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Apogee Consulting Inc

Internal and External Auditors Under Fire by Defense Contractors

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Here are a couple of stories about auditors—both internal and external—and how they can impact a company’s operations in somewhat unexpected ways. Both stories involve Big 4 auditor Deloitte—currently ranked the “biggest of the Big 4” audit and professional service firms—but there are also other players, as you shall see.

First, we want to discuss the case of two Boeing whistleblowers. Unlike the typical whistleblower we discuss on our blog, their allegations had nothing to do with violations of the False Claims Act or defective pricing. Instead, these two Internal Auditors were concerned with Boeing’s “potential Sarbanes-Oxley violations”. According to this story at ComplianceWeek.com, the two Boeing employees alleged that—

[Boeing] feared its external audit firm, Deloitte & Touche, would find a material weakness in internal control over financial reporting. The two [whistleblowers] told the court that managers created a hostile work environment and pressured internal auditors to issue positive findings.

More specifically—

The [two internal] auditors said they began expressing their concerns over potential Sarbanes-Oxley violations to supervisors in February 2007, especially their discomfort with the authority given to PricewaterhouseCoopers, which was hired to support the internal audit function. Neumann and Tides believed PwC auditors were too deep in the design and audit of controls, and they believed the software system for recording audit results wasn't adequately secure.

Apparently, Boeing did not heed their concerns. Frankly, if that’s all they had, we would have turned a deaf ear as well. If Deloitte was the external auditor, then we can’t see how having PwC (or pwc as it’s now branded) involved in the company’s SOX preparations would have caused any conflicts for Boeing.

(Though we note one of the issues was that PwC was acting both as Boeing’s outsourced internal auditor and as the company’s SOX controls documenter at the same time, which might be construed as a potential conflict of interest—but we think only if PwC was going to test the SOX controls as part of its internal audit work. Otherwise, not too big of a deal in our view.)

Having failed to persuade company management to heed their concerns, the two internal auditors next turned to the public media, “which led to a news article in July [2007] asserting the company threatened employees, manipulated audit results, and was susceptible to theft and fraud.”

We Googled the three 2007 articles in the Seattle Post-Intelligencer. What’s rather unusual about the articles is that two of them consist of Boeing’s written responses to questions posed by the reporters. Here are some links in case you are interested:

  1. Boeing’s responses, Round One.

  2. Boeing’s responses, Round Two.

  3. The newspaper discusses 5,000 Boeing documents it reviewed

In the third Seattle P-I article linked to in the above list, the newspaper reported—

Among the problems the P-I found:

  • Boeing's internal audit findings were so poor -- meaning that so many computer system controls were failing or evidence was missing -- that external auditor Deloitte & Touche decided not to rely on the results for three consecutive years.

  • Boeing exposed sensitive information about computer systems' holes to employees who did not need access to all of the data, according to e-mails and interviews.

  • An internal complaint was filed with the company's ethics board that audit results had been manipulated. The company decided last September that the allegation was unsubstantiated.

  • Some employees involved in the compliance process perceived a threatening culture. A late 2006 internal report said that employees felt they were being told that their jobs and salaries were "on the line," and they were being pressured to produce evidence for audits "ahead of events occurring normally.

The newspaper reported that—

In 2006 alone, Sarbanes-Oxley compliance cost Boeing $55 million, according to the company -- about the list price of one new 737 plane. A lot of that money has gone to the external auditor, Deloitte, and other large accounting firms that helped with its internal audit, including PricewaterhouseCoopers and Jefferson Wells.

Despite all the fees paid (or perhaps because of the fees?), the newspaper reported that Deloitte gave Boeing’s SOX controls “a clean bill of health.” In the next breath, the newspaper noted that—

When it comes to telling shareholders all that it should, Deloitte does not have a spotless record, according to government records.

 

The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, which was created by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, inspects audit firms by reviewing samples of their work.

 

In the three reports the board has published on Deloitte, it has questioned dozens of decisions that made audit results appear rosier. In 2006, the board criticized one Deloitte audit for certifying information technology controls that the firm had not sufficiently tested. The company being audited was not identified, and Boeing said it was not the firm.

Based on the internal details reported in the Seattle Post-Intelligencer articles, it seems self-evident that one or more Boeing employees had provided quite a bit of company documents. The two Boeing Internal Auditors (Neumann and Tides) were fired for violating the company’s communication policy.

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found that, although the Sarbanes-Oxley Act does protect whistleblowers, it only protects disclosures to certain recipients—and the public news media was not one of the three recipients listed in the statute. Thus, the two Internal Auditors could not avail themselves of the SOX whistleblower protections.

Whew. Despite the newspaper’s insinuations, we cannot find any indication that Deloitte or Boeing engaged in any wrongdoing. But stay tuned for the next story, and then we’ll try to tie it all together.

The second story also involves Deloitte. In this story, defense contractor Navistar reportedly sued Deloitte on April 27, 2001, for $500 million in damages, alleging “fraud, fraudulent concealment, breach of contract and malpractice” related to audits performed between 2002 and 2005.

What’s the real issue? Well, according to the story—

‘Deloitte lied to Navistar and, on information and belief, to Deloitte's other audit clients, as to the competency of its audit and accounting services,’ the Warrenville-based truckmaker alleged in its complaint.

Deloitte, to no one’s surprise, denied the allegations. The story reported—

Jonathan Gandal, a spokesman for Deloitte, said Navistar's claims lack merit and that the firm would vigorously defend itself.

 

‘A preliminary review shows it to be an utterly false and reckless attempt to try to shift responsibility for the wrongdoing of Navistar's own management. Several members of Navistar's past or present management team were sanctioned by the SEC for the very matters alleged in the complaint.’


The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission last year said the truck company had resolved an agency investigation into its accounting practices under which Navistar wasn't required to admit or deny the SEC's findings.

 

‘Navistar had numerous deficiencies throughout its system of internal controls during the relevant period, including fifteen material'

weaknesses during 2005-06 that were attributable, in part, to the company's failure to dedicate sufficient resources to those controls,’ according to the SEC.

Chief Executive Officer Daniel Ustian agreed to surrender to Navistar shares worth $1.3 million, while former Chief Financial Officer Robert C. Lannert consented to repay $1.05 million, each sum reflecting monetary bonuses they'd received during the restatement period, the SEC said. Four other company executives paid civil penalties without admitting liability.

To clarify, in addition to making trucks, Navistar also makes about $2 billion per year from selling mine-resistant ambush-protected (MRAP) vehicles to the DOD. In 2008, it was ranked as the 10th largest defense contractor in America.

But let’s get back to Navistar’s allegations of Deloitte wrongdoing. In this opinion piece over at “Fraud Files,” Tracy Coenen explores the issue. She writes—

The lawyers say Deloitte lied about its competency in performing audits, and the company ultimately restated its financial statements for 2002 through 2005.  Whose fault is it that Navistar overstated its pre-tax income by $137 [million] during those years? According to them, Deloitte.


Navistar employees buried their fraud in accounts that are easy to manipulate, and the task of hiding the fraud from the auditors isn’t too hard either. The fraud was hidden in accounts such as vendor rebates, warranty reserve, vendor buybacks, and other income. …


Navistar’s story about the fraud seems to keep changing. Early on in the case, the company denied wrongdoing and said the problem was with ‘complicated’ rules under Sarbanes-Oxley. I’m not sure how SOX is to blame for management having secret side agreements with its suppliers who received ‘rebates.’ Or improperly booking income from tooling buyback agreements, while not booking expenses related to the tooling. Or not booking adequate warranty reserves. Or failing to record certain project costs.


And now the company says Deloitte is to blame. …


In the case of Navistar, each of the fraudulent accounting schemes above are nearly impossible to detect. The company failed to book items or provide information about them to the auditors, yet they are suing the auditors for failing to find the items.


Ouch! Tracy does have a way with words, doesn’t she?

Superficially, these are two stories involving (if only tangentially) Sarbanes-Oxley, Deloitte, and internal control issues. And they both involve auditors of one sort or another. But to us, the real connection is what’s missing from each of the stories.

Where was DCAA?

Boeing is the largest aircraft maker in America and one of the perennial Top 3 defense contractors. Navistar was a Top 10 defense contractor. Each had allegations of failed internal controls. Navistar had a public restatement of its financial statements and some of its executives were fined by the SEC. To us, that sounds “high risk” and, potentially, a control environment that would make one wonder how the company could qualify as a “responsible” contractor eligible for new contract awards.

We have internal auditors involved in (unprotected) whistleblowing. We have investigative journalism. We have SEC investigations. Yet we never hear or read about DCAA uncovering these (alleged) control failures or secret supplier rebates. We never hear about DCAA auditors making Form 2000 referrals to the Department of Justice. We don’t hear about suspension or debarment proceedings. In fact, POGO’s Federal Contractor Misconduct Database has zero listings regarding any fines or penalties (or settlements) related to Navistar’s DOD contracts. Nothing. There is no report of Navistar having any problems with DOD.

Just to be sure, we did a quick review of Navistar’s 2010 Annual Report, and we did not notice any listing of pending litigation related to the U.S. Government. Nada.

(And for that matter, we are unaware that DCAA has ever alleged that Boeing has an inadequate Information Technology system because of its long-lived IT control “deficiencies”. But we also have to admit we probably wouldn’t know of any issues unless they came to light during litigation.)

We see these two stories as being illustrative of huge, neon-colored red flags that one would expect would bring DCAA down on these contractors—especially Navistar—like the proverbial ton of bricks. And perhaps, in the background, DCAA auditors are even now quietly and patiently waiting for their management to give them the approval to issue the audit reports or Forms 2000 that will address these issues. But right now it seems like the DCAA auditors, whose job it is to protect taxpayers from fraud and waste connected with DOD contracts, are missing in action.

 

Can One Commit Defective Pricing on a “No-Bid” Contract?

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This one is a puzzler ….

Headquartered in Newark, New Jersey, Ultralife is a multi-national engineering and manufacturing firm specializing in high-tech power and communications systems, as well as more prosaic battery and battery charger products. On April 29, 2011, the company filed a Form 8-K with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), in which it announced that it had recorded a $2.7 million charge against First Quarter 2011 earnings, based on reaching an “settlement-in-principle” with the U.S. Department of Justice related to what appears to be allegations of defective pricing on three “exigent, non-bid contracts with the U.S. government.”

The Form 8-K reported that—

In September 2005, the Defense Contracting Audit Agency presented its findings related to its audits of the three exigent contracts and suggested a potential pricing adjustment of $1.4 million related to reductions in the cost of materials that occurred prior to the final negotiation of these contracts. … Under applicable federal law, the Company may have been subject to treble damages and penalties associated with the potential pricing adjustment.  In light of the uncertainty, the Company decided to enter into discussions with the government in April to negotiate a settlement.

We looked at the most recent Annual Report available to the public (for FY 2010) and noted that the U.S. Department of Defense comprised 11 percent of Ultralife’s total sales (down from 26% in the prior year). We did not find any discussion of the issue(s) noted above in the financial statement footnotes related to legal matters. However, in the section entitled “Potential Commitments” we found the following discussion—

We had certain ‘exigent’, non-bid contracts with the U.S. government, which were subject to audit and final price adjustment, which resulted in decreased margins compared with the original terms of the contracts. As of December 31, 2010, there were no outstanding exigent contracts with the government. As part of its due diligence, the government has conducted post-audits of the completed exigent contracts to ensure that information used in supporting the pricing of exigent contracts did not differ materially from actual results. In September 2005, the Defense Contracting Audit Agency (‘DCAA’) presented its findings related to the audits of three of the exigent contracts, suggesting a potential pricing adjustment of approximately $1,400 [$1.4 million] related to reductions in the cost of materials that occurred prior to the final negotiation of these contracts. We have reviewed these audit reports, have submitted our response to these audits and believe, taken as a whole, the proposed audit adjustments can be offset with the consideration of other compensating cost increases that occurred prior to the final negotiation of the contracts. While we believe that potential exposure exists relating to any final negotiation of these proposed adjustments, we cannot reasonably estimate what, if any, adjustment may result when finalized. In addition, in June 2007, we received a request from the Office of Inspector General of the Department of Defense (‘DoD IG’) seeking certain information and documents relating to our business with the Department of Defense. We continue to cooperate with the DCAA audit and DoD IG inquiry by making available to government auditors and investigators our personnel and furnishing the requested information and documents. The DCAA Audit and DoD IG inquiry have now been consolidated and the US Attorney’s Office is representing the government in connection with these matters. We recently received a settlement proposal from the US Attorney which was based on the non-acceptance of various positions submitted by us in discussions and exchanges related to these matters. We are now reviewing the settlement proposal for purposes of preparing our response. At this time we have no basis for quantifying any penalties or liabilities we might face on account of the DCAA Audit and DoD IG inquiry. The aforementioned DCAA-related adjustments could reduce margins and, along with the aforementioned DOD IG inquiry, could have an adverse effect on our business, financial condition and results of operations.

Okay. Let’s review and comment on what Ultralife reported.

  1. The company received three “exigent” contracts. We looked-up “exigent” on the Internet and learned that such contracts are (apparently) issued when there is an emergency or similar compelling urgency. We then looked at FAR Part 18 and learned that a Contracting Officer has certain flexibilities available for use when conducting an “emergency acquisition”—as we assume these were. For example, emergency acquisitions may limit the number of sources sought and need not provide for full and open competition. Contracting Officers may solicit from a single source for contract awards valued up to $1 million, in certain circumstances. Contracting Officers may even request proposals orally under certain circumstances. Letter contracts can be used when appropriate. But with all those flexibilities available, we did not notice that a Contracting Officer had the authority to issue a contract without receipt of a proposal.

  2. Given the foregoing, we are unsure what Ultralife meant by a “no-bid” contract. We would understand the terms “sole-source” or “single source” but “no-bid” implies that there was no proposal whatsoever. But that can’t be correct, because Ultralife reported that it had actual contracts, and that its contracts experienced “decreased margins” when compared to their “original terms”. Moreover, there had to be some original pricing, because that was what the DCAA audited in its post-award audits. Further, there had to be some negotiations involved, since Ultralife reported that DCAA had alleged that the cost of materials had decreased “prior to the final negotiation” of those contracts.

  3. So we have to conclude that this was, despite Ultralife’s somewhat unique approach to describing the situation, a rather run-of-the-mill defective pricing allegation.

  4. But what’s interesting is the implication that there was some sort of False Claims Act violation being alleged as well. The “treble damages and penalties” phrase doesn’t come from a TINA violation; that comes from the False Claims Act.

So we think, based on sheer speculation with absolutely no knowledge of the facts other that those reported herein, that Ultralife found itself facing allegations that it knowingly failed to disclose “cost or pricing data”—which led to a contract price so tainted that Ultralife’s invoices became individual violations of the False Claims Act. Yeah, that could run into a lot of money….

But wait a second. If these were truly emergency acquisitions then who put the “Price Reduction for Defective [Certified] Cost or Pricing Data” clause into the contract? Are you telling us that there were such urgent and compelling circumstances that the Contracting Officer found that it appropriate and justified to only approach one source—but at the same time that there was sufficient time to require Ultralife to submit a proposal, to disclose (certified) cost or pricing data, to negotiate a price, and then to put together a traditional full-clause contract? Really?

Maybe it’s just the tortured description provided by Ultralife … but in our view something doesn’t add up here. Something’s not making sense to us.

And because of this settlement, we’ll never know the details of the full story….


 

CWC Hears Suggestions on Improving Wartime Contracting

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CWC Hearing20110425_Panel_1

We almost entitled this article, “CWC Hears Good Suggestions from Reasonable People, is Bewildered”—but somehow we refrained from non value-added snark. Seriously, we hope the CWC Commissioners were listening intently when Jacques Gansler was speaking during the CWC hearing on April 25, 2011.

“Who’s Jacques Gansler?” we hear you asking. Well, children, the Honorable Dr. Gansler was the Under Secretary for Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) from 1997 to 2001, and is largely credited (in our minds, at least) with making some of the key improvements to DOD acquisition management during his tenure. Since then, he’s Chaired a couple of important Commissions on behalf of the DOD, and his 1989 book, Affording Defense, is still worth reading today.

What we liked about Dr. Gansler’s testimony before the CWC was that it was informed based on his years of experience at the helm of DOD during the period of post-FASA transformation. It was reasonable, it was nuanced, and his criticism of the CWC’s recommendations was delivered a heck of a lot more diplomatically that we would have been able to do. (See our rant on the same topic, here.)

Dr. Gansler’s testimony was so well-done that we want to ignore the testimony of the GAO guy, the DOD IG guy, and the two SIGAR guys, and simply focus on what Dr. Gansler had to say. We shall quote as follows—

  • The first time I testified before your Commission, in September 2010, the focus of our discussion was the government’s acquisition workforce. Today, I will emphasize this same topic, as I believe that people are the key to success. In fact, in both studies I will discuss today, three threads exist: the acquisition workforce, the leadership of that workforce, and the contractors they manage. At heart, these studies recognize the importance of contractors as partners in achieving the Department’s mission, and identify ways to ensure the government is strategically positioned to operate within this enduring business model, by empowering its acquisition workforce and by creating positive incentives for its contractors to achieve higher and higher performance at lower and lower costs.

  • In a world where more than 50 percent of the ‘total force’ in Iraq and Afghanistan is contractors, contracting has an impact that cannot be a secondary consideration: it must be front and center—embedded in military planning, education, and training; and led and managed by a cadre of civilian and military professionals. … the acquisition workforce is pivotal if we are to solve these challenges. … DoD has an extremely dedicated corps of acquisition people. The problem is they are understaffed, overworked, under-trained, under-supported, and, I would argue, most importantly, under-valued. A combination of acquisition workforce reductions and spending increases has taken its toll. Particularly alarming, and of great concern to us, was the fact that, despite about a seven-fold workload increase from the 1990s to present, and the greater complexity and urgency of contracting in the intense contingency environment, the civilian and military contracting workforce has been declining.

  • … contractors are important force multipliers. We cannot forget their value. They enable military personnel to focus on mission-essential tasks. Over time, each of the Services has outsourced tasks previously performed by personnel in uniform. Outsourcing tasks that are not inherently governmental has significantly increased overall military effectiveness, and it has done so at significant savings to the taxpayer. To add to the contractor value proposition: these resources come to the Department ready-trained, and can be flexibly engaged and released to address surge needs, as they come and go. [Emphasis in original.]

  • … DoD has an enduring need for more well-trained, motivated, and experienced government contracting personnel. Without those baseline resources, the Department cannot meet the wartime need. To put this in perspective, at the time of our Commission’s analysis, there were about 270,000 contractors in the Iraq and Afghanistan theater—more than half the total force. Yet, the Army was not ‘training (including exercises) or educating as we fight;’ that is, incorporating the reality of contractors. Beyond training, of course, the Department needs experienced government people to manage contractors and to conduct the inherently-governmental functions. [Emphasis in original.]

  • The [Defense Science Board’s] task force also found that the Department’s good intentions to improve competition for services have led to unintended, adverse consequences. While one of the benefits of competition is lower prices, strategies favoring low price over best value, or fixed-price over time-and-materials contracts, may create more problems than they solve. Not only might the government be jeopardizing its ability to get the best solution, it might actually be increasing prices: a fixed-price contract in the services arena in particular it may lead to higher costs, as contractors accommodate additional risk associated with this contract type. Similarly, the recent trend to award service contracts (or even goods) on the basis of ‘Low Bid, Technically Acceptable,’ often results in lower quality and higher long-term costs (compared to ‘Best Value’ awards). Or, as another example, requiring competition on all awards has significantly reduced the incentive to submit new ideas as unsolicited proposals. And while the bid protest process is a hallmark of our competitive procurement system, we can significantly hamper desired results if we permit, without penalty, protest actions lacking substance.

  • By using a commercial approach, including commercial terms and conditions, the government could tap premium talent and proven goods from firms that would otherwise be deterred by the government’s standard approach to acquisition. We are now 17 years beyond the 1994 passage of the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act, and faced with the reality that application of FAR Part 12 principles has been problematic for services: only 18 percent of DoD’s services are sourced using commercial practices. The entry barriers remain the same: concerns over intellectual property and data rights, cost-accounting requirements, profit and overhead policies—to name just a few.

  • Within the acquisition community, DoD currently lacks program managers with strong experience in portfolio-specific services, and new hires with contracting experience in these areas also lag. The functional personnel managing large service contracts lie outside the acquisition community. (These are the Contracting Officer’s Representatives (CORs) with the substantive knowledge of the area under contract.) This means they are not subject to relevant defense acquisition workforce training. Even within the acquisition community, a robust shared body of knowledge for services contracting is lacking. While the Defense Acquisition University (DAU) does have a Services Acquisition Center of Excellence, its staff represents a tiny portion (about 1 percent) of the overall DAU faculty numbers; and there are few services-based case studies being taught—despite the fact that services constitute the majority of DoD’s buys. And, while training is minimal, so too are the career opportunities: the current culture and incentives drive good people to product acquisition programs—or to avoid acquisition altogether.

  • [The CWC’s Second Interim Report to Congress] covers incredibly salient topics. On first blush, it appears to do so through a lens that, from the very outset, is aimed at minimizing the important role contractors play: the subtitle ‘Correcting over-reliance on contractors in contingency operations’ conveys an impression that DoD should reduce the role of contractors. In reality, contractors play an essential role in contingency operations. The government’s focus should not be on decreasing contractors, but instead on ensuring they are performing appropriate functions, and then properly managing them. As I have previously stated, contractor services can offer significant savings (e.g., the Congressional Budget Office found contractors could perform weapon system maintenance for 90 percent less than organic performance of this function), provide a flexible means to address support needs, and offer immediate support through ready-trained individuals. So, while your main title rightly identifies risk as a considerable issue, the subtitle is open to misinterpretation. [Emphasis in original.] My opinion on the title reflects my general comments on your second interim report, which fall into two areas of concern regarding contractors (1) too great an emphasis on punishments and (2) an absence of value recognition.

  • … the focus on punishments, like suspension and debarment, comes at the expense of incentives. Missing is a discussion of creating incentives to reward outstanding performance, such as awarding contractors with follow-on work, if they achieve higher performance at lower costs. Your second interim report contains an entire section on competition policy improvements, urging increased competition. This gave me pause: what is the purpose of forcing competition, regardless of the results achieved? I strongly believe in the value of competition (to get higher performance at lower costs); but if the threat of future competition is enough to get those desired results, then competition should not always be mandated. Rather, it should be required if the desired results are not achieved. The incentive for achieving desired results is the follow-on award. [Emphasis in original.]

  • … I encourage your Commission to seek out a balance in your final report, which is due this summer. A balanced discussion of the two issues I raise—reward and recognition, over punishment and sub-optimization—will go a long way toward creating the systemic improvements our troops deserve. We cannot discount that contractors are an important force multiplier; instead, we must build the capability and infrastructure to manage this reality. Clearly, there are many important actions (legislative, regulatory, policy, practices, and so forth) where your Commission can play a valuable role. In any of these actions, I see the key issues as getting the right people (government and industry) and in creating positive incentives for these individuals to get what the warfighters need, when they are needed—with outstanding performance and at low cost. This can be done; and it must be done. The men and women serving our nation in harm’s way deserve no less. [Emphasis in original.]

Amen, brother! We hope the CWC Commissioners will listen to this voice of reason ….

 

DOD Walks Away from Use of Performance-Based Payments

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bureaucrats

This one hits close to home, folks.

If you are a site member, you know we’ve published two technical articles, and made several speeches and presentations, on the subject of Performance-Based Payments (PBPs). Suffice to say, we are sensitive to anything that impacts use of PBPs.

Coming almost unnoticed out of the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA) of 1994, PBPs became the DOD’s “preferred method” for providing contract financing payments for competitively awarded firm, fixed-price acquisitions of noncommercial goods and services in March, 2000. (See Federal Acquisition Circular 97-16.) Almost immediately, DOD policymakers became enamored of PBPs and sought to implement them on a majority of qualifying acquisitions within five years—a goal that was achieved within 12 months!

Without rehashing our previous writings, let’s simply say that PBPs were created because of a couple of reasons that made a whole lot of sense at the time—and which continue to make sense to us today. The PBP rationale includes:

  • The DOD found the prior contract financing method (customary progress payments based on contractor costs incurred) to be both difficult to understand and burdensome to administer.

  • Reduction in “non-value-added cost-based oversight”.

  • Emphasized schedule and technical progress.

  • Reinforced roles of government program managers and reduced roles of accountants and auditors.

  • Lowered barriers that prevented commercial contractors from entering the DOD marketplace, thus increasing competition while allowing DOD to access leading-edge commercial technology.

Importantly, implementation of PBPs tied contractor financing payments to measurable program performance. No longer did a contractor receive financing payments simply for spending money; the contractor actually needed to make tangible progress towards completion.

In our articles, we speculated about the linkage between PBPs and the termination of the A-12 Avenger II stealth attack fighter program in 1991. Then Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney terminated the program for default after payment of more than $2 billion in cost-based progress payments. More than 20 years later, that T4D action is still being litigated and the Pentagon is still trying to recover its “progress” payments from the two prime contractors involved.

Regarding the impact of PBP usage on contract oversight, we wrote in December, 2005 (in Contract Management magazine)—

Reductions to administrative burdens associated with cost-based billings. Since PBP trigger events are a ‘yes-or-no’ technical decision, there are no associated costs to review. For instance, compliance with FAR Part 31 cost principles or the Cost Accounting Standards is not a requirement for PBP payment requests. The contractor does not need to develop a government-specific accounting or billing system that is subject to audit and adequacy determination. The substantial resources normally devoted to complying with government-unique accounting rules can be applied elsewhere.

Despite the seemingly unassailable rationale for use, there is one DOD constituency who has, from the beginning, resisted use of PBPs and fought them at every turn. Can you guess that DOD stakeholder?

If you answered “DCAA” then you win a prize!

DCAA has never accepted PBPs, perhaps recognizing that the more PBPs are used, the less there is a need for DCAA to perform “non-value-added cost-based oversight” such as detailed reviews of progress payment requests. Here’s a challenge: go look at DCAA’s website (http://www.dcaa.mil) under “standard audit programs” and find the standard audit program associated with PBPs.

Go on. We’ll wait right here.

You couldn’t find one, could you? Despite decade of usage, DCAA still doesn’t acknowledge them.

Okay, we hear you saying, “But why should DCAA have an audit program for something they aren’t supposed to audit?” That would make sense except for the fact that many Contracting Officers want DCAA to audit contractors’ use of PBPs even though they really shouldn’t be doing so. So when a Contracting Officer asks DCAA to audit some aspect of PBPs, there is no audit guidance to guide the auditors.

And now it looks like DCAA has won its fight against PBPs.

We warned readers about the September 14, 2010 Memo from Dr. Ash Carter (USD, AT&L). That memo included the following tactic—

Reverse a decade of practice and restore DOD’s preference for using customary progress payments based on cost incurred, with other contract financing options being agreed-upon only with a commensurate reduction in contractor profit, based on increased cash flow.

We said at the time—

… we are disappointed to see the end of DOD’s regulatory preference for Performance-Based Payments and the return of customary progress payments. The debacle of the A-12 program taught many that progress payments had little to do with actually making progress, and everything to do with the ability to spend money. It looks to us like that lesson has been forgotten.

On April 29, 2011, the Honorable Shay Assad, Director of DOD’s Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy (DPAP), issued a memo that officially ended DOD’s preference for PBPs. The memo said—

As a matter of practice, for new contract awards, the basis for negotiations for fixed-price contracts shall be the use of customary progress payments. … After agreement on price, or contract award in the case of competitive acquisitions, the contractor shall have the flexibility to propose PBPs for the Government’s consideration. This will allow the contracting officer to determine the reasonableness of the consideration being offered by the contractor for a more favorable payment structure.

Why does DOD want to walk away from PBPs? Because (in the words of the memo)—

PBPs offer the contractor improved cash flow as compared to customary progress payments. … This difference in the time value of money produces a PBP price that is lower than that warranted with customary progress payments, and yet is a better financial arrangement for the contractor.

So Mr. Assad is basically saying that since contractors will drop their price in return for a promise of accelerated cash flow, the DOD needs to approach contract negotiations in such a manner as to capture that price reduction. Which is fine, insofar as it goes. But when one looks at the barriers DOD is putting into place when a contractor would want to propose use of PBPs, one comes to the conclusion that DOD really doesn’t want to use them.


The memo says—

… the contractor should be instructed that if PBPs are desired, a proposed PBP schedule should be submitted which includes all PBP events, completion criteria and event values along with the contractor’s expected expenditure profile. … The contracting officer must clearly identify the consideration received in the post negotiation clearance document whenever a payment schedule more favorable to the contractor than customary progress payments is negotiated. … The negotiated consideration must be specifically approved by the clearance official or one level above the contracting officer, whichever is higher.

“What’s the problem with the foregoing?” we hear you asking.

Well, consider that PBPs are only used on firm, fixed-price contracts. That contractor effort described above is quite often going to be a direct-charged effort. Which means that either the contractor eats the cost of that effort from its expected profit, or it bids that effort into its firm, fixed-price. So the submitted price will be higher than it otherwise would be, because of the mandatory effort now required to use PBPs.

Moreover, when customary progress payments are used, there is an administrative cost on both sides of the contract. (Elimination of those administrative costs was one of the primary benefits associated with use of PBPs.) Those costs are going right back into future contractor bids, because the contractor must now assume that only customary cost-based progress payments are going to be used.

Finally, the DOD is once again setting itself up for a repeat of the A-12 debacle. We’ve already noted the return of fixed-price development contracts. Now comes the return to cost-based progress payments on such contracts. Those two “return to what didn’t work before” trends are exactly what led to that multi-billion dollar poster child for DOD waste of taxpayer funds.

So nice job, Mr. Assad. You managed to reverse one of the more important innovations of Clinton-era acquisition reform. You’ve opened the door for contractors to increase their offer prices at a time when the DOD (and indeed the entire Federal government) is focused on lowering those very prices. And you’ve managed to recreate the environment that led to one of the worst DOD weapon system “train wrecks” in history.

Oh, and we forgot to mention that now we’ve got a nice conflict between the Assad guidance and the requirements of FAR 31.1001, which establishes the policy of the United States that “Performance-based payments are the preferred Government financing method when the contracting officer finds them practical, and the contractor agrees to their use.” (Emphasis added.) We have to ask whether DOD has submitted a request to the FAR Councils for a FAR Deviation, as required by FAR Subpart 1.4?

 

Yet Another Defense Contractor Defrauds DOD

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Yeah. Just after we got through reminding our readers that as much fraud, waste and abuse takes place in the government and commercial sectors as takes place in the government marketplace comes a story about yet another defense contractor who pleaded guilty to some egregious wrongdoing.

Let’s add Staff Gasket Manufacturing Corporation, of Bergen County, New Jersey, to the list of especially stupid defense contractors that already includes such notables as Kustom Products, Inc. of Coos Bay, Orgeon—who allegedly sold the DOD counterfeit “Jesus Nuts” (the little doodads that secure the main rotors of helicopters to the aircraft)—and Rocky Mountain Instruments, who exported sensitive technical data to overseas manufacturers so it could be the low bidder to its DOD prime contractors.

Before we get into Staff Gasket’s wrongdoing, let’s state up front that the FAR is a complicated and complex beast, and that it’s unreasonable to expect anybody to have mastery of its entire panoply of regulations and contract clauses—especially when the judiciary has a tendency to reinterpret those regulations and clauses in a counter-intuitive way, and when the FAR Councils have a tendency to issue Federal Acquisition Circulars revising the regulations every month or so. Compared to much of the FAR, Part 25 (“Foreign Acquisition”) is a fairly arcane piece of work, covering such fun topics as the Buy American Act, the Trade Agreements Act, customs/duties, prohibited sources, and other similar things that make the life of acquisition professionals so much fun.

And let’s not forget that the Part 25 solicitation and contract clauses establish compliance criteria that contractors violate at their own risk….

Staff Gasket Manufacturing Corporation was one such contractor. Let’s get back to its story, and that of the company’s President, Eric Helf, age 38. According to the linked story, Staff Gasket pleaded guilty to wire fraud and a violation of U.S. export control laws, while Helf pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit wire fraud in connection with the company’s “scheme”.

What was the scheme?

According to the story—

From August 2004 through March 2006, Staff Gasket — which was previously located in Englewood — won bids and entered into contracts with the U.S. Department of Defense to provide replacement parts for equipment to be used in military operations, including lock pins for HH-60 helicopters

The problem was, those contracts required that the equipment had to be manufactured in the United States, to exact (and sensitive) specifications. Staff Gasket decided to cut corners by procuring parts from manufactures outside the U.S., including those located in China. The story reported that Staff Gasket made “fraudulent statements in its bids, saying ‘it was the manufacturer of these parts and the parts would be manufactured in accordance’ with the specifications required [by contract].”

Instead, Staff Gasket “would ‘purchase similar and less expensive parts from other manufacturers, including foreign manufacturers located in China, or unauthorized distributors that did not meet the DoD requirements.’” The story reported—

The company and others operating under its direction would also direct that certain production and packaging of foreign-manufactured parts be disguised so the true manufacturer was hidden, making it look like Staff Gasket had built the parts … Some parts would be ‘non-conforming’ ….

When questioned about the process used to build certain parts, Staff Gasket would allegedly submit false information back to the government.

Staff Gasket caused the DoD to lose about $751,091 in connection with the fraudulent contracts, authorities said.

We have previously discussed the issue of counterfeit parts in contractors’ supply chains. While it is surely possible that a company might unknowingly acquire counterfeit parts, prime contractors also need to be on the lookout for subcontractors and suppliers that knowingly source parts from uncontrolled (and unmonitored) sources, who do so in order to lower their bid prices through such unlawful means.

If the bid price is too good to be true, it very well may be.

 


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Newsflash

Effective January 1, 2019, Nick Sanders has been named as Editor of two reference books published by LexisNexis. The first book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Cost Accounting Standards. Nick replaces Darrell Oyer, who has edited those books for many years.