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Apogee Consulting Inc

Interim DFARS Rule Addresses Contractor Business Systems “Definition and Administration”

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It’s here.

Much like a long-expected—yet dreaded—phone call from your oncology specialist, or your spouse’s divorce lawyer, on May 18, 2011, the new DFARS rule covering contractor “business systems” (aka internal control systems) was published in the Federal Register.

This item has to be among the top two or three issues we’ve been writing about on this website, since we first took issue with the “independent” (but not bias-free) Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan (“CWC”). We’ve published many articles related to this topic, including this notification of the proposed DFARS rule, our comments on that rule (as submitted to the DAR Council), the DAR Council’s revised draft rule, and our additional comments on the revised draft.

Suffice it to say, we’ve been all over this issue like white on rice.

And now we have an interim rule, with additional public comments solicited. (As if those comments are going to affect the rule.…)

DCAA has been holding off on performing its “ICAPS” system reviews for nearly two years, ostensibly awaiting this new rule. (Which is wrong on several levels—including the situation where at least one contractor was left with an “inadequate” accounting system (which kept it from winning new work) because DCAA wouldn’t return to perform a follow-up system review to confirm that all corrective actions had been effectively implemented.) So this new rule permits DCAA to gear-up and get back out there into the field, reviewing and assessing contractors’ systems of internal controls.

(Since DCAA hasn’t been auditing too many contractor internal control systems, and hasn’t been auditing too many contractor incurred cost submissions, one wonders just what the hell they have been auditing … but perhaps that’s a rant better left for another day.)

Let’s summarize the interim rule, remembering that, as a DFARS rule, it applies only to DOD and NASA contractors. If you’re a civilian agency contractor, you need not worry overmuch—though we bet DCAA will assert that the DFARS rule establishes a basis for the adequacy of any contractor’s business systems. In fact, the rule’s promulgating comments assert that, “Because they are designed to be consistent with GAGAS, while are based on standards developed by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), the system criteria are applicable equally to DoD, NASA, and civilian contractors.” So don’t rest too easy, civilian agency contractors: your time may be coming sooner than you think.

Anyway, here’s our take on the rule:

  1. There are now six (6) contractor business systems of internal control, not 10. They are: Accounting, Estimating, Purchasing, Earned Value Management, Material Management and Accounting, and Property Management. But that’s somewhat misleading, because the adequacy criteria formerly associated with some of the other internal control systems (e.g., Billing System, Timekeeping/Labor Accounting, etc.) now have been consolidated into the adequacy criteria associated with the Accounting System.

  1. A new DFARS clause (252.342-7005, Contractor Business Systems) will be inserted into solicitations and contracts when the contract is a “covered contract” and the solicitation or contract includes one or more of the individual business system clauses (e.g., 252.215-7002, Cost Estimating System Requirements; 252.234-7002, Earned Value Management Systems; 252.242-7004, Material Management and Accounting System; 252.242-7006, Accounting System; 252.244-7001, Contractor Purchasing System Administration; or 252.245-7003, Contractor Property Management System Administration).

  1. A “covered contract” is defined as any contract subject to Cost Accounting Standards (CAS). If you are not a CAS-covered contractor or your contract is exempt from CAS—congratulations! You don’t have to worry too much about this new rule. For example, small businesses are exempt from CAS. (In addition, educational institutions and Federally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDCs) also are expressly exempt from the rule’s requirements.)

  1. The administration of the new rule is found at DFARS 242.70 (Contractor Business Systems); between that direction and the language found in the 242-7005 clause, this is how we think it will operate.

    1. DCAA, or other “functional specialists,” will perform reviews of the six business systems. Any “significant deficiencies” will be identified to the cognizant Administrative Contracting Officer (ACO).

    2. A “significant deficiency” is defined as “a shortcoming in the system that materially affects the ability of the Department of Defense to rely upon information produced by the system that is needed for management purposes.” But that definition is somewhat misleading. According to the promulgating comments, “DCAA policy is to report only deficiencies determined to be significant deficiencies” as defined both in the rule and in the Generally Accepted Government Auditing Standards (GAGAS). The promulgating comments note that, “Based on the definition in GAGAS, a significant deficiency is a deficiency, or combination of deficiencies, that adversely affects the entity’s ability to initiate, authorize, record, process, or report data reliably.” So note there is a separate, more detailed definition of “significant deficiency’ that DCAA will be using.

    3. The ACO will make an initial determination to approve or disapprove the business system(s) based on the identification of significant deficiencies by auditor or functional specialist.

    4. The contractor will have 30 days to respond to the initial determination.

    5. The ACO will evaluate the contractor’s response and issue a final determination. If the contractor’s response is unpersuasive, then the final determination will notify the contractor that (i) its system is being disapproved, and (ii) that payment withholds are being implemented.

    6. The ACO will identify “one or more” covered contracts from which the payments will be withheld. When there are multiple systems with significant deficiencies, the ACO is directed to ensure “that the total amount of payment withholding … does not exceed 10 percent of progress payments, performance-based payments, and interim payments … under each of the identified covered contracts.” Similarly, when only a single system is involved, then the withholding limit is five (5) percent of such payments. The ACO has “sole discretion” to identify the covered contracts from which to withhold payments.

    7. Payment withholds will be taken against in-process payments by the DOD, and the ACO will direct that the contractor deduct the payment withholds from prospective invoices that it generates. Payment withholds are not subject to interest payments under the Prompt Payment Act.

    8. The contractor has 45 days to submit a corrective action plan to the ACO. If the ACO “in consultation with the auditor or functional specialist” determines that the contractor is effectively implementing the corrective actions, then the payment withholds “will” be reduced to two (2) percent.

    9. Payment withholds will persist until the ACO “determines that the contractor has corrected all significant deficiencies as directed by the Contracting Officer’s final determination.” The contractor must notify the ACO in writing when it has made all the necessary corrections. At that point, the ACO may discontinue payment withholds and direct the contractor to bill for outstanding amounts due, but only if there is agreement that the significant deficiencies have been corrected; otherwise, the payment withholds will continue.

    10. If the ACO has not made a determination within 90 days, then whatever payment withholds exist must be reduced by “at least 50 percent.”

Looking at the individual business system clauses, we see quite a bit of familiar adequacy criteria. It’s also interesting to see how the granularity of the adequacy criteria varies system by system.

Within the Accounting System Administration clause (for example) we see eighteen (18) criteria that must be met, but none of the criteria are new: they were previously associated with either overall Accounting System adequacy or with one of the subsidiary systems (e.g., timekeeping/labor accounting). But we were impressed to note that there are twenty-four (24) adequacy criteria associated with Purchasing System adequacy.

The single adequacy criteria associated with Property Management is “The Contractor’s property management system shall be in accordance with paragraph (f) of the contract clause at Federal Acquisition Regulation 52.245-1.” But we all know that a DOD Property Administrator expects a contractor to have detailed command media that addresses a multitude of detailed criteria.

There are five (5) adequacy criteria associated with Estimating System requirements. There are two (2) adequacy criteria associated with Earned Value Management Systems—although we note that one of the two criteria references ANSI/EIA-748, which contains 32 criteria. There are three (3) MMAS adequacy criteria.

So to wrap it up, this interim rule seems to be written in such a way that defense and NASA contractors—and perhaps all contractors (as we noted above)—can live with it. That’s not to say that it is without risk. Indeed, we see considerable risk associated with implementation of this new rule. We see two sides to the risk: (1) the known risk associated with the rule language, and (2) the unknown risk associated with how the rule will be actually implemented in the field.

The known risks include:

  • Whether DCAA will comply with the requirement to report only “significant deficiencies,” or if the audit agency will continue the unfortunate trend of reporting every small mistake as a glaring systemic problem.

  • Whether the significant deficiencies will be reported “in sufficient detail” to permit the ACO and contractor to understand both the problem and necessary solution, or whether the contractor will be left in limbo, trying to correct a problem that it doesn’t understand.

  • Whether the ACO will exercise the FAR-provided authority to implement payment withholds only when required—and reduce those payments in line with the rule’s guidance; or if the ACO will timidly await DCAA’s concurrence/permission to take any action.

The unknown risks include:

  • Whether DCAA will apply these criteria to contracts not officially covered by the rule.

  • Whether DCAA will apply pressure to DCMA Contracting Officers to implement payment withholds for relatively insignificant findings.

  • Whether DCMA Contracting Officers will be eager to disapprove contractor systems, knowing the immediate cash flow hit as well as the more long-term undermining of the contractor’s competitive position.

  • Whether the cash flow hit will be of such magnitude to force some contractors out of business.

This is a significant regulatory development. Your company’s cash flow is at risk. DCAA will be issuing audit guidance to implement the rule in the near future. Stay tuned for further details.


 

DCMA Reinforces Contracting Officer Authority While Industry Criticizes DCAA

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We are looking at the new DFARS “business systems” rule and we’ll have some things to say about it in the near future. To provide context, though, we want to note two recent events.

First, we came into possession of a May 12, 2011 letter from Charlie Williams, Jr. (Director, DCMA) to all DCMA Administrative Contracting Officers (ACOs), entitled “Expectations for Contracting Officers”. The memo starts out by acknowledging that DCMA has been criticized in recent times—by many, including Apogee Consulting, Inc.—for ceding FAR-mandated authority to DCAA auditors. The memo discusses the importance of the ACO role, stating—

At contractor locations where we have determined it is in the government’s interest to establish forward pricing rates, we should be continuously evaluating the rates and the individual pool and base elements that comprise them. In other words, I expect you to be as knowledgeable if not more so than anyone else with respect to the contractor’s rate structures and methodologies so you can provide expert advice based on fact. …

Working closely with DCAA auditors is a critical factor in your ability to be successful in the final outcomes that result from your rate decisions. … it is our policy that when you receive an audit report from DCAA, you should use the audited rates as the single government forward pricing rate recommendation. While this is policy, you will not find anything that states, ACOs should ignore common sense or relinquish their discretion in promulgating FPRRs. So simply put, it is my expectation that ACOs should always apply judgment and well informed thought prior to making any decision. I fully expect that there will be times when the contracting officer determines, in his or her judgment, that the rates contained in the audit may not be the best representation of future projections. When that judgment is well informed by fact and data, you must not be reticent or feel constrained in communicating your views with the auditors and if necessary requesting a Board of Review to elevate real differences.

Well. The above is nicely worded but (as they say) we’ll believe it when we see it. And from our experience, ACOs and other Contracting Officers are not walking that particular walk at the moment.

Before we move on, we also want to note a recent letter sent by the Aerospace Industries Association (AIA) to Patrick Fitzgerald, Director of DCAA, expressing “concerns with the current audit environment”. The letter tells Mr. Fitzgerald that the AIA is “greatly concerned that DCAA’s audits have now virtually eliminated materiality and risk assessments in planning and performing audits.” The AIA letter asserts that, as a result of the DCAA audit issues, “audits now take considerably longer to complete and consume considerably more resources.”

Attached to the AIA letter is a list of 54 audit issues experienced by AIA members. The audit issues range from the serious to the relatively trivial. Here are some examples—

  • Branch Manager claims that contractor’s systems with an ‘adequate’ determination do not reduce risk nor decrease the amount of transaction testing required.

  • Audit started in April 2009, then was reassigned to another auditor in September 2009, and then reassigned to another auditor in April 2010. Since April 2009, the DCAA has only requested information for their risk assessment… DACO requested that give [the audit] a high priority and requested a report by November 2010. Current due date is March 2011.

  • The Contractor is unable to reach an FPRA with the USG because the DCMA cannot negotiate without first having a DCAA FPRP audit report. As no FPRP audit report has been issued during 2010, this has resulted in difficult and protracted contract negotiations for both the Contractor and DCMA.

  • Entrance conference held February 2009. Received verbal notification November 2009 of ‘no findings’. Received notification December 2010 the audit was to be cancelled due to test data being over 9 months old ….

These two events share a commonality. They indicate a disconnect between theory and practice. This disconnect will feature prominently in our upcoming discussion of the DFARS “business systems” rule.

Stay tuned for that article, out soon.

 

Customer Concerns with Cost/Schedule Problems

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We’ve been thinking about how customers handle programs that are experiencing cost growth and/or schedule delays.

On April 26, 2011, DefenseNews reported that the Pentagon was implementing “should cost” program analyses on 14 major defense acquisition programs (“MDAPS”) in order to “make the weapons' projected price tags more realistic and save money.” The article discussed an April 22, 2011 memo from Dr. Ash Carter, in which he wrote—

It is essential that we eliminate cost overruns and begin to deliver programs below budget baselines that are set using independent Will-Cost estimates. I believe this is achievable if Program Managers continuously perform Should-Cost analysis that scrutinizes every element of government and contractor cost.

Meanwhile, Dr. Carter testified before the Senate that the F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program is going to cost at least twice as much “in real terms” as was originally estimated, according to this Reuters report.

According to the Reuters article, “This [situation] was ‘unacceptable and unaffordable,’ he told the panel, while voicing confidence the government would succeed in cutting excess costs in the coming months and years.”

Senators weren’t happy with the continued spiral of cost-growth. The story reported—

Committee chairman Carl Levin said new estimates of ‘life-cycle’ F-35 costs, including development, operation and maintenance, now top $1 trillion. The committee has been a strong supporter of the program, but he asked Carter to present alternatives as a ‘backup’ option within a week.

‘People should not conclude that we will be willing to continue that kind of support without regard to increased costs resulting from a lack of focus on affordability,’ the Michigan Democrat said.

Senator John McCain of Arizona, the panel's top Republican, described the F-35 program as ‘incredibly troubled’ and a ‘train wreck.’ He suggested the Pentagon think of alternatives to the F-35 program if its costs cannot be brought down.

Carter, the undersecretary of defense for acquisition, responded that there were no good alternatives to the F-35, a multirole aircraft due to replace various aircraft in the military fleets of both the United States and its partners.

The Senate was unhappy with program problems of the high-visibility program, but what could they do? As Dr. Carter testified, there were “no good alternatives” and thus no credible threat to hold over the head of Lockheed Martin. All the DOD can do is deploy teams of “should-cost” analysts to harass the program team and (by the way) distract the team from its focus on execution.

Nice.

The U.S. is not the only country with such issues. The U.K. has had its own share of weapon system problems, as this article reports. As the result of its cost and schedule problems, the U.K. MoD cancelled the Nimrod UAV programme, after spending £3.6 billion. As one article reported—

The RAF Nimrod MRA4 project was aimed at updating the earlier Nimrod MR2 aircraft and dates back many years. As detailed today by Mr Cameron, the programme is now running eight years behind schedule and 200 per cent over-budget, with an initial requirement for 25 airframes reduced to nine.

The Defence Review calls for the Nimrod MRA4 to be cancelled altogether: an unfortunate end to a troubled development. [Emphasis added.]

Even Russia is not immune from cost growth and schedule delays. The Seattle Times reported that—

The Kremlin says that President Dmitry Medvedev has fired several weapons plants chiefs and Defense Ministry officials over the industry's failure to deliver new weapons on time.

Medvedev also has reprimanded a dozen of other officials. Tuesday's move follows his recent meeting with arms manufacturers at which he criticized them for failing to meet last year's weapons orders and jacking up prices.

Here’s another take on the same story.

… the president demanded answers: ‘If high-level decisions are made, if funding is released, why are the weapons not delivered?’ Medvedev quoted his presidential message—delivered to a joint session of parliament in November 2009—that in 2010, the Russian military would receive more than 30 land and sea-based long-range ballistic missiles, five Iskander ballistic rocket systems, 300 modern armored vehicles, 30 helicopters, 28 warplanes, three nuclear submarines, a naval corvette and 11 new military satellites in orbit. ‘Why is this not done? This is absolutely unacceptable,’ barked Medvedev, ‘I did not invent the figures—you all sitting here approved them.’

Recalling the times of Josef Stalin’s terror and the Gulag, Medvedev announced: ‘In previous times, half of those present would already be doing hard physical labor in the fresh air.’ [Emphasis added.]

We have consistently noted that effective program execution is absolutely critical—especially in these economically troubled times. But it’s interesting—at least to us—at the varied customer reaction to program execution problems.

In the U.S., politicians express grave concerns and the DOD scrambles to look like it has a plan to correct the situation, while admitting that it really has little alternative other than staying the course.

In the U.K., troubled weapon systems have been cancelled.

And in Russia, people are getting fired while President Medvedev fondly reminisces about the good old days, when leaders would be sent to the gulag for failing to deliver weapon systems on time, for the budgeted amounts.

How will your customer react to your bad news?

 
 

More Corruption in the Navy

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We’ve previously reported on a NAVSEA Program Manager who accepted bribes from a contractor, which ultimately resulted in the contractor going out of business and many innocent employees losing their jobs.

Today’s story concerns another Navy contractor, San Diego-based JD Machine Tech, Inc., whose President pleaded guilty to providing gratuities and “bribes” to “a Navy official” in return for contract awards. On May 16, 2011, the Washington Post carried an Associated Press story which reported the following—

Jesse Denome … admitted that from June 2004 to September 2005 he gave a Navy official a bicycle worth nearly $2,500, a model airplane engine worth $449 and made $18,000 in payments on the official’s personal credit card. In exchange, prosecutors say the official placed over 100 orders [cumulatively worth about $300,000] … for a Navy aircraft program. The Navy is still investigating the official, identified only as D.V.

As if the above admissions weren’t serious enough, the article also noted that Denome was also being charged with tax evasion, for failing to report $300,000 in income, as well as, “passing off vacations and hobbies as business deductions.”

The article reported that Denome (age 47) “faces up to eight years in prison and more than $500,000 in fines.”

We respect the military service men and women who place their lives on the line every day, in order to protect the security of the United States. We also acknowledge those who serve in less obvious ways—such as logisticians and quartermasters—and we thank them for their efforts, as well.

We respect the military and its focus on leadership and accountability. The military’s focus on leadership and accountability has served as a role model for our approach to such things—and we’re sure we’re not alone in that regard.

Here’s a list of military leadership principles from this website—

  1. Know yourself and seek self improvement.
  2. Be technically and tactically proficient.

  3. Seek responsibility for your actions.

  4. Make sound and timely decisions.

  5. Set the example.

  6. Know your troops and look out for their welfare.

  7. Keep your troops informed.

  8. Develop a sense of responsibility in your subordinates.

  9. Insure the task is understood, supervised, and accomplished.

  10. Train your troops as a team.

  11. Employ your command in accordance with its capabilities.

Secretary of the Navy Gordon England published the following Principles of Leadership—

  1. Provide an environment for every person to excel

  2. Treat every person with dignity and respect — nobody is more important than anyone else

  3. Be forthright, honest and direct with every person and in every circumstance

  4. Improve effectiveness to gain efficiency

  5. Cherish your time and the time of others — it is not renewable

  6. Identify the critical problems that need solution for the organization to succeed

  7. Describe complex issues and problems simply so every person can understand

  8. Never stop learning — depth and breadth of knowledge are equally important

  9. Encourage constructive criticism

  10. Surround yourself with great people and delegate to them full authority and responsibility

  11. Make ethical standards more important than legal requirements

  12. Strive for team-based wins, not individual

  13. Emphasize capability — not organization

  14. Incorporate measures and metrics everywhere

  15. Concentrate on core functions and outsource all other

According to one blogger, “the single greatest thing about the United States Navy is that everybody is accountable up and down the line. An unbroken chain of responsibility extending from the lowliest seaman recruit to the top-ranking fleet admirals.” The blogger continued—

As a Navy officer, you are responsible for every aspect of those serving under you: ranging from personal habits and hygiene to specialized training and daily activities. All with continual in-depth testing and performance reviews. No man or woman is beyond the responsibility for acts committed during their watch – even if they were not directly responsible for the act itself.

Okay. Given the foregoing we have to ask, “Where is the accountability with respect to the wrong-doing of these Navy officials?”

Who is accountable for the lax ethical environment within the Navy’s procurement team, and (perhaps) for the lax control environment that permits these (admittedly few) individuals to accept bribes?

Who is accountable for permitting the Navy to award contracts to bidders without properly reviewing those award decisions to ensure that they are being made to the most qualified, lowest priced, bidders?

Who will take responsibility for these leadership failings?


 

Falsified Test Certifications Hurt Contractor and Put Lives at Risk

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On May 6, 2011, Robert Ruks, age 34, a former quality inspector at Huntington-Ingalls Shipbuilding (formerly Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding) (formerly Newport News Shipbuilding), pleaded guilty to two counts of making false statements in connection with inspections of welds on submarines constructed at the shipyard.

According to this report at DefenseNews, Ruks inspected and certified more than 10,000 welds during his 4 year tenure as a “non-destructive testing weld inspector.” He performed inspections on the submarines New Mexico, Missouri, California, Mississippi, New Hampshire, and the North Carolina. All of the subs in question are of the Virginia-class nuclear powered fast attack type—the U.S. Navy’s latest.

About 10 percent of the welds that Ruks inspected (or more accurately failed to inspect) were classified as SUBSAFE, meaning that they were hull integrity or other safety critical welds. As the DefenseNews story noted, “A defective pipe joint weld on a submarine that Ruks had certified as properly done could have caused the loss of the submarine.”

Another article stated that, “In May 2009, the Navy announced that an investigation was under way after an inspector at the Newport News shipyard admitted falsifying three weld inspections, saying he had done them when he had not.” Apparently, that investigation led to Ruks, after his co-workers reported him to shipyard management. As the DefenseNews article reported—

Questioned on May 14 of [2009] by his supervisors, Ruks admitted he had falsely certified inspecting three lift pad welds on a submarine although, according to a statement of facts filed with his plea agreement, the inspections were not performed. Ruks lied again on May 22, 2009, when he was questioned by agents from the Naval Criminal Investigative Service. According to the statement of facts, while Ruks admitted falsifying the lift pad weld certifications, he lied to the agents about the number of other ship and submarine hulls he had failed to inspect. … As a result of Ruks' false weld certifications, Northrop Grumman was forced to expend 18,906 man-hours to complete the reinspections, at a cost of $654,000 ….

It was reported that the reinspections found that 14 structural welds and two pipe welds were unsatisfactory—which (as we noted) may have put Navy lives at risk during submarine maneuvers.

The articles report that—

Ruks' guilty plea was accepted Friday by U.S. District Judge Mark S. Davis in federal court in Newport News. Ruks faces a maximum penalty of five years in prison and a fine of $250,000 for each count, as well as three years of supervised release on top of any prison term he may receive.

As part of Ruks' plea deal, he agreed to a "restitution order" that could require him to pay the U.S. government all of the $654,000 that it cost to reinspect and rework some of the 9,506 welds he certified on six submarines, court records show.

The final amount, however, is yet to be determined.

We too often focus on cost accounting and other issues, or on the mundane corrupt actions associated with procurement. It behooves us all to remember that fraud and corruption can spring from almost any source, and that there are people out there who think little of putting lives at risk in order to make their own lives easier.

 


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Newsflash

Effective January 1, 2019, Nick Sanders has been named as Editor of two reference books published by LexisNexis. The first book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Cost Accounting Standards. Nick replaces Darrell Oyer, who has edited those books for many years.