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Not a Small Business: Expensive Mistake

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We have noted several recent Department of Justice press releases about companies that have been found to have falsely certified that they met certain criteria and were thus eligible for award of certain contracts set aside for companies that met the criteria. Companies that claimed to be a small socioeconomically disadvantaged business, but were not. Companies that claimed to be a small woman-owned business, but were not. Companies that claimed to be a small, service disabled veteran owned business, but were not. Companies that claimed to be HUBZone small businesses, but were not. You get the idea.

If you are a small business, you probably know it. FAR Part 19 has lots to say about the subject, as does Chapter 13 of the Code of Federal Regulations. There are rules that address permissible size standards by NAICS code. The Small Business Administration has lots of information to help companies with the complexities of eligibility determination. (For example: here.) While the topic is deep and complex, and there are gray areas, the basics are readily determinable, such that you probably know whether or not your company qualifies.

When you qualify, you “self-certify”—that is, you execute a Representation or a Certification in Section K of your proposal. Those Reps and Certs are, of course, subject to the False Statements Act. If you falsely certify, that’s really not a good thing—as those Department of Justice press releases we noted above testify.

Of course, small businesses grow. As they grow, their compliance risks evolve. We’ve discussed that situation several times on this site, including this article. We wrote—

Many small business government contractors don’t evolve their infrastructure, their back offices, to keep pace with the compliance risks of their newer contract awards. They end up with a mismatch between the needs of their newer contract requirements and the capabilities of their administrative staff. That’s when consultants can add some value. But the real issue is not the knowledge or expertise of the team; the real issue is that the actual practices may need to change to match the compliance requirements of the newer contracts. The company may need to make fundamental changes to the way in which it does business.

Some small businesses get acquired. They get acquired by large businesses, or perhaps they get acquired by another small business. Either the small business becomes a large business or, perhaps, both buyer and target become large businesses by virtue of the acquisition. In either situation, the acquired company may no longer qualify for the socioeconomic niche it had relied on for contract awards. Those Section K Reps and Certs need to be reviewed before execution, lest somebody falsely certify to being something they are not.

In related news, the Department of Justice recently announced that it had reached a settlement with TrellisWare Technologies, Inc., a communications company located in San Diego, with regard to allegations under the False Claims Act that TrellisWare had falsely certified that it was eligible for Small Business Innovative Research (SBIR) program awards, when it fact the company did not qualify as being a small business. According to the DoJ press release, TrellisWare “is a majority-owned subsidiary of ViaSat, Inc., a global broadband services and technology company also headquartered in San Diego.” The press release explained—

Between 2008 and 2015, TrellisWare was awarded multiple SBIR contracts to provide the Navy, Army and Air Force with a variety of technology services and products involving communications and signal processing systems, including wireless networks used in military tactical environments. TrellisWare self-certified that it met the small business size requirements for eligibility to receive SBIR funding. But based on certain disclosures that TrellisWare later made about its ownership relationship with ViaSat, the government conducted an investigation into TrellisWare’s eligibility for SBIR awards. The government contends that TrellisWare was not eligible for SBIR awards because it was actually a majority-owned subsidiary of ViaSat at the time it was awarded and performed on SBIR contracts.

Apparently, the government asserted TrellisWare falsely certified that it qualified as a small business in order to receive SBIR contract awards, and that every single invoice the company had submitted under those SBIR contracts was an individual false claim. We’re confident that situation led to a very large quantum, and that TrellisWare/ViaSat was content to settle the allegations for $12.2 million.

Word to the wise: you need to review your Section K Reps and Certs from time to time, in order to make sure they are accurate. You probably want to restrict the authority of those who execute Reps and Certs on behalf of the company to those who can do so knowledgeably. You do not want to face a situation similar to the one faced by TrellisWare/ViaSat, where the government alleges you intentionally executed false Reps and Certs.



More on Threshold Changes

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Recently we had an opportunity to point out to readers that the 2018 NDAA had changed the TINA threshold, moving it from $750,000 to $2 million effective June 18, 2018. We also noted that the micro-purchase threshold and the simplified acquisition threshold were also changing. We discussed whether contractors should update their policies, procedures, and instructions to the new thresholds based on changes to statute, or if they should wait until the DAR Council implemented those statutory changes in the DFARS.

We concluded that contractors should lean forward. We opined that contractors should implement the new thresholds in advance of any official rule-making.

However, at a recent industry meeting, we got some pushback. Respected colleagues, frenemies, and competimates pointed out that solicitations issued by DoD components were going to use the “old” TINA threshold of $750,000 to decide when to request certified cost or pricing data. (FAR 15.403-4(a)(1) states “The threshold for obtaining certified cost or pricing data is $750,000.”) They asked if a contractor was supposed to push back and refuse to provide certified cost or pricing data based on the new threshold, and thus risk being found to be non-responsive to the solicitation requirements. When you put it like that, the answer is “no.” (Though we think it would make for a quick bid protest.) If the solicitation contains the 52.215-10 or the 52.215-11 or the 52.215-12 or the 52.215-13 clauses, because the contracting officer followed the regulatory guidance instead of the statute, then obviously the low-risk path is to provide the required certified cost or pricing data in the required format of FAR Table 15.2.

What we are advocating is a change to the contractor’s own policies, procedures, and instructions with respect to how it interacts with its subcontractors. We concluded that the contractor should adopt the statutory threshold changes in advance of any formal rule-making. In other words, the contractor should request certified cost or pricing data from its subcontractors only when necessary and when the value of the proposed subcontract is expected to exceed $2 million.

If a solicitation contains the “TINA clauses” (as listed above) then this may create a conflict. For example, the 52.215-12 provision states “ Before awarding any subcontract expected to exceed the threshold for submission of certified cost or pricing data at FAR 15.403-4 … the Contractor shall require the subcontractor to submit certified cost or pricing data (actually or by specific identification in writing), in accordance with FAR 15.408, Table 15-2 … unless an exception under FAR 15.403-1 applies.” In other words, the solicitation provision references the regulatory threshold and not the statutory threshold (even though FAR 15.403-4 clearly references the underlying statutes themselves). Thus, once again, the contractor may be found to be non-responsive if it uses the statutory threshold rather than the regulatory threshold when determining whether or not to obtain certified cost or pricing data from its subcontractors.

Obviously the more conservative and safer course of action is to wait for the FAR Councils to implement the statutory changes. However, if that’s your plan you may have a very long wait. At that same industry meeting, we heard that certain DoD interests do not like the new TINA threshold, and are planning to drag their feet with respect to regulatory implementation, while working hard to convince Congress to rescind the change. If you don’t implement the statutory change now, you may never implement it.

It’s your call.

We will point out one more thing: the CAS threshold is tied to the TINA threshold.

It’s hard to actually find the linkage, because when the CAS language was moved into 48 CFR Chapter 99, the government abandoned any pretense of maintenance. You can find the recent CAS Board preambles at FAR Chapter 99 on the acquisition.gov website (which is the official government website for acquisition regulations), but you can’t find the CAS program rules or the Standards themselves. Instead, you get a link to “the official codified Cost Accounting Standards” at a Government Printing Office website (gpoaccess.gov/cfr/index.html)—but that link is broken. If you do a search on “48 CFR Chapter 99” you get a hit with the correct GPO address, but that GPO address contains an outdated version of the CAS rules. It says that the 9903.201-1(b)(2) CAS exemption is “Negotiated contracts and subcontracts not in excess of $500,000”—which is woefully out of date. Other CAS exemption language is similarly out of date. And this is the official language. You have to go over to the unofficial Hill AFB website (farsite.hill.af.mil) to get the correct language.

The correct 9903.201-1(b)(2) CAS exemption reads: “Negotiated contracts and subcontracts not in excess of the Truth in Negotiations Act (TINA) threshold, as adjusted for inflation (41 U.S.C. 1908 and 41 U.S.C. 1502(b)(1)(B)).

You can confirm this by checking the DCAA Contract Audit Manual, at 8-103.2 (“CAS Exemptions”) which provides that “negotiated contracts and subcontracts (including interdivisional work orders) less than the Truth in Negotiations Act (TINA) threshold” are exempt from CAS.

Note that the CAS exemption is tied directly to statute and not to regulation. Thus, regardless of what you do for certified cost or pricing data coverage, you must change your policies, procedures, and instructions with respect to CAS administration of subcontractors. Any subcontractor proposal valued at less than $2 million is exempt from CAS, effective 18 June 2018. If you try to impose CAS on such contract actions, say (for example) by including any CAS clause in the subcontract, then you risk being found to have committed a Public Law violation in your next CPSR.

By “slow-rolling” the implementation of the 2018 NDAA threshold changes into the acquisition regulations, the FAR Councils have created a problem for contractors. If the contractors wait for the regulatory implementation, then they must disconnect CAS coverage from TINA coverage. They will end up requesting certified cost or pricing data from subcontractors that are, by statute, exempt from CAS. This helps nobody and may well lead to increased procurement costs.

In our view, the only rational approach is to apply the statutory threshold changes now. The FAR Councils should immediately issue a Class Deviation to FAR 15.403-4(a)(1) to implement the new TINA threshold, even if formal rule-making takes a bit longer. If you are a contractor, you should discuss this quandary with your cognizant contracting officer and try to get some relief. It’s the smart thing to do.


Last Updated on Tuesday, 13 March 2018 18:44

State and Local Cost Allowability Problems

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Over in California’s 2nd District Court of the State Court of Appeal, the Parsons-Dillingham joint venture was recently handed a significant victory in its long-running False Claims Act battle with the Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transit Authority (MTA). In a couple of unpublished opinions, the finding of the Superior Court that the joint venture was liable under the FCA for billing unallowable indirect costs was reversed, and the defendants were awarded attorney fees. Since at one point the joint venture was on the hook for perhaps as much as $93 million, this is indeed a significant victory.

The Parsons-Dillingham joint venture was awarded its “original contract” for Red Line construction in 1984, but the contract was amended in 1991 to add “segment two” to the project. The Court referred to the post-1991 contract as “the Amended Contract,” since the 1991 amendment added additional contract language that affected cost recovery. (In 1993 another amendment added “segment three” to the project, but that did not seem to affect the parties’ rights.)

Suits were filed against the joint venture in 1996 and 1997, based on post-1991 billings, but it was not until 2014 that the Superior Court found liability—"approximately $30 million for improperly billed general and administrative costs (G&A) and overhead charges, $25 million for unauthorized subcontractor overhead charges and $38 million in prejudgment interest.” It took another four years for that finding to be reversed. In summary, we are talking about some 22 years of litigation.

Judge Perlus, writing for the Court, summarized the cost recovery requirements thusly—

Pursuant to Article CP-3.A. of the amended contract Parsons was entitled to its ‘Recoverable Costs,’ defined as, ‘(i) allowable direct labor costs (‘Direct Labor,’ as defined below), (ii) associated allowable Indirect Costs (also referred to herein as ‘Overhead’ or ‘Overhead Costs’) in an amount stated as a percentage (the ‘Overage Rate’) of the appropriate component of Direct Labor, (iii) costs of subcontracts, and (iv) other direct charges (‘ODCs’) necessarily and reasonably required in the performance of this Contract. . . .’ The provision defining Recoverable Costs continues, ‘[N]o costs or expenses incurred by [Parsons] as a result of [Parsons’s] failure to comply with terms and conditions of this Contract shall constitute Recoverable Costs.’ It also states, ‘All Recoverable Costs must be reasonably incurred by [Parsons] exclusively in connection with the performance of the Services subsequent to the date of this Contract. Except where explicitly stated to the contrary in this Contract, Chapter 1, Subpart 31.2 of the FARs [(Federal Acquisition Regulations)] shall be used to determine whether a given cost item is an element of Recoverable Cost.’

(Internal footnote omitted.)

The original dispute alleged that Parsons had failed to adjust its provisional billing rates to actual rates, and that it had billed MTA for unallowable costs. The MTA unilaterally established final billing rates, and Parsons filed a cross-complaint, alleging (among other things) breach of contract.

In analyzing the contract language, the Superior Court found that there was an “exclusivity clause”—i.e., that only costs that were exclusively incurred by Parsons in performance of the project were recoverable in MTA billings. Looking at the FAR definitions of indirect cost, general & administrative expense, allocability and allowabilty, the Superior Court concluded that overhead and G&A expenses were allocable to the project but had been made unallowable by the “exclusivity clause” language. The Appellate Court disagreed, writing—

The key language of the so-called exclusivity provision—'reasonably incurred . . . exclusively in connection with the performance of the Services subsequent to the date of this Contract’—properly (and literally) read, is not a disallowance of reasonably allocated indirect costs, including G&A, incurred in performing the amended contract, but a temporal limitation, requiring Parsons to charge direct costs and allocate indirect costs incurred before the May 1, 1991 effective date of the amended contract to the base contract in effect since 1984.That is, only those expenses for work done after April 30, 1991 on MOS-1 and MOS-2—direct labor, associated allowable indirect costs, subcontract costs and other direct charges—were recoverable under the terms and conditions of the new amended contract. No indirect cost pool to be allocated to the amended contract could include elements, including G&A, that predated May 1, 1991. … although G&A is recognized as a recoverable cost under the FAR and was billed by Parsons and paid by MTA under the base contract without dispute, nothing in the amended contract explicitly disallowed continued recovery of this major cost item as the amended contract required if FAR subpart 31.2 was not to be followed to determine recoverable costs and as the parties did, for example, for facilities costs, a far less significant item. Whatever else may be said about the ‘exclusivity clause,’ it does not explicitly prohibit the recovery of G&A.

There was more to the dispute, and much more to the Appellate Court’s opinion. But that’s not the point of this article. The point is: state and local contracts can be risky. Some of those contracts are funded with Federal dollars; many reference FAR cost allowability requirements. Contractors that bucket such contracts into lower risk categories, because they are not prime contracts directly with a Federal agency or because they are not subcontracts issued under a Federal prime contract, are making a mistake. State and local contracts carry risks, and some of those risks are substantial.

We are reminded of the 2012 SAIC settlement with respect to allegations made about corrupt decisions on SAIC’s “City Time” project—a project with the City of New York. The company’s Statement of Responsibility, made as part of its settlement agreement with the Department of Justice, stated “Those responsible for directly managing the project failed to enforce the company’s procurement policies in ways that allowed the irregular [subcontract] relationship to continue.” As a result of the project’s failure to comply with company policies, the company was required to pay more than $500 million.

We are fairly confident in saying, six years later, that the SAIC management team at the time wished it had classified its New York City project as high risk and applied the appropriate level of scrutiny. $500 million can pay for a heckuva lot of scrutiny.

In addition to regulatory risks, some state and local contracts can be inartfully drafted, as individuals who lack Federal government acquisition experience attempt to mimic the contract language used by Federal government acquisition professionals. (Example: Using the acronym “FARs” when the correct term is “FAR”.) Just because the contract language references or invokes Federal regulations does not mean that the language will be interpreted in the same way as a Federal Court would, should a dispute arise.

All in all—and as we’ve written before—it’s important to accurately assess your contract risks so that you can manage them. Focusing solely on Federal contracts and subcontracts, and ignoring contracts with state and local governments, will likely lead to some problems. In extreme cases, you can be looking at more than 20 years of litigation.

Last Updated on Tuesday, 06 March 2018 19:51

What Happened to Collaboration?

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Recent news reports indicate that Lockheed Martin and its F-35 customer are having difficulty negotiating an acceptable price for the next tranche (Lot 11) of aircraft.


This seems to be a frequent issue, as we’ve noted before. For example, in this 2012 article, we quoted several high-ranking military commanders expressing concerns about the adversarial relationship between Lockheed Martin and its customer. (“Air Force Major General Christopher Bogdan, nominated to be the head of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Program Office, declared the relationship between his organization and Lockheed Martin … to be ‘the worst he has ever seen.’”) In this 2016 article, we discussed how, after the parties had failed to agree on a price, the government used a “rarely invoked” contract clause to unilaterally establish a price.

Now here we are in 2018 and negotiations are difficult, and the parties are making public comments in order to pressure the other side.

USNI News reported that—

Lockheed Martin submitted its Lot 11 proposal about a year and a half ago, but [Vice Admiral] Winter said the first offer from Lockheed Martin didn’t arrive at the Pentagon until more recently. Winter conceded he had hoped to have the deal finalized by the end of 2017. … ‘I will tell you I am not as satisfied with the collaboration and the cooperation by Lockheed Martin,’ Winter said. ’They could be much more cooperative and collaborative. We could seal this deal faster. We could. They choose not to, and that’s a negotiating tactic.’

‘The price is coming down but it’s not coming down fast enough,’ Winter said. ‘We don’t know to the level of granularity that I want to know, what it actually costs to produce this aircraft.’

Readers of this blog may find issues with Vice Admiral Winter’s quoted comments. For instance, the submission of the Lot 11 proposal was, in all likelihood, Lockheed Martin’s first offer. (Which is why a contractor that responds to an RFP is usually called an “offeror.”) In another for instance, let’s talk about cost “granularity.” The program WBS and OBS is a matter of EVMS adequacy, and Lockheed Martin (finally) received a determination that its EVMS was adequate years ago, after becoming a poster child for failed business systems. MIL-STD-881C is the governing document. As one EVMS consultancy states: “The summary WBS is developed by the procuring agency, approved by the Cost Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG), and normally provided to the contractor in a Request for Proposal.  The contractor is expected, to expand the WBS down to a level where work will be authorized, planned and managed.” Thus, if the government customer wanted more granularity it could have easily specified the level it wanted.

But Lockheed Martin didn’t point to any of those issues in its public response. Instead, Lockheed Martin’s CFO asserted that Pentagon negotiators have become “less predictable” and are trying to reduce costs in areas that have previously been accepted. In this article, LockMart CFO Tanner was quoted as saying—

‘It’s not like negotiations were always easy, but I’ll say they were more predictable than they are today,’ Tanner said in an interview Monday. ‘There’s just more things that are being changed or things that you thought were sort of foundational elements of negotiation that maybe weren’t up for negotiation that now seem to be up for negotiation.’ For example, he said, the government now wants companies to eat various costs they once would have been reimbursed for. ‘Everyone should be interested in cost reduction, not simply not reimbursing elements of cost that you historically reimbursed,’ Tanner said. ‘That’s a strange way to get cost reduction and, I would argue, a very short-sighted, not helpful, not healthy for the industry and ultimately not healthy for the folks in the Pentagon buying under that strategy to use that approach.’

Further details regarding the costs that the Pentagon negotiators wanted Lockheed Martin to “eat” were not publicly released. But it really doesn’t matter much, does it? The point here is that this is a high-stakes game where the animosity between Pentagon and contractor is, once again, being played out in the public eye.

Shay Assad has been a consistent proponent of contractor price reductions through stronger negotiating tactics from the beginning. In 2011, we quoted: “Speaking at the Credit Suisse 2011 Aerospace & Defense Conference, Shay Assad said that the Pentagon is concerned with cost reduction, not margin reduction, and that he would be surprised if profitability went down even as spending is decreased.” In 2013 we wrote about Mr. Assad’s pet “should-cost” initiative—

Should-cost negotiations that do not result in significant price reductions (when compared to the contractor’s own estimate) seem to be seen as a failure by the government’s negotiators. In other words, the objective of ‘should cost’ does not seem to be to arrive as a ‘best guess’ or “most probable” estimated product cost; the objective appears to be to brow-beat the contractor into price concessions so that victory can be claimed in the fight against contractor profits.

In that same article, we discussed Frank Kendall’s Better Buying Power 2.1 comments about contractor profit, in which he stated—

Current profit levels in the aggregate are reasonable and sustainable, but they are not tied tightly enough to successful performance in meeting DoD goals. Traditionally, the Government’s objective position for contract profitability has been a function of perceived risk and the anticipated value to be achieved by successful contract performance. DoD profit policy and our acquisition strategies should provide effective incentives to industry to deliver cost-effective solutions in which realized profitability is aligned and consistent with contract outcomes.

So here we are in 2018, and Lockheed Martin, as the prime contractor for the largest single military weapon system program in the history of this country, is experiencing the fruits of those seeds planted long ago.

But it’s not just Lockheed Martin, of course. It’s many contractors in many diverse industries that support the Federal government. Many contractors are feeling the animosity from their government customers. The days where the official Pentagon policy of “partnering” with contractors—a policy that culminated in “alpha contracting” where the parties worked side by side in the same room to arrive at estimated costs—have long departed the scene. Its use seems to have peaked in the mid-2000’s, and not much can be found on the topic today.

If you are a government contractor entering into negotiations—particularly sole-source negotiations—you need to be prepared for a rough ride. The negotiators on the other side are trying to squeeze every nickel out of your price. And there is absolutely nothing wrong with that approach; that is their job. You need to be prepared for unpredictable and perhaps “unfair” negotiating tactics. You can best counter those tactics by strictly complying with the FAR requirements, and by bringing facts and figures to support your position.

Good luck.



CAS Board Back in Action!

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We’ve bemoaned the lack of CAS Board activity several times on this site. The most recent bemoanery may be found here. That article was written in July, 2017—about eight months ago. At that time, we noted that there was no CAS Board website, there was no OFPP website, there was no OFPP Administrator, and therefore there was no CAS Board Chair. There was nothing. We observed—

… it has become clear over the past 10 or so years that the CAS regime is also unworkable. It’s overly complex. It’s ambiguous. It’s burdensome. It’s grounded in a viewpoint that’s more than 40 years old, where DOD acquired more goods than services. But in the past 40 years many things have changed and the CAS regulations and Standards have not kept up with the changes. As we’ve noted from time to time, the CAS Board almost never met even when there was an OFPP Administrator to chair it. The published minutes reflected a situation where literally years would pass between meetings. The published list of CAS Board members included people who had left government service literally years before.

Meanwhile, in the intervening eight months, not very much has changed. We still cannot find a current OFPP website. We still cannot find a current CAS Board website. There is no confirmed OFPP Administrator and, therefore, there is no CAS Board Chair.

However, some things have changed. First, rumors are beginning to swirl that there may, in fact, be a nominee for the OFPP Administrator sometime in the near future. In the interim, it appears that Ms. Lesley Field has been acting as both OFPP Administrator and as CAS Board Chair. Thus, the CAS Board was able to actually hold a meeting and make a decision!

That relative flurry of CAS Board activity led to a Federal Register notice and a final rule, “clarifying” one of the existing exemptions from CAS coverage by adding a single word. As the Federal Register notice states—

… final rule revis[es] the exemption from CAS for firm-fixed-price (FFP) contracts and subcontracts awarded on the basis of adequate price competition without submission of cost or pricing data. This final rule clarifies that the exemption applies to FFP contracts and subcontracts awarded on the basis of adequate price competition without submission of certified cost or pricing data.

(Emphasis added.)

That single word we italicized in the quote above – certified – is the clarification.

This codifies the clarification as a final rule. The proposed rule, which was published for comment and input in 2011, received two comments. Both comments, according to the CAS Board, supported “the proposed change.” (Wait—we thought it was a clarification? Which is it?)

The reason for the change and/or clarification, as explained by the CAS Board, was documented in the proposed rule. “… the Board explained [in 2011] that at the time the CAS rule was promulgated in 2000, the term cost or pricing data was understood to mean certified cost or pricing data. However, as a result of changes made to the Federal Acquisition Regulation in 2010 … the term could also be read to mean cost or pricing data without the certification.”

In other words, it was the FAR Councils mucking about with FAR Part 15 cost or pricing data requirements that necessitated the present seven-year-long rule-making activity by the CAS Board.

We discussed the “mucking about” in this article. We said at the time—

We notice that the prohibition on obtaining cost or pricing data when certain conditions (e.g., adequate competition) are found has been de-emphasized in favor of a more detailed discussion of the types of data the contracting officer should obtain. This appears to represent a return to a pre-Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA) pricing environment, which may add to contractors’ proposal costs— meaning that, ultimately, the Government may end up paying more for the goods and services it acquires.

With nearly eight years of hindsight to guide us, it seems that the 2010 changes to cost and pricing date requirements were part of a multi-pronged approach by certain interest groups to ensure that the government paid as low as price as possible, by pushing contractors to provide more and more detailed information. That push ignored the cost that contractors were going to incur in order to provide that information. That push ignored the additional barriers to market entry that were being created—barriers that, today, the government is working hard to remove. Further, that push ignored the impact on subcontractors, many of whom are small businesses, who were going to have to deal with these new requirements.

In the past eight years, prime contractors have seen their purchasing systems put in jeopardy because they failed to adequately comply with the 2010 FAR Part 15 rule changes. As a result, they have pressured their subcontractors to comply, so that cost and price analyses can be performed on subcontractor proposals. That’s been great news for Apogee Consulting, Inc., who has make nice bank by helping those small business subcontractors navigate the cost or pricing data requirements. But it’s been bad news for taxpayers, who have had to pay the bill for the resulting increased costs.

In hindsight, the 2010 FAR Part 15 revisions were ill-advised. They added little except cost. Moreover, those changes led to a seven-year-long rule-making effort by a CAS Board that—trust us—had far better things to do with its limited time and staff.

But the CAS Board is now back, led by Acting Chair Field. We expect to be reporting on more activity in the near future.



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In March 2009, Nick Sanders’ article “Surviving Government Audits: Have the Rules of Engagement Changed?” was published in Government Contract Costs, Pricing & Accounting Reports (4 No. 2 GCCPAR P. 11). Apogee Consulting, Inc. is proud to announce that Mr. Sanders’ article was selected for reprint and publication in Thomson West’s The New Landscape of Government Contracting.  Mr. Sanders, Apogee Consulting’s Principal Consultant, joins such distinguished contributors as Professors Steven Schooner and Christopher Yukins, Luis Victorino and John Chierachella, Joseph West and Karen Manos, Joseph Barsalona and Philip Koos and Richard Meene, and several others.  The text covers a lot of ground, ranging from the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) to Business Ethics and Corporate Compliance, and includes several articles on the False Claim Act and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.  In addition, the text includes the full text of many statutory and regulatory matters affecting Government contract compliance.


The book may be found here.