On August 31, 2009 Boeing announced the retirement of Scott Carson, President of Boeing Commercial Aircraft (BCA).  Mr. Carson will be replaced by Jim Albaugh, the current President of Boeing's Integrated Defense Systems (IDS).  Mr. Dennis Muilenberg will succeed Mr. Albaugh as President of IDS.  This executive shuffle is the latest move in the nearly three-year year struggle to capitalize on delays in the Airbus A380 program.  

Mr. Carson's three-year tenure at BCA was marked by program setbacks in both the 747-8 and 787 "Dreamliner" programs.  In September 2007, Boeing announced a three-month delay to the Dreamliner program, blaming both a shortage of aerospace fastners as well as incomplete software.  One month later, the company announced a further three-month delay to flight testing as well as a six-month delay to aircraft deliveries, this time blaming "traveled work" -- work that suppliers had failed to accomplish.  In April 2008, Boeing announced another 15-month delay to aircraft deliveries.  In November 2008, yet another delay was announced, this time due to incorrectly installed fastners and the recent machinists' strike.  In December 2008, Boeing announced a further delay to test flights, this time for another six-month period.  In May 2009, Boeing announced a further slip to delivery schedules of another six months, because of delays in ramping up production.  On June 15, 2009 Boeing announced that the 787 would make its first flight in two weeks; however, on June 23rd the company announced a postponement of the first flight "due to a need to reinforce an area within the side-of-body section of the aircraft."  According to a July 30, 2009 Seattle Times report, the wing structural problem was worse than stated in the company's June 23rd press release.  Boeing's customers are reported to be "dismayed" by the continued schedule slippages.

What makes the Dreamliner so interesting is that it marked Boeing's attempt to develop a new method of supply chain management.  According to Wikipedia,

Boeing manufactures the 787's tail fin at its plant in Frederickson, Washington, the ailerons and flaps at Boeing Australia, and fairings at Boeing Canada Technology. This was a new and daring step for Boeing, which has historically guarded its techniques for designing and mass producing commercial jetliner wings.  ... the wings are manufactured by Japanese companies in Nagoya such as Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, which also makes the central wing box.  The horizontal stabilizers are manufactured by Alenia Aeronautica in Italy; and the fuselage sections by Global Aeronautica and Boeing Charleston in Charleston, South Carolina (USA), Kawasaki Heavy Industries in Japan and Spirit AeroSystems, in Wichita, Kansas (USA).

The passenger doors are made by Latécoère (France), and the cargo doors, access doors, and crew escape door are made by Saab (Sweden). Japanese industrial participation is very important to the project, with a 35% work share, and many of the subcontractors supported and funded by the Japanese government.  On April 26, 2006, Japanese manufacturer Toray Industries and Boeing announced a production agreement involving $6 billion worth of carbon fiber. ...  On February 6, 2008, TAL Manufacturing Solutions Limited, a subsidiary of the Tata Group (India) announced a deal to deliver floor beams for the 787 from their factory at Mihan, near Nagpur, India to assembly plants in Italy, Japan and the United States.

Messier-Dowty (France) builds the landing gear, which includes titanium forged in Russia, and brake parts from Italy, and Thales supplies the integrated standby flight display and electrical power conversion system. Honeywell and Rockwell-Collins provide flight control, guidance, and other avionics systems, including standard dual head up guidance systems. Future integration of forward-looking infrared is being considered by Flight Dynamics allowing improved visibility using thermal sensing as part of the HUD system, allowing pilots to "see" through the clouds.  Connecticut (USA)-based Hamilton Sundstrand provides power distribution and management systems for the aircraft, including manufacture and production of Generator Control Units (GCUs) as well as integration of power transfer systems that can move power from the Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) and the main engines to the necessary parts and machinery of the aircraft. Cold weather test of the APU took place in Alaska.

Boeing's supply chain management situation has been called a "nightmare". Although recent reports indicate that Boeing has belatedly developed innovative program management techniques to manage its far-flung suppliers-- including use of hand-held video cameras from shop floors to assess real-time production progress and extensive use of web-based conferencing from a Command Center that operates 24 hours a day. These innovations came too late, apparently, to save Mr. Carson.

In a late-breaking addition to this article, on September 2, 2009 TheStreet.com carried a brief story.  Following is an exact quote of that story.

"Boeing Co. CEO Jim McNerney told an investors' conference Wednesday that the company 'lost the handle a little bit' in managing the 787 program.  But Jim Albaugh, the newly appointed chief of the commercial airplane division, 'has been managing hundreds of programs for the last eight years,' McNerney said, promising improved execution in the 787 program."

It may now be said that "lost the handle a little bit" can join "hiking the Appalachian Trail" in the 2009 list of euphemisms.