Pentagon Outsources Supplier Development
We’ve recently reported testimony regarding the status and health of the defense industrial base. Readers may recall that Jacques Gansler told the Commission on Wartime Contracting that—
We are now 17 years beyond the 1994 passage of the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act, and faced with the reality that application of FAR Part 12 principles has been problematic for services: only 18 percent of DoD’s services are sourced using commercial practices. The entry barriers remain the same: concerns over intellectual property and data rights, cost-accounting requirements, profit and overhead policies—to name just a few.
In a similar vein, Mr. Gansler subsequently testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee (Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee) that—
To meet the 21st Century National Security environment, the industrial base must be flexible, adaptable, agile, responsive, and innovative; and it must provide high-quality goods and services at affordable prices, in the quantities required. To achieve this, requires the government to change the way it does its business, i.e. reform its laws, regulations, policies and acquisition/procurement practices. It must remove the current barriers—created through overregulation and detailed “input” specifications—and shift to an emphasis on creating incentives for industry to achieve the desired output results. [Emphasis in original.]
Perhaps the DOD has given up the fight to transform its acquisition practices along the lines Mr. Gansler has advocated. Perhaps it has given up efforts to emphasize flexibility, adaptability, agility, responsiveness and innovation when there are so many barriers—internal, external, cultural, and legal—to such an evolved state. Perhaps not. History may be the final judge.
But National Defense magazine reported in its May 2011 edition that DOD has begun to look outside the Pentagon walls to search for nontraditional defense suppliers to fill niche needs for green energy, wireless communications, cybersecurity and data mining products. As the magazine article reported, “Some of the technologies on the Pentagon’s wish list exist in the larger [non-defense] marketplace, but are supplied by companies that shy away from government contracting or may not be aware that the Defense Department is in need of their products.”
To that list of supplier concerns we would add—
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Don’t have an approved accounting system
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Don’t have an approved timekeeping system
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Are afraid of hostile DCAA auditors writing adverse audit reports condemning perfectly acceptable commercial practices
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Are afraid of Truth-in-Negotiation Act requirements
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Are afraid of being accuse of False Claims Act violations because of inadvertent mistakes
In other words, all the barriers that Mr. Gansler told his Governmental listeners keep companies from entering the DOD marketspace.
 Anyway, the DOD thinks it has found a way to identify and encourage/incubate its next generation of suppliers, to assist them in developing innovative products, to create opportunities for future competitions. It calls its efforts the Defense Venture Catalyst Initiative—or DeVenci, for short.
DeVenci “focuses on increasing Department of Defense (DoD) awareness of emerging commercial technologies developed by non-traditional DoD procurement sources, and on increasing the awareness of DoD needs and requirements within these sources.”
DeVenci accomplishes its objectives by having potential suppliers pitch their products to a government panel that includes 26 outside venture capitalists, who provide their services to DOD on a pro bono basis. Suppliers may self-nominate (via FedBizOpps) or may be nominated by the venture capitalists (VCs). Suppliers who make successful pitches must then survive a DOD review and (DOD-funded) test of their products—a process that can last “from six to 18 months.” Survivors of that vetting process are then evaluated by DOD personnel via a process that excludes the VCs. The survivors are connected with DOD users/buyers and (presumably) receive contract awards.
In the words of the DOD—
Interactive participation of the venture capital community, small innovative companies, and potential DoD customers is a proven way to accelerate the identification of emerging commercial technologies relevant to DoD needs. The DeVenCI model is to broker interactions that transfer knowledge and understanding between DoD participants with specific capability needs and small innovative companies. The goal is to find emerging technologies aimed at commercial market driven needs that also could be applied to DoD needs.
How’s the program doing?
The magazine article reported that—
Over the past year and a half, 376 companies were nominated. Defense Department subject matter experts reviewed their submissions, and 99 of them were invited to give a 25-minute presentation to an audience of government officials and VCs. Out of the 99 firms, 25 received government funds to have their products tested. Of those, 10 companies reached the ‘operational capability’ holy grail.
If the odds seem daunting, consider that a 10/376 chance of a contract award is not that much different than the odds faced by the average DOD bidder; in fact, the odds may be better than those experienced by bidders in many competitions.
If you are a small business, offering a cutting-edge product, and have been looking for a way to break into the DOD marketplace, then DeVenci may be your ticket to success. Moreover, if you are a large prime with a mentor-protégé agreement, you may want to consider pointing your protégé firm towards this program.
After all, nothing ventured, nothing gained.
Senate Discusses Health of the Defense Industrial Base
On May 3, 2011, the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities, held a hearing on the status of the defense industrial base. Six VIPs offered testimony, and today we want to look at their written testimony.
Frank Kendall (Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) offered the following interesting sound bites (word bites?).
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To understand this increasing dynamism and complexity the Department is pursuing multiple, concurrent efforts to map and better understand the defense industrial base. This approach is in contrast with other more traditional narrow program-focused and product-focused assessments. The Department will replace intuitive judgments about the impacts of changing domestic demand, globalization, commercial-military integration, emerging sources of innovation, and other issues with data-driven industrial base evaluations. By continuously assessing the industrial base on a sector-by-sector, tier-by-tier basis, the Department will develop a reservoir of critical and actionable information. … Our efforts to encourage competition in the industrial base build on our commitment to gain insight about the state of the base’s health before dictating oversight – insight that the Department has historically lacked, especially about the companies at the lower tiers of the industrial base. We have undertaken an aggressive effort to map and assess the industrial base sector-by-sector, tier-by-tier (S2T2). The goal is to understand the gross anatomy of the industrial base. Just as doctors do not seek to understand the functioning of every individual neuron in the central nervous system, the Department does not seek to know the exact details and reasoning behind every supplier relationship. But we do need to better understand the industrial base’s nervous system, circulatory system, and bone structure.
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… For example, the Department expects to reward prime contractors for successful supply chain management, efforts that add value to DoD by reducing the costs of the components integrated further up the product stream. Understanding subtier-level connections between the Department’s programs will improve our own supply chain management, helping the Department’s efforts to maintain economical and stable production rates at multiple tiers. A better baseline of industrial base data will assist programs’ market-research efforts, including in the area of contracted services, where market research needs particular attention and where the Department tends to pay rates above commercial rates. Comprehensive information about industry’s deeper structure will help program managers develop strategies to increase competition, as directed under the Better Buying Power initiative.
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The Department is very conscious that the top tiers of the defense industry have already consolidated significantly, and we do not anticipate it to be in the best interest of the warfighter or taxpayer to see additional merger activity among the top prime contractors. But we do expect some increased activity at the middle and lower tiers, activity that we will monitor closely.
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The new S2T2 repository of industrial base data will also serve as a jumping off point for future assessments by all Defense Components, ensuring that data collection and analysis cumulates, thereby increasing the value of all industrial base assessment efforts. Having one office in the Department leading this effort will prevent duplication of effort that wastes the Department’s resources and harasses overworked program offices and contractors with multiple, redundant requests. Sustaining and strengthening the data over time will also contribute required insight to the Department’s merger, acquisition, and divestiture reviews and other industrial base policies.
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The commercial base has become increasingly global in nature. It maintains global supply chains, gets financing from global investors, and employs a global workforce. Globalization poses numerous advantages and challenges. … On the other hand, the benefits of globalization are tempered by potential risks. Some foreign nations and non-state actors are constantly trawling global supply chains, trying to gain access to critical US technologies and information on US defense systems. Similarly, the U.S. needs to address risks that counterfeit parts or even components intentionally designed to subvert crucial defense systems could slip in through the increasingly complex, global supply chain. … Globalization also poses unique risks of supply chain disruptions. Natural disasters can happen anywhere in the world, and even an entirely domestic defense supply chain could face disruptions. But if a disruption occurs at a domestic supplier, the Department can use Defense Priorities and Allocation authorities under the Defense Production Act to compel US industry to prioritize DoD critical orders. Those authorities do not extend overseas, so when disruptions occur at foreign suppliers, the Department may have a more difficult time adjusting. We are working to alleviate this challenge by increasing the use of bilateral defense trade agreements and security of supply agreements with our allies.
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DoD reimburses approximately 1200 firms in the industrial base for IR&D efforts, thus providing opportunities for innovation to both the large primes and the smaller mid and lower-tier firms. The IR&D funding is critical to ensure a healthy talent base in industry and to keep industrial design team skills sharp over the long term. The Department has recently launched initiatives to increase communication with industry regarding technology needs and operational requirements to ensure maximum return on industry’s IR&D efforts, which the Department reimburses as an allowable cost. For example, the Department is preparing Vendor Communication Plans which provide clear guidance and encourage communication between industry and government about requirements and technology objectives. The Department is also reaching out to industry to find new ways to collaborate through sharing of detailed information about their IR&D projects and the Department’s technology roadmaps.
We were next going to recap the testimony of Mr. Brett Lambert, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Manufacturing and Industrial Base Policy. But his written testimony was virtually verbatim—essentially word for word, that of Mr. Kendall, above. If you read Kendall’s stuff, then you already know Lambert’s points.
Norm Augustine, venerated former CEO of Lockheed Martin, offered the following points—
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Unrealistic initial estimates of the size of the total production buys and production rates—which lead to excessive tooling costs and amortization penalties.
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Cutbacks in planned annual purchases—which diminish the significant gains that can otherwise be realized by moving down the learning curve.
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Uncertainty in year-to-year funding—which precludes efficient purchasing quantities, discourages contractor investment in productivity measures, and leads to cancellation or renegotiation of sometimes thousands of subcontracts.
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Failure to discount future cash flows—something that would never be permitted in the private sector.
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Failure to provide reserves in proportion to the risk entailed in a task—again, something that could never be tolerated in the private sector.
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National defense today depends not only on companies generally associated with national security but also on the thousands of sub-contractors and suppliers who provide the larger firms with everything from castings and forgings to microchips and lasers. Many of these smaller firms do not possess the financial staying-power or resiliency of the larger firms and are thus even more vulnerable to turbulence in the procurement process. Viewing the environment in which both large and small U.S. firms operate today, the outlook for our nation’s security, let alone the economy as a whole, is not reassuring.
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American firms spend over twice as much on litigation as on research. They commonly spend more on healthcare for their employees and retirees than on the basic material that go into their products. … The patent system is ponderous and the export laws were designed for another era. The immigration laws discourage much-needed talent from remaining in our country. The prevailing tax and market structure encourages a short-term outlook and disincentivizes long-term investment—for example, research. The demise of the iconic Bell Laboratory, home of the laser, transistor and many Nobel Laureates, is but one example of the latter. If current plans are carried out the government will soon have the equivalent of two Army divisions overseeing defense procurement. While oversight is indispensable, the question of balance is nonetheless present—particularly when industry’s response is likely to be to match that number of overseers within its own firms as a defensive measure.
We’re not done yet. Here are the thoughts of Dr. Jacques Gansler—
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To meet the 21st Century National Security environment, the industrial base must be flexible, adaptable, agile, responsive, and innovative; and it must provide high-quality goods and services at affordable prices, in the quantities required. To achieve this, requires the government to change the way it does its business, i.e. reform its laws, regulations, policies and acquisition/procurement practices. It must remove the current barriers—created through overregulation and detailed “input” specifications—and shift to an emphasis on creating incentives for industry to achieve the desired output results. [Emphasis in original.]
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Since ‘changing the way the government does its business’ and, correspondingly, ‘transforming the National Security industrial base for 21st century needs,’ is basically a ‘cultural change,’ the literature is clear— for successful implementation of a cultural change it requires leadership (with a vision, a strategy, a set of actions, and a set of metrics).
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I have written and testified frequently about the benefits (in cost and performance) of competition. But, there are … right and wrong ways to perform a competitive acquisition …. Weapon systems are not interchangeable commodities (so you can not just ‘open the envelope’ and pick the low bidder) the decision must be based on a combination of risk (based on ‘past performance’ of the firm and current status of the proposed technology) and the proposed performance, cost, and delivery (i.e. ‘best value’); as well as the probability of maintaining these ‘ promises’ in the presence of the large number of future changes (that are unavoidable in this rapidly-changing world). So, incentives are required (to achieve high performance at low cost); and the best one (over the long run) is the presence of, or a credible option for, continuous competition among two sources (known as ‘competitive dual-sourcing’). The usual counterargument is that ‘we can’t afford the second-source start-up costs;’ and ‘this time will be different’—‘We will manage the sole-source contractor, and allow no government-imposed changes.’ But this just doesn’t have any credibility!
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Since the mid-90s, as the dollars and actions for DoD acquisitions were rising dramatically, the acquisition workforce was being cut. (Twenty-five percent of this was by Congressional mandate.) Even more critical than the numbers being cut, were the senior positions. For example, in 1990 the Army had five General Offices with Contracting experience; in 2007 they had none. In this same time period, the Defense Contract Management Agency went from four General Officers to none (while their workforce went from 25,000 to 10,000). And the Air Force had cut both their acquisition General Officers and their SES acquisition personnel in half. Without smart, well-trained, experienced acquisition buyers and managers, making the required changes in DoD buying practices, and achieving the required transformation of the industrial base (for 21st century National Security) will simply be unachievable.
In our next article, we’ll discuss the implications of these statements.
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Health of the Defense Industry, Part 2
We previously reported on testimony proffered to the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities, by some serious heavyweight players. In this article we want to explore the implications of that testimony.
Supply Chain Management
As we have reported in past articles, DOD is seeking to map its supply chain (a process that DOD calls its “S2T2” strategy). According to Mr. Kendall, that supply chain knowledge (or, in his terminology, “the gross anatomy of the industrial base”) will be used to drive decisions regarding DOD oversight. That sounds ominous, doesn’t it? What can he be thinking?
One example he cited was the use of “rewards” for prime contractors that implement supply chain management strategies to reduce downstream costs (e.g., component or system integration costs). As another example of “oversight,” he noted that the DOD is seeking to better align the defense industry’s IR&D spend with its own technology objectives.
Well, nothing in the foregoing paragraphs strikes us as falling into the “oversight” category. One idea he noted was simply an application of a contract “incentive;” while the other idea was simply an objective. That said, we have been concerned about DOD’s objective of better “aligning” contractor IR&D spend with its own technology road map. We have no objection to the goal—but we have strong concerns about the method(s) DOD intends to employ in order to reach that goal. (We most recently expressed our long-held concerns here.)
Speculating about the future (which is always an undertaking fraught with error), we can easily foresee a time when DOD questions/disallows any contractor IR&D expenditures that have not been pre-approved as aligning with the Agency’s technology roadmap. In other words, DOD will be engaging in centralized R&D planning and control.
If we’re right (and we fervently hope we’re wrong) then generations of Soviet leaders will be smiling in their graves. And we’re quite sure that such efforts will work out for the U.S. DOD just as well as they did for the former Soviet Union. Which is to say, not so well.
Back to the testimony.
Mr. Kendall’s testimony acknowledged trends that will be familiar to longtime readers of this site’s articles. For example, he touched on the globalization of the defense supply chain and how that globalization introduces additional risks into program execution, including the introduction of counterfeit parts. He acknowledged the importance of successful supply chain management to accomplishment of mission (and/or program) objectives. And he noted that opportunities exist to reduce cost and schedule by working to improve supply chain management practices, particularly at the lower tiers of the supply chain. To those points, we can only say, “Amen, brother!”
Now, we have our doubts about DOD’s ability to accomplish its stated goals. We have yet to encounter very many DOD contractors that have actually mapped their entire supply chains, program by program, and identified where lower tier suppliers support multiple programs. The burden to execute the S2T2 strategy will likely fall on the DCMA—and we don’t think they’re prepared for it. That said, we agree with DOD that it’s a laudable—and even important—objective that needs to be accomplished.
Thoughts on Program Management
As we’ve asserted many times before, how defense programs are being performed today looks almost nothing like how they were performed thirty or forty years ago. We are at least two generations removed in time, and perhaps quantum levels removed in technology, from the environment in which we sent men to the moon. For example, the number of lines of executable source code in the average 2010 DOD weapon system is essentially unimaginable to a DOD program manager of 1970. As the House of Representatives Armed Service Committee Panel on Defense Acquisition Reform noted that the Polaris A3 submarine-launched ballistic missile program of the mid-1960’s had less than a million executable lines of source code, compared to the F-35 aircraft program, which has roughly 13 million lines of executable source code to wrestle with. Thus, effective management of the IT aspects of a modern weapon system may, in many cases, outweigh the importance of its other aspects.
Apogee Consulting, Inc. Management Axiom No. 1:
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The Defense Market is complex and it is changing; it is changing faster all the time. What worked for DOD yesterday won’t work today. What worked for a company yesterday is no guarantee of success in today’s market.
Partners or Adversaries?
Mr. Augustine testified about the impact of acquisition and program mis-management on the ability of contractors to control cost and schedule. For instance, he said one of DOD’s key problems was “Uncertainty in year-to-year funding—which precludes efficient purchasing quantities, discourages contractor investment in productivity measures, and leads to cancellation or renegotiation of sometimes thousands of subcontracts.” He also said that, “American firms spend over twice as much on litigation as on research.” What do those two statements have to do with each other?
The two statements identify wasteful practices that impede effective program management, and they both identify the cause of such waste—an acquisition environment that is excessively rigid, overly legalistic, and which suboptimizes almost every transaction because the interested parties are adversaries instead of partners.
Congress funds programs, and the Anti-Deficiency Act requires DOD to follow Congress’ funding direction to the letter. Congress’ unwillingness to believe in—and invest in—DOD weapon system programs for a period longer than one year costs the taxpayers millions, if not billions, of dollars each year. That needs to change.
We have pontificated about DOD’s tendency to turn on, and attack, its own contractors many times on this site. Congress and the news media love to run stories about contractor waste, fraud, and abuse. Nobody wants to run stories about how DOD is partnering with its contractors on a long-term basis in order to work together to develop challenging technology. Anybody who tries that is going to be heavily criticized.
Further, DOD’s acquisition workforce is—by the admission of its own leadership—not up to the challenges of managing today’s programs. The workforce is too small, it is ill-trained, and it rotates around far to quickly to develop any subject matter expertise. In short, DOD is mis-managing its acquisition workforce—and then complains when acquisition outcomes don’t match intended goals.
Finally, let’s not spare the defense industrial base, those DOD contractors who are the front-lines in new technology development, as well as weapon system production. Generally speaking, those contractors do very little to foster/protect their suppliers. The issues identified in the Senate testimony as pertaining to DOD are a macrocosm of those issues pertaining to the contractors’ individual program supply chains. Primes award firm, fixed-price subcontracts when every indication tells them not to—all in the name of “controlling” cost growth by pushing that risk lower into the supply chain. Each purchase order is a one-off transaction, as opposed to another event in a chain of events within a partnership. Contractors need to do a better job of managing their supply chains—which includes protecting their suppliers from undue risk.
The so-far unstated common theme in the foregoing paragraphs is the role of attorneys. Attorneys comprise the majority of Congress. Attorneys advise DCMA contracting officers regarding what can, and what cannot, be done. Attorneys write purchase orders and subcontracts. Attorneys are everywhere in the acquisition environment.
We have nothing against attorneys. But we also note they have a unique skillset and specialized training that creates an advocacy role. Whether advocating for a party to a courtroom proceeding or advocating for a company when drafting purchase order, the attorneys have been trained to view the interaction in as an adversarial one. It’s a win/lose environment in which they operate. They are focused on protecting their client by minimizing risk and shifting it to the other party.
And guess what, gentle readers? In the modern world of program and supply chain management, that kind of approach is going to suboptimize the outcome for both parties.
Apogee Consulting, Inc. Management Axiom No. 2:
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We can save quite a bit of money if we manage programs better in an environment that’s conducive to effective program management. Congress can save money by reducing funding uncertainty and by rationalizing acquisition statutes and regulations. DOD can save money by partnering with its contractors instead of attacking them and by improving the quality of its acquisition management workforce. And contractors can save money by partnering with their subcontractors instead of trying to maximize their own profit at the expense of their subs
As always, members of this site are encouraged to offer their own views.
Fraud in the Construction Industry
The Society of Corporate Compliance and Ethics (SCCE) tipped us to a story reported by the New York Times on fraud in the New York construction market. Let’s get things started with a quote from the NYT story—
The district attorney’s office and industry experts say that corruption generally adds 10 percent to the already-high cost of construction in New York, making the city less hospitable to business than other places.
Corruption is so endemic to the construction industry, said John E. Osborn, who specializes in construction law and represents property owners, “that it’s part of regular business practices.”
Yes, you read that correctly. One plaintiff’s attorney asserted that fraud and corruption is “part of the regular business practices” of the New York construction industry. It’s business as usual. It’s expected.
But it’s not always tolerated.
The NYT article reported that, on May 4, 2011, four executives of the Lehr Construction Corporation were arraigned “on charges that they systemically stole tens of millions of dollars from investment firms, insurance companies and law firms as they built corporate offices in buildings across Manhattan.” Allegedly, they “routinely inflated mechanical, electrical and other subcontractors’ costs by 10 percent to 13 percent on office projects they supervised.” Prosecutors asserted that the wrongdoing cost the company’s customers about $30 million over the past 12 years—which is good money even by Manhattan standards.
In support of the earlier assertion that fraud and corruption may be endemic to the New York construction marketplace, the NYT reported that—
It is the second time in 13 years that executives at Lehr, which at its peak had roughly $500 million a year in billings, have been charged with fleecing their corporate customers, and the third corruption case involving a member of the Lazar family, which founded Lehr.
How did the scheme work? According to the NYT article—
According to the district attorney, on jobs in which Lehr served as construction manager, the men created a document known as the ‘bid package,’ and required subcontractors to inflate their bids by 10 percent or more.
After the subcontractor was selected by Lehr and the client, it would then secretly negotiate with Lehr executives about the real price for the work, with the inflated bills submitted to the client …
Prosecutors said Lehr would reap the illicit profit by underpaying the contractors by the same amount on other jobs, so the illegal sums would not show up in an audit. …
Prosecutors said that Mr. Lazar’s son Jeffrey, who oversaw the sales, estimating and purchasing departments, and Mr. Phillips, who shared responsibility for day-to-day operations, met weekly at their Broadway offices with Mr. Halper and Mr. Wasserman to work out the details of their scheme. All the men, and the company, were charged with enterprise corruption, scheming to defraud and grand larceny; Mr. Halper and the company also were charged with money laundering.
We like that part about the owner’s son who “oversaw the sales, estimating and purchasing departments.” Yeah, no segregation of duty issues there, for a firm that at one point had $500 million in annual sales.
In what was perhaps an unsurprising conclusion to its story, the NYT reported that the Lehr Construction Corporation filed for bankruptcy protection last year.
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