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Apogee Consulting Inc

Disclose Internal Audit Reports at Your Own Risk

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Recently we wrote about how Fluor Hanford’s own internal audit reports were used against it, in order to support allegations that the company’s management was well aware that its “weak internal control systems” created opportunities for its employees to misuse purchase cards (and to receive supplier kick-backs). We asserted that—

  • Internal audit reports are important. Internal auditors should be of high quality and so should their reports. Internal audit reports that report bad facts should not be ignored; indeed, management should take quick and decisive action to address the findings.

  • Internal audit reports that point out lax internal controls, which management ignores, become really effective “smoking guns” that will be used against the organization in a court of law.

But we were reminded that there’s another aspect of internal audit reports that must be considered during litigation. Our readers understand that some internal audit and/or compliance reports are prepared under privilege for internal and/or external counsel. Disclosure of such reports can prove problematic.

Karen Manos, writing in the May 2011 edition of West’s Government Contract Costs, Pricing & Accounting Report, reported that—

A U.S. Magistrate Judge ruled from the bench that Oracle’s disclosure of a privileged report in response to a General Services Administration Inspector General subpoena resulted in a broad subject matter waiver of all communications related to the report. … Oracle provided the IG a copy of the report of its outside counsel’s compliance review [related to compliance with the GSA Price Reductions clause]. … The Judge [found that] 'Defendants attorney-client privilege is waived with respect to all communications between defendants and [outside law firm] relating in any way to the contract in issue and/or the review performed.' ...

Ms. Manos, a widely respected Government Contracts attorney with Gibson Dunn, cited the case as: U.S. ex rel Frascella v. Oracle Corp., No. 1:07 cv529 (E.D. VA Mar. 30, 2011), ECF No. 186. A client advisory from McKenna, Long & Aldridge can be found here. The MLA attorneys wrote, “… as the Oracle case demonstrates, clients and counsel must carefully consider the potential implications -- both good and bad -- of disclosing to the government any compliance-related information prepared by counsel. “

On a related note, Francine McKenna posted an article on her Forbes blog discussing the interplay between the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), internal controls, and fraud. In that article, she reported a KPMG conclusion that, “Companies with weak or non-existent internal controls over financial reporting are more susceptible to fraud and they take longer to uncover.“ She also noted a recent Financial Executives International (FEI) survey that, “the primary owner of Sarbanes-Oxley compliance initiatives in most organizations is still the internal audit function.” She quoted Richard Chambers (CEO of the Institute of Internal Auditors or IIA) as saying—

While nothing about that contravenes our professional standards, the best role for Internal Audit to play in Sarbanes-Oxley compliance initiatives is to provide overall assurance on the effectiveness of the organization’s documentation and testing of internal controls and Section 302 certification process, rather than to be down in the weeds doing the actual documentation and testing of controls instead of management.

To wrap this up, we want to emphasize the importance of performing internal audits and testing internal controls. That said, we think companies ought to distinguish between internal audits that test SOX-related controls over financial reporting, and internal compliance reviews that test the operational controls embedded in contractor “business systems”. We are skeptical that the knowledge and skill sets between the two are easily transferable.

And, as noted by Ms. Manos and by the MLA attorneys, there’s a third category of internal reviews—the extraordinary internal reviews performed under attorney-client privilege. Such reviews should only be provided to outsiders (including government personnel such as DCAA auditors or Agency Inspectors General) under very carefully considered circumstances, lest the door be opened for qui tam relators and opposing counsel to obtain a bounty of documents that would have otherwise been protected.

Ask yourself how your company addresses its internal audit function, and whether there is a separate group that evaluates your “business systems”. Are you investing enough into detecting wrong-doing or, like other contractors in the news, are you pretending there’s no risk to your company or its shareholders?

 

Fluor Settles False Claims Allegations for $4 Million

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On June 17, 2011, the U.S. Department of Justice reported that Fluor Hanford, Inc., a wholly owned subsidiary of Fluor Federal Services, Inc. and Fluor Corporation, had agreed to pay the U.S. Government $4 million to resolve allegations of violations of the False Claims Act. Flour Hanford is the entity that operates and manages mixed radioactive waste at the Department of Energy’s Hanford Nuclear Site in Hanford, Washington.

According to one website—

Hanford is one of five major Department of Energy nuclear processing plants and R&D laboratories in the United States. It has more than ten industrialized areas (most with reactors of some kind) located on a 562 square mile site on the Columbia River in eastern Washington. Originally built in secret to produce plutonium for the Manhattan Project, the installation manufactured nuclear materials used in bombs for decades after the war, and it has become one of the most contaminated sites in the country, with millions of gallons of radioactive waste, much of it migrating through the soil towards the Columbia River. More than 10,000 people work on clean-up issues at the reservation, most of which continues to be closed to the public.

According to the DOJ press release—

Between 2003 and 2008, Fluor employed individuals known as material coordinators, whose job responsibilities included purchasing supplies for use by Fluor on its DOE contract. Between 2003 and 2008, three such material coordinators, Susanna Zuniga, Gregory Detloff and Paul Kempf, made hundreds of fraudulent purchases using government purchase cards, using their positions and exploiting weaknesses in Fluor’s internal control system to funnel DOE funds to themselves. … Additionally, between 2005 and 2008, at least 14 Fluor material coordinators solicited, received and accepted kickbacks from a Hanford-area vendor known as Fast Pipe and Supply Company and its owner, Shane Fast. These kickbacks, which took the form of cash, tickets to sporting events, gift cards and other things of value, were intended to influence the material coordinators to purchase from Fast rather than competing vendors. In return for these kickbacks, the 14 Fluor material coordinators did more than $3.5 million in business with Fast.

Notice that the DOJ went out of its way to note that Fluor’s internal controls were weak and permitted the miscreants to execute their fraudulent acts. Readers should remember that the False Claims Act permits either civil or criminal prosecution (or both, we suppose). The civil False Claims Statute explicitly provides that violations include reckless conduct and/or deliberate ignorance of the truth. In other words, no specific intent to defraud the Government is necessary. (NOTE: This is a layperson’s interpretation.) In other words, if the DOJ could prove that Fluor’s management was aware of lax internal controls but did nothing to address the issues, it would be well on its way to a conviction.

So you’ll understand why the DOJ not only pointed out allegedly the weak internal controls, but also announced to the world that—

As early as 2001 and repeatedly between 2001 and 2008, internal audits conducted by Fluor alerted it to weaknesses in its purchase card controls, weaknesses exploited by the three material coordinators. Nonetheless, Fluor failed to address these weaknesses, allowing these schemes to go undetected for years.

Oops! Those are some troubling facts ….

And about those material coordinators – the DOJ also announced that, “Five former Fluor employees have been indicted for their participation in the fraudulent schemes. Four of the individuals have pleaded guilty, with the fifth awaiting trial.”

Lessons learned for the rest of us?

  1. Internal controls are important and enhancing them is an investment in lowering your future litigation (not to mention settlement) costs.

  2. Internal audit reports are important. Internal auditors should be of high quality and so should their reports. Internal audit reports that report bad facts should not be ignored; indeed, management should take quick and decisive action to address the findings.

  3. Internal audit reports that point out lax internal controls, which management ignores, become really effective “smoking guns” that will be used against the organization in a court of law.

 

Shay Assad Departs DPAP

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Shay Assad

On May 31, 2011 the Defense Department announced that Shay Assad, Director of Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy (DPAP) had been assigned to a new position, that of Director, Defense Pricing. Both positions report to the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics), so this is a lateral move. Reportedly, Mr. Assad will be replaced by Richard Ginman, one of his deputies.

Seems innocuous, doesn’t it? Not really. We’re going to dig a bit deeper to show you how this transition not only ties into many of the important issues on which we have routinely reported, but that it also establishes the future for DOD acquisition policy.

Mr. Assad has been either the subject of, or a key participant in, many blog articles on this site. A quick search returned 21 articles in which he has been mentioned. He’s been a key figure in our ongoing saga of Defense contractor oversight.

As DPAP Director, he established acquisition and cost policy for the Pentagon. For example, we reported that his Class Deviation implemented the Franken Amendment. Perhaps more importantly to regular readers, he emerged in late 2009 as the mediator in the public flame wars between the DCMA, DCAA, DOD IG, and Commission on Wartime Contracting (CWC). In another “for example,” in this article we reported that Mr. Assad had Chaired the DOD’s Taskforce on Wartime Contracting (TFWC), and that he had concluded that every concern raised by the CWC was already being addressed.

Mr. Assad had established himself as a key leader in the Pentagon’s contractor management. He had been involved in the highest profile issues facing DOD’s acquisition workforce. Recently, reports linked Mr. Assad to the travails of the F-25 JSF program. Reuters reported that—

Carter's deputy, Shay Assad, came to Fort Worth last week to review Lockheed's costs amid growing frustration that only about 15 percent of the plane's cost is linked to ‘touch labor,’ work on the plane actually done in the plant, with the rest linked to Lockheed's overhead.

We touched on these frustrations in our story on customer reactions to program cost/schedule increases. We quoted a report that stated—

Committee chairman Carl Levin said new estimates of ‘life-cycle’ F-35 costs, including development, operation and maintenance, now top $1 trillion. The committee has been a strong supporter of the program, but he asked Carter to present alternatives as a ‘backup’ option within a week. … Senator John McCain of Arizona, the panel's top Republican, described the F-35 program as ‘incredibly troubled’ and a ‘train wreck.’ He suggested the Pentagon think of alternatives to the F-35 program if its costs cannot be brought down. Carter, the undersecretary of defense for acquisition, responded that there were no good alternatives to the F-35, a multirole aircraft due to replace various aircraft in the military fleets of both the United States and its partners.

Mr. Assad’s lateral move to his new position—a position apparently created for him—portends something new in the Pentagon’s approach to establishing contract prices. The new approach was discussed in an interview of Mr. Assad, published online in Federal Computer Week. Mr. Assad said—

One of the things that we are looking at is creating within the DCMA a pricing center of excellence. It would include a market research branch. If people are looking for a particular service, these folks would be able to provide them guidance as to how to go about doing that market research.

Matthew Weigelt, author of the FCW story, summed up Assad’s new responsibilities thusly—


Ashton Carter, undersecretary of Defense for acquisition, technology and logistics, has sought to improve efficiency through the Better Buying Power initiative and other activities that drive down costs, such as increasing competition for contracts.



DOD has also focused on managing program costs. Senior officials are trying to control spending and comparing what an acquisition should cost and what it will cost in the end.



David Berteau, director of the Center for Strategic and International Studies' Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group, said Assad's new position will help reverse 15 years or more of a decline in managing defense contracts and controlling prices. Such a position is long overdue and will have lasting value for DOD.

‘It is central to the success of Carter's initiatives,’ he said. ‘But more importantly, it will have benefits across all $360 billion of DOD contract dollars.’

Aviation Week reported a Reuters story with an emphasis on weapon system cost control. It reported—


The Pentagon is stepping up efforts to get the best prices possible for up to $400 billion in weapons and services it buys each year, but officials insist they are not trying to slash contractors’ profits.



‘This isn’t a war on contractor profitability. This really is trying to figure out how do we pay less for the goods and services that we buy,’ Shay Assad, a top aide to the Pentagon’s chief weapons buyer, told Reuters after a news conference to discuss an organizational change that left him with the new title ‘director, defense pricing.’



‘The reality is we need to step up our game across the board, and so that’s what we’re doing,’ Assad told reporters. He said unlike profit margins, overhead costs would be fair game. ‘That’s cost. How do we get that out?’ …



Assad said his job was not to tighten the screws on contractors, but to help equip the service’s acquisition experts to achieve the best possible deal for taxpayers.

He said he would review all sole source acquisition deals valued at over $1 billion, and some others worth more than $500 million. He would also be involved with pricing for competitive deals, but another official would oversee those negotiations.



Over the next 18 to 24 months, for instance, the Pentagon is revamping its Defense Contracts Management Agency and building a database that will help contract officials compare their programs with those of other services.



DefenseNews reported the story with emphasis on Assad’s role in negotiating contract costs. It said—


There will be a new negotiator at the table as the Pentagon and Lockheed Martin hammer out a pricing deal for the latest batch of F-35 Joint Strike Fighters. Shay Assad, the newly named director of defense pricing, will help the U.S. Defense Department buy weapons at a lower cost than official budget estimates. The creation of the new position is part of the Pentagon's quest to drive down the cost of weapons at a time when defense budgets are constricting. In his new role, Assad will help program managers hit these should-cost targets, which will be set at levels less than official budget estimates.



In addition, he will spend more time improving the contracting and pricing work forces in ‘improving their skills on what it is we pay on the goods and services we buy.’



One of the major elements of this is to transform the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA), Assad said. DCMA has hired 300 pricing analysts who will assist contract officers during negotiations for weapons, sustainment, services and other contracts. It will take 18 to 24 months to bring this work force up to speed, Assad said.



Officials are also creating an online system that will ‘enable our contracting officers to get insight into the financial aspects of the companies that we deal with in a real-time way,’ he said. The system, which already includes rate data, is being tested. Currently, it could take contracting officers months or even a year to compile this type of data. Soon it will all be organized under one roof and should take minutes to retrieve. …



Assad will be ‘intimately involved’ supporting the acquisition of the F-35, the Pentagon's most expensive program. DoD converted the program to a fixed-price construct last year and has entered new negotiations for the fifth batch of production aircraft. The F-35 negotiations will likely not wrap up until this fall, Assad said.

We noted above that Mr. Assad’s transfer shows how the DOD intends to manage its contractors. Let’s list some of the strategies mentioned in the various stories above.

  1. Allegedly, 85 percent of the F-35’s unit cost is “overhead”. That’s nonsense, of course, but it plays well. Assad’s intent is to drive down such “overhead” costs by focusing on what those various tasks “should cost” as opposed to what the contractor tells DOD it is actually costing.

  2. Assad is going to focus on enhancing DCMA’s existing skillset in analyzing contractor proposals and their proposed prices, and in negotiating program prices. Reports mentioned that DCMA’s pricing analysts would be key to achieving those goals.

  3. Another aspect of the transformation is to develop insight into contractors’ actual costs. To that end, a database has been created to permit rapid comparisons between contractors.

A couple of final thoughts on the foregoing:

  • Omitted from any reports that we saw was mention of the role of Mr. Charlie Williams, Jr. (Director, DCMA) in the agency transformation. We can’t help but wonder whether Mr. Williams sees Mr. Assad’s new role as being one of additional, badly needed, support—or whether he sees Mr. Assad as stepping on his toes like an elephant at a sock hop.

  • Omitted from any reports that we saw was mention of the role of DCAA in assuring fair and reasonable contract prices. Mr. Assad, who has been an effective mediator between DCMA and DCAA (and other stakeholders), is going to focus on DCMA and nobody has anything to say about DCAA. What’s that about? And while we’re on this topic, what about that DCMA/DCAA dispute resolution process that Mr. Assad was instrumental in crafting and in executing? What’s going to happen to that process without Mr. Assad?

  • About that magic database. Surely the database cannot be intended for use in comparing contractor indirect rates. Nobody can compare contractors’ indirect cost rates because very few contractors have identical cost accounting practices. Some contractors have a lot of direct costs and others have a lot of overhead pools and special cost allocations. What matters is the bottom-line price and not how much is “overhead”. So there must be another purpose to that database….

Leveraging on the points above, let’s speculate wildly for your amusement.

Suppose—and we’re just speaking hypothetically here—just suppose DCMA wanted to stop relying on DCAA. Suppose DCMA was fed up with audit reports that arrived too late, and contained too little reliable information to permit effective contract negotiations. Suppose DCMA was tired with DCAA’s misplaced emphasis on compliance with GAGAS and maintenance of auditor independence. Suppose DCMA wanted to negotiate with contractors on issues ranging from forward pricing indirect cost rates to contractor proposals, and it wanted to conduct those negotiations on its own timetable, and be responsible for its own outcomes. What might DCMA do in that hypothetical situation?

It seems to us that DCMA might develop its own price analysis center of excellence. One that focused on analyzing contractor costs. One that was staffed with dedicated analysts who had been rigorously trained in cost and price analysis techniques—analysts who could match DCAA auditors in proposal analysis expertise. In that scenario, DCMA could conduct its own proposal analyses and negotiate with contractors without the need for a detailed DCAA audit.

And if DCMA wanted to move away from reliance on DCAA to negotiate contractor indirect cost rates—especially forward pricing rates—then DCMA might develop a database of historical contractor indirect cost rates. Such a database might be used for linear regression and other similar statistical analyses, so as to project future contractor indirect cost rates without relying on a detailed audit of contractor budgets. DCMA could negotiate from a position of strength based on its statistical analyses, and would no longer need to wait for a DCAA audit report.

As we’ve asserted before, our belief is that DCMA has given up on DCAA and is frantically trying to develop its own expertise so that Contracting Officers no longer need to rely on audit reports in order to sit down at the negotiating table.

From this viewpoint, Mr. Assad’s new role makes perfect sense: his new job is to get DCMA to “man-up” so that DCAA’s current role in contract pricing can safely be de-emphasized. From this viewpoint, Mr. Assad’s seemingly innocuous transfer portends a significant change for DOD contractor management, one that does not bode well for DCAA.

Watch DOD’s new pricing center of excellence carefully. Watch DCMA’s interaction with DCAA. Look for changes in the current roles and relationships. Those changes might be signs that we’re on the right track.

Hypothetically speaking.


 

“Begun, the Cyber-Wars Have”

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“A fake fortuneteller can be tolerated. But an authentic soothsayer should be shot on sight. Cassandra did not get half the kicking around she deserved.”

– Robert A. Heinlein

We’ve been warning you about cyber threats and cyber security for quite some time. Surprisingly (to us) our articles have not proven to have been very popular, consistently scoring amongst the lowest in the site article analytics. We have been ringing the alarm bells about cyber security for nearly two years.

In November, 2009, we wrote that—

The AW&ST article reports that the U.S. is under such constant cyber-attack that ‘the definition of ‘success’ has shifted to containing intrusions instead of eliminating them.’ As SecDef Gates noted in a June 2009 memo, ‘our increasing dependency on cyberspace, alongside a growing array of cyber threats and vulnerabilities, adds a new element of risk to our national security.’ … As the AW&ST article reminds us, our adversaries are making advances as well, perhaps in areas in which we are vulnerable to exploitation.

A month later, we reported on the U.S. Cyber Challenge, a nation-wide contest that was designed to “find 10,000 young Americans with the interests and skills to fill the ranks of cyber security practitioners, researchers, and warriors. Some will become the top guns in cyber security.” The United States needs such “cyber warriors,” of course, because it’s tough to defend (or attack) when one lacks resources. We have consistently pointed out that the Pentagon’s over-reliance on tanks and aircraft and missiles is missing the point that the information grid and its infrastructure are its unprotected flank.

In January 2010 we asserted that—

The next big war between nation states probably won’t be fought using tanks and planes; it will probably be fought in cyberspace. The war could be over before a single shot is fired, with the winner being the first to shut down the other side’s electrical and information grids. The soldiers of the next war are in training now. And the United States is way behind other nations in training and equipping its cybersoldiers.

Finally, we noted the following—

We certainly don’t want to be seen as being overly alarmist. So, we’re just saying that the so-called “Iranian Cyber-Army” “may have successfully infected as many as 20 million PCs.” Our cyber-security stories don’t interest many site visitors for some strange reason, but here’s a link to the story at computerworld.com. Again, there’s no reason to be overly concerned about this group, which may or may not be connected to the Iranian government, but which is known for having hacked both Twitter and Baidu. Don’t be worried about its for-rent botnet service. Ignore the fact that investigators found ‘an administration interface where people who want to rent the botnet can describe the machines they would like to infect and upload their own malware for distribution by the botnet.’ …



And while you’re not looking at your lack of cyber-security, take no notice of Darnell Albert-El, of Richmond, Virginia, who was sentenced to serve 27 months in prison for ‘hacking into his former employer’s website’ and ‘one count of intentionally damaging a protected computer without authorization.’ Albert-El, a former IT Director for Transmarx, LLC, was fired by his employer. After his termination, ‘he used a personal computer and an administrator account and password to access the computer hosting the Transmarx website.’ What did he do with his unauthorized access? He ‘caused the transmission of a series of commands that intentionally caused damage without authorization to the computer by deleting approximately 1,000 files related to the Transmarx website.’ ….

So when we heard (in March 2011) that EMC’s security division, RSA, had been hacked, we were hardly surprised. RSA, for those scratching their heads in puzzlement, is the self-proclaimed “premier provider of security, risk, and compliance solutions for business acceleration.” According to its website, RSA “brings visibility and trust to millions of user identities” by helping businesses implement “controls in identity assurance, encryption and key management, SIEM, data loss prevention, and fraud protection.” Except the company founded on computer security found itself the victim of an “extremely sophisticated” exploitation scheme that stole “information related to the company’s SecurID two-factor authentication products.”

As they say, “Physician, heal thyself.”

According to this Wired article, “SecurID adds an extra layer of protection to a login process by requiring users to enter a secret code number displayed on a keyfob, or in software, in addition to their password. The number is cryptographically generated and changes every 30 seconds.” The Wired article also reported—

‘While at this time we are confident that the information extracted does not enable a successful direct attack on any of our RSA SecurID customers,’ RSA wrote on its blog, ‘this information could potentially be used to reduce the effectiveness of a current two-factor authentication implementation as part of a broader attack. We are very actively communicating this situation to RSA customers and providing immediate steps for them to take to strengthen their SecurID implementations.’



As of 2009, RSA counted 40 million customers carrying SecurID hardware tokens, and another 250 million using software. Its customers include government agencies.

Well, RSA’s assessment of the situation proved to be—shall we say?—overly optimistic.

On May 21, 2011, less than 60 days after the EMC penetration, aerospace/defense giant Lockheed Martin was attacked in a “tenacious” manner. According to this Financial Times article—

Lockheed did not confirm that the raid on its data built on the attack on RSA, but many analysts said that it was likely, because one of Lockheed’s first acts had been to disable the remote logins.



More disturbing, they said, was the fact like others in the defence industry, Lockheed had previously acted to make itself less dependent on the rapidly-changing numeric passwords the RSA tokens produced.



The RSA breach began with e-mails sent to its staff with an attachment that contained a hidden remote-access program that took advantage of a security flaw in Adobe’s Flash software for viewing content. …



Analysts said it appeared the hackers had obtained the ‘seed’ numbers used to generate passwords. If they combined that with administration information kept by customers associating tokens with specific employees, the passwords could be duplicated.



The National Security Agency went further, declaring not long after the RSA attack that the tokens should no longer be deemed sufficient to grant access to ‘critical infrastructure’. Defence contractors including Lockheed began requiring employees to put in extra personal passwords.



Although Lockheed said its programs and customer data had not been compromised in the attack, the breach suggests that the extra passwords were not sufficient to repel hackers, an ominous sign for remote-access systems in defence and other industries.



Richard Stiennon, a former Gartner security analyst and author of a recent book on cyberwar, said: ‘If there is a direct connection between the RSA breach and the subsequent attacks on Lockheed Martin and other defence contractors, this will be one of the most sophisticated sequences of attack events ever’.



But that’s not all—not by a long shot.



Reports have recently emerged that both Northrop Grumman and L-3 Communications may also have been victims of similar cyber-attacks. One news story reported—



Attackers hit major defense contractor L-3 Communications Holdings by spoofing pass codes from a cloned RSA SecurID token, Reuters reported May 27. The attackers may have used a similar method to target another defense contractor, Lockheed Martin, on May 21. The second-largest U.S. defense contractor Northrop Grumman may also have been hacked, as the company shut down remote access to its network without warning on May 26, according to Fox News. …



‘L-3 Communications has been actively targeted with penetration attacks leveraging the compromised information,’ an L-3 executive wrote April 6 in an internal memo obtained by Wired Threat Level.

It’s not clear from the internal email whether attackers managed to actually break into L-3 networks, or if they were detected in the midst of the attack. The memo also did not specify exactly why or how L-3 came to the conclusion that the SecurID two-factor authentication system was at fault. An L-3 spokesperson just said the company takes security seriously and that the incident has been resolved.



While the details of these attacks are not “fully known,” it is likely that attackers were able to install a keylogger somewhere within the network, according to Harry Sverdlove, CTO of security firm Bit9. The information captured and knowledge of RSA’s token-generation algorithm would give attackers a way to breach the network, Sverdlove said, noting that this would be a “worst case scenario” for SecurID.

‘It would mean that a single point of attack can be used to defeat the dual-factor authentication provided by the security tokens,’ Sverdlove said. The keylogger may have been installed on a remote system that connected to the network via a VPN. This makes sense, since the ‘best bet’ is to attack vulnerable endpoints, or computers that are connecting remotely and are likely not under the direct control of the organization’s security policies.



Northrop Grumman does not comment on cyber-attacks against it, the company spokesperson said. It’s also unclear how Northrop Grumman was hit, as ComputerWorld reported that the defense contractor replaced all its SecurID tokens with tokens from a different vendor ‘immediately’ after the RSA breach.

The network shutdown at Northrop Grumman caught ‘even senior managers by surprise’ and caused chaos, according to the Fox News story. ‘We went through a domain name and password reset across the entire organization,’ an unnamed source told FoxNews.com.

Okay. If that were all we had, you might be a little concerned. But we’re not done yet …

This past week, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) was attacked. “The hack's perpetrators obtained a ‘large quantity of data,’ including e-mail and other documents during the intrusion, according to Bloomberg.” The report continued—

How hackers were able to penetrate the IMF's network is still unknown. But it appears the intrusion may have been the result of a spear phishing attack. This kind of attack typically works by tricking an employee into clicking on a link to a malicious website or downloading a file loaded with malware.

And, on June 11, 2011, the hacker collective Anonymous called-out the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), according to Time Magazine. According to Time, Anonymous issued a response to a recent NATO report on the perils of cyber warfare by telling NATO, “This is no longer your world. It is our world—the people’s world.”

Anonymous’ manifesto continued—

We do not wish to threaten anybody's way of life. We do not wish to dictate anything to anybody. We do not wish to terrorize any nation.



We merely wish to remove power from vested interests and return it to the people - who, in a democracy, it should never have been taken from in the first place.



The government makes the law. This does not give them the right to break it. If the government was doing nothing underhand or illegal, there would be nothing 'embarassing' [sic] about Wikileaks revelations, nor would there have been any scandal emanating from HBGary. The resulting scandals were not a result of Anonymous' or Wikileaks' revelations, they were the result of the CONTENT of those revelations. And responsibility for that content can be laid solely at the doorstep of policymakers who, like any corrupt entity, naively believed that they were above the law and that they would not be caught.



A lot of government and corporate comment has been dedicated to 'how we can avoid a similar leak in the future'. Such advice ranges from better security, to lower levels of clearance, from harsher penalties for whistleblowers, to censorship of the press.



Our message is simple: Do not lie to the people and you won't have to worry about your lies being exposed. Do not make corrupt deals and you won't have to worry about your corruption being laid bare. Do not break the rules and you won't have to worry about getting in trouble for it. … Do not make the mistake of challenging Anonymous. Do not make the mistake of believing you can behead a headless snake. If you slice off one head of Hydra, ten more heads will grow in its place. If you cut down one Anon, ten more will join us purely out of anger at your trampling of dissent.

Now you should be nervous.

Our take (besides our repetition of the need to enhance cyber security)? We think we are all watching history being made. We believe that 2011 will one day be noted for the beginning of the cyber-wars.

No, we don’t think we’re being overly alarmist. Just ask Lockheed Martin, or L-3 Communications, or Citigroup, or the IMF. Our website was attacked and wiped-out a few weeks ago—and we had taken the precaution of blocking all IP addresses based in China. (Fortunately, our back-ups worked and we were up and running again within 72 hours.)

We think the U.S. has fallen behind other countries, and parastatial entities, in the strategy and tactics of cyber-warfare. Like the French and their Maginot Line, the U.S. has spent billions on its military assets, without adequately securing the information grid that is the true backbone of its high-tech military. We think the U.S. military is vulnerable; we think corporate America is vulnerable. And we’re pretty sure you are vulnerable as well.

 

Final FAR Close-Out Rule Issued

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When we wrote about issuance of the interim DFARS rule on “business systems” we opined that seeing the rule in print was like receiving a long-expected—yet still dreaded—phone call from your oncology specialist or from your spouse’s divorce attorney.

This feeling is worse than that. Much worse.

On May 31, 2011, the final FAR rule on contract close-out was issued in the Federal Register.

Where to start?

Quick-close outs are authorized when unsettled direct and indirect costs associated with the contract do not exceed the lesser of $1 million or 10 percent of the total contract, task order, or delivery order amount. This is more restrictive than the prior language, which focused only on indirect costs and provided for more contracting officer discretion.

(The quick close-out amount(s) also represent a significant reduction from the amount(s) in the proposed rule. DCAA submitted a comment that the proposed amounts were too high. Given that DCAA got everything it wanted in this rule, it is hardly surprising that the FAR Councils lowered the quick close-out ceilings as well.)

The Allowable Cost and Payment contract clause—which is mandatory for cost-type contracts—has been revised to define what an “adequate” final indirect cost rate proposal must look like. It contains fifteen (15) mandatory schedules and fifteen (15) “supplemental” schedules. The 15 mandatory schedules must be submitted in order for the proposal to be considered “adequate” while the 15 supplemental schedules must be provided during audit.

Final “completion” vouchers/invoices must include settled subcontractor amounts/rates. According to the new rule, “The prime contractor is responsible for settling subcontractor amounts and rates included in the completion invoice or voucher and providing status of subcontractor audits to the contracting officer upon request.”

Fee withholds are now mandatory instead of being discretionary. The new rule revises the Fixed Fee clause (52.216-8) to state—

(b) Payment of the fixed fee shall be made as specified in the Schedule; provided that the Contracting Officer withholds a reserve not to exceed 15 percent of the total fixed fee or $100,000, whichever is less, to protect the Government's interest. The Contracting Officer shall release 75 percent of all fee withholds under this contract after receipt of an adequate certified final indirect cost rate proposal covering the year of physical completion of this contract, provided the Contractor has satisfied all other contract terms and conditions, including the submission of the final patent and royalty reports, and is not delinquent in submitting final vouchers on prior years' settlements. The Contracting Officer may release up to 90 percent of the fee withholds under this contract based on the Contractor's past performance related to the submission and settlement of final indirect cost rate proposals.

Similar changes have been made to clauses 52.216-9 (Fixed Fee-Construction) and 52.216-10 (Incentive Fee).

We have railed and ranted about this rule before. In August, 2009, we reported that—

Although some aspects of the proposed rule change did, in fact, address contract close-out activities, the majority of the language turned out to be a ‘wolf in sheep's clothing’ that, if implemented as drafted, will significantly expand the powers of DCAA, and will force contractors to comply with arbitrary DCAA demands or risk monetary penalties.

In October, 2009, we told you about some of the comments the FAR Councils had received. Those comments were considered and, in the main, ignored. Although the ostensible purpose of the rule originally was to improve the contract close-out process, during the rulemaking process that purpose became “to ensure uniformity, consistency, and fairness to all contractors.” The new rule “assures that contractors are fully informed in advance of the Government's parameters for the content of an adequate final indirect cost rate proposal.”

The FAR Councils’ responses to the public comments were, to put it diplomatically, misleading. For example, the FAR Councils assert that, “no new requirement is imposed on contractors by this rule. The list of data (schedules) now included in FAR 52.216-7(d) requires the same information previously cited in FAR 42.705-1(b).”

The language at 42.705-1(b) was—

A contractor shall support its proposal with adequate supporting data. For guidance on what generally constitutes an adequate final indirect cost rate proposal and supporting data, contractors should refer to the Model Incurred Cost Proposal in Chapter 6 of the Defense Contract Audit Agency Pamphlet No. 7641.90, Information for Contractors, available via the Internet at http://www.dcaa.mil.

Unfortunately, that “guidance on what generally constitutes an adequate final indirect cost rate proposal and supporting data” has now become “See the clause at 52.216-7(d)(2) for the description of an adequate final indirect cost rate proposal and supporting data.” And of course, that clause now lists the 15 mandatory schedules we noted above. The guidance has become the absolute rule.

If that’s not a significant regulatory change, we’ll eat our hat(s). Yet that’s what the FAR Councils would have us believe. They state—

The Department of Defense, the General Services Administration, and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration certify that this final rule will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities within the meaning of the Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. 601, et seq., because the rule does not impose any additional requirements on small businesses. The changes to FAR parts 4 and 42 clarify and streamline closeout procedures. The changes to the clauses at FAR 52.216-8, 52.216-9, and 52.216-10 allow for a reserve to be set-aside to protect the Government's interest. Contracting Officers already may set aside a reserve under current FAR procedures.

To sum up, this rule does nothing to streamline contract close-outs. Instead, it gives DCAA sole authority to determine whether a contractor has submitted an “adequate” incurred cost submission/final indirect cost rate proposal. Sure, the rule states that the cognizant Administrative Contracting Officer makes the official determination, but when was the last time an ACO picked a fight with DCAA? How many DCMA Review Boards does it take to teach ACOs that the path of least resistance—rubber-stamp agreement with DCAA—is the unofficial DCMA policy?

The proposed rule omits any discussion regarding whether the ACO’s determination constitutes a “final decision” under the Contracts Dispute Act. If the determination is a final decision under the CDA, then it is appealable to the U.S. Court of Federal Claims or to the appropriate Board of Contract Appeals. If it is not a final decision, then no appeal is possible.

And any attempt to fight DCAA’s checklist approach to adequacy, to argue that certain mandatory schedules are not applicable to the facts and circumstances of a particular contractor, will result in monetary penalties—as the ACO invokes mandatory fee withholds that will not released until the contractor agrees (under financial duress) to submit exactly the schedules that DCAA demands.

Did you submit a comment? Did you point out the inequity of this rule? If not, you have no reason to complain. Go download your DCAA “ICE” model and prepare your final rates.


 


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Newsflash

Effective January 1, 2019, Nick Sanders has been named as Editor of two reference books published by LexisNexis. The first book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Cost Accounting Standards. Nick replaces Darrell Oyer, who has edited those books for many years.