SAIC in Deep Curry with New York City’s “CityTime” Payroll Project
New York City’s “CityTime” payroll project is reportedly over-budget and behind schedule. And really, should we be surprised? When’s the last time you read about a city or county or state IT project that actually came in under budget or on time or even with the originally planned functionality? Answer: it’s been awhile.
But what sets NYC’s project apart is the series of alleged ethical “lapses” that have plagued its prime contractor, Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC). SAIC, as many readers will recognize, is a major Federal contractor performing billions of dollars worth of projects each year. (SAIC’s total FY2011 revenue was $11 billion.) So we were taken aback to read about the alleged problems SAIC had with managing the CityTime project, a project on which it had reportedly received $650 in billings (against an original budget of $68 million).
According to a report by the Wall Street Journal, “Last year, following a probe by the city's Department of Investigation, federal prosecutors charged six people with stealing $80 million from CityTime. Prosecutors have since added one more defendant; one defendant has died, and one has pleaded guilty and agreed to help prosecutors with the case.”
One allegation concerns SAIC’s principal subcontractor, TechnoDyne, who reportedly received $450 million from SAIC—allegedly because it agreed to pay kick-backs to SAIC employees. According to this article, on June 20, US Attorney Preet Bharara announced that TechnoDyne’s and its two co-founders (Padma and Randy Allen) had been indicted on fraud charges. One blog site stated—
Carl Bell, a former SAIC employee and CityTime systems engineer, has pled guilty to multiple charges and claims he received at least $5 million in kickbacks from TechnoDyne and the Allens ‘to ensure the continued success of the fraudulent scheme.’ Gerard Denault, another former SAIC employee, who was recently arrested in connection with the alleged scheme, allegedly took more than $9 million in kickbacks.
The Allens have reportedly fled to India and the company has closed its doors, leaving about 200 employees jobless. The article reported—
One defendant, Mark Mazer, a principal agent and representative of the New York City Office of Payroll Administration, oversaw the project. He allegedly approved time sheets for consultants who were on leave, who had been fired, and who were working less time than was reported. The payroll office awarded more than $600 million to SAIC, which paid about $450 million to TechnoDyne.
According to the 43-page indictment, TechnoDyne gave $75 million to companies D.A. Solutions and Prime View and their executives, Dimitry Aronshtein and Victor Natanzon, and allegedly channeled $25 million to Mazer. Natanzon pleaded guilty to his role in the CityTime fraud in February 2010.
The article continued—
Prosecutors have seized over $38 million in 120 bank accounts involving shell companies in three continents used to hide transactions in the CityTime probe.
Employees at TechnoDyne learned by e-mail May 31 that their company had closed its doors effective that day. When they tried to retrieve paychecks the next day, they were shocked to find out the Allens had removed them from the payroll in mid-May. In other words, they had worked two weeks not knowing they had no jobs.
This was a sad end for a company that had, in 2010, been honored by Ernst & Young LLP as New Jersey’s Entrepreneur of the Year. But there’s more to the SAIC story than the sad end of TechnoDyne.
Reports have surfaced of alleged timekeeping irregularities by SAIC’s staff, namely one Gerard Denault, SAIC’s CityTime Project Manager. (He was also one of those who allegedly received kick-backs from TechnoDyne.) We saw one Wall Street Journal article from May 25, 2011 that asserted that SAIC had fired Mr. Denault “for allegedly violating company policy when reporting his own timekeeping.” The article continued—
According to a ‘confidential’ letter that SAIC sent to the city this week, Mr. Denault ‘routinely recorded set hours each day rather than the actual hours that he worked as we require.’
‘Mr. Denault performed extensive work on CityTime, but because he did not precisely record the hours he worked as SAIC policy requires, SAIC cannot accurately calculate the amount that should have been billed to the city,’ the letter said.
SAIC has agreed to reimburse the city for all of Mr. Denault's billed services. The reimbursement will be $2,470,522.
Quite obviously, we don’t know all the facts and the real story of this problematic project. But we wonder whether the real problem here might be that SAIC didn’t view its state and local projects as being as risky as its Federal projects. We wonder if SAIC didn’t focus its compliance efforts on its Federal contracts which, after all, would be subject to Federal False Claims Act suits if it misbilled the Federal government. We also wonder whether the notoriously decentralized and entrepreneurial company might have taken a “hands-off” approach to local project management.
Regardless of the facts, we would urge readers to review their portfolio of projects, and ask themselves whether all projects are being treated equally. Are all projects subject to the same internal control systems and compliance reviews? Or, as we suspect is the case, have some projects slipped below your compliance radar screen because they are incorrectly perceived as being “low risk”?
We bet SAIC is asking themselves those questions right now.
“I’m Not a Large Business, I’m Diversified!”
Ah, the old refrain plays once again, like the coda in “Layla” by Derek and the Dominos.
What are we talking about? We’re talking about misrepresentation of the size of a business—which can land a company in some seriously hot water.
This is not a new issue. For instance, we previously reported on the problems faced by GTSI, a decent-sized Federal contractor that was alleged to have been “an active participant in a scheme that resulted in contracts set-aside for small businesses being awarded to ineligible contractors and with contracts not being performed in accordance with applicable law, regulations and contract terms …”
While we may sometimes cynically comment on the “games” associated with socio-economic reporting, and the various bureaucratic rules that govern how companies claim credit for awarding subcontracts to the various categories of small business entities, the fact remains that the ability to meet one’s small business socio-economic goals can often be a competitive advantage in the Federal marketplace. Not to mention that a large portion of Federal contract awards are set-aside for small businesses. So it clearly behooves a company to claim small business size status when permitted to do so by FAR Part 19 and the SBA regulations at Title 13 of the Code of Federal Regulations.
On the other hand, misrepresentation of business size can be a problem, as two Orlando men have learned (to their chagrin), according to this story in the Tampa Bay Times. The story, penned by William Levesque, reported that Eduardo Blanchet and Daniel Guillan were founders of B.I.B. Consulting—a (legitimate) small business that won a $50 million contract from the U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) to provide foreign-language instruction services. (Apparently the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center at the Presidio of Monterey was unavailable to provide those services.)
So far so good. The two men and their company were within the bounds of propriety. But then (allegedly) the two men formed another company—MiLanguages—to compete for another $100 million SOCOM language service contract. Together, the two (allegedly) ran both companies and even established MiLanguages as a B.I.B. Consulting subcontractor; but together, the two affiliated companies no longer qualified for treatment as small businesses. Unfortunately MiLanguages (allegedly) certified to SOCOM that it was a small business when bidding on the new contract, and it was (allegedly) awarded to them on that basis.
According to Mr. Levesque’s story—
The indictment said the men made false representations and submitted false information to the Small Business Administration to win designation as a small business eligible to receive the SOCom contract.
In 2007, the men instructed an attorney to ‘send a letter to the SBA size program manager relaying that MiLanguages and B.I.B. had no common officers, shareholders or employees … and that a 'clear line of fracture' existed between B.I.B. and MiLanguages,’ the indictment said.
In reality, the indictment said, the two men set up MiLanguages bank accounts in which they were the only signatories.
The government has moved to seize the assets of the company and two men, including more than $7 million in bank accounts, property and vehicles. The government said it also will seek a $100 million forfeiture judgment against them.
Yeesh! The Feds sound upset, don’t they?
Readers of this website blog should be clear that affiliated entities under common control count together when determining business size. Businesses that do not qualify as small businesses under the applicable NAICS code should not certify that they are small businesses. Period.
Further, FAR Part 19 is tricky and needs to be read in conjunction with the SBA regulations that lie outside of the FAR. When in doubt, have a knowledgeable and experienced attorney guide you through the calculations—lest you wind up as our two friends from Orlando did.
|
Stop the DATA Act!
Normally we don’t have a lot to say about pending legislation. Pending acquisition regulations: yes. Pending public laws: not as much. As far as we can remember, our last (and only) foray into pending legislation was this bit on “The Subcontractor Fairness Act” wherein we opined that, “This is bad legislation and, if signed into law as written, will do much more harm than good. “
The reason we so rarely get worked up about pending legislation is that such legislation so rarely survives as written. There are Committee hearings and votes, and amendments and CBO input and more amendments … it’s difficult to get too upset about something until it seems likely to become law; at which point it’s time to call your Congressman and/or Senator and remind them that, when in doubt, the best rule is, “primum non nocere.” (“First, do no harm.”)
But sometimes we are called to point out that a piece of pending legislation is so full of potential pitfalls that we recommend calling one’s Congressperson and/or Senator right now, so as to make sure the legislation doesn’t survive as drafted, and so as to ensure that any pending idiocies are amended into oblivion.
This is one of those times.
It’s called “The DATA Act” (H.R. 2146) and it’s chock-full of things that are going to be problematic for government contractors. Introduced by Representative Darrell Issa (R-CA 49), it has the ostensible purpose of promoting “accountability and transparency in federal spending.” Let’s summarize its requirements:
-
Any recipient of more than $100,000 in federal funds—whether such funds be grants or loans, contracts or cooperative agreements, subcontracts, purchase orders, task orders, delivery orders or even blanket purchase agreements—would be required to report exactly how those federal funds were spent to a brand-new oversight board called, “Federal Accountability and Spending Transparency Board” (or “FAST Board” if you like catchy acronyms).
-
The information to be reported to the FAST Board includes: “the amount of Federal funds that were expended or obligated to projects or activities; a detailed list of all projects or activities for which Federal funds were expended or obligated; and such additional information reasonably related to the receipt and use of Federal funds as the Board shall require.”
-
The draft legislation mandates reporting by recipients not less often than once per quarter. However, the legislation also states that, “To the extent practicable, the Board shall require continuous or automatic reporting for compliance ….”
-
The information provided by recipients (as well as the information reported by awarding agencies) will be published online by the FAST Board.
-
The information provided by recipients will be combined with “other compilations of information, such as Government databases and other proprietary and nonproprietary databases” so that the eligibility of recipients to receive Federal funds can be verified, and so that “Executive agencies, Inspectors General, and law enforcement agencies” can “track Federal awards to find waste, fraud, and abuse.”
-
Penalties may be imposed on those recipients that fail to accurately report required information.
In case we weren’t clear, we have grave concerns about this piece of legislation. First of all, the data and uses for that data seem somewhat duplicative. Doesn’t the Federal government already track how it awards its funds? (Note: that was a rhetorical question. The answer is yes. Yes it does. It’s called USAspending.gov.)
And doesn’t the Federal government already have a means to verify the eligibility of contractors to receive Federal funds? (Hint: that was another rhetorical question right there. It was called the Excluded Parties List System (EPLS) but is soon to be called the System for Award Management or SAM.) It’s right over here.
More importantly, do you as a recipient of Federal funds want yet another financial report to submit? Many of you already submit monthly Cost Performance Reports pursuant to your contracts’ EVMS clauses. Some of you submit periodic Contract Funds Status Reports (CFSRs) and/or Quarterly Limitation of Payments (QLOP) reports. Chances are, you already track expenditures in great detail and report that information in several different formats. These FAST Board reports will simply be another report of the same financial data, in a different format, that will need to be proofed and reconciled, and which will be audited and questioned and supported by your staff—whom you will need to hire more of in order to execute the foregoing tasks, in a time of declining budgets and competitive pressure to cut your indirect costs.
But that’s not even the part that really worries us. Go back and review the third bullet point in the list above, the part dealing with reporting frequency. Take a look at the directive to have the FAST Board require “continuous or automatic reporting.” See that part? To us, it means that the Federal government wants to link to your accounting system, so that it can pull financial expenditure information right from your books and records.
How does that sound to you?
You know, though, we’re not the only ones who have serious issues with The DATA Act. Over at OMBWatch, they call the pending legislation “troublesome” and “dangerous” and “fatally flawed”. But not for the same reasons we did. Their concerns include: it would repeal FFATA (“The Federal Funding Accountability and Transparency Act”), a law passed in 2006 that (among other things) created USASpending.gov. FFATA was signed into law with the same purpose as espoused by The DATA Act … and we’re not at all sure why The DATA Act needs to replace FFATA (nor apparently is OMBWatch). Moreover, OMBWatch notes that The DATA Act’s requirements “sunset” in seven years, which means that in seven years either the bill gets extended or transparency ends. In their words—
… by repealing FFATA, the bill would actually take spending transparency a few steps back, because FFATA contains a number of data elements that are required to be reported that the DATA Act does not. And unless Congress acts to reauthorize the bill in 2018, the spending information that appears on USAspending.gov and all the other spending transparency created by the DATA Act will disappear. We shouldn't have to be reconsidering whether spending transparency is necessary every seven years or worried that a polarized Congress finding itself in a legislative stalemate will fail to agree on approving time-sensitive legislation.
And to cap off this little tirade, we note with sadness and alarm that, on June 22, 2011, the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform unanimously approved The DATA Act and sent it to the House floor for consideration.
It may already be too late. But don’t let that stop you from trying to stop this bill.
NAVAIR Can’t Manage UCAs, According to DOD Inspector General
We’ve been toying with writing another article about the on-going DOD Oversight Wars, focusing (again) on Senator Grassley’s attacks on the DOD Inspector General and the DOD IG’s response to those attacks. But frankly, POGO is all over it and there’s not much new to report. So instead we’ll discuss a recent (June 8, 2011) DOD IG audit report that calls into question NAVAIR’s management of Undefinitized Contract Actions (UCAs). What caught our eye was how the DOD IG pointed the finger of blame at NAVAIR’s contractors.
The DOD IG reviewed 52 UCAs worth $1.6 Billion at the Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) and found the following—
-
4 UCAs were inadequately justified in terms of urgency; i.e., why couldn’t NAVAIR have just issued actual priced contracts?
-
29 UCAs were not definitized within the statutory/regulatory timeframe (180 days)
-
5 UCAs were definitized, but at unsupported contractor profit rates
As we noted above, what caught our eye was the IG’s finding that 29 UCAs were definitized late “because the contractor submitted untimely or inadequate proposals, Government personnel changed requirements after UCA issuance, and additional contributing factors.”
This is not the first time we’ve addressed Government management/administration of UCAs. See, for example, this article in which we generally discussed UCAs and reported that the U.S. Air Force was addressing the problem of untimely definitization of UCAs by better partnering with contractors through what it called a “proposal kick-off meeting” that was to be chaired by the cognizant Contracting Officer and supported by DCAA. We reported that DCAA issued MRD 10-PSP-016(R) that directed its auditors to “attend these meetings to obtain an understanding of the contractor’s proposal, including supporting data.” We also opined (as we usually do) on the Air Force’s approach, posting—
We generally endorse any process that would definitize UCAs within the required timeframes, but we wonder if the foregoing Air Force and DCAA direction might not be avoiding addressing the real problem—which is insufficient identification of Government requirements, and subsequent changes to those requirements—which prevents contractors from submitting timely and comprehensive proposals. (See the GAO reports linked above, which show the lack of defined requirements is a much a problem as any lack of cost or pricing data.) Focusing on enforcing timely contractor provision of requested data to support fact-finding and negotiations seems to be a fundamentally misplaced management emphasis—particularly since the Air Force is now endorsing DCAA’s arbitrary and punitive ‘denial of access to records’ process.
Obviously, then, we were already sensitized to any assertions that the root cause of untimely UCA definitization was untimely or inadequate contractor cost proposals. Indeed, as we reviewed this DOD IG audit report, we saw that (despite the IG’s soundbite quoted above) there were a number of causes for NAVAIR’s inability to timely definitized its UCAs.
For example, on page 13 of the audit report, the IG stated that there were “multiple contributing factors” including “a lack of contracting personnel to complete definitization, contractors not submitting adequate proposals in a timely manner, or Government personnel changing contract requirements after NAVAIR contracting personnel issued the UCA.” In addition, “the contractors’ proposal pricing updates and extended contract negotiations with Government personnel also impacted NAVAIR contracting personnel’s ability to definitize UCAs within the required time frames.” On page 21 of the audit report, the IG stated that another causal factor was “untimely Defense Contract Management Agency and Defense Contract Audit Agency response times.” In addition, “NAVAIR administration delays, and a contractor’s sale of part of its business” were also listed as causal factors.
The DOD IG audit report also reported the following:
-
The contracting officer also stated that it took about 3 months to prepare the business clearance memorandum (BCM) for negotiations because of the contract specialist’s heavy workload and the need to examine a major subcontractor’s proposal for the UCA definitization.
-
Contracting personnel also cited slow Defense Contract Management Agency and Defense Contract Audit Agency response times as a contributing factor for late definitization. NAVAIR contracting personnel explained that the two Government agencies were slow to submit questions to the contractor and that the questions submitted were vague. In addition, NAVAIR contracting personnel stated that the contractor was even slower to respond to the information requests and, ultimately, NAVAIR contracting personnel had to act as an intermediary between the two parties. As a result, NAVAIR contracting personnel definitized the UCA 588 days after receipt of a qualifying proposal.
-
Contractors had to prepare and certify enormous amounts of cost or pricing data before definitization or altered the pricing of the proposal, which required additional Government review. Specifically, contractors updated or rescinded forward pricing rate agreements that were in place with the Defense Contract Management Agency during the undefinitized period or provided updated actual costs incurred that significantly changed the proposal price. NAVAIR contracting personnel also delayed negotiations to jointly definitize two UCAs that enabled the contractor to obtain better sub-vendor pricing for increased quantity.
-
The contracting officer stated that the contractor withdrew from the agreement due to changes in its cost accounting system and disclosure statements. The contracting officer stated that negotiations were impacted because contracting personnel not only had to negotiate differences in direct inputs, such as for hours and materials, but also significant differences in rates. NAVAIR contracting personnel were required to update the negotiation position to reflect the Defense Contract Management Agency’s December 16, 2009, forward pricing rate recommendation. The contracting officer also attributed late definitization to the program office’s delayed release of its technical evaluation. As a result, NAVAIR contracting personnel definitized the UCA 252 days after receiving a qualifying proposal.
To be fair, the DOD IG also reported problems with contractors, including finding that “Contractors were slow to submit counteroffers and disagreed with Government personnel on contract terms, cost reasonableness, and profit.” On page 22 of the audit report, the IG stated that, “NAVAIR contracting personnel did not receive adequate contractor proposals or timely submittals, which contributed to the late definitization of seven UCAs.” The IG also reported that—
The contractor proposals were inadequate because the contracting officers determined that they did not contain sufficient information to enable DoD personnel to conduct complete and meaningful audits or determined the proposals contained questionable costs. Contractors use of multiple subcontractors and proposal resubmissions also added time to the undefinitized period. Contractor proposal resubmissions sometimes required that Defense Contract Audit Agency personnel perform additional audit work. If the revised proposal is deemed inadequate then the revision process starts again. If the contractor does not submit a timely qualifying proposal, the contracting officer should suspend or reduce payments to the contractor in accordance with DFARS Subpart 217.74 and NAVAIR Instruction 4200.33D.
We are worried that the foregoing opinion—that if a contractor fails to submit a timely “qualifying” proposal then payments under the UCA should be reduced or suspended—fails to acknowledge the role that DCAA plays in determining proposal adequacy. Though the audit report stated that “contracting officers determined” the proposals lacked sufficient information to enable “complete and meaningful audits,” we all know that DCAA made that call for the CO. It is highly unlikely that any Contracting Officer is going to determine, on his or her own, whether a proposal is adequate for audit. That means that the DCAA auditor made the call. And in our experience, that DCAA auditor determination may not be as objectively based as one would care for.
In conclusion, as in the case of the GAO reports we have previously discussed, we don’t agree that the more important causal factor for untimely UCA definitization is contractor proposal problems. Instead, the body of this DOD IG report revealed multiple causal factors—many of which one might reasonably think were up to the DOD oversight bureaucracy (including DCMA and DCAA) to fix.
So again, instead of beating-up defense contractors, we would suggest that the DOD IG focus on its own shop and recommend staffing enhancements and the streamlining of existing overly bureaucratic processes.
|