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Shay Assad Departs DPAP

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Shay Assad

On May 31, 2011 the Defense Department announced that Shay Assad, Director of Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy (DPAP) had been assigned to a new position, that of Director, Defense Pricing. Both positions report to the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics), so this is a lateral move. Reportedly, Mr. Assad will be replaced by Richard Ginman, one of his deputies.

Seems innocuous, doesn’t it? Not really. We’re going to dig a bit deeper to show you how this transition not only ties into many of the important issues on which we have routinely reported, but that it also establishes the future for DOD acquisition policy.

Mr. Assad has been either the subject of, or a key participant in, many blog articles on this site. A quick search returned 21 articles in which he has been mentioned. He’s been a key figure in our ongoing saga of Defense contractor oversight.

As DPAP Director, he established acquisition and cost policy for the Pentagon. For example, we reported that his Class Deviation implemented the Franken Amendment. Perhaps more importantly to regular readers, he emerged in late 2009 as the mediator in the public flame wars between the DCMA, DCAA, DOD IG, and Commission on Wartime Contracting (CWC). In another “for example,” in this article we reported that Mr. Assad had Chaired the DOD’s Taskforce on Wartime Contracting (TFWC), and that he had concluded that every concern raised by the CWC was already being addressed.

Mr. Assad had established himself as a key leader in the Pentagon’s contractor management. He had been involved in the highest profile issues facing DOD’s acquisition workforce. Recently, reports linked Mr. Assad to the travails of the F-25 JSF program. Reuters reported that—

Carter's deputy, Shay Assad, came to Fort Worth last week to review Lockheed's costs amid growing frustration that only about 15 percent of the plane's cost is linked to ‘touch labor,’ work on the plane actually done in the plant, with the rest linked to Lockheed's overhead.

We touched on these frustrations in our story on customer reactions to program cost/schedule increases. We quoted a report that stated—

Committee chairman Carl Levin said new estimates of ‘life-cycle’ F-35 costs, including development, operation and maintenance, now top $1 trillion. The committee has been a strong supporter of the program, but he asked Carter to present alternatives as a ‘backup’ option within a week. … Senator John McCain of Arizona, the panel's top Republican, described the F-35 program as ‘incredibly troubled’ and a ‘train wreck.’ He suggested the Pentagon think of alternatives to the F-35 program if its costs cannot be brought down. Carter, the undersecretary of defense for acquisition, responded that there were no good alternatives to the F-35, a multirole aircraft due to replace various aircraft in the military fleets of both the United States and its partners.

Mr. Assad’s lateral move to his new position—a position apparently created for him—portends something new in the Pentagon’s approach to establishing contract prices. The new approach was discussed in an interview of Mr. Assad, published online in Federal Computer Week. Mr. Assad said—

One of the things that we are looking at is creating within the DCMA a pricing center of excellence. It would include a market research branch. If people are looking for a particular service, these folks would be able to provide them guidance as to how to go about doing that market research.

Matthew Weigelt, author of the FCW story, summed up Assad’s new responsibilities thusly—


Ashton Carter, undersecretary of Defense for acquisition, technology and logistics, has sought to improve efficiency through the Better Buying Power initiative and other activities that drive down costs, such as increasing competition for contracts.



DOD has also focused on managing program costs. Senior officials are trying to control spending and comparing what an acquisition should cost and what it will cost in the end.



David Berteau, director of the Center for Strategic and International Studies' Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group, said Assad's new position will help reverse 15 years or more of a decline in managing defense contracts and controlling prices. Such a position is long overdue and will have lasting value for DOD.

‘It is central to the success of Carter's initiatives,’ he said. ‘But more importantly, it will have benefits across all $360 billion of DOD contract dollars.’

Aviation Week reported a Reuters story with an emphasis on weapon system cost control. It reported—


The Pentagon is stepping up efforts to get the best prices possible for up to $400 billion in weapons and services it buys each year, but officials insist they are not trying to slash contractors’ profits.



‘This isn’t a war on contractor profitability. This really is trying to figure out how do we pay less for the goods and services that we buy,’ Shay Assad, a top aide to the Pentagon’s chief weapons buyer, told Reuters after a news conference to discuss an organizational change that left him with the new title ‘director, defense pricing.’



‘The reality is we need to step up our game across the board, and so that’s what we’re doing,’ Assad told reporters. He said unlike profit margins, overhead costs would be fair game. ‘That’s cost. How do we get that out?’ …



Assad said his job was not to tighten the screws on contractors, but to help equip the service’s acquisition experts to achieve the best possible deal for taxpayers.

He said he would review all sole source acquisition deals valued at over $1 billion, and some others worth more than $500 million. He would also be involved with pricing for competitive deals, but another official would oversee those negotiations.



Over the next 18 to 24 months, for instance, the Pentagon is revamping its Defense Contracts Management Agency and building a database that will help contract officials compare their programs with those of other services.



DefenseNews reported the story with emphasis on Assad’s role in negotiating contract costs. It said—


There will be a new negotiator at the table as the Pentagon and Lockheed Martin hammer out a pricing deal for the latest batch of F-35 Joint Strike Fighters. Shay Assad, the newly named director of defense pricing, will help the U.S. Defense Department buy weapons at a lower cost than official budget estimates. The creation of the new position is part of the Pentagon's quest to drive down the cost of weapons at a time when defense budgets are constricting. In his new role, Assad will help program managers hit these should-cost targets, which will be set at levels less than official budget estimates.



In addition, he will spend more time improving the contracting and pricing work forces in ‘improving their skills on what it is we pay on the goods and services we buy.’



One of the major elements of this is to transform the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA), Assad said. DCMA has hired 300 pricing analysts who will assist contract officers during negotiations for weapons, sustainment, services and other contracts. It will take 18 to 24 months to bring this work force up to speed, Assad said.



Officials are also creating an online system that will ‘enable our contracting officers to get insight into the financial aspects of the companies that we deal with in a real-time way,’ he said. The system, which already includes rate data, is being tested. Currently, it could take contracting officers months or even a year to compile this type of data. Soon it will all be organized under one roof and should take minutes to retrieve. …



Assad will be ‘intimately involved’ supporting the acquisition of the F-35, the Pentagon's most expensive program. DoD converted the program to a fixed-price construct last year and has entered new negotiations for the fifth batch of production aircraft. The F-35 negotiations will likely not wrap up until this fall, Assad said.

We noted above that Mr. Assad’s transfer shows how the DOD intends to manage its contractors. Let’s list some of the strategies mentioned in the various stories above.

  1. Allegedly, 85 percent of the F-35’s unit cost is “overhead”. That’s nonsense, of course, but it plays well. Assad’s intent is to drive down such “overhead” costs by focusing on what those various tasks “should cost” as opposed to what the contractor tells DOD it is actually costing.

  2. Assad is going to focus on enhancing DCMA’s existing skillset in analyzing contractor proposals and their proposed prices, and in negotiating program prices. Reports mentioned that DCMA’s pricing analysts would be key to achieving those goals.

  3. Another aspect of the transformation is to develop insight into contractors’ actual costs. To that end, a database has been created to permit rapid comparisons between contractors.

A couple of final thoughts on the foregoing:

  • Omitted from any reports that we saw was mention of the role of Mr. Charlie Williams, Jr. (Director, DCMA) in the agency transformation. We can’t help but wonder whether Mr. Williams sees Mr. Assad’s new role as being one of additional, badly needed, support—or whether he sees Mr. Assad as stepping on his toes like an elephant at a sock hop.

  • Omitted from any reports that we saw was mention of the role of DCAA in assuring fair and reasonable contract prices. Mr. Assad, who has been an effective mediator between DCMA and DCAA (and other stakeholders), is going to focus on DCMA and nobody has anything to say about DCAA. What’s that about? And while we’re on this topic, what about that DCMA/DCAA dispute resolution process that Mr. Assad was instrumental in crafting and in executing? What’s going to happen to that process without Mr. Assad?

  • About that magic database. Surely the database cannot be intended for use in comparing contractor indirect rates. Nobody can compare contractors’ indirect cost rates because very few contractors have identical cost accounting practices. Some contractors have a lot of direct costs and others have a lot of overhead pools and special cost allocations. What matters is the bottom-line price and not how much is “overhead”. So there must be another purpose to that database….

Leveraging on the points above, let’s speculate wildly for your amusement.

Suppose—and we’re just speaking hypothetically here—just suppose DCMA wanted to stop relying on DCAA. Suppose DCMA was fed up with audit reports that arrived too late, and contained too little reliable information to permit effective contract negotiations. Suppose DCMA was tired with DCAA’s misplaced emphasis on compliance with GAGAS and maintenance of auditor independence. Suppose DCMA wanted to negotiate with contractors on issues ranging from forward pricing indirect cost rates to contractor proposals, and it wanted to conduct those negotiations on its own timetable, and be responsible for its own outcomes. What might DCMA do in that hypothetical situation?

It seems to us that DCMA might develop its own price analysis center of excellence. One that focused on analyzing contractor costs. One that was staffed with dedicated analysts who had been rigorously trained in cost and price analysis techniques—analysts who could match DCAA auditors in proposal analysis expertise. In that scenario, DCMA could conduct its own proposal analyses and negotiate with contractors without the need for a detailed DCAA audit.

And if DCMA wanted to move away from reliance on DCAA to negotiate contractor indirect cost rates—especially forward pricing rates—then DCMA might develop a database of historical contractor indirect cost rates. Such a database might be used for linear regression and other similar statistical analyses, so as to project future contractor indirect cost rates without relying on a detailed audit of contractor budgets. DCMA could negotiate from a position of strength based on its statistical analyses, and would no longer need to wait for a DCAA audit report.

As we’ve asserted before, our belief is that DCMA has given up on DCAA and is frantically trying to develop its own expertise so that Contracting Officers no longer need to rely on audit reports in order to sit down at the negotiating table.

From this viewpoint, Mr. Assad’s new role makes perfect sense: his new job is to get DCMA to “man-up” so that DCAA’s current role in contract pricing can safely be de-emphasized. From this viewpoint, Mr. Assad’s seemingly innocuous transfer portends a significant change for DOD contractor management, one that does not bode well for DCAA.

Watch DOD’s new pricing center of excellence carefully. Watch DCMA’s interaction with DCAA. Look for changes in the current roles and relationships. Those changes might be signs that we’re on the right track.

Hypothetically speaking.


 

Final FAR Close-Out Rule Issued

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When we wrote about issuance of the interim DFARS rule on “business systems” we opined that seeing the rule in print was like receiving a long-expected—yet still dreaded—phone call from your oncology specialist or from your spouse’s divorce attorney.

This feeling is worse than that. Much worse.

On May 31, 2011, the final FAR rule on contract close-out was issued in the Federal Register.

Where to start?

Quick-close outs are authorized when unsettled direct and indirect costs associated with the contract do not exceed the lesser of $1 million or 10 percent of the total contract, task order, or delivery order amount. This is more restrictive than the prior language, which focused only on indirect costs and provided for more contracting officer discretion.

(The quick close-out amount(s) also represent a significant reduction from the amount(s) in the proposed rule. DCAA submitted a comment that the proposed amounts were too high. Given that DCAA got everything it wanted in this rule, it is hardly surprising that the FAR Councils lowered the quick close-out ceilings as well.)

The Allowable Cost and Payment contract clause—which is mandatory for cost-type contracts—has been revised to define what an “adequate” final indirect cost rate proposal must look like. It contains fifteen (15) mandatory schedules and fifteen (15) “supplemental” schedules. The 15 mandatory schedules must be submitted in order for the proposal to be considered “adequate” while the 15 supplemental schedules must be provided during audit.

Final “completion” vouchers/invoices must include settled subcontractor amounts/rates. According to the new rule, “The prime contractor is responsible for settling subcontractor amounts and rates included in the completion invoice or voucher and providing status of subcontractor audits to the contracting officer upon request.”

Fee withholds are now mandatory instead of being discretionary. The new rule revises the Fixed Fee clause (52.216-8) to state—

(b) Payment of the fixed fee shall be made as specified in the Schedule; provided that the Contracting Officer withholds a reserve not to exceed 15 percent of the total fixed fee or $100,000, whichever is less, to protect the Government's interest. The Contracting Officer shall release 75 percent of all fee withholds under this contract after receipt of an adequate certified final indirect cost rate proposal covering the year of physical completion of this contract, provided the Contractor has satisfied all other contract terms and conditions, including the submission of the final patent and royalty reports, and is not delinquent in submitting final vouchers on prior years' settlements. The Contracting Officer may release up to 90 percent of the fee withholds under this contract based on the Contractor's past performance related to the submission and settlement of final indirect cost rate proposals.

Similar changes have been made to clauses 52.216-9 (Fixed Fee-Construction) and 52.216-10 (Incentive Fee).

We have railed and ranted about this rule before. In August, 2009, we reported that—

Although some aspects of the proposed rule change did, in fact, address contract close-out activities, the majority of the language turned out to be a ‘wolf in sheep's clothing’ that, if implemented as drafted, will significantly expand the powers of DCAA, and will force contractors to comply with arbitrary DCAA demands or risk monetary penalties.

In October, 2009, we told you about some of the comments the FAR Councils had received. Those comments were considered and, in the main, ignored. Although the ostensible purpose of the rule originally was to improve the contract close-out process, during the rulemaking process that purpose became “to ensure uniformity, consistency, and fairness to all contractors.” The new rule “assures that contractors are fully informed in advance of the Government's parameters for the content of an adequate final indirect cost rate proposal.”

The FAR Councils’ responses to the public comments were, to put it diplomatically, misleading. For example, the FAR Councils assert that, “no new requirement is imposed on contractors by this rule. The list of data (schedules) now included in FAR 52.216-7(d) requires the same information previously cited in FAR 42.705-1(b).”

The language at 42.705-1(b) was—

A contractor shall support its proposal with adequate supporting data. For guidance on what generally constitutes an adequate final indirect cost rate proposal and supporting data, contractors should refer to the Model Incurred Cost Proposal in Chapter 6 of the Defense Contract Audit Agency Pamphlet No. 7641.90, Information for Contractors, available via the Internet at http://www.dcaa.mil.

Unfortunately, that “guidance on what generally constitutes an adequate final indirect cost rate proposal and supporting data” has now become “See the clause at 52.216-7(d)(2) for the description of an adequate final indirect cost rate proposal and supporting data.” And of course, that clause now lists the 15 mandatory schedules we noted above. The guidance has become the absolute rule.

If that’s not a significant regulatory change, we’ll eat our hat(s). Yet that’s what the FAR Councils would have us believe. They state—

The Department of Defense, the General Services Administration, and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration certify that this final rule will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities within the meaning of the Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. 601, et seq., because the rule does not impose any additional requirements on small businesses. The changes to FAR parts 4 and 42 clarify and streamline closeout procedures. The changes to the clauses at FAR 52.216-8, 52.216-9, and 52.216-10 allow for a reserve to be set-aside to protect the Government's interest. Contracting Officers already may set aside a reserve under current FAR procedures.

To sum up, this rule does nothing to streamline contract close-outs. Instead, it gives DCAA sole authority to determine whether a contractor has submitted an “adequate” incurred cost submission/final indirect cost rate proposal. Sure, the rule states that the cognizant Administrative Contracting Officer makes the official determination, but when was the last time an ACO picked a fight with DCAA? How many DCMA Review Boards does it take to teach ACOs that the path of least resistance—rubber-stamp agreement with DCAA—is the unofficial DCMA policy?

The proposed rule omits any discussion regarding whether the ACO’s determination constitutes a “final decision” under the Contracts Dispute Act. If the determination is a final decision under the CDA, then it is appealable to the U.S. Court of Federal Claims or to the appropriate Board of Contract Appeals. If it is not a final decision, then no appeal is possible.

And any attempt to fight DCAA’s checklist approach to adequacy, to argue that certain mandatory schedules are not applicable to the facts and circumstances of a particular contractor, will result in monetary penalties—as the ACO invokes mandatory fee withholds that will not released until the contractor agrees (under financial duress) to submit exactly the schedules that DCAA demands.

Did you submit a comment? Did you point out the inequity of this rule? If not, you have no reason to complain. Go download your DCAA “ICE” model and prepare your final rates.


 

DCMA Reinforces Contracting Officer Authority While Industry Criticizes DCAA

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We are looking at the new DFARS “business systems” rule and we’ll have some things to say about it in the near future. To provide context, though, we want to note two recent events.

First, we came into possession of a May 12, 2011 letter from Charlie Williams, Jr. (Director, DCMA) to all DCMA Administrative Contracting Officers (ACOs), entitled “Expectations for Contracting Officers”. The memo starts out by acknowledging that DCMA has been criticized in recent times—by many, including Apogee Consulting, Inc.—for ceding FAR-mandated authority to DCAA auditors. The memo discusses the importance of the ACO role, stating—

At contractor locations where we have determined it is in the government’s interest to establish forward pricing rates, we should be continuously evaluating the rates and the individual pool and base elements that comprise them. In other words, I expect you to be as knowledgeable if not more so than anyone else with respect to the contractor’s rate structures and methodologies so you can provide expert advice based on fact. …

Working closely with DCAA auditors is a critical factor in your ability to be successful in the final outcomes that result from your rate decisions. … it is our policy that when you receive an audit report from DCAA, you should use the audited rates as the single government forward pricing rate recommendation. While this is policy, you will not find anything that states, ACOs should ignore common sense or relinquish their discretion in promulgating FPRRs. So simply put, it is my expectation that ACOs should always apply judgment and well informed thought prior to making any decision. I fully expect that there will be times when the contracting officer determines, in his or her judgment, that the rates contained in the audit may not be the best representation of future projections. When that judgment is well informed by fact and data, you must not be reticent or feel constrained in communicating your views with the auditors and if necessary requesting a Board of Review to elevate real differences.

Well. The above is nicely worded but (as they say) we’ll believe it when we see it. And from our experience, ACOs and other Contracting Officers are not walking that particular walk at the moment.

Before we move on, we also want to note a recent letter sent by the Aerospace Industries Association (AIA) to Patrick Fitzgerald, Director of DCAA, expressing “concerns with the current audit environment”. The letter tells Mr. Fitzgerald that the AIA is “greatly concerned that DCAA’s audits have now virtually eliminated materiality and risk assessments in planning and performing audits.” The AIA letter asserts that, as a result of the DCAA audit issues, “audits now take considerably longer to complete and consume considerably more resources.”

Attached to the AIA letter is a list of 54 audit issues experienced by AIA members. The audit issues range from the serious to the relatively trivial. Here are some examples—

  • Branch Manager claims that contractor’s systems with an ‘adequate’ determination do not reduce risk nor decrease the amount of transaction testing required.

  • Audit started in April 2009, then was reassigned to another auditor in September 2009, and then reassigned to another auditor in April 2010. Since April 2009, the DCAA has only requested information for their risk assessment… DACO requested that give [the audit] a high priority and requested a report by November 2010. Current due date is March 2011.

  • The Contractor is unable to reach an FPRA with the USG because the DCMA cannot negotiate without first having a DCAA FPRP audit report. As no FPRP audit report has been issued during 2010, this has resulted in difficult and protracted contract negotiations for both the Contractor and DCMA.

  • Entrance conference held February 2009. Received verbal notification November 2009 of ‘no findings’. Received notification December 2010 the audit was to be cancelled due to test data being over 9 months old ….

These two events share a commonality. They indicate a disconnect between theory and practice. This disconnect will feature prominently in our upcoming discussion of the DFARS “business systems” rule.

Stay tuned for that article, out soon.

 

Interim DFARS Rule Addresses Contractor Business Systems “Definition and Administration”

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It’s here.

Much like a long-expected—yet dreaded—phone call from your oncology specialist, or your spouse’s divorce lawyer, on May 18, 2011, the new DFARS rule covering contractor “business systems” (aka internal control systems) was published in the Federal Register.

This item has to be among the top two or three issues we’ve been writing about on this website, since we first took issue with the “independent” (but not bias-free) Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan (“CWC”). We’ve published many articles related to this topic, including this notification of the proposed DFARS rule, our comments on that rule (as submitted to the DAR Council), the DAR Council’s revised draft rule, and our additional comments on the revised draft.

Suffice it to say, we’ve been all over this issue like white on rice.

And now we have an interim rule, with additional public comments solicited. (As if those comments are going to affect the rule.…)

DCAA has been holding off on performing its “ICAPS” system reviews for nearly two years, ostensibly awaiting this new rule. (Which is wrong on several levels—including the situation where at least one contractor was left with an “inadequate” accounting system (which kept it from winning new work) because DCAA wouldn’t return to perform a follow-up system review to confirm that all corrective actions had been effectively implemented.) So this new rule permits DCAA to gear-up and get back out there into the field, reviewing and assessing contractors’ systems of internal controls.

(Since DCAA hasn’t been auditing too many contractor internal control systems, and hasn’t been auditing too many contractor incurred cost submissions, one wonders just what the hell they have been auditing … but perhaps that’s a rant better left for another day.)

Let’s summarize the interim rule, remembering that, as a DFARS rule, it applies only to DOD and NASA contractors. If you’re a civilian agency contractor, you need not worry overmuch—though we bet DCAA will assert that the DFARS rule establishes a basis for the adequacy of any contractor’s business systems. In fact, the rule’s promulgating comments assert that, “Because they are designed to be consistent with GAGAS, while are based on standards developed by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), the system criteria are applicable equally to DoD, NASA, and civilian contractors.” So don’t rest too easy, civilian agency contractors: your time may be coming sooner than you think.

Anyway, here’s our take on the rule:

  1. There are now six (6) contractor business systems of internal control, not 10. They are: Accounting, Estimating, Purchasing, Earned Value Management, Material Management and Accounting, and Property Management. But that’s somewhat misleading, because the adequacy criteria formerly associated with some of the other internal control systems (e.g., Billing System, Timekeeping/Labor Accounting, etc.) now have been consolidated into the adequacy criteria associated with the Accounting System.

  1. A new DFARS clause (252.342-7005, Contractor Business Systems) will be inserted into solicitations and contracts when the contract is a “covered contract” and the solicitation or contract includes one or more of the individual business system clauses (e.g., 252.215-7002, Cost Estimating System Requirements; 252.234-7002, Earned Value Management Systems; 252.242-7004, Material Management and Accounting System; 252.242-7006, Accounting System; 252.244-7001, Contractor Purchasing System Administration; or 252.245-7003, Contractor Property Management System Administration).

  1. A “covered contract” is defined as any contract subject to Cost Accounting Standards (CAS). If you are not a CAS-covered contractor or your contract is exempt from CAS—congratulations! You don’t have to worry too much about this new rule. For example, small businesses are exempt from CAS. (In addition, educational institutions and Federally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDCs) also are expressly exempt from the rule’s requirements.)

  1. The administration of the new rule is found at DFARS 242.70 (Contractor Business Systems); between that direction and the language found in the 242-7005 clause, this is how we think it will operate.

    1. DCAA, or other “functional specialists,” will perform reviews of the six business systems. Any “significant deficiencies” will be identified to the cognizant Administrative Contracting Officer (ACO).

    2. A “significant deficiency” is defined as “a shortcoming in the system that materially affects the ability of the Department of Defense to rely upon information produced by the system that is needed for management purposes.” But that definition is somewhat misleading. According to the promulgating comments, “DCAA policy is to report only deficiencies determined to be significant deficiencies” as defined both in the rule and in the Generally Accepted Government Auditing Standards (GAGAS). The promulgating comments note that, “Based on the definition in GAGAS, a significant deficiency is a deficiency, or combination of deficiencies, that adversely affects the entity’s ability to initiate, authorize, record, process, or report data reliably.” So note there is a separate, more detailed definition of “significant deficiency’ that DCAA will be using.

    3. The ACO will make an initial determination to approve or disapprove the business system(s) based on the identification of significant deficiencies by auditor or functional specialist.

    4. The contractor will have 30 days to respond to the initial determination.

    5. The ACO will evaluate the contractor’s response and issue a final determination. If the contractor’s response is unpersuasive, then the final determination will notify the contractor that (i) its system is being disapproved, and (ii) that payment withholds are being implemented.

    6. The ACO will identify “one or more” covered contracts from which the payments will be withheld. When there are multiple systems with significant deficiencies, the ACO is directed to ensure “that the total amount of payment withholding … does not exceed 10 percent of progress payments, performance-based payments, and interim payments … under each of the identified covered contracts.” Similarly, when only a single system is involved, then the withholding limit is five (5) percent of such payments. The ACO has “sole discretion” to identify the covered contracts from which to withhold payments.

    7. Payment withholds will be taken against in-process payments by the DOD, and the ACO will direct that the contractor deduct the payment withholds from prospective invoices that it generates. Payment withholds are not subject to interest payments under the Prompt Payment Act.

    8. The contractor has 45 days to submit a corrective action plan to the ACO. If the ACO “in consultation with the auditor or functional specialist” determines that the contractor is effectively implementing the corrective actions, then the payment withholds “will” be reduced to two (2) percent.

    9. Payment withholds will persist until the ACO “determines that the contractor has corrected all significant deficiencies as directed by the Contracting Officer’s final determination.” The contractor must notify the ACO in writing when it has made all the necessary corrections. At that point, the ACO may discontinue payment withholds and direct the contractor to bill for outstanding amounts due, but only if there is agreement that the significant deficiencies have been corrected; otherwise, the payment withholds will continue.

    10. If the ACO has not made a determination within 90 days, then whatever payment withholds exist must be reduced by “at least 50 percent.”

Looking at the individual business system clauses, we see quite a bit of familiar adequacy criteria. It’s also interesting to see how the granularity of the adequacy criteria varies system by system.

Within the Accounting System Administration clause (for example) we see eighteen (18) criteria that must be met, but none of the criteria are new: they were previously associated with either overall Accounting System adequacy or with one of the subsidiary systems (e.g., timekeeping/labor accounting). But we were impressed to note that there are twenty-four (24) adequacy criteria associated with Purchasing System adequacy.

The single adequacy criteria associated with Property Management is “The Contractor’s property management system shall be in accordance with paragraph (f) of the contract clause at Federal Acquisition Regulation 52.245-1.” But we all know that a DOD Property Administrator expects a contractor to have detailed command media that addresses a multitude of detailed criteria.

There are five (5) adequacy criteria associated with Estimating System requirements. There are two (2) adequacy criteria associated with Earned Value Management Systems—although we note that one of the two criteria references ANSI/EIA-748, which contains 32 criteria. There are three (3) MMAS adequacy criteria.

So to wrap it up, this interim rule seems to be written in such a way that defense and NASA contractors—and perhaps all contractors (as we noted above)—can live with it. That’s not to say that it is without risk. Indeed, we see considerable risk associated with implementation of this new rule. We see two sides to the risk: (1) the known risk associated with the rule language, and (2) the unknown risk associated with how the rule will be actually implemented in the field.

The known risks include:

  • Whether DCAA will comply with the requirement to report only “significant deficiencies,” or if the audit agency will continue the unfortunate trend of reporting every small mistake as a glaring systemic problem.

  • Whether the significant deficiencies will be reported “in sufficient detail” to permit the ACO and contractor to understand both the problem and necessary solution, or whether the contractor will be left in limbo, trying to correct a problem that it doesn’t understand.

  • Whether the ACO will exercise the FAR-provided authority to implement payment withholds only when required—and reduce those payments in line with the rule’s guidance; or if the ACO will timidly await DCAA’s concurrence/permission to take any action.

The unknown risks include:

  • Whether DCAA will apply these criteria to contracts not officially covered by the rule.

  • Whether DCAA will apply pressure to DCMA Contracting Officers to implement payment withholds for relatively insignificant findings.

  • Whether DCMA Contracting Officers will be eager to disapprove contractor systems, knowing the immediate cash flow hit as well as the more long-term undermining of the contractor’s competitive position.

  • Whether the cash flow hit will be of such magnitude to force some contractors out of business.

This is a significant regulatory development. Your company’s cash flow is at risk. DCAA will be issuing audit guidance to implement the rule in the near future. Stay tuned for further details.


 

More Corruption in the Navy

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We’ve previously reported on a NAVSEA Program Manager who accepted bribes from a contractor, which ultimately resulted in the contractor going out of business and many innocent employees losing their jobs.

Today’s story concerns another Navy contractor, San Diego-based JD Machine Tech, Inc., whose President pleaded guilty to providing gratuities and “bribes” to “a Navy official” in return for contract awards. On May 16, 2011, the Washington Post carried an Associated Press story which reported the following—

Jesse Denome … admitted that from June 2004 to September 2005 he gave a Navy official a bicycle worth nearly $2,500, a model airplane engine worth $449 and made $18,000 in payments on the official’s personal credit card. In exchange, prosecutors say the official placed over 100 orders [cumulatively worth about $300,000] … for a Navy aircraft program. The Navy is still investigating the official, identified only as D.V.

As if the above admissions weren’t serious enough, the article also noted that Denome was also being charged with tax evasion, for failing to report $300,000 in income, as well as, “passing off vacations and hobbies as business deductions.”

The article reported that Denome (age 47) “faces up to eight years in prison and more than $500,000 in fines.”

We respect the military service men and women who place their lives on the line every day, in order to protect the security of the United States. We also acknowledge those who serve in less obvious ways—such as logisticians and quartermasters—and we thank them for their efforts, as well.

We respect the military and its focus on leadership and accountability. The military’s focus on leadership and accountability has served as a role model for our approach to such things—and we’re sure we’re not alone in that regard.

Here’s a list of military leadership principles from this website—

  1. Know yourself and seek self improvement.
  2. Be technically and tactically proficient.

  3. Seek responsibility for your actions.

  4. Make sound and timely decisions.

  5. Set the example.

  6. Know your troops and look out for their welfare.

  7. Keep your troops informed.

  8. Develop a sense of responsibility in your subordinates.

  9. Insure the task is understood, supervised, and accomplished.

  10. Train your troops as a team.

  11. Employ your command in accordance with its capabilities.

Secretary of the Navy Gordon England published the following Principles of Leadership—

  1. Provide an environment for every person to excel

  2. Treat every person with dignity and respect — nobody is more important than anyone else

  3. Be forthright, honest and direct with every person and in every circumstance

  4. Improve effectiveness to gain efficiency

  5. Cherish your time and the time of others — it is not renewable

  6. Identify the critical problems that need solution for the organization to succeed

  7. Describe complex issues and problems simply so every person can understand

  8. Never stop learning — depth and breadth of knowledge are equally important

  9. Encourage constructive criticism

  10. Surround yourself with great people and delegate to them full authority and responsibility

  11. Make ethical standards more important than legal requirements

  12. Strive for team-based wins, not individual

  13. Emphasize capability — not organization

  14. Incorporate measures and metrics everywhere

  15. Concentrate on core functions and outsource all other

According to one blogger, “the single greatest thing about the United States Navy is that everybody is accountable up and down the line. An unbroken chain of responsibility extending from the lowliest seaman recruit to the top-ranking fleet admirals.” The blogger continued—

As a Navy officer, you are responsible for every aspect of those serving under you: ranging from personal habits and hygiene to specialized training and daily activities. All with continual in-depth testing and performance reviews. No man or woman is beyond the responsibility for acts committed during their watch – even if they were not directly responsible for the act itself.

Okay. Given the foregoing we have to ask, “Where is the accountability with respect to the wrong-doing of these Navy officials?”

Who is accountable for the lax ethical environment within the Navy’s procurement team, and (perhaps) for the lax control environment that permits these (admittedly few) individuals to accept bribes?

Who is accountable for permitting the Navy to award contracts to bidders without properly reviewing those award decisions to ensure that they are being made to the most qualified, lowest priced, bidders?

Who will take responsibility for these leadership failings?


 


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Newsflash

Effective January 1, 2019, Nick Sanders has been named as Editor of two reference books published by LexisNexis. The first book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Cost Accounting Standards. Nick replaces Darrell Oyer, who has edited those books for many years.