the particular contract type was selected. This shall be documented in the acquisition plan, or if a written acquisition plan is not required, in the contract file.

(i) Explain why the contract type selected must be used to meet the agency need.

(ii) Discuss the Government's additional risks and the burden to manage the contract type selected (e.g., when a cost-reimbursement contract is selected, the Government incurs additional cost risks, and the Government has the additional burden of managing the contractor's costs). For such instances, acquisition personnel shall discuss--

(A) How the Government identified the additional risks (e.g., pre-award survey, or past performance information);

(B) The nature of the additional risks (e.g., inadequate contractor's accounting system, weaknesses in contractor's internal control, non-compliance with Cost Accounting Standards, or lack of or inadequate earned value management system); and

(C) How the Government will manage and mitigate the risks.

(iii) Discuss the Government resources necessary to properly plan for, award, and administer the contract type selected (e.g., resources needed and the additional risks to the Government if adequate resources are not provided).

(iv) For other than a firm-fixed price contract, at a minimum the documentation should include--

(A) An analysis of why the use of other than a firm-fixed-price contract (e.g., cost reimbursement, time and materials, labor hour) is appropriate;

(B) Rationale that detail the particular facts and circumstances

(e.g., complexity of the requirements, uncertain duration of the work, contractor's technical capability and financial responsibility, or adequacy of the contractor's accounting system), and associated reasoning essential to support the contract type selection;

(C) An assessment regarding the adequacy of Government resources that are necessary to properly plan for, award, and administer other than firm-fixed-price contracts; and

(D) A discussion of the actions planned to minimize the use of other than firm-fixed-price contracts on future acquisitions for the same requirement and to transition to firm-fixed-price contracts to the maximum extent practicable.

(v) A discussion of why a level-of-effort, price redetermination, or fee provision was included.

(2) Exceptions to the requirements at (d)(1) of this section are--

(i) Fixed-price acquisitions made under simplified acquisition procedures;

(ii) Contracts on a firm-fixed-price basis other than those for major systems or research and development; and

(iii) Awards on the set-aside portion of sealed bid partial set-asides for small business.

In the foregoing quotation, note that the government has helpfully listed risks associated with other than firm, fixed price contracts. Let’s bring them down here for clarity, in case you skimmed over the language of the interim rule. Risks to be considered include:

  • Inadequate contractor's accounting system,

  • Weaknesses in contractor's internal control,

  • Non-compliance with Cost Accounting Standards, or

  • Lack of or inadequate earned value management system

As you ponder the list above, ask yourself just which government oversight agency will be determining the exact level of contract-related risk for any particular contractor. If you answered, “The DCAA,” then give yourself a prize. Yes, indeed, that same audit agency criticized by the Government Accountability Office and the DOD Inspector General for widespread and systemic audit quality failures concerning assessments of contractor internal control systems will be positioned to deny contractors awards of new contracts, if said contracts are other than firm, fixed price.

We’re sure that will work out well.

The FAR Councils seem to have anticipated our concerns. They wrote—

The Councils recognize that assigning adequate and proper resources to support the solicitation, award, and administration of other than firm-fixed-price contracts (cost-reimbursement, time-and-material, and labor-hour) contract is challenging. There is also great concern that a lack of involvement in contract oversight by program offices is primarily present in other than firm-fixed-price contracts.

The FAR Councils proposed a solution to the problem of inadequate resources. The solution is—

The Councils consider that greater accountability for the management and oversight of all contracts, especially other than firm-fixed-price contracts, can be gained and improved by requiring that properly trained CORs or COTRs … be appointed before award.

So that’s the solution. According to the FAR Councils, having more Contracting Officer Representatives and Contracting Officer Technical Representatives will ensure that the enumerated risks associated with other than firm, fixed-price contractors are effectively mitigated. Yeah, sure they will.

But we’re not done yet. Before we move on, let’s note another aspect of the interim rule.

Formerly, FAR 16.301-3 established the requirements for use of a cost-reimbursement contract. Prior to this rule, there were two primary requirements: (1) The contractor’s accounting system had to be adequate for account for contract costs, and (2) The government had to have adequate surveillance during contractor performance in order to assure that the contractor was performing in a reasonable efficient and effective manner. Now, FAR 16.301-3 reads as follows—

(a) A cost-reimbursement contract may be used only when-

(1) The factors in 16.104 have been considered;

(2) A written acquisition plan has been approved and signed at least one level above the contracting officer;

(3) The contractor’s accounting system is adequate for determining costs applicable to the contract; and

(4) Adequate Government resources are available to award and manage a contract other than firm-fixed-priced (see 7.104(e)) including—

(i) Designation of at least one contracting officer’s representative (COR) qualified in accordance with 1.602-2 has been made prior to award of the contract or order; and

(ii) Appropriate Government surveillance during performance to provide reasonable assurance that efficient methods and effective cost controls are used.

(b) The use of cost-reimbursement contracts is prohibited for the acquisition of commercial items (see Parts 2 and 12).

That doesn’t sound too bad until you take a look at the factors in 16.104. Among the twelve (12) factors discussed (which must be “considered” by the contracting officer), note this little gem—

(i) Adequacy of the contractor's accounting system. Before agreeing on a contract type other than firm-fixed-price, the contracting officer shall ensure that the contractor’s accounting system will permit timely development of all necessary cost data in the form required by the proposed contract type. This factor may be critical-

(1) When the contract type requires price revision while performance is in progress; or

(2) When a cost-reimbursement contract is being considered and all current or past experience with the contractor has been on a fixed-price basis. See 42.302(a)(12).

Stay with us here. Note that the last sentence directs contracting officers over to the regulations at 42.302(a)(12). Here’s what that bit says—

(12) Determine the adequacy of the contractor’s accounting system. The contractor’s accounting system should be adequate during the entire period of contract performance. The adequacy of the contractor’s accounting system and its associated internal control system, as well as contractor compliance with the Cost Accounting Standards (CAS), affect the quality and validity of the contractor data upon which the Government must rely for its management oversight of the contractor and contract performance.

Note the part we italicized for emphasis: “The contractor’s accounting system should be adequate during the entire period of contract performance.” What might that sentence mean?

Quite frankly, we’re not entirely sure what that sentence means. But consider this. Assume that DCAA issues an accounting system audit report identifying deficiencies in the contractor’s system, or weaknesses in its internal controls. Assume further that the contractor will submit a corrective action plan to remediate those deficiencies. Assume further that the Administrative Contracting Officer will have to decide whether the contractor’s corrective action plan will mitigate the government’s risk and that the system can be deemed “adequate pending implementation of corrective actions,” or if it will be deemed “inadequate” and payment withholds will be initiated. This is, of course, a very likely scenario, and one faced by many contactors today, with more to follow when the DFARS “business system” rule is finally issued.

Well, given the foregoing, we think that little sentence might just mean that no contractor’s accounting system can be considered adequate for other than firm, fixed-price contracts until all corrective actions have been implemented and until DCAA has issued a follow-up audit report telling the contracting officer that the contractor no longer has any system deficiencies and/or internal control weaknesses. In other words, one adverse DCAA audit report can be a death sentence for new contract awards, if those awards were to be on other than a firm, fixed-price basis.

What do you think? Do you think the FAR Councils went beyond Congress’ intent and overreached? Did they establish requirements for which existing resources are inadequate? Did they give too much power to DCAA to the detriment of the contracting process?

Despite the fact that the revisions were promulgated as an interim rule, the FAR Councils are still seeking public input. (The rule, link above, explains how to submit comments.) If you share our concerns with the interim rule revisions, perhaps you will be motivated to submit comments to the FAR Councils.

 


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Newsflash

Effective January 1, 2019, Nick Sanders has been named as Editor of two reference books published by LexisNexis. The first book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Cost Accounting Standards. Nick replaces Darrell Oyer, who has edited those books for many years.