When last we posted on the Army’s multi-billion dollar GCV program, we noted that the solicitation had been cancelled. The Army reported that it intended to issue a new Request for Proposals (RFP) within 60 days, but that contract award might be delayed for up to six months—leaving the three competing teams in limbo.

It should not be forgotten that the three teams undoubtedly spent significant funds preparing their first bids, funds that will be recovered through each contractor’s G&A expense allocation to existing DOD contracts. As the Pentagon continues to focus on driving affordability into its programs, somebody in a leadership position might want to consider how much it costs the taxpayers for such failed competitions. (Should we even mention the USAF’s KC-X Aerial Tanker program?)

Anyway, the teams will need to submit new proposals in response to the Army’s changing requirements. In the first go-round, the Army reportedly “overreached” with respect to technology integration. As we reported, “A disconnect emerged between what the Army required in its RFP and what the service expected to get….” A Pentagon review concluded that the program plan was simply too risky to proceed.

We quoted a GCV program spokesperson as saying, “The new RFP will reflect changes to the program’s efforts to minimize technology integration risk and to ensure that we have a viable acquisition strategy to deliver the vehicle within seven years of the contract award….”

So as the 60 days come to an end, we were interested to see how the Army was revamping its approach. One answer was provided during an October 1, 2010 “industry day” in which “Army officials explained their vision of the GCV program and gave industry insight into what they can expect with the release of the request for proposal that will kick off the development of the new vehicle.” Nearly 300 attendees listened to the Army briefings. Various sources carried articles about the industry day, but we are going with this one from the Fort Leavenworth Lamp.

According to the article, the Army still intends to issue its RFP very soon. More details regarding the Army’s requirements emerged during the industry day. The article reported—

Michael N. Smith, director of the Army Maneuver Center of Excellence, said the Army emphasized the importance of the infantry fighting vehicle to potential GCV contractors during the industry day. ‘The requirement is that we need an infantry fighting vehicle that can deliver a squad to the battlefield, in an improvised-explosive-device environment — realistically in an environment of anywhere along the continuum of operations under Army,’ Smith said.

Smith also said the Army already has ‘solutions’ that can operate in an IED environment, but that those cannot operate across the full spectrum of operations the Army may be called on to operate in. ‘So GCV ... as a platform, is designed to allow us to address ... that spectrum of operations, spectrum of conflict, while moving that squad to where it needs to be,’ Smith said.

He went on to say that Army leadership developed four imperatives for the GCV, and emphasized those to industry representatives. Those include capacity, force protection, full-spectrum operations and timing. Four imperatives, he said, which are ‘non-negotiables’ with regard to GCV development.

Capacity, he said, means ‘a requirement to deliver the entire infantry squad on a single platform.’ The force-protection requirement is separate from vehicle survivability, he said, but rather is about ensuring safety for Soldiers. …

‘Full-spectrum operations’ means the vehicle must be able to perform missions that include both offensive and defensive operations, as well as stability operations. ‘From an operational perspective, (that) means I have to have modular and scalable capabilities,’ he said. Smith added that the vehicle must include ‘a whole suite of things to allow me to adapt the platform to accomplish the mission in a wide variety of environments and terrain sets.’

Timing, Smith said, means ensuring the vehicle is developed in time to ensure the end product is still valid for the mission. …

Cost is another significant element in GCV development and will play a key role in the RFP when it is released.

‘Our intent for this RFP is to give them a target range and to use that as part of assessing their proposals and making a determination — among other factors, certainly — who ultimately will be selected,’ DiMarco said. The colonel said a specific price range for manufacture would be specified in the RFP, though he was unable to say what that range would be.

Well, there you go. The Army’s NextGen Ground Combat Vehicle must operate in a “full-spectrum” threat environment, must be able to carry an entire infantry squad and safely deliver that squad into whatever threat environment is out there, and it has to be developed, tested, and fielded ASAP. Oh—and by the way—it has to be cheap. In other words, it has to do everything, meet an ambitious schedule, and meet aggressive cost targets.

Let us ask you, gentle readers—exactly what about the Army’s new strategy is new or different, or even feasible? The Army wants everything and it wants it now and it wants it to be affordable. Yes, that is clearly the low-risk approach. (Note: Sarcasm.)

We are not alone in criticizing the Army’s revised same-‘ol-same-‘ol approach. Here’s an editorial from the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. It says—

The ‘back to the future’ direction in which the service is headed will be expensive, controversial and expose what is perhaps the Army's most chronic weakness: the inability to talk about combat basics in a plain and coherent way. … The stakes on the Ground Combat Vehicle could not be higher and go well past the issue of the vehicle itself. The Army's approach to its future is best characterized as a return to land-combat basics, a reconsideration of essential truths--and, in particular, truths about the fog of war and the need for adequate manpower as well as firepower in land combat--that will also prove very inconvenient. In particular, in a time of austerity, they will prove especially unsettling to those with an eye on the Pentagon's bottom line. …

Army leaders have convinced one another many times before that their plan for modernization was on target. Given the service's recent procurement history, the Pentagon, Capitol Hill and other Washington audiences will be skeptical. The program will also be a legacy of the Future Combat Systems in the sense that it will capture a number of the FCS successes, such as the network capabilities. It will also push technology in a number of areas. For example, whether it has a hybrid electric or diesel power plant, it's likely to be something on the order of 1500 horsepower; that is, as mighty as the turbine that drives the Abrams' 70 tons.

The GCV will also be a big and heavy vehicle, whether one measures by the ‘deployment’ weight of about 50 tons or with the add-on armor that might add another 20 tons. One design proposal received very cold water in response from the COINdinistas who frequent the Small Wars Journal website: ‘Dang! It looks like a middle-aged Bradley with a huge beer belly and other baggage, not to mention the triple chins!’ was one of the milder takes.

It has been said by experienced former senior Government acquisition officials that writing a proposal in response to inadequate Government requirements is nothing more than an exercise in creative writing—an exercise in writing fiction. We expect that RFPs that contain these types of requirements will generate unparalleled new heights in such creative fiction writing.

But we sincerely doubt it will get the Army’s soldiers a better GCV any faster, or that it will get the taxpayers a more affordable program. This is not the way to do it, United States Army.

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