• Increase font size
  • Default font size
  • Decrease font size
Apogee Consulting Inc

Former U.S. Army Sergeant Pleads Guilty to Theft of Equipment in Iraq

E-mail Print PDF

On June 28, 2011, the U.S. Department of Justice announced that Robert A. Nelson, age 46, of San Antonio, Texas, had pleaded guilty “to conspiring to steal U.S. Army equipment related to his work as a non-commissioned officer helping to train Iraqi army personnel in Mosul, Iraq, in 2008.” According to the DOJ, Nelson pled to one count of “conspiracy to steal public property”. The DOJ reported that—

Nelson was deployed to Forward Operating Base Diamondback, Iraq, as the non-commissioned officer-in-charge of the Ninewa Operations Command Military Transition Team. This transition team helped train the Iraqi Army units stationed nearby.

While serving in Iraq, Nelson agreed with a U.S. Army translator to steal eight generators from a lot on base that held various pieces of used equipment. Once the generators were taken off the base, the translator arranged for them to be sold on the black market in Iraq. Nelson admitted that he received half of the proceeds of the sales of stolen equipment, with approximately $35,000 of the money being wired to Nelson’s account by the translator’s brother. In total, Nelson admitted receiving approximately $44,830 from this scheme.

One thing we noticed in the foregoing is that this case continues the apparent trend of cutting military folks a break. From the DOJ report, it seems pretty clear that Nelson did quite a bit more than “conspire to steal public property.” In fact, he did participate in the actual theft of military equipment from an Army F.O.B. Regardless, he was allowed to plead to what seems to be a lesser offense.

We first noticed—and complained about—this sort of prosecutorial beneficence in this article about “Captain Mike”—who was convicted of “theft of government property” for stealing nearly $700,000 in “uncirculated bundles of $100 bills”. In contrast, we offer this tale of Kellogg, Brown & Root (KBR) who was sued under the False Claims Act “because it was unable to account for materials paid for” under a subcontract with a Turkish company named Yuksel-Reysas. It seems to us like too many (former) military service people are allowed to plead to lesser charges while contractors get the book thrown at them. But perhaps that’s just our bias showing ….

Former Army Sergeant Nelson faces up to five years in prison plus a fine of up to $250,000. In addition (DOJ reported), Nelson agreed to pay the U.S. Government $44,830—the amount of his unlawful gain.

Finally, DOJ reported that, “The investigation into this conspiracy continues.” So stay tuned for future related news stories

 

Armor Group Dodges Brothel Bullet, Agrees to Quick FCA Settlement

E-mail Print PDF

Brothel

We have had concerns with the FAR contract clause 52.222-50 since its initial promulgation. The clause prohibits trafficking in persons—i.e., it prohibits contractors from using, benefitting from, or participating in the use of slave labor. Period. Which is fine, if that’s all the clause did.

But the clause also prohibits “the procurement of commercial sex acts”.  Further, it defines “commercial sex acts” as “any sex act on account of which anything of value is given or received by any person”. Let’s note that such activities are legal and regulated by the Government in many places, including parts of Nevada as well as parts of Europe.  But you can’t engage in such lawful activities when you are performing on a contract that contains the clause. Moreover, the definition is so loose that simply taking your date out for a dinner might well be construed to be giving or receiving a thing of value.  If one “gets lucky” one might be violating the contract prohibition.

The clause carries with it its own remedies for noncompliance. Those remedies include:

  • Requiring the contractor to remove a contractor employee or employees from the performance of a contract.

  • Requiring the contractor to terminate a subcontract.

  • Suspension of contract payments.

  • Loss of award fee.

  • Termination of the contract for default or cause.

  • Suspension or debarment of the contractor.

Recently, a contractor performing work in Afghanistan ran afoul of this issue. Armor Group North America (AGNA) found itself the defendant in a False Claim Action filed by a qui tam relator (whistleblower) named James Gordon, who was a former employee of AGNA who claimed that he had been retaliated against for bringing concerns about wrongdoing and ethical breaches to the attention of his management. According to this internet report, Mr. Gordon alleged the following—

  • AGNA did not properly staff the Kabul embassy in order to provide the level of security outlined in the company’s contract with the Department of State.

  • AGNA employees were allowed to visit local brothels that were well-known for using trafficked women as employees, in violation of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act.

  • AGNA cut costs by substituting refurbished Iraqi vehicles in place of armored vehicles for transporting goods to and from the Kabul Embassy.

AGNA settled the FCA suit for $7.5 million. According to this Department of Justice press release—

The settlement resolves U.S. claims that in 2007 and 2008, AGNA guards violated the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA) by visiting brothels in Kabul, and that AGNA’s management knew about the guards’ activities. The settlement also resolves allegations that AGNA misrepresented the prior work experience of 38 third country national guards it had hired to guard the Embassy, and that AGNA failed to comply with certain Foreign Ownership, Control and Influence mitigation requirements on the embassy contract, and on a separate contract to provide guard services at a Naval Support Facility in Bahrain.

Previously, we have gone on record warning contractors performing international work—especially work in Southwest Asia—regarding the FAR “morals clause” that has been included in many of their contracts. The remedies available to the Government are both severe and wide-ranging. In our view, AGNA “dodged a bullet” by agreeing to a quick settlement with the DOJ. Not only did the company avoid much more severe consequences, but it also removed this salacious story from the insatiable modern news cycle.

Contractors performing international work need to guard against their employees violating the prohibitions of 52.222-50. Contractors need to listen to allegations of wrongdoing and be prepared to show Government investigators that they took those allegations seriously. Although $7.5 million may not seem like a lot of money, we’re sure of at least two things: (1) the company paid more than that amount when attorney fees are included, and (2) that amount could have paid for quite a bit of self-governance processes.

If your company performs international work, you may want to ask yourself how prepared you are to survive similar charges of wrongdoing.

According to the DOJ, Mr. Gordon will receive $1.35 million as his share of the settlement. There was no report as to how much of that amount his attorneys will receive.


 

DCAA Continues Tradition of Inflating Taxpayer Savings

E-mail Print PDF

We often wish DCAA leaders and taxpayer “advocates” testifying before Congress would stop inflating the amounts of “taxpayer savings” and the “return on the taxpayer dollar” they report. To say the values are inflated is an exercise in understatement.

Agency costs are understated by unknown—but very large—amounts. This is because many contractors are forced to provide office space for the auditors that are assigned to “resident” offices, branch offices and other “FAO” locations that are actually located on-site at the contractors’ facilities. In addition to office space, contractors must also provide desks, phones, copy machines, file cabinets, office supplies, and other items of tangible value. One larger defense contractor we know provides its DCAA auditors with roughly $1 million worth of office space alone—and that’s just for a subsidiary operation. Another contractor was directed to provide special access to its cafeteria to accommodate DCAA auditor schedules.

And it’s not just DCAA, of course. Other Government agencies—including DCMA—require the same treatment. Contractors often have to forego facility reductions (with concomitant taxpayer savings) because they need to house their Government oversight officials.

Contractors who object to acting as the Government’s unofficial landlord and office supply provider are told to pass it back to the Government in their indirect cost rates—with the implicit threat that a failure to go along with the Government’s “request” will lead to additional audit findings. And so every contractor we know of goes along with the request, passing the additional costs back to their Government customers and, by extension, the U.S. taxpayers.

We don’t know the value of this largesse but we bet the DOD could reduce its weapon system spend if its oversight officials made use of GSA facilities instead of contractor facilities, allowing the contractors to pass along the reduced facility costs to its customers.

We also wish somebody would point out that much of DCAA’s claimed “taxpayer savings” is illusory. DCAA claims savings associated with every audit finding, with every questioned dollar—regardless of whether those questioned costs are sustained by a Contracting Officer or by the Courts. More to the point, DCAA claims savings associated with every questioned dollar on every contractor proposal submitted for consideration. We all know that’s a flawed methodology.

The fact of the matter is that, generally speaking, in a competitive procurement only one contractor receives a contract. The other contractors receive nothing. So the only “savings” that counts to the taxpayers is the one associated with the contract award. “Savings” associated with proposals that did not result in a contract award simply count for nothing.

There are no savings where the taxpayer doesn’t spend any money. It’s too bad DCAA has chosen to inflate the “taxpayer savings” it generates through such a flawed methodology. And it’s too bad nobody has pointed this flawed methodology out to Congress, or that no Congress person has ever challenged DCAA leadership for promulgating such a charade and testifying about sham savings.

Recent DCAA audit guidance (MRD 11-OTS-024(R), issued June 2, 2011, continues this tradition of inflating reported taxpayer savings. The new audit guidance discusses how auditors are to calculate “cost avoidance” (also known as “achievable savings”) when performing Operations Audits.

Operations Audits, for those who may not be familiar with that term, these are DCAA audits that focus on management’s decision-making and the efficiency of contractor operations. (See DCAA Contract Audit Manual at 14-500.) According to DCAA—

… the total audit concept places major emphasis on the degree of prudence exercised by management in establishing policies and making management decisions, methods of controlling costs, and the extent of reliance that can be placed on the accounting information and other financial data. …

The audit plan for major contractor operations is primarily designed to seek out and identify those areas where the contractor's practices are wasteful, careless, inefficient and result or may result in unreasonable costs and unsatisfactory conditions in performing Government contracts; and to report such matters to those responsible for taking action to correct or improve the condition.

According to the DCAA audit guidance (link above), when reporting cost savings from Operations Audits the historical practice was to use one year’s worth of costs. In other words, when the DCAA auditors found inefficiencies or unreasonable costs that the contractor was supposed to correct, the value of those costs was based on what the contractor had incurred (or would incur) over a one year period. But the audit guidance announced that, “The DCAA Director has approved a major policy change that will allow estimation of cost savings over an extended period of time that more logically reflects the impact of audit findings and conclusions up to a maximum period of six years.”

Let’s repeat that. Instead of using one year’s worth of costs when reporting savings available to the contractor, DCAA will now be reporting up to six years’ worth of costs.

Is this a big deal? Well, it might be.

Readers may recall our discussion of Shay Assad’s new job at the Defense Department. Mr. Assad will be focusing on what programs “should cost” as opposed to merely accepting what contractors report they will cost. Part of that responsibility is addressing contractor overhead and other indirect costs, which Mr. Assad called “fair game” in his efforts to reduce Defense spending.

So when DCAA reports “achievable savings” in contractor operations, we think Mr. Assad will tend to use that data in his efforts to reduce weapon system prices. And now, because of this new audit guidance, his cost reduction goal will be six times higher than it would have otherwise been.


 

Did Boeing Rip-Off US Army on Spare Part Pricing?

E-mail Print PDF

On June 28, 2011, the Project on Government Oversight (POGO) reported that, “taxpayers were massively overcharged in dozens of transactions between the Army and Boeing for helicopter spare parts,” based on a DOD Inspector General audit report that POGO had obtained. The DOD IG report had been issued in redacted (edited) form on the IG website, but POGO had obtained a 154-page unredacted version which it published at this link. POGO reported that—

Overall, for 18 of 24 parts reviewed, the DoD OIG found that the Army should have only paid $10 million instead of the nearly $23 million it paid to Boeing for these parts—overall, taxpayers were overpaying 131.5 percent above “fair and reasonable” prices. The audit says Boeing needs to refund approximately $13 million Boeing overcharged for the 18 parts. Boeing had, as of the issuance of the audit, refunded approximately $1.3 million after the DoD OIG issued the draft version of its report. Boeing also provided a ‘credit’ to the Army for another part for $324,616.

That sounds pretty bad, doesn’t it? If the above paragraph weren’t damning enough, POGO also provided another link to even more examples of “spare parts ripoffs” allegedly perpetrated by Boeing. Examples reported by POGO included—

  • A “straight pin” (NSN 5315-00-823-8682) which the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) would have charged the Army $0.04 each, but for which Boeing charged the Army $71.01.

  • A “spur gear” used in a Chinook helicopter (NSN not provided) which the DLA would have provided to the Army for $12.51 each, but for which Boeing charged $623.74.

Et cetera, et cetera. As the POGO article summarized—

… in case after case examined by the DoD OIG, the Army was buying parts for much more money from Boeing that DLA already had in its inventory at significantly lower prices. In some cases, Boeing bought parts from DLA (one part of DoD) and resold them at a higher price to the Army (another part of DoD). From 2007 to 2009, Boeing bought $3.1 million in parts from DLA and sold them to the Army for $4.2 million.  ‘[B]ased on the data Boeing provided us, Boeing made a 35 percent profit on the parts that it bought from DLA,’ the audit report states.

Certainly, the POGO report sounded pretty bad. We decided to first review the (redacted) DOD IG report that was intended to be made available to the public, a copy of which we provide here.

The first thing we noticed was that the DOD IG aimed much of its criticism at the Army itself, and not at Boeing. The audit report stated—

AMCOM officials did not effectively use $339.7 million of existing DoD inventory before procuring the same parts from Boeing because DoD had inadequate policies and procedures addressing inventory use. We identified $242.8 million to $277.8 million of excess inventory that AMCOM could use to satisfy CCAD contract requirements.

The DOD IG report continued—

AMCOM officials did not effectively negotiate prices for 18 of 24 high-dollar parts reviewed because neither AMCOM officials nor Boeing officials performed adequate cost or price analyses, and Boeing officials submitted cost or pricing data that were not current, complete, and accurate … . [Because of those lapses] [w]e calculated that Boeing charged the Army about $13 million or 131.5 percent more ($23 million versus $10 million) than fair and reasonable prices for the 18 parts.

The DOD IG audit report also stated—

… AMCOM officials did not use the most cost-effective source of supply for consumable items because DoD had not developed an effective material management strategy. We identified that the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) had sufficient inventory to satisfy annual contract requirements for 1,635 parts on the follow-on contract, and the Boeing contract price for those items was $8.0 million, or 51.2 percent, higher than the DLA price.

Okay. From the foregoing we can see that Boeing’s conduct was far from perfect and that its actions deserve criticism. But from what we saw, the DOD IG’s target was AMCOM and the findings centered on AMCOM’s ineffective management of its contractor. It seems to us that the POGO allegations treated the DOD IG’s report as if it were a DCAA report—i.e., an audit of Boeing’s contract—instead of being an audit of the Army’s contractor management. In support of our assertion, we noted that the DOD IG’s recommendations for process improvement were largely focused on AMCOM and not on Boeing.

So the real story is not that Boeing “ripped-off” the U.S. Army. No, the real story is that AMCOM didn’t effectively manage Boeing and, more specifically, AMCOM didn’t source—or direct Boeing to source—parts from internal DLA stockpiles, and permitted Boeing to reprocure items at a higher (and completely unnecessary) cost.

That said—and as we noted previously—Boeing’s conduct was apparently far from being above reproach. The unredacted DOD IG report asserted that—

  • Boeing did not use adequate cost or price analysis to establish the reasonableness of proposed subcontractor prices.

  • Boeing’s pricing data was based on low-volume quantities—e.g., quantities of one or two or three items, which were allegedly based on “outdated” historical use data that had “no relationship to the quantities [actually] required or the actual price Boeing negotiated with its subcontractors.” Allegedly, Boeing routinely failed to share pricing/quantity discounts that it obtained from subcontractor negotiations with its customer.

  • For seven parts audited, Boeing’s cost or pricing data allegedly was not accurate, current, or complete—resulting in “defective pricing” for those parts.

As the result of such alleged behavior, the DOD IG concluded that “Boeing charged the Army about $13 million … more than the fair and reasonable prices” for 18 parts audited.

A couple of concluding thoughts on this matter.

First, defective pricing is a serious concern and, where Boeing was subject to the Truth-in-Negotiations Act (TINA) then its AMCOM customer has recourse to obtain unilateral price reductions plus interest on any overpayments. That said, we don’t know all the circumstances. For example, what quantities was Boeing told to bid on? If AMCOM told Boeing to bid on quantities of one or two or three items each, then that’s what Boeing was required to do. And if Boeing had the business acumen to negotiate volume pricing discounts with its subcontractors then (assuming no defective pricing) there was absolutely no requirement for Boeing to pass on those savings. If AMCOM wanted to share in savings Boeing negotiated, then it shouldn’t have awarded a Firm, Fixed-Price (FFP) contract type to Beoing.

Second, we were interested in the DOD IG methodology for determining what prices Boeing should have charged AMCOM. In the unredacted report, the DOD IG states that its methodology was to add 34 percent to Boeing’s actual direct costs incurred, so as to account for “overhead, general and administrative costs, and the negotiated profit rate.” Well. We certainly don’t know Boeing’s business model, but that strikes us as a ludicrously low number. Take away 15 percent for profit and you have 19 percent to cover overhead (including payroll taxes, fringe benefits, facilities and utilities, etc.) and G&A (including allocations from local, sector, and corporate management. We would be very, very surprised to learn that those values represented Boeing’s true indirect cost rates for this effort.

So to conclude, there seems to be quite a bit of blame to throw at the various entities. As the DOD IG did. We didn’t even mention the IG’s criticism of DCMA’s Contractor Purchasing System Review (CPSR) of Boeing’s Philadelphia operation or the fact that one of the recommendations from the IG audit report was that DCMA should categorize Boeing’s purchasing system as “high risk”. And we didn’t get into the IG’s criticism of the Contracting Officer for failing to heed DCAA’s problems with Boeing’s proposal(s).

Glossing over the DOD IG’s questionable methodology, it seems pretty clear that AMCOM did not have much of a clue. Boeing apparently submitted a (partially) defectively priced proposal—either by customer direction or through its own lax procedures. But as usual, the situation was more complex and nuanced that POGO’s “knee-jerk” headline would lead the casual reader to believe.

 

When Are Indirect Rates Final Billing Rates?

E-mail Print PDF

One of our pet peeves is Government’s tendency to want to reopen “final” indirect cost rates—i.e., rates that have been audited and negotiated and agreed-to by both Government and contractor as suitable for closing-out flexibly priced contracts. It’s not that we are against such an occurrence in all situations. For example, the Courts have held that “finalization” of indirect cost rates is no bar to revision when a CAS 413 segment closing pension adjustment is being calculated. We’re okay with that (kind of) even though at least one attorney passionately argued that “final means final” in the original series of Teledyne decisions that framed much of how that complex adjustment is supposed to work.

But DCAA wants more. In their view—and to be fair it’s the view of the FAR Councils as well—any CAS noncompliance must address the cost impacts of all “affected contracts” regardless of whether those impacts take place in “closed” years where indirect rates have been finalized. For example, see our series of articles on how DCAA (and DCMA) wants to treat the “expressly unallowable” costs associated with ineligible healthcare plan dependents. In our view, the Government’s position is—shall we say?—extreme and untenable. We await a good legal decision that imposes rationality, equity, and plain old common sense on the patently irrational, unfair, and bizarre interpretation taken by the FAR Councils in the mid-2000’s during their poorly conceived rewrite of FAR 30.6.

Recently, the ASBCA addressed a similar problem in a decision that we want to share with our readers. The decision was entitled Kearfott Guidance and Navigation Corporation, ASBCA No. 55626, dated June 10, 2011, and it can be found here. (Readers please note that Kearfott was represented by Stephen Knight of the law firm, Smith Pachter McWhorter. We’ve mentioned Steve’s work before, with approval if not outright admiration.)

The case was summarized by Judge Freeman as follows—

Kearfott … appeals a final decision denying its claim for inclusion of mistakenly omitted allowable costs in the calculation of indirect cost rates and facilities capital cost of money (FCCOM) factors in a letter agreement. The government contends that the omission was deliberate, the costs not proven to be allowable, and the letter agreement final. We find the omission inadvertent, the costs allowable, the letter agreement reformable for mutual mistake, and sustain the appeal.

Basically, Kearfott and the DoD agreed to rates for the period 1989 through 1997 to address a previously litigated issue as to whether Kearfott could claim the costs of “writing-up” its assets. The parties executed an agreement but—quite importantly—the agreement never had the word “final” in it. It’s pretty obvious the parties understood the indirect rates in the agreement to represent the final rates for the years in question … but they never explicitly said so.

A couple of months after executing the agreement, Kearfott realized that the rates it has agreed-to omitted costs associated with its intangible assets, such as software development and a covenant not to compete. DCMA had Kearfott submit a “Final” indirect cost rate proposal for the period 1984 through 1994, which was to be audited by DCAA. (We have no idea what happened to indirect rates for 1995 – 1997.)

DCAA performed its audit and opined (via memorandum) that the costs of the intangible assets were “not allocable” to Government contracts because—

… the 12 April 2005 letter agreement was ‘negotiated in good faith and with both parties clearly aware that amortized intangible asset costs were not included’; and … ‘[Kearfott] did not mistakenly omit the amortization of intangible asset costs; they were aware of their existence and chose to exclude them from all proposals and incurred cost submissions for the subject years.’

First of all, we have a bit of a problem with DCAA’s “opinion” as quoted above. We don’t see much accounting or audit testing in that opinion; what we see is DCAA trying to do the Contracting Officer’s job. But let’s move on ….

A year later, the DCMA Administrative Contracting Officer (ACO) told Kearfott that he was not going to reopen the previously negotiated rates, “citing substantially the same reasons” as were contained in the DCAA memorandum opinion.

Our readers should focus on the DCAA logic: it was DCAA’s opinion that Kearfott did not make a mistake, and that it was the company’s established cost accounting practice to exclude such costs from its indirect rate calculations. We’ve seen that logic before and we’ve always responded that, “a mistake is not a cost accounting practice.” In his decision, Judge Freeman said the same thing. He wrote—

… we find that the bookkeeping entry assigning the identifiable intangible asset write-up amortization costs to an income deduction account and not to an operating cost account was a mistake and not an established accounting practice or otherwise a deliberate decision to omit these costs from the indirect cost rates and FCCOM factors applicable to government contracts.

The Judge also found that Kearfott’s intangible asset costs were reasonable and allowable, as well as being allocable to the company’s government contracts. Moreover, the Judge found that the indirect rate agreement was “reformable” because of a mutual mistake. To do otherwise would be to give the Government a windfall to which it was not entitled.

The Judge sustained Kearfott’s appeal.  Kearfott's indirect cost rates would be revised.


 


Page 201 of 279

Newsflash

Effective January 1, 2019, Nick Sanders has been named as Editor of two reference books published by LexisNexis. The first book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Cost Accounting Standards. Nick replaces Darrell Oyer, who has edited those books for many years.